

CLASSIFYING RIGHTS

In our moral discourse we assert moral rights statements. And we use some moral rights statements as premises in arguments the conclusion of which is another moral right statement. That is, we argue *from* rights *to* rights. A subclass of these arguments are arguments in which we try to establish the existence of a moral right on the basis of statements of the existence of other moral rights. What are the basic constituents of this kind of moral reasoning and how can it be informative? In this paper I try to throw some light on these questions by probing a classification of rights according to their objects.

1. The vocabulary of rights.

The following is a list of moral rights statements.

- 1) The right to freedom is the most cherished right.
- 2) The way they treated John constituted a violation of his right to freedom.
- 3) John has the right to go to Maxies' pub at ten o' clock on Monday.
- 4) A committee of philosophers and doctors discussed whether smokers have a right to medical treatment for diseases related to smoking,
- 5) My right to the castle of my grandfather was never questioned by those who protested against the accumulation of wealth by the royals.
- 6) The promisee has a right to the object of the promisor's promise.
- 7) John has a right that Jack returns to him the money he owes him.

We may make some useful classifications of rights which will help us in our discussion. Firstly, we may distinguish between *general* and *specific* rights. The rights mentioned in 1), 2), 4) and 6) are general rights, while the rights mentioned in 3), 5) and 7) are specific rights. There are of course different levels of generality. We may speak of the right of an *individual* (as in 2), 3), 5) and 7)), of a *group of persons*¹ (as in 4) and 6)) or we may speak of a right without specifying who is the right holder (as in 1)). Further, the object of the right may be something *abstract* (as in 1)) or something *concrete* (as in 3) and 5)). To avoid any confusion, in the examples I will adduce I will treat as specific rights only those rights which are *both* rights of a specific individual *and* rights to a specific thing or action (see below). This means, for example, that a right of

1. The rights the subjects of which are groups of persons are not necessarily *collective rights* (neither (4) nor (6) are collective rights).

an individual to an abstract entity (like the right in 2) will be treated as a general right. The paradigmatic case of a general right will be a right to an abstract entity the right holder of which is not specified (as in 1).

Secondly, right may be classified according to their objects. We may distinguish three types of rights: a) rights to *values* (as in 1 and 2)), b) rights to *goods* (as in 4) and 5)) and c) rights to *actions* (as in 3) and 7)). Rights to actions may be divided into two classes: i) rights to *actions to the right holder* (as in 3)) and ii) rights to *actions of the duty bearer* (as in 7)). I will call the former *active* rights and the latter *passive* rights². In this paper I will focus on this classification of rights according to their objects.

In our moral discourse about moral rights we usually invoke some rights in order to justify some other rights. I will call this kind of justification of moral rights *rights-based justification of moral rights*. Of course a rights-based justification of a moral right is not an argument whose premises are exclusively statements of the existence of other moral rights. Other factual and moral considerations may be parts of a rights-based justification of a moral right. What distinguishes a rights-based justification from other kinds of justification of moral rights is that it includes statements of the existence of moral rights (other than the moral right to be justified). A quite common form of the rights-based justification of moral rights is an inference from general rights to specific rights. So, for example, we may treat the general right to freedom (in 1) as the justificatory grounds of a specific right of a certain individual to perform a concrete action, say, to go to Maxies' pub at ten o'clock on Monday. Following a terminology introduced by Joseph Raz I will call the right which serves as the justificatory grounds of another right a *core* right and the right which is justified on the grounds of another right a *derivative* right (Raz (1986), p. 168).

The relation between core and derivative rights is not that of *logical entailment*. The existence of a general right to freedom does not logically entail that there is a right of mine to go to Maxies at ten o'clock on Monday but it may be the reason why I have such a specific right. Further, to use an example of a rights-based justification which is not an inference from general to specific rights, if I have purchased over a period of five years certain paintings of Degas, my right in the collection of paintings logically entails that I have a right in each of the paintings; but the fact that I have a right in the collection of paintings may not be the justificatory reason for the fact that I have a right in each of the paintings. On the contrary, it is because I have a right in each of the paintings that I have a right in the collection³.

It can be easily inferred from the above that a core right is a right which gives *the reason why* of the existence of another right. To avoid any confusion we

2. For a different use of the terms «active rights» and «passive rights» see FEINBERG, J. *Social Philosophy*, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1973, p. 60.

3. For a similar point, see RAZ J., *The Morality of Freedom*, Oxford, OUP, 1986, p. 168.

need to distinguish core rights from rights which merely provide *evidence* for the existence of a moral right. For example, the fact that A has a number of rights, like the right to go to the cinema, to walk on the street, to read the newspaper he likes, etc., may be evidence for the fact that A has a right to freedom. But this does not entail that the former rights are core rights and the right to freedom a derivative right. This inductive inference, whatever it may establish, it does not give the reason why of its conclusion. On the contrary, an inference from the existence of A's right to freedom may give the reason why of the existence of A's other relevant rights.

To recapitulate, I argued that there are moral rights of different levels of generality and that moral rights may be classified according to the nature of their objects into rights to values, rights to goods and rights to actions. I also argued that some rights may figure as the justificatory grounds of other rights. In the following sections, I will defend the distinction between rights to values, rights to goods and rights to actions and examine the implications of this distinction for the rights-based justification of moral rights.

2. Rights to goods and rights to actions. Is the distinction between rights to goods and rights to actions valid and meaningful? I will try to answer this question by considering one class of rights, property-rights, which may be considered to include both what I call rights to goods and rights to actions. Take the following two lists of rights:

- a) The right to have a house, the right to have a car, the right to possess a bank account, the right to possess a factory.
- b) The right to sell one's own property, the right to invest one's own money, the right to paint the interior walls of one's house, the right to destroy one's own property.

Let us first focus on list a). List a) contains examples of rights to the possession of things. Now, the kind of things a particular person has a right to own is contingent upon what moral code accepted and some relevant factual circumstances. For example, a moral code may allow that a particular individual has a right to possess some goods, but not others. For example, while, according to one moral code, I may have the right to possess a house or a bank account I may lack the right to possess pornographic videos or guns. Again, it should be noted that the corresponding legal rights I may possess are not relevant. It may indeed be the case that the legal code of the society I live in may give me the right to possess pornographic videos or guns, but the moral code of my society, while it gives me the right to possess some goods (or else it allows that individuals may have a right to property), may proscribe the possession of pornographic videos or guns.

Further, it may be the case that, while the moral code of my society may permit the possession of a particular set of goods, say, diamonds or billions of dollars in my bank account, certain factual considerations may defeat my specific moral

right to this set of goods at a certain time. For example, the famine which hits the Sudanese people may render the accumulation of diamonds by their president morally impermissible, although their president may not have exploited the Sudanese people in order to find the money for his diamonds.

On the other hand, the examples of rights mentioned in list b) are not rights to the possession of certain goods but rights to the performance of certain actions. The rights in b) are closely connected with the general right to property and the rights in a). The range of actions (selling one's own property, investing one's own money, etc.) property-right holders have a right to perform, specifies the area of social practice, a particular person's general right to property affects. The rights in b) are necessary for the rights to goods to have any significant bearing on the right holders' life as well as the life of the society they live in. Indeed, my right to possess, say, a car would be empty if I did not have any right to use it.

Rights to actions make relevant rights to goods a significant part of social practice. The exact nature, however, of their relation to rights to goods seems elusive. Are they equivalent to rights to goods or are they conceptually distinct? Think for example of a particular person's right to have a car. What is the relation between that person's right to the possession of a car and his right to use or manage it⁴ (drive it, paint it, lend it to his friends, ect.)? (Note that the relation in question is not between the right to have a car and the right to use a car, but the relation between the right to have a car and the right to use that car). The implications of this issue for my distinction between right to goods and rights to actions are important. If rights to actions are shown to be conceptually inseparable from what I called rights to goods, then the validity of the distinction between rights to goods and rights to actions becomes questionable.

The most powerful argument in favour of the thesis that rights to actions should be thought of as parts or necessary constituents of rights to goods is the one built upon a consideration I have already mentioned. Namely, the consideration that a right to the possession of a particular thing would be empty and of no significant consequence for the right holder and his fellow citizens if it was not somehow accompanied by some relevant rights to actions. For example, the right to own a car seems to be empty unless this right of ownership is accompanied by the right to do something with the car.

To this, however, it could be objected that the right to a thing by itself has some significance for the right holder and is of some consequence for the social practice. For example, my right to own a car, as distinct from the relevant rights to use this car, is the grounds of someone else's (a fellow citizen's or an authority's) duty to act in such a way as to protect my right. In this case my right to a thing suffices by itself to put me in a particular relation with my fellow

4. For the distinction between rights to possession of things and rights to use and manage things, see HONORÉ, (A.M., *Ownership*, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Oxford, 1961.

citizens and affect in some way their behaviour towards me.

Further, the fact that A has a right to the possession for a certain thing does not logically entail that A has a right to use or manage that thing. The above statement admits of two readings, a strong and a weak one. According to the strong reading, this statement should be understood as denoting that it is not necessary for A to have a right to x that A has a right to use or manage x. According to the weak reading, this statement should be understood as denoting that, if one knows that A has a right to x, one does not necessarily know what right to use or manage x A has. Both of the statements are true. I may know that John owns a Land Rover, but I may not know what he has a right to do with it. And I do not need to have the latter knowledge in order to be able to validly say that he has a right to possess the Land Rover. Similarly, I may have a right to a thing without having a right to do anything with it. For example, when my country is at war I may have no right to drive my car in the streets, sell it, or use it in order to store goods in, although I may still own this car and nobody has the right to break its windows or take it from me.

If, then, rights to the possession of goods are not reduced to rights to use or manage these goods, what is the relation between the two kinds of rights? I believe that we may regard rights to the possession of goods as core rights upon which rights to use or manage these goods are grounded within the context of a rights-based justification of rights. That is, they are an essential part of an inference which provides the reason why of the existence of the relevant rights to use or manage these goods.

Till now I used property rights as examples of rights to goods. This should not create the mistaken idea that rights of ownership of goods are the only class of rights to goods. «Rights to goods» may include goods as diverse as the right of a patient to the required medical treatment, the right of children to have a teacher, the right of children to proper nourishment, the right of an invalid to appropriate entrance to public buildings. My claim is that all of these rights to goods have justificatory priority to relevant rights to actions: they provide the grounds for relevant rights to actions⁵.

A last remark concerns rights to actions. Right holders may have a right to act in a particular way or a right that someone else acts in a particular way. For example, John may have a right to sell his house or a right that Jack repairs the door of John's house. My claim that rights to actions are grounded upon relevant rights to goods holds for both types of rights to actions; that is for both A's right

5. I do not claim that every right to action is grounded upon a certain right to a good and that it is never the case that a right to action may be the core right to a good. My claim is that rights to goods are the justificatory grounds of *relevant* rights to actions. The way in which a right to an action is *relevant* to a right to a good should be understood on the model of the relation between my right to possess x and my right to use or manage x.

that he acts in a particular manner and A's right that B acts in particular manner. For example, my right to paint my house and my right that John does not destroy my house are both grounded upon my right to possess the house.

3. Rights to values. There are however rights which cannot be said to be either rights to goods or rights to actions. Think, for example, of the right to education, the right to life, the right to freedom of conscience, the right to free speech, the right to political participation, or the right to property (when «property» is not understood as a short name for things like cars, houses, etc. but expresses the notion of «ownership»). Education, life, political participation, etc. are neither goods nor actions; they are «values».

I use the term «value» in a sense that is not directly relevant to the context of the distinction between values and facts. That is to say, I do not use the term to stress the normativity of some concepts, the fact that they are «actions guiding» as opposed to «world guided»⁶. Rather I utilise the obvious conceptual connection between «value» and «valuable». «Valuable» is taken somewhat narrowly to signify what is important from the human beings' point of view. From this perspective valuable is what is important for human beings in the respect of advancing or preserving their well-being. Similarly, values are agent-centered in the following sense:

Value is a condition of the agent, considered in abstraction, which society seems to be necessary for the well-being of each and every agent under normal circumstances.

Let me make the following clarifications about this account of value.

(a) «Value is a condition of the agent...». Freedom as a value in this sense amounts to the ability of the agent to act without external constraints. And we can equally speak of conditions of the agent like having ownership, being educated, etc. which are values in the required sense.

(b) «... considered in abstraction...». The condition of the agent which is value, is not specific enough to rule out conflicting interpretations. «Being educated», for example, is vague about and allows different interpretations of what counts as education, what standard of learning a particular person should achieve to be validly considered «educated», what the educational practice should be, etc. But the vagueness and indeterminacy of values are not pathological features. In moral discourse the necessarily vague and indeterminate abstract concepts play a significant role. In this respect, values are on a pair with abstract norms and principles, virtues, moral universals (like «good», «right», «just»). The latter, although they lack a concrete content to provide the agent with sufficient information about what exactly to do in a particular situation, do nevertheless set certain limits to what he is allowed to do and

6. I borrow these terms from WILLIAMS B., *What does Intuitionism Imply?*, *Making Sense of Humanity*, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995.

considerations like «I ought to be just», «I ought to do the right thing» or «I ought to follow the demands of justice» are part of what motivates him to act. Further, they give the defining characteristics of a moral code and can be used as a generally trustworthy criterion of the identification of moral codes. For example, by examining the abstract principles, conceptions of virtue and moral universals like «good», and the values of the ancient Greeks we are able to identify the differences between their moral code and ours. Finally, the vagueness and indeterminacy of moral principles, virtues, values, etc. makes it possible for the moral agents to be less passive as recipients of moral doctrines and ideas and to furnish our conception of moral autonomy. They leave enough room for exercise of deliberation, reliance on intuitions, involvement of imagination, responsibility for decisions and meaningful moral disputes. In other words, they are at least partly responsible for some central features of our notion of autonomous moral agents.

(c) «... which society seems to be necessary...». My suggestion that the criteria for whether a particular condition of the agent is a value are society's beliefs may seem questionable. The two rival candidates could have been the beliefs of the agent, on the one hand, and objectivity (what conditions of the agent *really* contribute to his well-being), on the other. Both are in my view deficient, though for different reasons. The first misrepresents the manner in which we think of beneficial conditions of the agent and ascribe values in the required sense to individuals. The second fails to do justice to the social dimension of the practice of values and raises some awkward questions about the foundation of values in human nature.

I will first explain why relativising values to beliefs of the agent about what contributes to either his own or the general well being of all humans conflicts with the way we think about what condition for the agent considered in abstraction is beneficial for him. Firstly, in our normal practice of characterising a condition of the agent as necessary for his well-being the agent's views about what contributes to his well-being are neither the sole nor the most important standard. Consider, for example, the case of a young woman who after her affair has an unfortunate end falls into depression and wants to take her life. She finds no meaning in her life and sees suicide as salvation. Are we going to say that life is not a value for her (or even more that she has no right to life)? Surely not. What she believes to contribute to her well-being does not have significant bearing on assessing whether life is a value for her.

Secondly, not only are the beliefs of the agent about what contributes to his well-being not significant, but even his more general beliefs about what contributes to the well-being of all humans do not determine our conception of a condition of that agent as a value. Consider, for example, the case of someone who is horrified by the development of technology and science and believes that all human beings would be happier if they were uneducated savages. Our

man considers education to be bad not only for his well-being but for the well-being of all humans. But the important thing to note is that his views about what contributes to human happiness do not affect our view that education is a value for him and that he has a right to it. Our recognition of a particular state considered in abstraction as a value for him does not depend upon his views about what contributes to the well-being of humans.

The above examples illustrate the following point: *it is not a necessary condition for a particular state S considered in abstraction to be a value for A that A believes that S is necessary for his own well-being or that S is necessary for the well-being of all men.* Why then not claim that value is a condition of the agent which is objectively necessary for the well-being of any agent, that is, independently of what the agent himself or a third party believes? All in all, it is probably true that, when we ascribe values in the required sense to individuals, we do seem to mean that the relevant conditions of the agent are objectively beneficial. The answer is located simply in the nature of the inquiry I am concerned with here. My aim is purely descriptive in the sense that I try to give an account of what it is as part of a social practice to treat conditions of the agent considered in abstraction as values. My question is «what conditions a particular state of the agent considered in abstraction should satisfy in order for it to be thought a value in a society, that is, to be thought worthy of being preserved by society and achieved by all men»?

Defining values as conditions of the agent considered in abstraction which objectively contribute to human well-being fails to capture the basic source of normativity of values and their impact on social practices. Values affect the lives of individuals in society only in so far as they are recognised by society. And since I am concerned with the phenomenology of values in social practice, to define value in a way which allows for a condition of the agent to be a value without having been recognised by society is of no use. Nothing can be a part of a social practice unless it has been somehow recognised by members of a society. Consider for example, as it is quite probably the case, that there is a state S which is objectively beneficial to humans but which has not being recognised as such by a society. Would it have any impact on the way some social institutions are constructed, on the behaviour of the citizens, on the moulding of their moral rights and duties? If not, then the issue of whether a particular state of the agent considered in abstraction is objectively necessary for the well-being of men should be left out of my account of value.

The above considerations do not of course imply that one cannot call «values» states of the agent which are objectively beneficial. But if one does so, then one moves from descriptive inquiry in the sense I specified above to metaphysical considerations about the nature of values as states of the agent. My account of value leaves open the possibility for what in a society is considered to be value not to be objective value. So, my account allows a further question to be raised,

namely, whether what in my account is a value is *really* a value. But it *does not require* that this question can be raised, that it makes sense, or that there is an answer to it. In this respect my account is neutral between two ethical theories which adopt opposing views about the metaphysics of values, social relativism and ethical objectivism. This neutrality has a methodological advantage. It enables meaningful talk about values without requiring that problems about the metaphysics of values have been settled.

(d) «... under normal circumstances...». By «circumstances» I mean both physical and psychological conditions of the agent and external factors. Two issues are of relevance here. The first is what counts as normal and the second is why what happens in normal circumstances has a bearing on an account of value.

Generally speaking, it can be affirmed that normal physical and psychological conditions of the agent exclude serious physical and psychological deficiencies, such as serious brain damage, extended mutilation, terminal diseases, madness, mental deficiency. It is difficult to draw a concrete line between the normal and the pathological, but for our purposes the basic criterion is whether a particular person's physical and psychological deficiencies are so enormous as to differentiate him from the rest of his fellow human beings in respect of even the most basic necessary conditions for his well-being. For example, the basic needs of a person with serious brain damage may be so different from the needs of a generally healthy person as to make what is necessary for the well-being of the former incompatible with the well-being of the latter.

The distinction between normal and exceptional in the case of external factors is even more difficult to draw. Some examples of exceptional «external» circumstances may be dramatic climatic changes, famine, or nuclear accidents. For our purposes, the basic criterion for something to count as an exceptional external factor is whether, even when the physical and psychological conditions of a particular agent are not affected, it suffices to differentiate him from other agents in respect of even the most basic conditions of his well-being. For example, the basic needs of a person who faces the prospect of famine in his country may be extremely different from the basic needs of a person who faces no such danger. It should be clear from the above that the «normal circumstances requirement» makes values sensitive and, thus, relative to historical conditions. For, if we assume, for example, that for some reason, say as a result of a nuclear war, both our psychological and physical conditions as the environment dramatically change and what it is now normally the case becomes exceptional, then our basic needs may change and, thus, many, or even all, of our values. And possibly changes in both men's psychological and physical conditions and external circumstances account for the difference in values between, say, some ancient cultures and our culture.

The normal circumstances requirement has two main functions in my

account of what a value is. Firstly, it restricts the force of the universality requirement, namely, the requirement that for a condition of the agent to be a value it should be necessary for the well-being of every agent and, thus, rules out the obvious objection from the fact that the basic needs of people do actually differ. Secondly, it brings to the fore a generic feature of values and subsequently of rights to values, namely, that they are born out of considerations of what is normally the case and not of the nature of ideal situations. That is, what gives rise to them and defines their nature is not the human mind's contemplation of utopias but shared experience of what in most cases humans need to flourish in the world they live in.

The above discussion of the nature of values differentiates my account of rights to values from a fashionable conception⁷ of the right to life, the right to freedom, the right to education, etc. According to my account, these rights are not simply «right-categories», under which fall a number of type or token rights to goods or rights to actions which exhaust their content. They are not general terms, used for convenience to refer to classes of specific rights which alone have a concrete object. They do have a specific object, a particular abstract condition of the agent which is necessary for or a constituent of the well-being of every agent. For example, on my account, the right to education is not simply a category name which covers specific rights like the right to go to school, to have a teacher, to learn basic mathematics, etc. but itself has an object, the right holder's state of being educated.

Thus far, I have distinguished three kinds of rights, rights to values, rights to goods and rights to actions on the basis of the characteristic features of their objects. What is the relation between a right to a particular value and relevant rights to goods and actions? I have already noted the abstract character of values and the fact that they are not sufficiently informative about what a particular person should do in a specific case so as to figure as trustworthy guides to action. It is due to this feature of values that rights to values cannot be taken to logically entail any relevant rights to goods or actions. For example, nothing follows from the fact that I have the right to own things about what things I have a right to possess or how to use them. But rights to values may be the ultimate justificatory grounds for rights to goods or rights to actions in the following sense: they may constitute the rights which in conjunction with certain other moral or factual considerations suffice to ultimately justify why a particular person has a relevant right to a good or an action within the context of a rights-based justification of moral rights. For example, my right to ownership as a value is the right which in conjunction with other moral and factual considerations ultimately justifies my right to have a car.

7. For this conception of what I call rights to values, see THOMPSON J.J., *The Realm of Rights*, Harvard, Harvard Univ. Press, 1990 and HALPIN, A., *Rights and Law Analysis and Theory*, Oxford, Hard Publishing, 1997.

This means that rights to values may be taken to be the ultimate core rights: they are an essential part of an inference which provides the ultimate reason why of the existence of other rights, rights to goods or rights to actions. This may create the presumption that the term «core rights» should be preserved only for rights to values and that only a justification of a right which mentions rights to values may be a valid or complete rights-based justification. I want to resist this suggestion for the following reason. There can be different kind of justifications of something and of different degrees of depth, each of which may be validly called justification. The same holds for scientific explanations of physical phenomena. It is perhaps possible to explain all physical phenomena in terms of the function of atoms and molecules; but phycisists provide other kinds of explanations which do not refer to relations of the microcosm while nobody questions the validity of these explanations. Similarly, in the case of rights-based justification of moral rights, I may justify right to the performance of an action by referring to a relevant right to a good that I possess or to a relevant right of mine to a value. Both of these justifications may be valid, sufficiently informative. Sometimes all I need to know is the existence of a relevant right to a good; sometimes I need to know whether I have a right to a value. But each of these rights-based justifications may be validly called justification and each of the relevant core rights may be validly called a core right. If a distinction needs to be drawn here, we may call the rights-based justifications in which rights to values figure as justificatory grounds of other rights *ultimate rights-based justifications* and the rights to values *ultimate core rights*.

To conclude, we may offer the following as basic principles of a rights-based justification of rights.

1) Rights-based justification of rights.

Some rights have justificatory priority over other rights.

2) Justificatory priority of rights over rights.

R1 has justificatory priority over R2 iff a statement of the existence of R1 together with other moral and factual statements are premises of a sound argument the conclusion of which is a statement of the existence of R2.

3) Core rights.

R1 is a core right of R2 iff R1 has justificatory priority over R2.

4) Ultimate or complete core rights.

R1 is the ultimate or complete core right of R2 iff R1 has justificatory priority of R2 and there is no other R which has justificatory priority over R1.

5) Ultimate or complete rights-based justification of a right.

The rights-based justification of R2 is ultimate or complete iff it identifies an R which is the ultimate or complete core right of R2.

Antony HATZISTAVROU
(Edinburgh)

ΑΚΑΔΗΜΙΑ



ΑΘΗΝΑΝ

Η ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΙΟΠΟΙΗΣΗ ΤΩΝ ΔΙΚΑΙΩΜΑΤΩΝ

Π ε ρ ί λ η ψ η

Στὸ παρὸν ἄρθρο ἐπιχειρῶ νὰ ἀναλύσω τὴ δομὴ ἠθικῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων τῶν ὁποίων οἱ προκείμενες καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα εἶναι δηλώσεις ἠθικῶν δικαιωμάτων (moral rights statements). Τὸ ἐνδιαφέρον μου ἐπικεντρώνεται σὲ μία ὑποομάδα αὐτῶν τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων: ἐπιχειρήματα τῶν ὁποίων οἱ προκείμενες καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα εἶναι δηλώσεις ὑπάρξεως ἠθικῶν δικαιωμάτων. Προσπαθῶ, δηλαδή, νὰ φωτίσω μία πτυχὴ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ συλλογισμοῦ, ἡ ὁποία ἔχει ἐλάχιστα συζητηθεῖ στὴ σύγχρονη βιβλιογραφία, τὸ συλλογισμὸ ἀπὸ δικαιώματα σὲ δικαιώματα. Γιὰ νὰ καταδείξω πῶς αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶδους ὁ ἠθικὸς συλλογισμὸς εἶναι δυνατὸς καὶ ἔγκυρος ἐπεξεργάζομαι μία ταξινόμηση τῶν ἠθικῶν δικαιωμάτων, τὰ δικαιώματα σὲ ἀξίες (rights to values), τὰ ὅποια εἶναι διακριτὰ ἀπὸ τὰ δικαιώματα σὲ ἀγαθὰ (rights to goods) καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα σὲ πράξεις (rights to actions), καὶ τὰ ὅποια συνιστοῦν βασικὲς προκείμενες σὲ ὁποιοδήποτε ἐπιχείρημα γιὰ τὴν ὑπαρξὴ κάποιου συγκεκριμένου ἠθικοῦ δικαιώματος.

Ἀντώνης ΧΑΤΖΗΣΤΑΥΡΟΥ
(Κύπρος)