

FROM SPACE TO PLACE: TOWARDS A HERMENEUTICS OF PLACE

“In Greek χρόνος means what corresponds to τόπος, to the place where each respective being belongs”

(Martin HEIDEGGER, *Basic Concepts*, 1941)

“Three terms which succeed one another and at the same time indicate three steps along the way of thinking: MEANING-TRUTH-PLACE.”

(Martin HEIDEGGER, *Seminar in Le Thor*, 1969)

In our paper we take Heidegger's hermeneutics of place as a noticeable example of the way in which continental philosophy argues on a long-lasting philosophical issue such as the space/place dichotomy. It would be plausible to argue with Edward Casey that it is in early modernity that the philosophical history of place is marked by the eclipse of the place for the sake of a new concept, that of the infinite space: «place disappeared “almost altogether”. It never went entirely out of sight»¹. Modernity, from Descartes on, seems to do nothing else than extend and deepen the gap between place and space, always to the detriment of place. The rediscovery of place, not only through literature or art, but also through philosophy, is rather recent: it is indeed an endeavor of twentieth-century “postmodern” thought. Heidegger's importance on this account is significant and has to do with his very thoughtpath, markedly with his critique of Western metaphysics in its basic concepts - essence, form, time and, most certainly, space².

1. *The Fate of Place. A Philosophical History*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, University of California Press, 1998, p. X. Casey begins his account of the Western history of place with Plato's *Timaeus* and the famous passage on the “chora”, then, the notion of “topos” in Aristotle's *Physics* IV. He thus puts forth the metaphysical necessity of place and the exclusion of the empty, of the “no place” (pp. 32-45, 50-71). From the Greek “cosmos” to the modern universe Casey sees a radical shift in the very perception of place, which leads to an absolute or to a relativist space in modern thinkers such as Gassendi, Newton, Descartes, Bacon. It is in fact a “shrinking” of the ontological status of place to the point of becoming an arbitrarily designated area or a point in an ever expanding physical space: «the inherent dynamism of place, its power to act or simply to resist, has given way to the supineness of space regarded as an indefinitely passible, indeed passive, medium». (p. 141).

2. On another occasion, while examining Kant's project of an architectonic of pure reason, Casey speaks of the archetypal complicity of place, form and identity by referring to Heidegger's



In the middle period of his philosophical itinerary Heidegger seems to have put aside his sole preoccupation with time and temporality, which pervaded his project of a hermeneutic phenomenology, offering a number of useful insights on the nature of the place/space dichotomy. In the paper we focus on Heidegger's 1936-1938 manuscript entitled *Contributions to Philosophy*. We argue that the elaboration of the theme of the "site-of-moment" (*Augenblicksstätte*) in these writings gives access to a transformed understanding of Dasein's placedness (*Räumlichkeit*), that is, of its site or of the site of its essence (*Wesensstätte*), and, moreover, to an account of place which overcomes the sole reference to existential temporality.

I. Heidegger's Renewed Understanding of Place: the "Aletheiological" Origin

The notion of the "site-of-moment" occurs in the fourth joining (*Fügung*) of Heidegger's *Contributions to Philosophy* called "Grounding". This section, which reiterates the project of existential analytics in a totally new perspective, takes as its starting point the notion of "time-space" (*Zeit-Raum*). The question is to define the domain of the truth of Being. Reiterating the "first inception" of thinking is meant to be an instantaneous turning. Truth, viewed as the truth of Being, is indeed subject to an instantaneous preparation. In this respect, *Ereignis* is undoubtedly the pivotal motive of the *Contributions*: "But be-ing (*Seyn*) is simultaneously grasped here as *en-owing*. Both belong together: grounding back into *Da-sein* and the truth of be-ing as enowing"³. It has often been argued that "Enowing" is linked with the instant and the way it temporalizes itself⁴. Thus, in the fourth section of "Grounding" ("Time-Space as Ab-ground") the *Augenblick* is thematized in terms of a "site-of-moment". This new approach to site takes as its starting point the notion of "time-space" (*Zeit-Raum*). We

notion of *Anwesenheit*. Identity is put forth as the result of the formal wholeness of articulated positions, it is reached through homologous positions: "Identity is place" (Place, Form, and Identity in Postmodern Architecture and Philosophy: Derrida avec Moore, Mies avec Kant in: Gary SHAPIRO, ed., *After the Future. Postmodern Times and Places*, Albany New York: State University of New York, 1990, p. 207). On the contrary, postmodernism in philosophy, as well as in architecture, which is the second "paradigm" used by Casey, is marked by the passage from the precise conceptual topography of modern thought, for which Kant serves as the most telling example, to displacement, to the very deconstruction of *stabilitas loci*, of the assurance of place (pp. 209-210).

3. *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowing)*, Bloomington-Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999, p. 223.

4. Jean Greisch contends that, by their connection to *er-äugen* and to the *Augenblick*, *Er-eignis* and *Er-eignen* go back to the Husserlian notion of categorical intuition (*La parole heureuse. Heidegger entre les mots et les choses*, Paris: Beauchesne, 1987, p. 17). Later on, Heidegger himself establishes the inner connection between *Ereignis* and *Er-äugnen*, as in his *Identity and Difference*.

qualify this new approach as Heidegger's attempt to "spatialize" temporality, a term we borrow from Françoise Dastur's reading of the *Contributions*. According to Dastur, Heidegger's development of the locality (*Gegend*) of Being is not a denial of his earlier project of a "phenomenological chronology": here time is no more considered as the metaphysical-transcendental foundation of Being, but as its place of dwelling⁵. The "time-space", as well as the "play of the time-space", reveal a revised understanding of the temporal mode of making-present⁶. In this respect, the *Contributions to Philosophy* give access to a critical turn that leads Heidegger to the later formulation of a "topology of Being" for which *Gegend* is the decisive term⁷.

In the "Grounding" the elaboration of a reflexion on place follows the development of Dasein's relation to Being — Dasein perceived here as the positive response to the metaphysical subject —, but also of the non-metaphysical essence of truth. This fundamental position is founded on the type of temporalizing proper to each: the deploying of "time-space" out of the "site-of-moment" is not a process of subjectivization of some kind but the latter's effective overcoming:

"Because Dasein is essentially selfhood (ownhood) and because for its part selfhood is the ground of the I and the we and of all lower and higher "subjectivity", therefore the unfolding of time-space out of the site for the moment is not a subjectivizing, but rather its overcoming, if not already a fundamental discarding in advance"⁸.

All these partial analyses prepare in some sense the wrestling with the question of time-space's abysmal nature (*Ab-grund*). Time and place are to be grasped from the point of view of the "span of time". From Aristotle to Leibniz and from him to Kant and even to Bergson, τόπος and χρόνος are metaphysical representations of place and time that are to be reversed, that is, overcome. This overcoming is closely related to the enactment of Dasein's "site-of-moment": "The ambiguity of space and time in Leibniz, their origin unclear, in Kant both simply attributed to human subject! But of course all of this without any inkling of time-space"⁹. The "site-of-moment" as the gathering of the removals-unto (*Entrückungen*) is a form of "jointure" (*Fuge*): "The removals-unto are shifted into this moment, and this moment itself holds sway only as the gathering of removals-unto"¹⁰. The structure of the «jointure» is that of adver-

5. *Dire le temps. Esquisse d'une chronologie phénoménologique*, Paris, Encre Marine, 1997, p. 39. A similar remark, but in a different referential context, is made by Joan STAMBAUGH, *The Finitude of Being*, Albany New York, State University of New York Press, 1996, pp. 118-119.

6. *Contributions to Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 181.

7. On this issue see the precious contributions of Dieter SINN in Heideggers Spätphilosophie, *Philosophische Rundschau* 14, 1966, pp. 130-141 and Otto PÖGGELER in Metaphysics and Topology of Being in Heidegger, *Man and World* 8, 1975, pp. 3-27.

8. *Contributions to Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 262. Cf. Michel de BEISTEGUI, *The New Heidegger*, London-New York, Continuum, 2005, pp. 80-82.

9. *Contributions to Philosophy*, p. 261.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 268.

sity – the counter-way of place and time – which will later on qualify the *Abgrund*; “Time is rendering ab-ground that removes unto the gathering. Charming-moving-unto (*Berückung*) o is the encircling hold of gathering that holds to ab-ground. Removal-unto is gathering unto the encircling hold that holds to ab-ground”¹¹.

In fact, the inner connection of “space-time” to the ab-ground is the last stage in Heidegger’s revised analysis of temporality. The “metontology” (*Metontologie*) courses and writings, which follow immediately *Being and Time*, are often considered as already witnessing a slight, yet apparent, transition from the existential to the “aletheiological” account of temporality. This is, for instance, the main thread in John Sallis’ account of the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Sallis speaks of the finitude of time as an “installing of radical disclosure” that sets this text “moving against itself toward the beginning of the critique of the beginnings of *Being and Time*”¹². The terms in which the revised interpretation of temporality is analyzed in the *Contributions to Philosophy*, the lexikon of *Entrückung* (sudden transport, rapture) and *Schwung* (vibrancy), appear for the first time in the courses and writings from 1928 to 1931¹³. Nevertheless, in 1928, Heidegger is not yet in position to cope with the critical issue of the finitude of time, that is, with Dasein’s radical limitation by establishing the closure lying at the heart of ecstatic temporality. If, according to Sallis, the course on *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* does not “fill the place of the missing third division of *Being and Time*”¹⁴, the *Contributions to Philosophy* make a decisive step in this direction¹⁵. It is by no means common ground for most scholars to argue that Heidegger later on does not “turn away from his initial

11. *Ibid.*, p. 269. Section 242 of the “Grounding” is considered to be one of the most critical moments in the development of the *Contributions*. Daniela VALLEGA-NEU, *Heidegger’s “Contributions to Philosophy”. An Introduction*, Bloomington-Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2003, p. 91.

12. *Delimitations. Phenomenology and the End of Metaphysics* (second expanded edition), Bloomington/Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 138. The same could be right for Heidegger’s account of time and temporality in GA 26, 1928, on Leibniz which focuses on, as well as, in *What is Metaphysics?* (1929).

13. David Farrell Krell points out that «there is evidence that the word *Entrückung* plays a decisive role in the sixth division of Heidegger’s principal unpublished text of the thirties, his *Contributions to Philosophy*. There time-space is experienced as simultaneity of the temporal ecstasies and proximity of space, both together occasioning the thrust (*Entrückung*) into the truth or clearing of self-concealing Being». (*Intimations of Mortality, Truth, and Finitude*, University Park, Pennsylvania University Press, 1991, p. 60).

14. *Delimitations...*, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

15. It is worthwhile noting that the *Contributions* are considered as Heidegger’s second *Hauptwerk* after *Being and Time*. Cf. Richard POLT, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. Ein Sprung in die Wesung des Seyns, in: D. THOMÄ, (hrsg.), *Heidegger Handbuch. Leben-Werk-Wirkung*, Stuttgart-Weimar, J. B. Metzler, 2003, pp. 184 -185.

project, but returns to the intimations of *Being and Time*¹⁶.

This treatment of place has a considerable impact on the development of Heidegger's hermeneutical philosophy as a whole. In fact, Heidegger's project of a "topology of Being" takes its starting point in the writings of the mid-thirties, where language is treated in a topological more than temporal perspective. As early as 1936, language is the privileged place for the setting forth of this topological discourse. Here *Wink* – the wave or gesture that gives a signal – makes up the essence of language¹⁷. The gathering essence of the "site-of-moment" is viewed as a hint or an enhinting (*Erwinken*), whereas the "spatializing" of temporality takes place in the mode of language as a hesitating refusal (*zögernde Versagung*):

"Thus from where comes the separatedness in temporalizing and spatializing? From the removal-unto and the charming-moving-unto which are fundamentally different and demand each other from within the unfolding of *hesitating refusal*. From where comes the separation of removal-unto and charming-moving-unto? From the hesitating refusal; and this is the *en-hinting* as the inceptual essential sway of enowing, inceptual in the other beginning"¹⁸.

In the *Contributions*, "sigetics" (*Sigetik*) is viewed as the core of language. The very structure of the thought that tends to overcome metaphysics is linked closely to language as silence¹⁹. The inner connection between *Ereignis* and language remains intact even in Heidegger's later treatment of the question, for which the essay *On the Way to language* is the landmark²⁰. It is on this basis that the unfolding of truth in the "time-place" becomes possible. "Time-place" does

16. David Farrell KRELL, *Intimations...*, *op. cit.*, p. 98. William McNeill, on the other hand, draws attention to the treatment of the *Augenblick* in GA 29/30 thus establishing a direct link between this very course and the *Contributions*: "In the 1929/30 course this productivity of transcendental imagination will be thought as the event of world formation (*Weltbildung*). Kant's discovery of the productivity of transcendental imagination, the temporal significance of which is not fully fathomed by Kant himself, is, Heidegger comments, «the first *Augenblick* in the history of philosophy in which metaphysics attempts to free itself from logic». And yet, he adds, "this *Augenblick* passed." (The Time of *Contributions to Philosophy*, in: Charles E. SCOTT, Susan M. SCHOENBOHM, Daniela VALLEGE-NEU, Alejandro VALLEGA, eds, *Companion to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy*, Bloomington-Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001, pp. 142-144).

17. «Alors que le *Zeichen* désigne indirectement une chose non actuellement présente, le *Wink* (signe au sens de geste) donne immédiatement à voir, fait directement apparaître ce qu'il s'agit de penser. C'est en ce sens que Heidegger laisse entendre que le faire-signer est le trait fondamental de la parole» (F. DASTUR, *Dire le temps*, *op. cit.*, p. 131).

18. *Contributions to Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, pp. 268-269 (author's emphasis).

19. *Ibid*, pp.358-359. Cf. Jean GREISCH, La parole de l'origine, l'origine de la parole. Logique et sigétique dans les *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, *Rue Descartes*: «Des Grecs», 1, 1991.

20. See: Marc Richir, «Ereignis, temps, phénomènes», in: Dominique Janicaud (dir.), *Martin Heidegger: Questions ouvertes*, Paris: Osiris/Collège International de Philosophie, 1989 and Robert Bernasconi, *Heidegger in Question*, Atlantic Highlands-New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993, pp. 190-210.

not belong to the ultimate moment in the history of the metaphysical notions of time and place or of their unexamined but usual coexistence as time *and* place, but to what Heidegger often designates as the “other inception” in thought. In any case, if momentariness in the sense of the “site-of-moment” belongs to Dasein’s very constitution, this doesn’t involve the latter’s metaphysical reduction to its essence, but, on the contrary, a non-metaphysical form of ipseity. Nevertheless, among Heidegger scholars, there is a considerable oscillation between a decisionist, that is, subjectivist approach to the “moment” and to momentariness and one that emphasizes its transgressive function²¹.

II. Back to the early Heidegger: place and time in existential analytics and before

It is therefore of critical importance to follow the evolution of the questioning on place through *Being and Time* and the writings directly related to it, up to its emergence in terms of “space-time”, and its close connexion to the “site-of-moment”, in the philosophy of the *Ereignis*. Let us clarify beforehand that Heidegger’s discussion on place in the hermeneutics of facticity, that is from 1923 on, is linked to a questioning on world and worldliness, witnessed in a masterly manner in the first division of *Being and Time*. However, other place-related terms, such as “situation”, and even the key-term *Da-sein* itself, show a topological concern awakened early in his itinerary. Very often in his courses of the early twenties Heidegger talks of a “situated” philosophy, a revitalized concept of philosophy, which is connected to life, and attempts to draw from the philosopher’s own existential situatedness. Our facticity does nothing else than specify this situatedness, philosophy’s dependence from life-contexts, which makes it come out of life itself, lived as a part of life. Factical life’s or, later on, Dasein’s situatedness witness the close link between life and philosophy.

In fact, the temporalizing character of such existential situatedness seems to come out of its topological character. We find ourselves already in a situation, already leading a certain life, already caught in it. Heidegger talks of the “Situation I” as early as in spring semester 1919 course thus appropriating in a phenomenological manner Karl Jasper’s concept of limit-situations as central in illuminating existence²². We also find ourselves involved with things in a pregiv-

21. «Cette unicité [de l’instant], voilà ce qui est problématique. Sert-elle à exalter un rare instant-étalon ou à fracturer tout étalon?» (Reiner SCHÜRMANN, *Des hégémonies brisées*, Mauzevin: T.E.R., 1997, p. 720). Heidegger’s formulations do nothing less than confirm this ambivalence: «History of truth, of shining, and of transformation and grounding of its essential sway, has only *rare moments* that lie far from one another» (*Contributions to Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, p. 239, emphasis mine).

22. It is in the context of this analysis that Heidegger talks for the first time of the “event (Ereignis) of situation” that relates to me, not as an objective process, but as a properizing event that defines me in my very motivations (Theodor KISIEL, *The Genesis of Heidegger’s*

en world: life is always life in a world, writes Heidegger already in 1919-1920. This is the necessary existential condition for our questioning ourselves and Being itself. The question of Being concerns the question as to how Being can itself be put into question, and this immediately brings our own "situated" being into view. But "situation" has nothing to do with location (*Lage*), that is, is deprived of any spatial content, as Heidegger points out in the 1922 *Natorp-Bericht*. Dasein's being-situated is revealed not only mentally, but also and foremost affectively – as a state-of-mind (*Befindlichkeit*). If there is one thing which qualifies the traditional way of philosophizing, this is no other than the forgetfulness of the situated character of our existence, of the "there" (*Da*) of being. Still other terms, such as the environment or world-around (*Umwelt*) – viewed as one of the "life-worlds" next to the with-world and to the self-world –, the in-Being (*In-Sein*) as such – the intimate familiarity in which Dasein feels "at home" and unthreatened in its dwelling²³ –, which is to be distinguished from being-in (*Sein-in*) in order to eradicate every vestige of spatial containment, anxiety (*Angst*) as the situation in which Dasein does not feel at home, the directionality of Dasein's caring (*Besorgen*) as that of *being-out-for* (*Aussein-auf*) something which it is not yet but can be, Dasein's "going about" (*Umgang*) and its "being-toward" (*Sein-zu*), interpretedness (*Auslegen*) – the initial form of hermeneutic understanding – as a "laying-out"-(*aus-legen*), the various "situation-directions" of sight (*Umsicht-Hinsicht-Durchsichtigkeit*). Even the first sketches of temporal terms, such as the "particular while" or "for the time being" (*Jeweiligkeit*)²⁴, presentedness as "presence at a place or in a context – Here!" (*Anwesenheit in der Umwelt*) keep strong topological connotations. As for the questioning on time and the temporalizing meaning of situatedness, the authentic temporality of momentariness is the leading thread of Heidegger's ear-

„*Being and Time*“, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 64-65). This stream of questioning reaches existential analytics: «The existential definiteness of possible resolute Dasein includes the constitutive moments of the existential phenomenon that we call situation and which we have not yet discussed». And he goes on noting that «in the term situation (position – “to be in position of”), there is an overtone of spatial significance. We shall not attempt to eliminate it from the existential concept. For such an overtone is also implied in the “there” of Dasein.” (*Being and Time. A Translation of “Sein und Zeit”*, transl. by Joan STAMBAUGH, Albany New York, SUNY Press, 1996, pp. 275-276).

23. *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985, p. 157.

24. In the Marburg courses “*Jeweiligkeit*” is connected to facticity, Dasein as such is factical: «Das eigene Dasein ist, was es ist, gerade und nur in seinem jeweiligen “Da”» (*Ontology. The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, GA 63, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999, p. 24). Dasein's temporally particular “there”, its being “there” for a while, its “timely” situatedness or placedness reveals its facticity. Factical Dasein carries with it the idea of a certain place, of a “there”: existence cannot be viewed in some detached or abstract manner, it cannot be viewed separately from the place, the world it finds itself in.

ly account of factual life. "Situation" is also the link between existential placedness and temporality, which is on the way to its final determination. Referring to the hidden continuity between the early courses on the hermeneutics of facticity and *Being and Time* Theodor Kisiel remarks:

"Even though the term *καίρος* is never used, the idea overly dominates the entire Second Division of BT, not only in the authenticating moment of response to the call of conscience but in its parallel, the holistic move of forerunning my own death. Small wonder that *the old kairological term "situation"*, betraying Heidegger's Christohellenic origins, can no longer be deferred, and slowly, albeit sporadically, and without real explanation, asserts itself in the closing pages of the book. In fact, the best English translation of Dasein itself is "human situation", provided that one at once retains the full temporally distributed particularity of the indexicals, "here, now, mine", that it is meant to convey"²⁵.

In fact, the initial link between a "proto-hermeneutics" of place and Dasein's momentariness viewed as "kairological time" occurs already in the courses of the early twenties. Scholars such as Otto Pöggeler²⁶, Jean-François Courtine²⁷ and Hans Ruin²⁸ attempted to show the religious as well as philosophical basis of Heidegger's analysis of eschatological as well as practical *kairos*. Two are the sources of Heidegger's initial encounter with kairological time: primal Christianity and Aristotle's concept of practical *kairos*²⁹. The latter is present in his early courses and writings such as the 1922 report to Paul Natorp but also in the 1924/1925 course on Plato's *Sophist*³⁰. *Kairos* is here related to facticity and

25. *Op. cit.*, p. 423 (emphasis mine). In existential analytics, the "moment" is designated as that according to which a resolution discloses a situation (*Being and Time*, *op. cit.*, p. 311).

26. *Destruktion und Augenblick* in: Thomas BUCHHEIM (hrsg.), *Destruktion und Uebersetzung. Zu den Aufgaben von Philosophiegeschichte nach Martin Heidegger*, Wiley-VCH, 1989. Pöggeler distinguishes three periods in Heidegger's kairological reflexion. The first account of Dasein's historicity is followed by the themes of the "site-of-moment" and the "way" (*Weg*), whereas the last step in this path of reflexion is made explicit by the intertwining of proximity (*Nähe*) and spur (*Spur/Numen/Wink*).

27. Jean-François Courtine refers to Heidegger's treatment of the instantaneous passing-by of the Last God back to his earlier account of *kairos* in primal Christianity (*Les traces et le passage de Dieu dans les Beiträge zur Philosophie* de Martin Heidegger, *Archivio di Filosofia*, 1-3, 1994, p. 525).

28. *Enigmatic Origins: Tracing the Theme of Historicity through Heidegger's Work*, Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell Internat., 1994.

29. *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles*, GA 61, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1994. Cf. also in this respect: Golfo MAGGINI, Historical and Practical *Kairos* in Heidegger's Early Freiburg and Marburg Courses, *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 32, 2001, pp. 81-92.

30. See: *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles* (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation), Appendix to: *Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik*, GA 62, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2005, pp. 343-400 and *Plato's Sophist*, Bloomington-Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1997, pp. 100-101 ff.

care and, with regard to Aristotle, to the critical themes of *kinesis*, *phronesis*, and *praxis*³¹. In the 1921/1922 course on *Phenomenological Interpretations to Aristotle. Introduction to the phenomenological Research* Heidegger does not use explicitly the term *kairos* but that of “the kairological” (*das Kairologische*). He refers to “the kairological characters of life” which make up the proper philosophical interpretation of *kairos*. The treatment of “the kairological” takes place in the second chapter of the course, where “ruinance” (*Ruinanz*) is viewed as the basic element of facticity. Every occurrence of life is not objective but a “how of the enactment of care” and as such every modality of occurrence “has its factual-kairological character, its determinate relation to time, to *its own* time which exists in the sense of the “enactment-relation” of facticity”³². Heidegger uses here the jointed terms of “*Kairos-Zeit*” to talk about the kairological temporality of life. “The kairological” includes a series of categorical determinations which are linked to the temporal relations in the factual and for the factual. He concludes by emphasizing the necessity to raise the question as to how life announces itself in a kairological perspective. To “give time”, “not to have time any more”, “one at a time” but also –and this seems to be the core of his analysis – “to be left to time”, that is, history. All those phenomena are kairological ways in which life announces itself³³. What is proper to life’s motility in the fundamental form of “ruinance” – the prefiguration of Dasein’s fallenness in *Being and Time* – is its tendency to “avoid time” (*Zeittilgung*). The various kairological categories are determinate interpretative motives of the enhancing of “ruinance”, of its “character of collapsing” (*Sturzcharakter*).

The context of the analysis is the sixth book of *Nicomachean Ethics*. What is of interest here is the inner connection between *πρᾶξις* and situation which explains the very structure of *φρόνησις*: «Since the *ζωή πρακτική* moves in each case within a definite surrounding world, this action is carried out under determined circumstances. These circumstances characterize the *situation* in which Dasein at any time finds itself». (p. 100, author’s emphasis). And a little bit further he adds: *Φρόνησις* is the inspection of the this here now, the inspection of the concrete momentariness of the transient situation. As *αἴσθησις*, it is a look of an eye in the blink of an eye, a momentary look at what is momentarily concrete, which as such can always be otherwise. (pp. 112-113).

31. Heidegger refers to the fifth book of the *Physics* where Aristotle distinguishes between *τόπος*, which is *φύσει*, and *θέσις*, which is relative (*πρὸς ἡμᾶς*). Heidegger specifies that the essence of *τόπος* is limit (*πέρας*) and possibility (*δύναμις*) of the proper being of a being: the place is constitutive of the presence of the being (*Plato’s Sophist, op. cit.*, p. 73). Later on, while analyzing Aristotle’s notion of *κίνησις* in relation to that of continuum, Heidegger makes an explicit reference to Hermann Weyl, one of the main specialists on relativity theory of his times, and his *Raum-Zeit-Materie. Vorlesungen über allgemeine Relativitätstheorie*, Berlin, 1918 (pp. 80-81).

32. GA 61, p. 137.

33. As Françoise Dastur notes, it is the kairological character of life that gives Heidegger the „paradigm“ for authentic historicity not in the terms of chronological reference and calculation, but in that of “enactment effectuation”, of the “nonobjectifiable relation of effectuation with time historicity.” (*Heidegger and the Question of Time*, Amherst New York, Humanity Books, 1998, p. 4).

If during the period when Heidegger elaborates his hermeneutics of facticity, the “kairological” is treated as proper to life, as late as the course on *The History of the Concept of Time* (1925) and *Being and Time*, the *Augenblick* brings forth Dasein’s authentic temporality. By “undoing the present it makes possible the “depresentification of the now”³⁴. In similar terms, the *Augenblick* appears at one of the most critical jointures of *Being and Time*, where anxiety, resoluteness, and historicity are put under scrutiny. In fact, the *Augenblick* appears to be the key-concept for comprehending historicity: It is in the occasion of the grasping of Dasein’s temporality as an ἐχστατικόν that Heidegger makes one of his most crucial references to the *Augenblick*, to the “moment of vision”: «When resolute, Dasein has brought itself back from falling, and has done so precisely in order to be more authentically “there” in the moment of vision as regards the situation which has been disclosed»³⁵.

If Saint Paul and Aristotle are the two main references in the first steps Heidegger took in his reflexion on the moment, Nietzsche’s *Untimely Meditations* is the second crucial reference, the discreet but critical presence of which in *Being and Time* (§76) should not be neglected. In the *Untimely Meditations*, monumental history is qualified as the “summit of a long bygone instant”. It is worthwhile to notice, nevertheless, that, if we adopt a decisionist reading of the moment in Heidegger, the reference to the *Untimely Meditations* is totally unfit: to the extent that “the moment” in Nietzsche is untimely, it turns to be distinct from the present and the making-present³⁶.

But how is the authentic temporality of the moment related to place and placedness in *Being and Time*? The question brings us back to the position that place and placedness holds in the frame of existential analytics³⁷. As was already the case in the earlier courses and writings, Heidegger is here preoccupied with the fundamentally “situated” or “placed” character of Being, which refers us directly to a topological structure. The account of Dasein’s “place”, which

34. *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 357. To the *Augenblick*’s authentic temporality stands opposed the localized or spatialized, that is, inauthentic „now“ of traditional metaphysics. Cf. Didier FRANCK, *Heidegger et le problème de l’espace*, Paris. Les Éditions de Minuit, 1986, pp. 119-123.

35. *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 376.

36. K. ANSELL-PEARSON, *Geist and Reich: Time, History and Germany in Nietzsche and Heidegger*, in: K. ANSELL-PEARSON/H. CAYGILL (ed.), *The Fate of the New Nietzsche*, Newcastle-Avebury, 1993. We would then put Nietzsche next to the poet Hölderlin as the one who contributed to Heidegger’s later radical shift from the “transcendental” to the “topological”. Unlike Nietzsche, Hölderlin’s impact upon Heidegger’s views of place and dwelling is more than acknowledged: *Poets and Rivers: Heidegger on Hölderlin’s Der Ister*, *Dialogue* 28, 1999, pp. 391-416, among many others.

37. In his recent study on Heidegger’s topology Jeff Malpas accounts for Dasein as a “being-there”, noticing that «being-there already implicates the idea of place – being-there is itself a “topos”» (*Heidegger’s Topology: Being, Place, World*, Cambridge-Mass., The MIT Press, 2006, p. 179).

stands undoubtedly in relevance to the question of space and spatiality, is given on three different levels, as is generally the structure of questioning in *Being and Time*: the first is that of the surrounding world and its *Zuhandenheit*, the second one is that of Dasein's own placedness, and the third and final one that of Being's "place". Taking the discussion of space from the conclusive sections of *Being and Time* (§ 70), we notice makes the harshest critique of space in the name of traditional ontology as such. Spatial representations belong to the very language of metaphysics: the task of fundamental ontology is no other than to deny this heritage, setting forth time and temporality as the cutting edge of all questioning on Being. Nevertheless, the initial occurrence of space takes place in the discussion of worldliness in the first division of *Being and Time* and, more specifically, of the orientation toward "Being-in" as such (§12). Heidegger illustrates his thesis that being-in is an existential, as it determines the very constitution of being of Dasein, by giving everyday life examples:

«Water and glass, dress and closet, are both "in" space "at" a location in the same way. This relation of being can be expanded; that is, the bench in the lecture hall, the lecture hall in the university, the university in the city, and so on until: the bench in "world space." These beings whose being "in" one another can be determined in this way have the same kind of being – that of being objectively present – as things occurring "within" the world»³⁸.

The account of existential placedness is indeed intrinsically bound to the critique of the very beginnings of modern metaphysics in the Cartesian notion of objective space, *res extensa*. Contrary to this so-to-speak objective sense of space Dasein's existential spatiality/making room (*Räumlichkeit*) emanates from his being-in-the-world. The phenomenological "destruction" of the Cartesian theses provides his analysis with a negative support to the positive explanation of Dasein's spatiality as emanating from worldliness (§ 22):

«the surrounding world does not arrange itself in a previously given space, but rather its specific worldliness articulates in its significance the relevant context of an actual totality of places circumspectly referred to each other...The fact that what is at hand can be encountered in its space of the surrounding world is ontically possible only because Da-sein itself is "spatial" with regard to its being-in-the-world»³⁹.

In the aftermath of this critique Heidegger develops a series of critical terms to elaborate the spatiality/"making room" of Dasein's being-in-the-world: near-

38. *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 50. See in this respect: Yoko Arisaka, Spatiality, Temporality, and the Problem of Foundation in *Being and Time*, *Philosophy Today* 40, 1996, pp. 36-46, Robert FRODEMAN, Being and Space: A Re-reading of Existential Spatiality in *Being and Time*, *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 23, 1992, pp. 23-35, and Konstantinos PROIMOS, Notes on the Question of Space in Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time*, in: *The Works of Art and their Place*, Ioannina: University of Ioannina Press, 2006, pp. 66-67 (in modern Greek).

39. *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 97. Much can be said about the way in which Heidegger comprehends the derivation of Dasein's spatiality from its temporality. In § 70, Heidegger talks of

ness and “region” (§ 22), de-distancing, directionality, orientation (§ 23)⁴⁰. Nevertheless, even in this first approach to the question of space, Heidegger acknowledges a certain “perplexity...with regard to the interpretation of the being of space”:

«In accordance in its being-in-the-world, Dasein has always already been pre-given in discovered space, even if unthematically. On the other hand, space in itself is initially obscured with regard to the mere possibilities of the pure spatial being of something contained in it. The fact that space initially *shows itself in a world* does not tell us anything about its kind of being»⁴¹.

The same ambiguity as to the question of space becomes evident in the course of the “repetition” (*Wiederholung*) of the question of space, in the light of the temporality of Being itself, in the context of § 70:

«Only on the basis of ecstatic and horizontal temporality is it possible for Dasein to break into space. The world is not objectively present in space; however, only within a world can space be discovered. The ecstatic temporality of the spatiality of Dasein makes it intelligible that space is independent of time, but on the other hand this same temporality makes intelligible also the “dependency” of Dasein upon space...»⁴².

Heidegger relates this *aporia* to the inadequacy of metaphysical language which uses spatial images and metaphors, without being able to clarify the nature of space as such. Consequently, in *Being and Time*, we already have a first indication of the difficulties in coping with the question of space and place, which seem to be inherent in its project, that is, its failure to overcome the language of metaphysics⁴³. The question of space is not reducible to that of time and

the grounding (*Gründen*) of spatiality in temporality, still he argues that space cannot be deduced from time or be dissolved into pure time. Nevertheless, the nature of the derivation of space from time is unclear. Is it just a loose sense of derivation, in the sense of dependence, or a “strong” sense of derivation, which affirms the hierarchical character of a grounding? This question becomes even more difficult to answer as one of the most basic structures of spatiality, that is, orientation, is essentially temporal.

40. The question of orientation, already present in the early hermeneutics of facticity, does not refer only to the question of space but has to do with the phenomenological project as such. The extent to which the question lies shows the gravity of the spatial problem in Heidegger’s existential analytics. Cf. Didier FRANCK, *Heidegger et le problème de l’espace*, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

41. *Being and Time*, *op. cit.*, p. 104 (author’s emphasis).

42. *Ibid*, pp. 337-338.

43. Jean-Louis Chrétien points out that the question of space does not receive a definitive answer in *Being and Time* and the reason for that is not the misunderstanding of space as such, but the lack of a proper ontology: the question of space is no less than the question of Being as such (De l’espace au lieu dans la pensée de Heidegger, in: Maxence CARON, dir., *Heidegger*, Paris: Editions du Cerf, 2006, p. 497). Also on the incompleteness of the treatment that space receives in existential analytics: Bernard von HERCENBERG, “Vers où?” et “pourquoi?”: Wozu? Cheminements et séparations à propos d’*Etre et temps* de Heidegger, *Archives de Philosophie* 71, 2008, pp. 465-467 and Michel de BEISTEGUI, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.

temporality: the ontological status of space is undecidable in the context of fundamental ontology. If the “destruction” of the traditional conception of measurable space has already begun early in Heidegger’s thoughtpath, it is his later account of the “other inception in thought” that led him to a revised posing of the question. It is clear that the phenomenology of space and spatiality in *Being and Time* does not yet constitute a hermeneutics of place in the proper sense of the term, though topological terms, such as those of “situation” and “dwelling”, inaugurates its ontological questioning:

...being-in designates a constitution of being of Dasein, and is an *existential*. But we cannot understand by this the objective presence of a material thing (the human body) “in” a being objectively present. Nor does the term designate a spatial “in one another” of two things objectively present, any more than the word “in” primordially means a spatial relation of this kind. “In” stems from *innan-*, to live, *habitare*, to dwell⁴⁴.

Jeff Malpas argues that «the understanding of being-there [Dasein] as “place” that was already present in *Being and Time* contained an ambiguity that allowed being-there to be taken as identical with the place that is already at issue here, as identical with the “place of the truth of being»⁴⁵. In terms similar to those of Malpas, Hans-Georg Gadamer speaks of a «shift away from transcendence as a founding notion...toward the more explicit “topology”», that is, of the transitional character of this move from “the thinking of meaning to the thinking, or re-thinking of place” as follows:

«Heidegger’s wants to mediate between the older point of departure from *Dasein* (in which its being is at stake) and the new movement of thought of the “there” [*Da*] in which *das Sein* or Being forms a clearing. In the word place [*Stätte*] this latter emphasis comes to the fore: it is the scene of an event and not primarily the site of an activity by Dasein»⁴⁶.

Still in fundamental ontology, space relies on the being-in-the-world, that is, on ecstatic temporality out of which it gets its full ontological significance: space can only be understood by going back to the world: spatiality is possible only on the basis of being-in-the-world as such. This is only to be understood on the background of § 70 of *Being and Time*, where Heidegger explicitly poses the following: «only on the basis of ecstatic and horizontal temporality is it possible for

44. *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51. As William Mc NEILL notes: «Dwelling, in this sense, does not refer to a “physical” place that could be located in mathematical terms; it is precisely that which resists any mathematical or scientific localization. Being in the world in the sense of dwelling means being in the presence of (*bei*) other beings, and thus also always being situated in a particular context; it means being an open site, not just or primarily for beings, but for beings in their presence and presencing». (*The Time of Life. Heidegger and Ethos*, Albany New York, SUNY Press, 2006, p. 154).

45. *Heidegger’s Topology*, *op. cit.*, pp. 148, 179.

46. *The Way in the Turn*, in: *Heidegger’s Ways*, Albany New York, SUNY Press, 1994, pp. 129-130.

Dasein to break into space»⁴⁷. It is by no means fortuitous that Heidegger's autocritical texts of the sixties – especially *Time and Being* – witness a sheer refutation of the former existential founding of space. We could then argue with Edward Casey that:

«if something does not happen *at these places*, it also will not happen in the encompassing but abstract spatial extent in which they are located. It – an “it” best rendered as an “event” (Heidegger)...- happens at that place *and* in that space, as well *in that time*: in all three together, *totum simul*»⁴⁸.

III. Place, Moment, and the Turn to the “Other Inception” of Thought

The new connection of temporality and placedness, precisely in terms of a “site-of-moment”, marks Heidegger's turning away from a phenomenological-existential account of time⁴⁹. If existential philosophy, mainly Kierkegaard and Jaspers, have been the main references for the first steps in Heidegger's reflexion on the moment, Nietzsche's second of the *Untimely Meditations* is the other crucial reference the discreet but substantial presence of which in *Being and Time* shouldn't be left out of sight. Of crucial importance for our argumentation is the 1937 lecture course on Nietzsche entitled “The Eternal Recurrence of the Same”, which thematizes the Moment (*Augenblick*) of the Eternal Recurrence. Here Heidegger treats Nietzsche's doctrine in a scholarly manner taking as a starting point the presentations given in majors texts such as *The Gay Science*

47. *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 337 (author's emphasis). It is not fortuitous that Hubert L. Dreyfus talks of a “confusion” in Heidegger's account of spatiality, which at the end makes Heidegger fail to avoid the Cartesian/Husserlian move of giving priority to *my* world of closeness and farness over *the* world: «Here Heidegger fails to distinguish the general opening up of space as the field of presence (dis-stance) that is the condition for things being near and far, from Dasein's pragmatic bringing things near by taking them up and using them. Such pragmatic bringing near as Heidegger uses the term can only be near to *me*, it is not a dimension of public space». (*Being-in-the-World. A Commentary of Heidegger's Being and Time*-Division I, Cambridge Mass.: The MIT Press, 1992, p. 132). For an account which opposes Dreyfus' account of the deficiencies of existential spatiality: Yoko Arisaka, Heidegger's Theory of Space: A Critique of Dreyfus, *Inquiry* 38, 1995, pp. 455-467.

48. *Getting Back into Place. Toward a Renewed Understanding of the Place-World*, Indianapolis-Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993, p. 288.

49. We wouldn't account in this respect for placing Heidegger's “topological” turn in the early thirties' Rectorate-address, thus making of it an appraisal of the ideology of the *Heimat* and its nationalistic outlook. Cf. J. Hillis MILLER, Slipping Vaulting Crossing: Heidegger, in: *Topographies*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995, pp. 216-254, Charles BAMBACH, *Heidegger's Roots: Nietzsche, National Socialism, and the Greeks*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2003, p. 217, Troy PADDOCK, *Gedachtes Wohnen: Heidegger and Cultural Geography*, *Philosophy and Geography* 7, 2004, pp. 237-251, among others. In opposite terms, Alejandro Vallega provides us with an original and incisive account of Heidegger's reflexion on place in terms of homelessness and alterity: *Heidegger and the Issue of Space: Thinking on Exilic Grounds*, University Park, Pennsylvania University Press, 2003.

(1882), where the doctrine is mentioned for the first time as well as in the posthumous fragments. In *The Gay Science*, Eternal Recurrence is designated as the “greatest burden”, the most burdensome thought «with respect to that which is to be thought in it, namely, being as a whole»⁵⁰. It thus reiterates some of the most crucial motives of existential analytics such as the priority of the “how” over the “what”, of possibility over reality. What comes to the fore is the «authentic appropriation (*Vereignlichung*), in which the human self comes into its own», the “Dasein in which the relation of I to Thou, I and “We” to “Ye” is grounded”⁵¹, time’s circling in itself as «the way in which being as a whole is»⁵², the riddle (*Rätsel*) of the doctrine as a sort of questioning⁵³. Consequently, the Eternal Recurrence of the Same is another name for Nietzsche’s metaphysical position, the last stage in Western metaphysics. It is certain that the basic themes of the analysis, namely Being’s questionableness — it is in that sense that the riddling of the doctrine is first perceived in terms of a questioning —, the priority of the modality, the “how” of the doctrine on its content, the “what” — it is precisely the meaning of the time’s ever-recurring circling as *the way in* which being as a whole is —, refers us directly back to *Being and Time*. Thus, the account of Eternal Recurrence in terms of a moment meets this earlier development where the moment is designated as the modality of the present proper to authentic temporality (SZ, § 68).

The unexpected introduction of the *Augenblick* is justified by this same will. In the second presentation of the doctrine, in the section of *Thus spoke Zarathoustra* entitled “On the Vision and the Riddle”, Zarathoustra and the dwarf, the spirit of gravity, represent the two fundamental existentials of authenticity and inauthenticity in Heidegger’s analytics of the Dasein. Zarathoustra’s riddle is about time, eternity, and the Moment, it is the venturing of “the truth of being as a whole”⁵⁴. He begins his ascent on the mountain and arrives at a gateway where two avenues meet. The inscription on the gateway is “*Augenblick*”. Here once again, the theme of the “moment” is viewed in the perspective of existential analytics, that is, it appears as a constitutive moment of Dasein’s temporality. Commenting on the dwarf’s question about the way in which the “moment” is related to recurrence Heidegger writes:

«The very question is posed in such a superior fashion that Zarathoustra can no longer expect an answer from the dwarf. The superiority consists in the fact that certain conditions of understanding have been brought into play, conditions the dwarf cannot satisfy — because he is a dwarf. These new conditions derive from the realization that the second question is based on the “Moment”. But such questioning requires that one adopt a *stance of his own within the “Moment” itself, that is, in time and its temporality*»⁵⁵.

50. Nietzsche, vol. II, New York: Harper & Row, 1984, p. 25.

51. Nietzsche, vol. I, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

55. *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44 (emphasis mine).

It is of great importance then to explore the double function of Nietzsche's doctrine, which, on the one hand, corresponds to some essential themes of *Being and Time* while, on the other hand, prepares the critique of Heidegger's "destruction" of subjectivity in existential analytics as it takes place in the thirties. I hold that it is in this very lecture course, in the light of his coming to terms (*Auseinandersetzung*) with Nietzsche's metaphysics, that Heidegger works out the notion of Da-sein's "site-of-moment"⁵⁶.

The notion of the "site-of-moment" (*Augenblicksstätte*) or, equivalently, "site of the moment" (*Stätte des Augenblicks*) becomes even more critical as it constitutes the very heart of Heidegger's critique of metaphysical subjectivity in the *Contributions to Philosophy*⁵⁷. This new topological approach to Dasein's existential constitution, as well as the reasons that bring the questioning of "the moment" at the heart of Heidegger's "topologizing" enterprise, is quite evident in the writings of the mid-thirties⁵⁸. As late as 1946 in the *Letter on Humanism* Being is cleared for the human being in ecstatic projection. In the clearing of the *Da*, the human being dwells as an ek-sisting being without yet being able properly to take over this dwelling into Being. Earlier on, in the *Contributions to Philosophy*, Da-sein's place is qualified as an "in-between" (*In-Zwischen*). This new approach presupposes the displacement of the original relation of the temporal ecstasies to the horizon of time as it is viewed in *Being and Time*:

«In *Being and Time*, time is experienced and named as fore-word for the word "of" Being... "Time" understood in the Greek manner, χρόνος [*chronos*], corresponds in essence to τόπος [*topos*], which we erroneously translate as "space". Τόπος is place [*Ort*], and specifically that place to which something appertains, for example, fire and flame and air up, water and earth below. Just as τόπος orders the appurtenance of a being to its dwelling place, so χρόνος regulates the appurtenance of the appearing and disappearing to their destined "then" and "there"..."⁵⁹.

56. Many annotators have anticipated the affinity between the questioning of the Nietzsche-courses and the *Contributions to Philosophy*. We mention David Krell, who in the postface to his translation of the courses makes a brief account of this affinity (*Nietzsche*, vol. I & II, pp. XXII-XXIV and 269-281).

57. Cf. Jeff MALPAS, From the Transcendental to the "Topological": Heidegger on Ground, Unity, and Limit, in: Jeff MALPAS (ed.), *From Kant to Davidson: Philosophy and the Idea of the Transcendental*, London: Routledge, 2002, pp. 75-99.

58. Nevertheless, while referring to the late Heidegger's notion of dwelling and building, Edward Casey distinguishes between "site" and "place": «Otherwise put – in my own preferred way of speaking – *place precedes site*. For dwelling (in either of its two primal senses of residing and wandering) entails place, just as the world of objects – determinate, physical objects positioned in an extended, homogeneous space – is the basis of site...» (*Getting Back into Place...*, *op. cit.*, p. 177, author's emphasis).

59. *Parmenides*, GA 54, Bloomington-Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1992, pp. 140-141. As Françoise Dastur notes: «It is thus, indeed, a question of leaving the enclosure of the horizon in order to think the proper gap that belongs to the far – the German *Weite* has the

What comes forth by this analysis is the way in which Heidegger's renewed understanding of place – closely linked to his critique of metaphysics – is formulated in various terms: in fact the shift from existential phenomenology to the “thought of Being” is a topological move⁶⁰. This critique is in fact double-edged: it aims first at the designation of the loss of placedness and of devastation, of the “non-places” proper to the modern world dominated by technology⁶¹. It aims secondly at the rise of a new understanding of place and situatedness, which will lead to a redefinition of our relationship to the world⁶². It is in this respect

same root as the Latin *vitium*, of which the primary meaning in “gap” – which forbids reducing the spatiality of Dasein to temporality... To give thought to what is proper to space, that is to say, *spacing* as the releasing of a free space, the opening of a clearing, is in fact only possible from the perspective of *Ereignis* understood as destiny – *Geschick*...» (*Heidegger and the Question of Time*, *op. cit.*, p. 65, author's emphasis).

60. It is by no means pointless to study the various terms used by Heidegger to designate “place” or locality (*Stelle*, *Ort*, *Ortschaft*, *Gegend*, *Platz*, *Stätte*, among others) throughout his itinerary. The vocabulary of place is closely linked to the essence of his questioning and his changing views of place is reflected in his use of the terminology. From *Dasein-Welt-Umwelt-Situation-Lage*, which refer to place in the mere sense of location or position, or temporalizing terms, which have clearly also a topologizing sense, such as *jeweilig* or *Ereignis*, Heidegger moves to more complex and ontologically accurate terms, such as *Ort* or *Ortschaft*, which thematize place directly (Jeff MALPAS, *Heidegger's Topology*, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-32). A strong “topological” connotation is also present in the “World-Fourfold” [*das Geviert*] that is made up of the “earth”, “the sky”, “man”, and “the gods”: «Heidegger also describes the latter [the Four-Fold] as *Gegeneinanderüber* – a reciprocity of linkages in which each of the “regions of the World-Fourfold is open for the others – open as if hiding itself”. In the later writings, it is this play of reciprocity among the *regions of the Fourfold* that is understood as the “saying” by which man is addressed and to which any utterance of his must be understood as corresponding.» (Frederick A. OLAFSON, *The Unity of Heidegger's Thought*, in Charles GUIGNON, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 117, emphasis mine).

61. Cf. in particular: What is Dwelling? The Homelessness of Modernity and the Worlding of the World, in Mark WRATHALL-Jeff MALPAS (eds.), *Heidegger, Modernity, and Authenticity – Essays in Honor of Hubert Dreyfus*, vol. 1, Cambridge-Mass. The MIT Press, 2000, pp. 187-204. Heidegger's critique of the technological understanding of Being and the transformations it brings to our perception of time and space gave rise to a number of post-modern critiques. See for instance: Marc AUGÉ, *Non-Places. Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity*, London, Verso, 1995. On the other hand, technology's lack of placedness lies in contrast to art in its various forms, such as architecture or sculpture. In the late Heidegger, place is rehabilitated through art in a unique way, in essays such as *Die Kunst und der Raum*, 1969, where place plays a central role (in: Dieter JÄHNIG, hrsg., *Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger*, Pfullingen, Neske, 1977, pp. 131-148). For an illuminating comment on the late Heidegger's perception of space and place in art, cf. Yiannis TZAVARAS' introduction to the Greek translation of the essay: *Ἡ τέχνη καὶ ὁ χώρος*, Athens, Indiktos Publications, 2006, pp. 7-22.

62. Edward Casey nevertheless qualifies Heidegger's re-evaluation of place as an indirect one, in comparison of a more direct approach to the question which takes the body as its leading thread, such as in Husserl's or even better in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body:

that the inner connection of a hermeneutics of place with a questioning on the temporality of the “decisive” or “proper moment” is one of the most stimulating aspects of the late Heidegger’s thoughtpath.

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ΑΠΟ ΤΟΝ ΧΩΡΟ ΣΤΟΝ ΤΟΠΟ: ΚΑΘ’ ΟΔΟΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΜΙΑ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΥΤΙΚΗ ΤΟΥ ΤΟΠΟΥ

Π ε ρ ί λ η ψ η

Στὸ ἄρθρο μας ἐξετάζουμε τὶς διαδοχικὲς ἀπόπειρες τῆς χαϊντεγκεριανῆς ἐρμηνευτικῆς φαινομενολογίας νὰ θέσει ἐκ νέου τὸ πρόβλημα τοῦ τόπου, σὲ διαφοροποίηση, ἂν ὄχι σὲ διάσταση ἀπὸ τὸ ἐρώτημα τοῦ χώρου ποὺ κυριαρχεῖ στὴ νεωτερικὴ σκέψη ἀπὸ τὸν Ντεκάρτ καὶ ἐξῆς. Παίρνοντας ὡς σημεῖο ἀφετηρίας τὰ χαϊντεγκεριανὰ κείμενα καὶ τὶς πανεπιστημιακὲς παραδόσεις τῆς δεκαετίας τοῦ ’30 ὅπου εἰσάγεται τὸ μοτίβο τοῦ «χρονο-χώρου» (*Zeit-Raum*), ἐπιστρέφουμε στὰ πρῶτα κείμενα τῆς ἐρμηνευτικῆς τῆς γεγονικότητος καὶ τὸ *Εἶναι καὶ χρόνος*, γιὰ νὰ δείξουμε τόσο τὶς πρωτότυπες ἐνοράσεις ὅσο καὶ τὰ ἀδιέξοδα τῆς χαϊντεγκεριανῆς ἀνάλυσης. Κεντρικὴ ἰδέα τῆς ἀνάλυσής μας εἶναι ὅτι ἡ προσπάθεια ἐκπόνησης μιᾶς ἐρμηνευτικῆς τοῦ τόπου εἶναι διαρκῆς στὸν Χάιντεγκερ καὶ γίνεται μὲ διάφορους ἄξονες εἴτε στὸ πλαίσιο τῆς ὑπαρκτικῆς ἀναλυτικῆς, εἴτε ἀργότερα σὲ αὐτὰ τῆς κριτικῆς τῆς μεταφυσικῆς καὶ τῆς ἐρμηνευτικῆς προσέγγισης στὸ φαινόμενο τῆς τέχνης. Ἰδιαίτερη μνεία γίνεται στὴ σύνδεση ποὺ φαίνεται νὰ διατρέχει τὴν προβληματικὴ αὐτὴ μεταξὺ τόπου καὶ «στιγμῆς» (*Augenblick*), μιᾶς καὶ ἡ ἰδιότυπη χρονικότητα τῆς «στιγμῆς» φαίνεται νὰ ὑπερβαίνει τὴν παραδοσιακὴ μεταφυσικὴ διχοτόμηση τόπου καὶ χρόνου, ἐπιτρέποντας μιὰ νέα θεώρηση τοῦ προβλήματος τοῦ τόπου.

Γκόλφω ΜΑΓΓΙΝΗ

«Heidegger gets back into place, then, not as “the first of all things” to be considered (as certain ancient thinkers had assumed) or in reactive flight before infinite space (a flight taken by many modern thinkers), but by indirection: by travelling through diverse “forest paths”, as he liked to put it. To begin with, he returns to place not through but despite the body’s involvement in placiality: as if place could be reached *around* and *outside* the body itself.» (*The Fate of Place*, *op. cit.*, p. 244, author’s emphasis). See also: *Getting back into Place*, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-105. Various objections can be held against such a thesis. See for instance: Jeff MALPAS, Remembering Place (Edward S. CASEY, *The Fate of Place*), *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 10, 2002, pp. 95-96. Malpas argues that Casey’s talk of indirection in Heidegger’s account of place does injustice to his unique contribution to the question. For Malpas, the body is no direct access to place, but should be understood «in terms of its own active em-placement – otherwise it becomes itself a mere “site” for an introvert and obsessive subjectivity». For an exchange between the two which illustrates the points of divergence in their respective theses on place: *Philosophy and Geography* 4, 2001, pp. 225-240.

