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## PROVIDENCE AND FATE IN STOICISM AND PRAE-NEOPLATONISM

CALCIDIUS AS AN AUTHORITY ON CLEANTHES' THEODICY (*SVF* 2, 933)

This paper can be considered either as a short essay on Stoic Theodicy—the vindication of divine goodness in respect to the existence of evil in a providentially determined world—or as an attempt at the interpretation of Calcidius' peculiar piece of information on a certain variance between Cleanthes and Chrysippus regarding the relationship between Providence and Fate in the light of the hierarchy sanctioned by Prae-Neoplatonism (an inclusive term for the philosophical tendencies of late antiquity). Actually it touches upon both these subjects to a limited extent, aiming at clarifying Stoic Determinism and Panprovidentialism, and at making certain suggestions on the way in which such late evidence as that of Calcidius—to which no parallel is found among the other remains—should be utilized as a source of early Stoicism. As the overall title indicates, the investigation of this relationship will not be limited to Calcidius' testimony, but will take into account additional evidence from both sides, Stoic and Prae-Neoplatonic; while, as the subtitle suggests, an effort will be made to assess the commentator's fairness towards Stoicism and to evaluate his testimony for the reconstruction of Cleanthes' Theodicy. With this end in view we shall pass in review various quotations and some authentic fragments of the early Stoics bearing on this problem, also taking into account the context into which Calcidius' statement is embedded and trying to see it against the Middle-Platonic background of the Commentary. We think it appropriate, however, to sketch some general Stoic views on Fate and Providence at the outset, and to present the passage which motivated the present investigation.

### 1. Providence and Fate in early Stoicism.

The combination of pure matter with the concept of God has been regarded by Prof. J. N. Theodorakopoulos<sup>1</sup> as the great paradox of Stoicism;

1. *Ἡ φιλοσοφία τοῦ Ζήνωνος*, «Πρακτικά Α' Διεθνoῦς Κυπρολογικοῦ Συνεδρίου - Λευκωσία 14-19.4.1972», Λευκωσία 1972, 249.



so is the identification of Providence with Fate. P. Merlan says: *The Stoic system can be interpreted in two ways. We see in it either a «mundanization» and a materialization of the divine, or, on the contrary a divinization and spiritualization of matter. Nothing exhibits this ambiguity better than the relation between Determinism (εἰμασμένη) and Providence (πρόνοια) in the Stoic system*<sup>2</sup>. Yet, Cleanthes' case determined on the basis of Calcidius' testimony aside<sup>3</sup>, these two concepts were for the Stoics identical.

Actually, for the Stoics Providence and Fate were two sides of the same coin, two aspects of the same reality, i.e. of God or universal Nature<sup>4</sup>. The prevalent alternative descriptions of the active principle, the polyonymous, one cosmic God of the Stoics, were Providence, Nature, Fate even Necessity, Truth and Cause<sup>5</sup>, in addition to Λόγος, universal Law, fiery Πνεῦμα and artistic Fire. Nature, the most central concept of Stoic Physics and Ethics seen from the point of view of Teleology, as a conscious, rational principle or as final cause, i.e. *natura artifex*, was identified with Providence; while taken from the point of view of Physics as *causa movens*, i.e., causal principle accounting for the temporal evolution of the world, its coherence and unity it was identical with Fate<sup>6</sup>. *The metaphysical system of the Stoics ...concentrates on the unity of final cause and the world-order which arises from it*, E. Zeller remarks<sup>7</sup>. The identification of God's will (Providence) with the unimpeded realisation of this will (Fate)<sup>8</sup>, unqualified matter being wholly tractable by reason, is a prerequisite of Stoic Monism.

Although it is spoken of two first principles, Λόγος and matter<sup>9</sup>, Stoic Pantheism actually admitted of a single principle, taken either as reason permeating matter throughout or as matter individualised, i.e. informed by

2. *The Cambridge History of Late Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, Cambridge 1970<sup>2</sup>, 124. For, as he adds, *strict determinism seems to leave no place for providence in any genuine sense of the word*.

3. Ibid. 124 n. 1: *Cleanthes subordinated providence to εἰμασμένη*.

4. Cf. W. C. Greene, *Moirai: Fate, Good and Evil in Greek Thought*, Gloucester, Mass. 1968<sup>3</sup>, 338 ff., 342: *two faces of a single reality*.

5. *SVF* 1, 102; 2, 913. Cf. A. A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, London 1974, 148.

6. J. v. Arnim, *Kleanthes*, RE 11, 1 (1921) col. 567. Cf. A. A. Long, *The Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics*, «Proceedings of British Academy» (1971) 91 f.

7. *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy*, London 1969<sup>18</sup>, 215.

8. See A. A. Long, *Freedom and Determinism in the Stoic Theory of Human Action*, in A. A. Long (Ed.), *Problems in Stoicism*, London 1971, 178-179.

9. *SVF* 2, 299-303. Cf. J. Christensen, *An Essay on the Unity of Stoic Philosophy*, København, 1962, 38 ff.



God, a corporeal substance himself. Thus God, unique cause<sup>10</sup> of everything, had to account for every thing, fact or event in the universe, in his property as Nature, Fate or Providence<sup>11</sup>.

Yet, Fate and Providence were never juxtaposed by the early Stoics at least as distinct hypostases, the latter being understood as the Providence of the gods<sup>12</sup>, the former as the world-order dictated by them<sup>13</sup>; they were meant by Zeno and Chrysippus at least to be identical, as being each of them identical with God, their common reference: as being both, namely, aspects of the divinity.

Their identification even through the mediation of God led to unre-served optimism, the implications of which, in respect to the problem of evil, were soon pointed out by both Epicureans and Academics. In a providentially determined world, natural and moral evil, strictly speaking, found neither justification nor even explanation<sup>14</sup>. The Stoics, though aware of the evil, which they tried to extenuate, felt consistent with themselves in maintaining both that *everything happens according to Fate* and that *everything is governed by divine Providence*<sup>15</sup>. Divination, fervently defended by all Stoics except Panaetius<sup>16</sup>, was theoretically demonstrated through the reality of Providence and Fate<sup>17</sup>, used in its turn for their defence<sup>18</sup>.

10. *SVF* 2, 346a = Seneca, *Epist.* 65, 4: *Stoicis placet unam causam esse id quod facit... 11: ratio scilicet faciens, id est deus.*

11. See V. Goldschmidt, *Le système stoïcien et l'idée de temps*, Paris 1969<sup>2</sup>, 78 ff. Cf. *SVF* 2, 396; 1064 for the identity of Zeus with Providence during the universal conflagration, though taken as two individually qualified entities on one substance. Cf. also J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, Cambridge 1969, 162-163.

12. Cicero, *De natura deorum* 2, 74: *velut a te ipso hesterno die dictum est anum fatidicam πρόνοιαν a Stoicis induci, id est providentiam... quia existumas ab iis providentiam fingi quasi quandam deam singularem quae mundum gubernet at regat... cum dicimus providentia mundum administrari deesse arbitrato «deorum»...*

13. Seneca, *De providentia* 5, 8: *ille ipse omnium conditor et rector scripsit quidem fata...*

14. See *SVF* 2, 1168-1186: *Cur mala sint cum sit providentia*. On Stoic Theodicy cf. J. N. Theodorakopoulos, op. cit. 249-50; Long, *The Stoic Concept of Evil*, «Philosophical Quarterly» 18 (1968), 329-343.

15. Ἄπαντα καθ' εἰμαρμένην *SVF* 1, 175; 2, 914; 924; 925; 943 (= Calcidius, *In Timaeum* 160 f) 944; 959; 975 etc. *omnia providentia administrari* in various formulations Cicero, *N. D.* 2, 76; 78; 80; 85; 127; 133; 162; 164 etc. That everything happens through Fate occurs only in the first and third books of *N. D.* (1, 55; 3, 14) among the Epicurean and Academic attacks, wholly lacking from the Stoic account in book 2.

16. Van Straaten, *Panaetii Rhodii Fragmenta*, Leiden 1962<sup>3</sup>, frg. 68.

17. *SVF* 2, 1187-1195, esp. Cicero, *De divinatione* 1, 38, 82.

18. *SVF* 2, 1019. Cf. A. Bouché - Leclercq, *Histoire de l'astrologie Grecque*, Paris 1892, 31.



Though not met with in the philosophical vocabulary with the Stoics for the first time<sup>19</sup> Providence and Fate, as divine properties, acquired such great importance in the Stoic system that whatever relevant discussions were later held had to take into account the Stoic positions, with a view either to furthering them (in the case of Providence) or attacking them (in the case of Fate). Opponents of the Stoics' attitude could hardly ignore the latter's creed, but took it as the starting point of their criticisms, though being themselves influenced by it up to a certain point, especially on matters of terminology.

Regarding Providence, the Stoics following Plato's polemical intentions against the Sophists and materialist Physicists formulated their Theology as a counter response to Epicurus who rejected divine providential care, banishing his gods to the *intermundia*<sup>20</sup>. God was defined by the Stoics in terms of his Providence<sup>21</sup>, and this divine aspect constituted the citadel of Stoic Philosophy. Declaration of this belief is found among Cleanthes' arguments for the existence of the gods<sup>22</sup>, while divine Providence itself was also supported by rational and evidential proofs<sup>23</sup>. *Omnia providentia regi* and *providentia mundum administrari* are the leit-motives throughout the whole account of Stoic Theology covering the second book of Cicero's *De natura deorum*<sup>24</sup>. Such a central tenet was this belief for the Stoic school that, had a Stoic questioned it, he could hardly have been considered as an orthodox Stoic.

The Stoics, on the other hand, were the first to elaborate a systematic and coherent account of Fate<sup>25</sup>. Whether their reputation for being hard determinists is due to misrepresentation by hostile authorities or to a certain ambiguity of their language, will not be discussed here<sup>26</sup>. What we are concerned with is their conception of Fate and some of the

19. On Providence as a philosophical and theological term see Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1, 4, 6; 4, 3, 2. Cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 30 c; 44 c, *Laws* 888 c 899 d, 900 c ff 902 e - 903 a. On Fate see Heraclitus frg. 51, 52 Marcovich, though no doctrine of Fate was ever formulated by him: M. Marcovich, *Heraclitus*, Merida 1967, 259; 276 on the constant measures rather than Fate. Plato, *Laws* 873 c: 918 e, 904 c; *Polit.* 272 c; *Phaedr.* 113 a; *Gorg.* 512e

20. Cicero, *N. D.* 1, 18.

21. *SVF* 2, 1021; 1115-1118; 1120; 1121; 1126. *Antipater* 3, 34 where divine benevolence is part of God's prolepsis (πρόληψις).

22. *SVF* 1, 528 = Cicero, *N.D.* 2 13-15: *ex praesensione rerum futurarum ... ex magnitudine commodorum..*

23. Cicero, *ibid.* 2, 75-153. Cf. *SVF* 2, 1106-1126: *esse providentiam argumentis probatur*. The second best source for Stoic Providence is Philo's *De providentia*. There is similarity in structure in both the Ciceronian section on Providence in *N. D.* 73-153 and Philo's treatise, while Seneca's short treatise *De providentia* deals mainly with Theodicy; that is, the problem of evil and unjust suffering.

24. See n. 15. Cf. Philo, *De prov.* Aucher 1822.

25. See *SVF* 2, 917-1007. Chrysippus was the third Greek philosopher after Xenocrates and Epicurus and the first Stoic one to write *On Fate*. So did Posidonius. Main sources: Cicero and Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De fato*. Cf. A. Gercke, *Chrysippea*, «Jahrb. für Class. Phil.», Suppl. 14, Leipzig 1885. J. v. Arnim, *Die stoische Lehre vom Fatum und Willensfreiheit*, «Beilage 18 Jahr. Phil. Ges. a.d. Univ. Wien», Wien 1905.

26. See Long, *Freedom and Determinism*, 178 (on account of *In Timaeum* 160-161 = *SVF* 2, 943): *Calcidius' remarks... give a thoroughly false impression of the complete early Stoic position*. Cf. G. L. Duprat, *La doctrine stoïcienne du monde, du destin et de la providence d'après Chrysippe*, *AGPh* 23 (1910) 472-511, esp. 509.



implications of its relationship with Providence. Fate was defined by them as *a pneuma-like force impressing a definite state upon matter, a causal nexus linking the successive states of it*<sup>27</sup>. As an alternative description of the world-order, Fate was neither a blind force similar to chance or fortune, nor a strict mechanical natural law, equivalent to Necessity. Like Providence, Fate was not a superstitious assumption either<sup>28</sup>, but the corollary of the Stoic doctrine of the *κρᾶσις*, consistent with the Stoic logical theory, a requirement of the dynamic continuum of Physics<sup>29</sup>, and a postulate of the doctrine of universal conflagration<sup>30</sup>. Fate was also the law of cause and effect; that is, the law according to which *every event is... determined by antecedent causes and will, itself, help to determine subsequent events* as A. A. Long put it<sup>31</sup>. It was also a causal nexus linking past, present and future events and the intertwinement of particular causes, reduced eventually to God as the unique universal efficient cause. In this causal nexus there was a place for the possible and, generally, the contingent, as well as for certain freedom, in the Greek sense of the word<sup>32</sup>. Fate was again *λόγος* in its cosmic sence, as the principle of structure and ordered development.

The Stoic doctrine of Fate mostly reported by hostile witnesses is difficult to reconstruct in its entirety; nor is it the purpose of this paper to do so, inasmuch as this topic has been adequately treated in recent literature<sup>33</sup>. Suffice to say that the image of the Stoic Fate drawn by Diogenianus (?), Cicero and, perhaps, Aulus Gellius—which best tallies with Chrysippus' quotations—is not always compatible with that sketched by Oenomaus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Nemesius and Calcidius: all of them prejudiced by the assumption that Stoicism radically opposed either Aristotelianism or Platonism in this respect. With the distinction between internal and external causes, rather between principal-perfect causes and antecedent-proximate ones, the Stoics avoided identifying Fate with Necessity. It is not thus surprising that Cicero presents Chrysippus as striking a middle course

27. S. Sambursky, *The Physics of the Stoics*, London 1959, 37. Cf. SVF 2, 913; 945; 976.

28. SVF 2, 475: ἡ τε πολυθρύλητος αὐτοῖς εἰμαρμένη καὶ ἡ τῶν πάντων πρόνοια δὲ <ἐντεῦθεν> (sc. ἀπὸ τοῦ θαυμαστοῦ δόγματος . . . τοῦ σώμα χωρεῖν διὰ σώματος) τὴν πίστιν λαμβάνουσιν. It is here the case of *κρᾶσις*. 1107: *neque id dicitis superstitiose atque aniliter, sed physica constantique ratione* (N. D. 3, 92).

29. Sambursky, op. cit. 1-20. Cf. *The Physical World of the Greeks*, London 1960, 132 - 153.

30. SVF 2, 614; 628. On Heraclitus' ἐκπύρωσις see G. S. Kirk, *Heraclitus, The Cosmic Fragments*, Cambridge 1954, 303-304. Otherwise, F. Cleve, *The Giants of Pre-sophistic Greek Philosophy*, The Hague 1969<sup>2</sup>, 122.

31. *Freedom and Determinism* 178, Cf. *The Stoic Concept of Evil*, 339 ff.

32. SVF 2, 975; 987. Cf. M. Pohlenz, *Liberté Grecque*, Paris 1956, 167.

33. See A. A. Long, *Stoic Determinism and Alexander of Aphrodisias 'De fato'* (1 - 15). AGPh 52 (1970) 247-268. G. Verbeke, *Aristotélisme et Stoicisme dans le 'De fato' d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise*, AGPh 50 (1968) 78 - 100. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy: Fate and Necessity* 112-132 W. Theiler, *Tacitus und die antike Schicksalslehre*, *Phyllobolia für Peter von der Muehl*, Basel 1946, 35-90. M. Reesor, *Fate and Possibility in Early Stoic Philosophy*, «Phoenix» 19 (1965) 285-297.



between fatalists and advocates of absolute human freedom<sup>34</sup> whereas, according to Calcidius, man was for the Stoics little more than an instrument of Fate. Actually man, as bearing within himself a particle of the divinity (that is, of universal reason) thus being himself as a rational creature his own perfect cause, determined future events no less than he was himself determined by past ones, «*making history as well as being history's product*»<sup>35</sup>.

Thus Fate, a blind all-embracing almighty power in early Greek poetry, rationalized and moralized to a certain extent by some Presocratics<sup>36</sup>, a law determining the lot of human souls in Plato, «irrational» nature in Aristotle —as is assumed by his commentators— was totally reduced to reason by the Stoics, identical with God, as his decree and the unhampered fulfilment of his plan, coinciding eventually with his Providence, as the realisation of God's will.

In this sense Stoic Panprovidentialism and Stoic Determinism were the corner-stones, but the stumbling-blocks as well, of the Stoic pantheistic Monism. The belief in boundless Providence was soon held to be incompatible with evil and unjust suffering; and the sway of an inexorable Fate (often presumed as equivalent to Necessity) was regarded as constituting unreconciled conflict with free will, a real antinomy —especially in the theory of Ethics—, and as abolishing contingency and chance in the cosmic sphere. Providence and evil, Fate and free will were particularly regarded as constituting questionable relationships, which the Stoics felt obliged to reconcile from the outset, preserving divine omnipotence and benevolence<sup>36a</sup>.

Providence and Fate, however, as distinct hypostases, insofar as the evidence at our disposal allows us to assume, never constituted terms of any sort of relationship, nor even of identification for the early Stoics at least and their immediate successors. Leaving aside a certain hierarchy among God, Nature and Fate attributed to Posidonius<sup>37</sup> (which, we believe, was connected with the sorts of divination and not applied to these concepts

34. Cicero, *De fato* 17, 39: *Between these two opinions (i.e. of fatalists and libertarians) Chrysippus as an 'arbiter honorarius' holds a middle course, but he seems to approach nearest to those who believe the acts of the soul to be free from necessity.* (Transl. C. D. Yonge, London 1907). Cf. the doctrine of 'confatalia' (συνειμαρμένα).

35. Long, *Freedom and Determinism* 194, 199 n. 82.

36. Esp. by Anaximander, Parmenides, Heraclitus (?). See W. C. Greene, *Fate, Good and Evil in Presocratic Philosophy*, HSPH 47 (1936) 85-129.

36a. *SVF* 2, 1183 by Philodemus does not seem to represent authentic Stoicism.

37. *F* 103; 107. L. Edelstein - I. G. Kidd, *Posidonius, The Fragments*, Cambridge 1972. We have extensively argued in favour of the connection of this hierarchy with divination in our forthcoming Ph. D. thesis. See also M. Laffranque, *Posidonius d'Apamée*. Paris 1964, 358 ff; A. Graeser, *Plotinus and the Stoics*, Leiden 1972, 110. Otherwise, L. Edelstein, *The Philosophical System of Posidonius*, *AJPh* 57 (1936) 286-325; Rist 201 ff.



as independent corporeal realities) and some equivocal passages of Seneca<sup>38</sup>, in which the spiritual problems of the new age are reflected, we must come to Marcus Aurelius so as to find a Stoic citation in which Providence and Fate are juxtaposed as mutually exclusive alternatives<sup>39</sup>.

For the early Stoics, as aforesaid, every event was explained as happening through Fate, and justified as being in conformity with the dictates of divine Providence. There were, however, events which though explained could hardly be justified such as moral wickedness, lack of self-control with regard to the affections and external presentations, the internal state of the man who was unwillingly dragged by events, even instances of natural evil. The former as due to ignorance were placed on man's own responsibility, while for the latter a systematic Theodicy was elaborated, so as by means of logical and anthropological arguments to minimize it reducing it eventually to the divine administration oriented towards the interest of the whole. Granted also that neither the contingent nor human power were precluded by the law of Fate, the law of cause and effect (cause being mainly taken as antecedent and proximate), the Stoics could speak of events as caused by both Fate and Providence, without being either strict determinists or naive optimists.

Therefore, the proposition that *what is according to Fate is also in conformity with Providence, and what is according to Providence is also in conformity with Fate* could be considered as an «orthodox» Stoic view, consistent with the Stoic Monism, although it appeared neither among the quotations of any early Stoic nor is it attested by any nearly contemporary reliable authority.

## 2. Calcidius *In Timaeum* 144 = SVF 2, 933.

The above opinion is as a matter of fact ascribed to Chrysippus, by Calcidius, the Latin commentator of Plato's *Timaeus*, seven centuries later<sup>40</sup>. What

38. *Epist.* 16, 5-6 *sive nos inexorabili lege fata constringunt, sive arbiter deus universi cuncta disposuit... si providentia... si factorum series alligatos trahit.* Cf. *De prov.* 3,1 *fato ista ire.* He also calls Fate *rerum naturae alteram partem* (ibid. 4, 1). But *Nat. Quest.* 2, 45, 2.

39. *Meditations*, 12, 14: ἤτοι ἀνάγκη εἰμαρμένης καὶ ἀπαράβατος τάξις ἢ πρόνοια ἰλάσιμος. 8, 35. But see 6, 1 and 4, 10 for the deontological view of Nature: Yet Marcus has a strong belief in Providence and preaches consent to Fate.

40. *Timaeus a Calcidio translatus Commentarioque instructus*, ed. J. H. Waszink (*Plato Latinus* 4) 1962, 183.



Calcidius' statement amounts to is that for Chrysippus all events —or at least some of them(?)— are both willed by God and determined by him. Whatever is planned by divine Providence has its place within the chain of causation, and reciprocally; that is, every event within the causal nexus expresses the divine will. Granted that Chrysippus is reported to have maintained that *everything happens according to Fate* and there is no uncaused event, everything can be both explained and justified. Evil, consequently, does not happen according to Fate only, but has also a place within the divine plan.

How far Calcidius does full justice to Chrysippus in ascribing this view to him will be discussed presently when we pass in review some of Chrysippus' fragments. That which has greatly puzzled scholars, and to which incongruous interpretations have been given, is the view Calcidius ascribes to Cleanthes in the sequel: *What is in accordance with the authority of Providence also takes place in conformity with Fate, but the reverse is not true.*

Calcidius' passage under discussion as a whole runs as follows:

*Itaque nonnulli putant, praesumi differentiam providentiae fatique cum reapse una sit. quippe providentiam dei fore voluntatem. voluntatem porro eius seriem esse causarum. et ex eo quidem, quia voluntas, providentia est, porro quia eadem series causarum est, fatum cognominatam. ex quo fieri, ut quae secundum fatum sunt etiam ex providentia sint. eodemque modo quae secundum providentiam ex fato, ut putat Chrysippus. alii vero, quae quidem ex providentiae auctoritate, fataliter quoque provenire, nec tamen quae fataliter ex providentia, ut Cleanthes (In Timaeum 144 = SVF 2, 933).*

Boeft<sup>41</sup> translates as follows: *Now some think it a mistake to assume a difference between providence and fate, as in reality they are one. In fact providence is God's will and His will is a train of causes and because His will is providence, it is called by that name, and because it is a train of causes, it is called fate.. Hence what is according to fate is also in conformity with providence and in the same way what is according to providence is also in conformity with fate. This is the opinion of Chrysippus. Others however are of the opinion that what is in accordance with the authority of providence also takes place in conformity with fate, but that the reverse is not true. Cleanthes is one of these.*

What this piece of information amounts to is: a) that a certain, and seemingly a serious disagreement, existed between Cleanthes and Chrysippus; b) that this disagreement was not limited to the relationship between Providence and Fate, but perhaps implied on Cleanthes' part a concept of Fate different from that occurring in this quotation—which is very likely to pertain to Chrysippus alone, whose reciprocal relationship implies the

41. J. den Boeft, *Calcidius on Fate. His Doctrines and Sources*, Leiden 1970, 13. Unless otherwise indicated we use Boeft's translation throughout.



identification of Fate with Providence; c) that Cleanthes was one of a group of Stoics (or unspecified philosophers) who shared the second view; d) that the realm of Providence as sketched in Cleanthes' alleged opinion is narrower than both Fate and Providence as covered by Chrysippus' presumed position; that there are, namely, things which, as occurring within the causal nexus, can be explained but not justified, as not commanded by divine Providence.

This is not the only case of divergence we know between Cleanthes and Chrysippus. Both later Stoics and other reliable authorities testify to various points of disagreement between them, and not on matters concerning details only<sup>42</sup>. From the fact also that Chrysippus is usually juxtaposed with Zeno in defending certain Stoic tenets, Cleanthes' name missing, we are entitled to assume that the second leader of Stoicism did not share some details of his master's teaching, whereas Chrysippus often returned to the views of the founder of Stoicism.

The variance implied above does not seem to us such a minor point as to pass unnoticed by both late Stoics and early polemical authorities, inasmuch as it could provide the latter with weapons from within the school to debate the positions of Chrysippus. As a matter of fact no other authority alludes to such a dissention. On the other hand, the Fate implied in Cleanthes' alleged opinion cannot be understood as the «providential Fate» of Stoicism, nor as necessarily stemming from God's will, i.e., as divine law, since there are fated events which are not dictated by the authority of Providence.

Yet Calcidius' text isolated from its context does not offer any help for the elucidation of Cleanthes' concept of Fate, which, in any case, cannot be taken as being identical with Providence; nor is any allusion made in the passage under discussion to the last two above made points.

Boeft<sup>43</sup>, commenting on Calcidius' excursus on Fate with reference to the citation in question, makes the following remarks: *This way of presenting matters tells less about the Stoic doctrine, for which such a distinction (sc. between Fate and Providence) does not really have much meaning, than about the authors: Calcidius, namely, and Augustine who without mentioning Chrysippus and Cleanthes speaks of the Stoic Fate in similar terms (SVF 2, 932).*

Thus after passing in review Chrysippus' and Cleanthes' relevant frag-

42. See *SVF* 1, 497; 498; 499; 508; 510 for views exclusively Cleanthean, and, 489; 511; 522; 525; 555; 568; 571 for cases of disagreement with Chrysippus.

43. *Op. cit.*, p. 14.



ments and surveying the modern literature which has dealt with this problem, we believe it appropriate and helpful to see this passage in the light of its larger context, by examining the author's personal attitude to Fate and ascertaining what he himself thought Stoic Fate and Providence were rather than what Chrysippus and Cleanthes actually believed. The parallel investigation of both the authentic Stoic fragments and the context into which this passage is embedded in the light of the Middle-Platonic doctrine of Fate defended by Calcidius, will also decisively determine Calcidius' reliability as an authority on Cleanthes' Stoicism.

### 3. Providence and Fate in Chrysippus' attested fragments.

According to Calcidius, Chrysippus had objected to a differentiation of Providence from Fate<sup>44</sup>, the former being God's will, which is also a series of causes, i.e. the latter. Seen as God's will the same divine property, namely, God's activity, is called Providence while, as a series of causes, it is called Fate. Hence their reciprocal relationship.

Chrysippus actually, though not literally, is not known to have claimed any differentiation between these divine aspects. He defined Fate as the *reason of things which are governed by Providence* (SVF 2, 913). This may mean either that Fate is the reason of those things only which are providentially administered or rather that all things are ruled by both Fate and Providence, as he is said to have maintained that *everything takes place according to Fate* (SVF 2, 914; 915; 920; 922; 924; 925; 926; 941; 944; 962; 991 etc.)—even if these expressions do not occur in his actual quotations except perhaps SVF 2, 1005. His wording (κατειλήφθαι, περιείχοντο, περιειλημμένου) instead of «happens», preserved by Diogenianus (SVF 2, 925; 939; 998), advocates a milder Determinism than that ascribed to him by hostile sources, since Fate here may be taken as having the hypothetical character admitted by both Middle - and Neoplatonists<sup>45</sup>. It is possible that Chrysip-

44. Since in ch. 143 was said: *now according to Plato providence precedes, destiny follows. . . and therefore according to Plato providence was born first*. Boeft (op. cit. 15) is right in taking the verb «presumi» to mean *are mistaken in assuming* as if the word *falso* had dropped out. Similarly J. C. M. Van Winden, *Calcidius on Matter. His Doctrine and Sources*, Leiden 1965<sup>2</sup>, 174 and passim.

45. Boeft op. cit., p. 2: *in Middle Platonism a Platonic theory of fate was developed on different metaphysical presuppositions, . . . challenge the Stoa*, cf. p. 47 ff. on ch. 150. The terminology of Calcidius is interesting: ἐξ ὑποθέσεως = *secundum praecessionem*; καθ' ὑπόθεσιν = *ex praecessione*. Fate is there taken as a law, «but not all things are legal». For the distinction between *secundum fatum* and *fatale* see ch. 152. This doctrine must have appeared with Gaius and Albinus (sag. 26, 1 εἰμαρμένην εἶναι οὐ μὴν πάντα καθειμάρθαι) not before 115 A.D. according to Theiler (op. cit. 56 ff.). It also occurs in Nemesis, *De natura hominis* 38, Alexander Aphrodisias *De fato* 30



pus in his first and second book on Nature, and in other works as well, ascribed everything even evil matters to God or universal Nature (which is the same) taken primarily as Providence and secondarily as Fate (*SVF* 2, 937; 1174; 1175; 1181); whereas in his fourth book on Providence he did not consider evil as primarily planned by God, but as a necessary consequence of the good and a side-effect (*SVF* 2, 1170). He did not, in the same book, attribute it to Providence, nor even to Fate (*SVF* 2, 1000), but to man himself (*SVF* 2, 999; 1000), moving within Pythagorean and Platonic lines.

What we may assume from this survey (though based upon attested fragments and not upon actual quotations only) is that Chrysippus appears as conventionally identifying Providence with Fate (*SVF* 2, 913; 928; 937) through the mediation of God, and this sort of identification is also attributed to the Stoics in general (*SVF* 2, 929; 930; 931).

There is evidence, however, in which Chrysippus does not appear to make Fate wholly dependent upon God and his will: *Fate is the administration which issues either from God's will or from whatever other reason* (*SVF* 2, 914). If Fate does not stem from God's will (that is, Providence), neither does it coincide with it, nor is it a wholly divine law, a providential order; yet this is an exceptional view of his. As a matter of fact Chrysippus seems mostly to have followed Zeno's tracks in identifying Fate with God<sup>46</sup>. The definitions of both Providence and Fate, besides, given by Calcidius coincide with Chrysippus' literal definitions of them (*SVF* 2, 921; 1000) —though in the last fragment Fate is called «series of things» and not of causes.

To conclude with Calcidius' reliability in regard to Chrysippus, we say that, though the latter did not identify these divine aspects as distinct hypostases (their relationship not being required by the Stoic system nor constituting a problem in that time), yet if the problem was posed in his lifetime, Chrysippus might have subscribed to the view Calcidius attributed to him seven centuries later, schematically taken, for all the reservations he temporarily held, as regards the extent of divine Providence.

Even if Chrysippus denied eventually that evil, moral evil particularly, should be referred to God, as he did not regard it as attributable to Fate either (*SVF* 2, 1000), but actually considered man responsible for it and, even if in some authentic fragments he seemed to have deprived Fate of its moral properties, as aforesaid, he nevertheless used in some of his works to reduce everything to God and his Providence. Thus, Calcidius' statement is at least consistent with part of Chrysippus' teaching, though without covering the whole range of the latter's doctrine, being itself somewhat

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(p. 200, 12 Bruns), PseudoPlutarch, *De fato* 570 ff etc., corresponding, according to A. A. Long, *Stoic Determinism* 267, to the Stoic division between antecedent — principal causes. We believe this doctrine somehow anticipated by the Stoics also on account of *SVF* 2, 925; 939; 960; 966; 995; 998; 939; 1000 and 958: *demonstrativa-condicionalia*). Cf. Cicero, *De fato* 7, 41. Long (ibid.) collates the terminology otherwise.

46. *SVF* 1, 102; 162; 176; 2, 928; 929; 932; 937; 945 etc. Thus Chrysippus was at a loss to give the reasons of the origin of evil (*SVF* 3, 229a).



contradictory or at least ambiguous. Calcidius was not an openly polemical authority, since he did not overtly attack the Stoic doctrines, but their refutations to what he considered to be the Platonic one; still he chose from what he knew as Stoic tenets those creeds only which suited his scheme and rendered the Stoics rivals of his «Platonism». Having attacked that part of Chrysippus' teaching only which served his purposes, ignoring what was in common with «Platonism» he renders himself a partial authority towards Chrysippus, but a relatively fair one—if one compares his statement of Cleanthes.

When we come to Cleanthes, with whom we are primarily concerned (since Calcidius' unparalleled opinion of him is decisive for the latter's doctrine of causation) matters are more difficult, for apart from Cleanthes' poems no quotation of him exists and his fragments are nothing else than doxographical accounts and later prejudiced testimonies. For a better understanding of Cleanthes' views we think it proper to state briefly what is attested as Zeno's theory of Fate and Providence, so that we may be in a position to know what was the official doctrine of the Stoa when Cleanthes was nominated head of the school.

#### 4. Zeno's doctrine of Fate and Providence.

Zeno is not reported as having written any books either on Providence or on Fate as is Chrysippus. He must have laid the foundations of these doctrines in the form in which they were later elaborated by Chrysippus in his books *on Nature*, *on Law* and *on the Whole*. He is presented by sources as having identified Fate with God and his Providence (*SVF* 1, 102; 160; 162; 176 etc.). He also considered the Law of Nature as divine, identifying it with upright Reason (ὀρθὸς λόγος), and regarding prudence and law—Providence and Fate (?)—as the principles of all things (*SVF* 1; 162).

That *God pertains to all things* (*SVF* 1, 154; 155; 158; 159; 161) is equivalent to the statement that *everything is governed by divine Providence*, also explicitly ascribed to Zeno (*SVF* 1, 153); while this holds equally true concerning Fate with which God is identical (*SVF* 1, 102; 160). The divine character of Reason (Λόγος) as a cosmic law has also been particularly stressed by Zeno, who is juxtaposed with Chrysippus and Posidonius as having maintained that *everything happens according to Fate* (*SVF* 1, 175).

Fate is not unequivocally determined by Zeno. The doxographical tradition and Aristocles ascribe the following statements to him, which may be considered as allowing a sort of definition on his part: *Fate is the power which sets matter in motion in a certain order and in the same manner, called alternatively Providence and Nature* (*SVF* 1, 176). Fate seems thus to be reduced to the Aristotelian efficient cause, coinciding with the activity of the Λόγος as the active principle of the world. Similar is the view occurring in *SVF* 1, 87 though the name «Fate» for universal Reason in its property as seminal reason is not





attributed to Zeno exclusively; for as first element, i.e. first principle-seminal Reason is by Zeno considered, according to Aristocles, the Fire (*SVF* 1, 98). The wording of this passage is awkward, for Fire taken as the element par excellence (*SVF* 2, 413) is said to have as first principles God and matter. What is important for our problem is that in this passage it is spoken of *fated periods of time* in reference to the world-conflagration; and Fate is determined as the *connection and sequence of the reasons and causes of past, present and future events* and not as the seminal principle itself containing them—such being the Fire. The world is nonetheless said *to be governed by Fate just like a state which has the best laws*. A certain differentiation between Fate and seminal Reason is implicit in this fragment; yet Fate is still taken as dependent on the first seminal principle and as ordering the reasons contained by it. Zeno's determination of Fate as *a sequence of reasons* is not far from Chrysippus' definition of it as *a series of causes*, inasmuch as Fate is by both considered to be an inevitable and irrefragable law. Fate, anyway, taken either as the efficient cause, or as the law of the development of events in time, is not actually differentiated as a cosmic power from God, but in a purely conceptual manner only; since both God and Fate denote the same thing, i.e. the strictly determined and properly ordered world-process, better, the world's individuating quality.

This short account, though based upon attested fragments, is by no means the actual doctrine of Fate accepted by Cleanthes as Zeno's inheritance. As very little remains of Zeno's teaching and not any literal quotation, and as Cleanthes is said to have been chosen by him because of his adherence to his master's doctrines, it is very probable that, preserved as it is by late authorities, Zeno's doctrine has been coloured by Chrysippean tints. For all our survey of Zeno's fragments, still, we are not in the position to know with certainty how close Cleanthes stood to the views of the leader of Stoicism.

##### 5. Cleanthes' doctrine of Fate and Providence as assumed from his poetry and fragments.

What we may say from the outset in dealing with Cleanthes is that none of the definitions of Fate attributed to Zeno is met with in Cleanthes' remains. The term εἰμαρμένη, moreover, is absent from his fragments apart from one reference which is not pertinent to Cleanthes exclusively. In *SVF* 1, 536 Cleanthes and Chrysippus are said to declare that only Zeus survives the conflagration. This information is contradicted by *SVF* 1, 510, attributed to Cleanthes exclusively, according to which only the Sun survives it. On the other hand, the books mentioned in *SVF* 1, 536 have been mainly written by Chrysippus.

It might be pleaded that Cleanthes may have used other alternative descriptions to denote the concept of Fate, such as Reason, common Law, γνώμη (*SVF* 1, 537), echoing Heraclitus to whom he was closer than any



other Stoic. The term εἰμαρμένη as a technical term is, anyway, totally missing from his remains, apart from the designation πεπρωμένη used in his prayer devoted to her and Zeus. (*SVF* 1, 527).

Cleanthes is not recorded either as having together with Zeno and Chrysippus identified God with Fate and Providence or as having shared the view that *everything happens according to Fate*. The argument *ex silentio* is eloquent enough in this case to allow us to assume that Cleanthes did not follow in Zeno's wake concerning the power, the extent and the divinity of Fate, as did Chrysippus. This assumption is made on the condition that Zeno had already formulated a certain doctrine of Fate, irrespective of its further elaboration by Chrysippus.

That Cleanthes did not admit necessity in the past is an argument for his being less of a determinist than Chrysippus, even if we are not able to exactly determine his position on the well-«known» master argument<sup>47</sup>. On the contrary he is explicitly recorded, especially by Cicero who is one of our most reliable authorities on Stoicism, to have fervently defended the Providence of the gods. One of his arguments for the gods' existence is called «from Providence» as arguing for the gods' existence *from the amount of benefits bestowed by them upon men*<sup>48</sup>, while the divine apparitions and the divine gift of divination which constitute his first argument<sup>49</sup> should be taken as signs of divine benevolence, implying the administration of the world by a rational divine power. His fourth and most important argument, moreover, is based upon the teleology of Nature as exhibited by the *regularity, variety and beauty of the motions of the heavenly bodies*<sup>50</sup>. What Cleanthes says of God in his fifth proof, stressing God's benevolence again, that is, *a perfect and excellent entity endowed with all virtues and unsusceptible of evil*<sup>51</sup>, may also stand as a definition of Him. Cleanthes' belief in the providential activity of God is also shown in his allegorical interpretation of Atlas (*SVF* 1, 549). The Sun is, moreover, preferred by him as the ruling principle of the world because of its *insurmountable contribution to the administration of the whole* (*SVF* 1, 499). This aspect of the Sun in addition to its providing the «vital heat», indispensable for the living organism, is stressed by Philo in a passage in which it is highly probable he echoes

47. *SVF* 1, 489. See P. M. Schuhl, *Le dominateur et les possibles*, Paris 1960.

48. *SVF* 1, 528 = Cicero *N. D.* 2, 13-15: *ex magnitudine commodorum*.

49. Ibid.: *ex praesensione rerum futurarum*. Cf. 2, 6 *praesentes di vim suam declarant*.

50. Ibid.: *aequabilitatem motus conversionumque caeli, solis, lunae siderum*.

51. *SVF* 529: τὸ δὲ τέλειον καὶ ἄριστον... πάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς συμπεπληρωμένον καὶ κακοῦ παντὸς ἀνεπίδεκτον.



Cleanthes rather than Chrysippus: *Sol, quem nonnulli rectorem esse dixerunt, eo quod largitur necessaria* (SVF 2, 1145).

Yet, even if the world is governed by divine Providence, there are things for Cleanthes which do happen, but are not planned by God. Such a thing is at least moral evil, the only thing for which God is by no means responsible, as Cleanthes explicitly preached in his *Hymn to Zeus*. This is the only realm to which the divine power and activity do not extend, but in an Epimethean manner only: that is, to turn evil into good, so as from the divine perspective to be only the good that exists. Moral misdemeanour is solely due to human wickedness, stemming either from ignorance or from stupidity, although man is said to be naturally inclined towards virtue. It cannot be proved, yet it cannot be denied that Cleanthes might also have accepted some actual cases of natural evil as such, even though, strictly speaking, the Stoics did not admit natural evil as a real one. The terror inspired by the irregular and frightening phenomena of nature is used as a further argument for the gods' existence<sup>52</sup>. These phenomena are not presented as instances of natural evil, but rather as divine signs; the analogue, however, of Seneca, who tried to justify them, allows us the assumption that perhaps Cleanthes had put forward the question of their justification as well. The statement that there are things not attributable exclusively to Providence is ascribed by Philo<sup>53</sup> to Cleanthes, Zeno, Parmenides and Empedocles. This generalization and, moreover, the ascription of the same position to thinkers so remote in time and so different philosophically renders one sceptical about its trustworthiness, but it cannot be certified that regarding Cleanthes the thesis defended is alien to him. Philo notes there that, granting that God did not generate matter, worldly events are caused either by the divine Providence or by the order of things. This *ordo rerum* can stand for the Latin equivalent of Fate. As an alternative description of it is used by Philo himself the *transmutation of the elements*<sup>54</sup>, while the terminology of this passage raises claims for the Stoic colour of the context. Divine Providence is, more-

52. SVF 1, 528: *tertiam quae terreret*. . . See also Seneca, *Nat. quaest.* 2, 42, 3. It is a case here of the anticipation of the «fear theory» of the origin of religion.

53. SVF 1, 509: *partim per providentiam dei, partim ob rerum ordinem*. Philo because of his Platonism as well as his personal doctrine of λόγος is one of the most problematic sources of Stoicism, though a rich one.

54. Given that for Philo: *per providentiam nimirum dicitur mundus regi, non quod omnium causa deus sit: nec enim malorum, neque eorum quae extra naturam fiunt* (p. 97 Aucher). . . *expedit porro istorum causam ascribere elementis, mutationibusque eorum* (p. 101 Aucher). See also the Greek text: *Περὶ Προνοίας* 52 f (Loeb ed. p. 492): στοιχείων μεταβολαί.



over, defended by Philo in purely Stoic terms, if we take «*qua tenus*» in *SVF* 1, 548 to mean: «inasmuch as»; for otherwise, i.e. if we translate: «up to the point» the Platonic influence which is very strong upon Philo would give the context a colour of dualism<sup>55</sup> incompatible with the Stoic teaching, according to which matter, as deprived of qualities, is morally indifferent.

To conclude the evidence we possess of Cleanthes' doctrine, we may state that apart from Philo's pieces of information — none of which refers to Cleanthes exclusively — which suggest that, in spite of the administration of the world by divine Providence, there are things not primarily falling within the divine plan, we do not find any grounds both for ascribing any personal doctrine of Fate to Cleanthes, and admitting a limitation of Providence on his part.

Most modern scholars, whose interpretations of Calcidius' statement concerning Cleanthes we shall survey presently, maintain that Calcidius was motivated into ascribing this view to Cleanthes by the latter's hymn to *Zeus* or a certain comment on it.

From a very brief analysis of this poem we reach the following conclusions: The name of Fate is missing from this poem also. Even if we substitute the words: common law, λόγος, γνώμη etc. for it, taking Zeus to stand for Providence (as found in Calcidius' relationship), no definite relation either of identification or of subordination between Providence and Fate is drawn from it. Zeus is presented there as the most glorious of the immortals, eternally almighty and leader of nature. Everything willingly obeys him because of his powerful thunderbolt through which he distributes universal Reason. Nothing throughout the world happens without his agency apart from the deeds of the bad men. Yet Zeus knows how to harmonize good with evil and thus establish the one eternal Reason, the universal law obeyed by all, evil men aside. It is God alone, the distributor of all gifts, who can save them, enlighten their souls and make them know the γνώμη which he himself obeys in governing the world<sup>56</sup>.

Zeus, as preached in this Hymn, is wholly providential and nothing exists outside him to prevent his beneficent administration. Even human misdeeds, which are by no means caused by him, are eventually turned by him into good. This is the greatest proof of his Providence, namely to also guarantee human freedom. In any case evil actions do happen; and these, even if they are eventually turned into good thus serving universal harmony, are not primarily the working of divine Providence<sup>57</sup>. The second sentence of Calcidius'

55. *Contraria (deo sc.) vel materiae vel malitiae naturae immoderatae erroris* (100 Aucher). See A. A. Long, *The Stoic concept of evil*, 333 - 4 n. 19, 23.

56. On Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus and its bibliography see our article. 'Ο Ὕμνος εἰς Δία καὶ τὰ Χρυσῆ Ἔπη, «Φιλοσοφία» 1 (1971) 349 n. 36.

57. For the presentation of reality by the Stoics in bifocal lenses: the eternal perspective and the human view-point, see Long, *Freedom and Determinism*, 176. Cf. Th. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* Q. 22, on God's power to turn evil into good; that is, on unlimited Providence. Augustine's view, quoted there, recalls that of Cleanthes.



reference to Cleanthes may thus find a certain justification. It can be assumed by virtue of the Hymn, namely, that there are things which do happen —and, since they happen, are fated because nothing happens outside the causal nexus—, but which are not in conformity with the divine Providence. However it is not, explicitly stated that such things are attributable to Fate; though in a certain sense they could be regarded as fated, both because they merely take place, and because they betray yielding to external causes: that is, not a proper use of presentations, which is the most infallible sign of Providence.

The first sentence, however, of Cleanthes' alleged view, that *what happens by the authority of Providence is also in accordance with Fate*, if Fate is not divine, is difficult to justify from the Hymn. Even if we take universal law, λόγος or γνώμη, to stand for the Stoic Fate, we cannot draw an unequivocal relationship between God, standing for Providence, and these concepts. That Zeus is said to govern the world by Law (1. 2) may be taken as implying that God (Providence) and Law (Fate) are distinct cosmic powers. In l. 24 Cleanthes speaks of the *universal law of God* as if this law, obeyed by all except bad men, has its origin in God. In the last line, finally, universal law appears as superior to both the gods and men, and this is the only case which seems to justify even the first sentence of Calcidius' statement of Cleanthes, which implies that Fate (law?) is superior to Providence. Yet this is only one of the three possible relationships drawn from the Hymn, since universal law is also found to be both equal to God and to depend upon him, i.e. to be dictated by him. Thus the concept of universal law is not philosophically determined by Cleanthes, and may echo the Heraclitean doctrine with some shades of the teaching of Zeno, inasmuch as the influence of Heraclitus is very strong upon him, and he has written *Explanations* on Heraclitus. Cleanthes, in any case, did not call God either universal or natural law, as emphatically as did Zeno; nor had Zeno himself formulated a clear doctrine of natural law either, as Watson very rightly notes<sup>58</sup>.

If we take the word λόγος as an alternative description of Fate in the Hymn, elsewhere designated by Cleanthes as the highest God<sup>59</sup>, we assume the following: Universal Reason is directed by God towards everything through the fire of the thunderbolt (1. 12); and it is by virtue of Reason that God has assumed his superiority. Λόγος, on the other hand—in terms recalling both the λόγος of Heraclitus<sup>60</sup> and mostly that of Plotinus<sup>61</sup>— is said (l. 21) to be the unity of opposites, the harmony of good and evil, identical with the divine universal law. With this aspect of λόγος, not attested by any other testimony, Fate as natural law is not incompatible (taken as universal cause, including the particular causes, in the spirit of Thomas Aquinas<sup>62</sup>) and it does not differ as such from Providence aiming for the interest of the whole. Yet in this Hymn λόγος is not independent of God.

58. *The Natural Law and Stoicism in Problems in Stoicism*, 221.

59. *SVF* 1, 530 = Cic. *N.D.* 1, 37: *nihil ratione esse divinius*, Cf. *SVF* 1, 531; 532. Cf. De Vogel, op. cit. frg. 918 d: Λόγος *identical with Zeus*.

60. VS, B 1, 2, 8, 31, 50, 72. There are striking Heraclitean echoes in the Hymn to Zeus even in the wording. Cf. K. Deichgräber, *Bemerkungen zu Diogenes Bericht über Heraklit*, «Philologus» 93 (1938) 29, on the probability of Cleanthes' being the author of the epigram on Heraclitus (*Anth. P.* 9. 540).

61. III 2 17-18; III 3 1-2 Cf. R. E. Witt, *The Plotinian Logos and its Stoic Basis*, CQ 25 (1931) 103-111. In certain respects λόγος may be taken as equivalent to the Stoic Fate = world-order.

62. Op. cit. Q. 22 A. I.



The word γνώμη (1. 35) as divine decree, may finally be taken as denoting the Stoic Fate—as described by Seneca—but as God's decree, however, and not as a distinct, independent and impersonal cosmic power, even if it be obligatory even for God himself to obey it.

To conclude the survey of the Hymn as constituting a source of Calcidius' reference we observe that, though Zeus is here presented as almighty and providential, he does not rule as a tyrant, but with justice and Law; yet these concepts are properties of His rather than distinct cosmic powers and by no means seem to set limits to divine Providence. The Hymn does not betray the formulation of a certain doctrine of Fate on Cleanthes' part, and only under a biased interpretation dictated by a fixed thesis on Calcidius' part it might have allowed the hierarchy ascribed to Cleanthes.

But even if it has not been proved by Cleanthes' remains, nor from the Hymn to Zeus that actually Cleanthes subordinated Providence to Fate (it not having been shown that he had even formulated a certain doctrine of Fate or followed Zeno on this matter) he has, nevertheless, specifically devoted a prayer to Zeus and Πεπρωμένη. This poem has been, moreover, preserved for us both in part and in whole by Epictetus<sup>63</sup>, while Seneca has given his own version of it<sup>64</sup>. It runs as follows: ἄγου δὲ μ' ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σὺ γ' ἢ πεπρωμένη, | ὅποι ποθ' ὑμῖν εἰμὶ διατεταγμένος, | ὥς ἔψομαι γ' ἄοκνος· ἦν δέ γε μὴ θέλω | κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἥττον ἔψομαι.

It is true that Calcidius' statement can be justified from a certain point of view by this short poem. If we put its contents schematically: ἔψομαι ἄοκνος=is both according to Providence (Zeus) and Fate; ἔψομαι=is only according to Fate, (Providence being the internal state of mind; that is, consent to Zeus' will). Fate thus appears a broader concept than Providence, consistent with Calcidius' statement: «all events are fated but not all events are in conformity with Providence». Providence is lacking in the latter case, unless taken as guarantee of human freedom. In any case Fate is not a divine decree under this interpretation. Yet it is surprising that neither Epictetus, nor Seneca and Simplicius are aware of it.

Epictetus—who quotes this poem five times—primarily a moralist, does not often speak of Fate in cosmic sense; Seneca, however, though mostly in keeping with early Stoicism in identifying Fate with God<sup>65</sup>, at times puts Providence and Fate as incompatible

63. *Dis.* 2, 23, 42; 3, 22, 95; 4, 4, 34; 4, 1, 131; *Man.* ch. 53.

64. *Epist.* 107, 10 - 11: *et sic alloquamur Jovem cuius gubernaculo moles ista derigitur... duc, o parens celsique dominator poli... ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt.* In Seneca's version Fate is not invoked.

65. *De benef.* 4, 23, 3; *Epist.* 117, 19; *Nat. qæst.* 2, 45, 1-2.



alternatives<sup>66</sup> even subordinating Zeus to Fate. Were Cleanthes known as having a personal doctrine of Fate, it is to be expected that both Epictetus and Seneca, the latter in particular, would have alluded to it. In fact, none of them, not even Simplicius, the Aristotelian commentator of Epictetus' *Ἐγχειρίδιον*, make any allusion to some specific connotations of Fate which appears in this poem personified as πεπρωμένη. For all of them as well as for modern commentators such as J. Dalfen<sup>67</sup> Cleanthes' πεπρωμένη is understood as a more popular and poetic alternative description of the Zenonian and Chrysippean Fate, inasmuch as this poem is a παραδιόρθωσις of Euripides' verses<sup>68</sup> in the Stoic spirit. Whether πεπρωμένη as a philosophical term has any semantical difference from είμαρμένη for Cleanthes —as it seems to have had for Chrysippus<sup>69</sup>— is not certain.

Epictetus in any case does not seem aware of any specific use of this term by Cleanthes; nor does πεπρωμένη appear stronger to the Stoic Fate in the ordinary sense; nor is it inferred from his introductory remarks that it may correspond to Necessity or be taken as a broader term than Zeus, a prayer to Necessity being inconceivable. He presents this short poem as putting forward a mode of life which best safeguards human freedom against external events, consent to the divine ordinance being for Stoicism the chief form of freedom. (*Dis.* 2, 23, 42). Submission to Zeus and Destiny as a road to freedom is also suggested by the context of the other quotations by Epictetus of Cleanthes' poem (*Dis.* 3, 22, 95; 4, 1, 128). God is not to be blamed nor anything else. In *Dis.* 4, 4, 35, even if Epictetus sees Zeus and Destiny as two distinct forces by using the plural θέλετε, Fate is again understood as divine order. That Epictetus speaks ib. 40 of 'supervisors' of Zeus does not allow the assumption of any comparison with Calcidius' reference, since Fate is in this context closer to chance rather than a causal principle (δαιμόνιον and chance). The same poem is quoted in whole in the *Ἐγχειρίδιον* without any introductory remarks, together with some verses by Euripides and two slightly modified Platonic quotations (ch. 53). Even if in Euripides' fragment it is spoken of Necessity (ἀνάγκη) this is to be understood as the divine will, as is shown from the Platonic sentences. Therefore Cleanthes' πεπρωμένη is not understood by Epictetus as a force independent of God or broader than him setting limits to Zeus' Providence which Epictetus had himself defended<sup>70</sup> in terms no less fervent than did the early Stoics.

Seneca in his own version of the same poem wholly reduces Fate to God, being addressed to Zeus only and considering it as divine decree<sup>71</sup>. For him Fate does both, leading the willing to follow and dragging the unwilling, whereas Fate as Necessity only drags, never leads, this being the activity of Zeus. Seneca having himself often distinguished between

66. Fate is often understood by Seneca in astrological sense, and as such seems stronger to God: *De prov.* 5, 8; *cum univeso rapi*, *De benef.* 4, 23, 4 *quantam fatorum seriem certus limes educit*. For the different trends of Seneca's world-thought, see R. Hoven, *Stoicisme et Stoiciens face au problème de l'au-delà*, Paris 1971, 109-126.

67. *Das Gebet des Kleanthes an Zeus und das Schicksal*, «Hermes» 99 (1971) 175-183.

68. See Euripides' *Hecuba* 346, 369, frg. 132. Cf. K. Praechter, *Zu Kleanthes' frg. 91 P. 527 v. A.*, «Philologus» 67 (1908) 157 ff.

69. *SVF* 2, 914; 997; 1003.

70. *Diss.* 1, 6; 1, 16. Cf. B. Hijmans, *Epictetus and the Teleological Explanation of Nature*, *PACA* 2 (1959) 15-21.

71. See n. 64.



both God and Fate, on the one hand, and Fate and Necessity, on the other, was fully entitled to note the distinction, between Fate and Providence if actually made by Cleanthes; he seems, however, thoroughly unaware of anything of this sort or of any variance between Cleanthes and Chrysippus on this point.

As not differing from God, moreover, as emanating from him Cleanthes' πεπωμένη is understood by Simplicius, the Aristotelian commentator of Epictetus' *Ἐγχειρίδιον* in the 5th century A.D. Commenting on ch. 53 Simplicius says of Cleanthes<sup>72</sup>: *Εὐχεται καὶ οὗτος* (sc. Cleanthes) *ἐν τοῖς Ἰαμβείοις τούτοις ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ θεοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ διὰ πάντων ἐν τάξει φοιτώσης αἰτίας ποιητικῆς τε καὶ κινητικῆς ἣν πεπωμένην καὶ εἰμαρμένην ἐκάλει.*

The use of the plural ἄγετε in this poem of Cleanthes does not literally involve the identity of Zeus and Destiny, but it does not imply any hierarchy or some conflict between them either. Fate seems here to designate the individual human lot decided and determined for ever by the will of God. As this poem is a modification, according to the Stoic spirit, of Euripides' verses referring to Ἀνάγκη, it is too much to claim that it contains a systematic doctrine of Fate. A certain distinction could be made in virtue of the last verse of this poem, of which Marcus Aurelius is also aware<sup>73</sup>: being dragged by events is different from willingly following, the former implying submission to Necessity, the latter confidence in divine Providence; that is, consent to the divine ordinance. Providence is thus reduced to the assurance of a moral internal state of mind. A prayer to natural Necessity is in any case alien to Cleanthes' religious temperament, as prayer is in general useless in the face of hard Determinism.

To conclude the survey of Cleanthes' relevant evidence we summarize as follows: a) Neither did Cleanthes identify God with Fate nor did he consider Providence and Fate as alternative descriptions of God. b) Neither is he reported as having maintained, together with Zeno and Chrysippus, that *everything happens according to Fate*. c) He does not seem to have formulated a certain doctrine of causation or to have explicitly shared in Zeno's views in this respect. d) His God is the cause of everything, apart from the deeds of bad men, moral evil, due to ignorance, being placed on human responsibility; Yet God is able to turn evil into good. e) If Philo's reference actually pertains to him, Cleanthes must have considered the transmutation of the elements, i.e. natural law, as a second cause for the things which are not justified by divine Providence. f) He has fervently defended the Providence of the gods, the chief bearer of which is for him the Sun, the ruling principle of the world<sup>74</sup>.

These assumptions drawn from the investigation of the available evidence apart from Calcidius' piece of information hardly square in their entirety with what Calcidius says of Cleanthes. That certain (fated) events

72. J. Schweighäuser (Ed.) 1800, 329.

73. *Med.* 10, 28.

74. *SVF* 1, 499. Cf. *SVF* 2, 694; 1145; 1150.



(moral evil) are not in conformity with Providence is deduced from the Hymn to Zeus. That Fate taken as natural law and not as divine decree may account for instances of natural evil is implied by Philo's passage. That Providence is included in Fate is still not justified by the evidence. Cleanthes is not attested to have juxtaposed Fate and Providence either in a certain hierarchy or in reciprocal terms.

#### 6. Interpretations of SVF 2, 933 suggested by modern literature.

Before we extend our inquiry into the context in which fragm. SVF 2, 933 is embedded, we shall pass in review some of the interpretations of this passage attempted by modern scholars.

E. Zeller, to begin with, reads Calcidius' opinion of Cleanthes as implying that Cleanthes subordinated Fate to Providence<sup>75</sup>, which is obviously wrong, as the exact opposite is the case. A. Bonhöffer noticing Chrysippus' divergence from Cleanthes remarks that the latter wished to substract evil from both the divine and the natural causality, admitting it, however, within the world-order<sup>76</sup>, which does not explain what Cleanthes must have meant by Fate. A. Gercke makes the following remarks: *Während Chrysippus Vorsehung und Naturgesetz unterschiedlos gebrauchte, hätte sein Vorgänger Kleanthes im Anschluß an die alten Vorstellungen des Volkes und seiner Dichter alles dem Verhängnisse, der untrennbaren Notwendigkeit unterworfen, auch die Götter und die göttliche Vorsehung*<sup>77</sup>. This view, even if partly correct, implying concession to popular language, is not consistent with Cleanthes' remains, as neither his poetry nor other trustworthy evidence reduce his Fate, if any, to Necessity. V. Arnold also considers Cleanthes' Fate to be wider than his Providence, *just as in Virgil the fates are more powerful than Jove*. He sees the sphere of Providence limited by Necessity, and Chrysippus forced to admit Cleanthes' position. Cleanthes seem thus a harder determinist than Zeno<sup>78</sup>. This being hardly justified by the evidence, A.C. Pearson rightly believes Zeno to be more of a fatalist than Cleanthes, even though he himself relates Calcidius' piece of information to the evil existing in the universe: *Cleanthes felt the difficulty that κακὸν could not be said to exist κατὰ πρόνοιαν, even if it existed καθ' εἰμαρμένην*<sup>79</sup>. Yet, commenting on lines 17-18 of Cleanthes' Hymn he remarks that *divine omnipotence is vindicated*. This passage is understood by De Vogel in terms similar to those of Arnold: *Cleanthes confines the field of Providence; everything happens by Fate, not everything by Providence*<sup>80</sup>. Both

75. *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, Darmstadt 1963<sup>6</sup>, 146 n. 3: *Anders bei Kleanthes, welcher nach Chalcidius das Verhängnis der Vorsehung in der Art untergeordnete, daß zwar alle von ihm ausgehenden Erfolge auch von jener ausgehen sollten, aber nicht umgekehrt*. Similarly Edelstein, *The Philosophical System* 292, n. 27.

76. *Die Ethik des Stoikers Epiktet*, Stuttgart 1894, 137 - 138.

77. *Eine platonische Quelle des Neuplatonismus*, *RhMus* 41 (1888) 279.

78. *Roman Stoicism*, London 1911, 203, 208.

79. *The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes*, London 1891, 298 (frg. 18).

80. *Greek Philosophy 3, The Hellenistic and Roman Age*, Leiden 1964, (frg. 927b).



these views suffer from the same deficiency; that is, they do not sufficiently elucidate Cleanthes' concept of Fate.

E. Bréhier, though characterizing Cleanthes' position as dualistic since *la providence est soumise à une puissance qui la dépasse*, avows his inability to determine the grounds on which Calcidius ascribed this position to him<sup>81</sup>. As *ein Rest von Dualismus* H.v. Arnim regards the same reference, contrasting it to Chrysippus' Pantheistic Monism and attributing the limitation of Providence by free will (in acting contrary to reason and God) to Cleanthes' religiosity<sup>82</sup>. Nor is Pohlenz' view different: *Kleanthes schied zwischen Heimarmene und Pronoia, weil es seinem religiösen Empfinden widerstrebte, daß auch die physischen und sittlichen Übel nach dem Willen Gottes eintreten sollten*<sup>83</sup>. That moral evil is due to ψυχῆς ἐξουσία is Stoic and specifically Cleanthean; that natural evil is due to matter is by no means Stoic but Platonic, and hardly squares with what Calcidius himself says of the Stoic doctrine of matter and the origin of evil<sup>84</sup>. Cleanthes' concept of Fate, as understood by Calcidius at least, is hardly made clear by all these interpretations which are only partly correct.

G. Verbeke was fully entitled to have given a satisfactory explanation both because he has written the single recent monography on Cleanthes and has dwelt on Alexander of Aphrodisias, who treats Stoicism in terms not dissimilar to Calcidius, as a source for Stoic Determinism<sup>85</sup>. Yet he did not attempt any investigation of the context of Calcidius' text, but seems to have been occupied with clarifying Cleanthes' concept of Fate, which he sees as φύσιν... τὴν ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ in terms of the doctrine of Fate attributed to Aristotle by his commentators<sup>86</sup>. Though we are not in agreement with him in considering matter to be the cause of events and things which fall outside Providence, we see his insight in not identifying Cleanthes' Fate with that of Chrysippus as a correct confrontation of Calcidius' reference, even if he does not elucidate Cleanthes' view of Fate thoroughly, if we understand him well.

D. Babut, in spite of the fact that he discusses at some length Pseudo-Plutarch's *De fato*, a treatise closely resembling Calcidius' excursus on Fate, and devotes a chapter to the relationship of Providence to Fate in both Plutarch and the Stoics, passes over frg. SVF. 2 933, i.e. Cleanthes' alleged view, remarking only that the supremacy of natural order actually abolishes Providence since: *faire de l'ordre naturel le principe suprême, revient à supprimer purement et simplement la providence*<sup>87</sup>; yet without making any specific reference to Cleanthes he takes the identification of Fate with Providence, in early Stoicism in general for granted.

J. Gould, chiefly dealing with Chrysippus, whom in contrast to Cleanthes he sees as trying to preserve the teleology of Plato and Aristotle, (which is not correct of Chrysippus rather than of Cleanthes), sees the latter's views as a deviation from Zeno's doctrine —to which Chrysippus returned— dictated by his denial of ascribing moral evil

81. *Chrysippe et l'ancien Stoicisme*, Paris 1951, 206-207 n. 1.

82. *Kleanthes*, RE 11, 1 (1921), col. 567.

83. *Die Stoa*, Göttingen 1959, 2; 58. (Cf. 1, 102).

84. See n. 55, and Calcidius' excursus «on matter» (ch. 268-355).

85. *Stoicisme et Aristotélisme* 80. Cf. *L'évolution de la doctrine du pneuma du Stoicisme à S. Augustin*, Leiden 1945, 131 ff.

86. *Kleanthes van Assos*, Brussel 1949, 194. Cf. Aristotle, *De gen. anim.* 770 b 9-13.

87. *Plutarque et le Stoicisme*, Paris 1969, 159-161 ; 310-315 esp. 311. Cf. 450.





moreover, was fathered on Plato, the lack of dogmatism of the Platonic dialogues admitting of various interpretations<sup>107</sup>. The basis on which both this hierarchy was justified and a doctrine of causation in Stoic terms— yet as a counter-answer to the Stoic one— was ascribed to Plato, was mainly *Timaeus* 41e 2-3 in a long comment on which, the passage under discussion is embedded.

Despite the confrontation of the above mentioned authors with the question of the relationship between Providence and Fate in terms similar to those of Calcidius and, in spite of the fact that whoever of them refers to the identification of these two concepts understands it as a tenet defended by the Stoics, no one except Calcidius refers to the Stoics by name. Some more explicit references to the Stoics, though always anonymous, concerning their attitude towards this relationship are made by Philo, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Augustine and Origen<sup>108</sup> all of them in the spirit of the hierarchical conception of Being prevailing in late antiquity to which the vitalistic Stoic Monism was viewed as the exact opposite. Alexander does not put this problem in the *De fato* (another example of intentional misrepresentation of the Stoic creed) but in the *Quaestiones*: καὶ γὰρ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ τὰ καθ' εἰμαρμένην γινόμενα καὶ κατὰ πρόνοιαν γίνεται, πῶς εὐλόγον κατὰ πρόνοιάν τινος ἀντιπράσσειν τοῖς καλῶς γινομένοις καὶ εὐλόγως τοῖς κατὰ πρόνοιαν; (10, 32 = SVF 2, 962), where Chrysippus' doctrine is implicitly debated without any allusion to Cleanthes' alleged view. What precedes this passage, not inserted by Arnim in the collection of the fragments<sup>109</sup>, advocates the assumption that, had Alexander known of a Stoic variation of this relationship, he would have used it to attack Chrysippus' thesis; but none of the above mentioned authorities nor even Plotinus who alludes to different Stoic theories of causation (III 1), make any hint to what Cleanthes' view could be.

Yet this different view is actually ascribed to Cleanthes by Calcidius,

107. See Calcidius, *In Timaeum* ch. 300 for the different ways Plato was interpreted by his disciples. On the transformation of the Platonic doctrine during subsequent centuries which would have astonished Plato, see F. Solmsen, *Plato's Theology*, New York 1942, 144; 177; 192. Cf. F. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, London 1971<sup>6</sup>, 36; 171 on the lack of a dogmatic theory of causation in Plato, and E. Taylor, *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, Oxford 1928, 256 (on 41 e): *confusion on this point has worked much havoc with both exegeseis ancient and modern*. K. Feebleman, *Religious Platonism*, London 1959, 139 remarks that Nemesius used Aristotle with biblical explanations. Greene, 368 says that Plutarch from scattered passages of Plato constructed a philosophy of history.

108. SVF 2, 932; 962; 988; 532.

109. *Quaestiones* I 4, p. 10, 19.



and it is to him as an author, and the relevant context of his Commentary on *Timaeus* that we shall presently resort in order to find some justification, if any, for Cleanthes' presumed variance with the orthodox Stoic creed.

#### 8. Calcidius as a source of the Stoic doctrines of Providence and Fate.

Calcidius, a Christian from Milan rather than Spain, wrote little after 400 A.D. according to Waszink<sup>110</sup>. He translated Plato's *Timaeus* and wrote a commentary on it up to 53 c. Until the 12th century Plato was known in the West from this translation. The question of his sources has been much discussed<sup>111</sup> and Numenius, Adrastus, Albinus, Porphyry, or simply a Platonist of the 2nd century A.D., greatly influenced by Stoicism, have been regarded by scholars as his most probable ones. Apart from other digressions made in this commentary such as «on matter», «on the ruling part of the soul»<sup>112</sup> etc., a long excursus «on Fate» begins as soon as Calcidius comes to *Timaeus* 41e 2-3: νόμους τε τοὺς εἰμαρμένους εἶπεν αὐτοῖς. As Boeft remarks<sup>113</sup> this mere sentence was sufficient for Calcidius to start a profound examination of the doctrine of Fate, though Plato himself did not give an explicit account of this doctrine. Neither did Aristotle, but Alexander of Aphrodisias also ascribed such a doctrine to him, formulated in Stoic terms. The Platonic doctrine of Ἀνάγκη<sup>114</sup> was a place much more appropriate than 41e 2-3 to discuss a Platonic theory of causation. Yet though temporarily resorting to such a discussion there<sup>115</sup> Calcidius treats it as mainly pertinent to the question of «matter». Granted the devaluation of nature in Plato's *Metaphysics*, the question of Fate which was pertinent to the corporeal reality and the wordly things only had not such an important place for him to justify the long discussion Calcidius devotes to it.

Calcidius' reasons for such a lengthy deviation on occasion of *Timaeus* 41e 2-3 which he translates as: *legesque immutabilis decreti docuit* are stated as follows: *hic jam magnam et difficilem rationem commovet* (sc. Plato)

110. Waszink, op. cit., Introduction XV. Van Winden, *Calcidius on Matter, his Doctrine and Sources*, Leiden 1965<sup>2</sup>, 2 posits him as a Spaniard after 300 A. D. since bishop Osius to whom the work is dedicated was said to live during 295-357 A. D.

111. Waszink, op. cit., XXXV - CVI; on Fate esp. LXII ff and XC ff. Cf. Boeft, op. cit., 127-137; Van Winden op. cit., 5-10; 248-259.

112. «De animae principali» ch. 214-233; «De silva» ch. 268-355.

113. Op. cit., 3, 8.

114. Ch. 268 ff. on *Timaeus* 47 e. See Van Widen 109-125; Cornford op. cit. 36.

115. See ch. 297: *unde igitur mala?* Van Winden 111 ff; Boeft, op. cit., 74 - 75.





*de qua multa disceptatio habita inter veteres perseverat etiamnunc.* He thinks it, therefore, his duty to present the «Platonic» doctrine—*though not that of others*—as it would take him long to follow the others, some of whom believe that nothing happens according to Fate, others that everything does, and nothing is in human will and power, and others both that some things are fated and some attributable to the freedom of the will. It looks as if the problem is posed between Fate and free will, but it also turns out to be between Fate and Providence, and between Providence and evil.

Thus in ch. 143-190, a treatise on Fate, complete in itself, is embedded, which, for all Calcidius' promises to write an exposition of the Platonic doctrine of Fate only, is actually a thorough Middle-Platonic account also occurring in other Prae- and Neo-Platonists, yet with many modifications<sup>116</sup> and additional elements on Calcidius' part, and many references to the Stoics in both the destructive and the constructive part of it. It has been divided as follows<sup>116a</sup>: ch. 142: Preface; 143-159: the fundamentals of the Platonic doctrine of Fate; 160-175: refutation of Stoic arguments against the Platonic doctrine of Fate; 175-190: renewed exposition of the Platonic doctrine of Fate.

The problem of the direct and indirect sources of this particular section of Calcidius' commentary has been greatly debated. Waszink regarding Numenius as the author intellectualis of the whole commentary believed he found additional elements for his argument in this tractatus on Fate. He also suggested that Alexander of Aphrodisias known to Calcidius through Porphyry was a very probable source<sup>117</sup>. Theiler opted for the school of Gaius<sup>118</sup> and Gercke for a Platonist of the 2nd century A.D., who also was the source of Pseudo-Plutarch and Nemesis<sup>119</sup>, while Posidonius, the Aristotelian Adrastus, even Plotinus were at times regarded as probable sources<sup>120</sup>. Boeft has convincingly shown<sup>121</sup> that Porphyry is very likely to have been Calcidius' direct source and this seems very probable to Van Winden<sup>122</sup> also, inasmuch as Porphyry was accused of transcribing Nume-

116. Waszink XXIV: *non sine dispositionis mutationibus satis gravibus*. Van Winden speaks of the author's talents and does not consider him a mere compileator (p. 3). He also remarks (p. 214) that Calcidius modified Numenius to fit his own concept of the soul. Numenius is generally regarded as Neopythagorean.

116a. Waszink XXXI, cf. Boeft 4-6.

117. Waszink LIX, XC ff.

118. *Ammonius und Porphyrius*, in *Entrétiens sur l'Antiquité Classique* XII, Genève 1965. Cf. Waszink, *Porphyrius und Numenius*, ib. 35-83.

119. *Eine platonische Quelle des Neuplatonismus*, 287-291.

120. Waszink XXXVII; Van Winden 5-10; See also E. Steinheimer, *Untersuchungen über die Quellen des Chalcidius*, Aschaffenburg 1912; B. W. Switalski, *Des Chalcidius Kommentar zu Plato's Timaeus*, Münster 1902; R. M. Jones, *Chalcidius and Neo-Platonism*, CP 13 (1918) 194-208.

121. Op. cit. 127-137.

122. Op. cit. 247, 248-259, 252.



nus. Waszink<sup>123</sup> himself in a paper later to his edition of Calcidius seemed to accept Theiler's view of an author belonging to the school of Gaius, whom Calcidius might have known through Porphyry together with Numenius and Alexander of Aphrodisias. It may thus be said that it is highly plausible that Calcidius in his tractatus on Fate might have adapted a treatise of Porphyry on Fate, which in all probability belonged to his ὑπομνήματα on Plato's *Timaeus*<sup>124</sup>. Even if the material is rather prae-Neoplatonic, Porphyry's ultimate authorship justifies both some Neo-Platonic (Ammonian) elements, such as the hierarchy of the hypostases in ch. 176, 177, 188 and some Aristotelian ones. For all the Stoic influence upon Calcidius or his source, even in the exposition of the «Platonic» doctrine of Fate, there has not been any particular Stoic source detected, whereas the undoubted influence of the Neopythagorean Numenius accounts for the antistoeic position of the treatise.

Calcidius in the sequel of the preface, now translating *Timaeus* 41e 2-3 in Stoic terms as: *universam factorum seriem revelasse*, understands it as implying that *according to Plato providence precedes, destiny follows*: i.e. that according to Plato *Providence was born first; fatum quidem dicimus ex providentia fore, non tamen providentiam ex fato* (ch. 143). It will not be argued here that the implications of the Platonic text<sup>125</sup>, as drawn by Calcidius are hardly justified from the text itself, inasmuch as Calcidius wrongly understands here the arrangement of the universe as the work of the hypostasized Providence<sup>126</sup>. What concerns us is that the view he ascribes to Plato, repeated in ch. 147: *sic fatum quidem ex providentia est nec tamen ex fato providentia* is the exact opposite of what in the sequel he ascribes to Cleanthes which constitutes the fragment under discussion.

Actually, after determining the Platonic Fate both as essence and as act, the latter being the *unchangeable law and inevitable decree which accompanies the nature of the world and by which all things in the world are ruled*, the former the *three-partite world-soul*, he states the Stoic counter-positions which we have already quoted. Since Calcidius does not comment on Cleanthes and Chrysippus views, we shall try to understand their meaning from what he thinks of the «Platonic» hierarchy, which is the reverse of the «Cleanthean» one. It might be supposed that he takes the Stoic views to imply that *everything happens according to fate*—abbreviations being usual to him—as he says in the sequel: «*But Plato adheres*

123. *Studien zu Timaeoskommentar des Calcidius*, Leiden 1964. See n. 118.

124. Boeft op. cit., 136-37. This view also accounts for some Aristotelian elements.

125. See Proclus' Commentary 322e, 323b (*Procli Diadochi in Platonis Timaeum Commentaria*, ed. Diehl III 271) where Fate is identified with Nature, whereas in Calcidius the world-soul either coincides with Fate or obeys it (143 - 144, 177). Boeft 19.

126. Boeft ibid. 8 as it is the case of the mixture of the ingredients for the making of the soul and not of the constitution of the universe.



*to the principle that neither are all things according to providence nor (according to fate) for the nature of regulated things is not uniform; thus some things result from providence alone, some from destiny, some from our free will. . . divine and intelligible things and those near to them are ruled by providence alone, the natural and corporeal things are according to fate. . . ».* This assumption is not, however, inferred from the alleged Stoic view, for in this way Plato would also have argued that «all things are ruled by Providence», since Providence is prior to Fate. Even if it is a general Stoic creed that *all things happen according to Fate*, at least for Chrysippus and Zeno, by virtue of Calcidius' statement such a view need not be involved by the priority of Fate to Providence ascribed to Cleanthes. Absolute Determinism might not be Cleanthes' doctrine in virtue of Calcidius' statement, since neither may Panprovidentialism be attributed to Plato on the reverse grounds.

The determination of the Platonic Fate by Calcidius, even if done in Stoic terms does not concern us. The importance said to have been given to the doctrine of Fate by Plato because of the bearing of this doctrine on all the three branches of philosophy: Ethics, Physics and Logic, pleads for the Stoic trait of all this context. What matters to us is Calcidius' view of the Stoic doctrine of Fate. This should be detected in the section concerned with the Stoic refutations of the Platonic doctrine. But, whereas Calcidius was very confident in determining the «Platonic» doctrine, in presenting the Stoic objections to it he seems to be at a loss to designate what the Stoics understood by Fate.

The first Stoic objection to the «Platonic» thesis he presents arises from the doctrine of God's perscience on the basis of which it is argued that «everything, including the art of divination and human action in general, happens according to Fate». This is not fair criticism of the Stoic position, man being for the Stoics a perfect, principal cause and not the condition *sine qua non* of Fate. This Stoic objection is refuted in the sequel (c.h. 163-164) on the grounds that everything is predetermined according to its nature, which the Stoics themselves admitted<sup>127</sup>. The second Stoic refutation to the thesis that moral evil is in man's power (which the Stoics themselves allowed) is that (*dicunt*) *non spontanea esse delicta* (ch. 165). Man being by nature inclined towards the good, and vice being an error of judgement, the cause of this error must be external to man. The Stoics thus accused of evil a *double perversion* arising either from *the things themselves* or from the *divulgence of fame*. This is actually a Stoic doctrine as we know from other sources as

127. *SVF* 2, 1000; 1002 (?).



well (*SVF* 3, 228-236). This objection extends down to ch. 168 and we believe with Waszink<sup>128</sup> and contrary to Boeft<sup>129</sup> that this chapter has a Stoic rather than a Platonic background, moreover a Cleanthean one. We regard it as an indication, that Calcidius may have had access to some texts of Cleanthes, perhaps his poetry, on the basis of which (plus Astrology) he thought himself entitled to attribute to Cleanthes the opinion we try to justify. Not very successfully translated by Boeft this chapter runs as follows:

(Because error arises from «the things» and the «divulgence of fame»), *therefore those who are to become wise need a gentle-manly education and rules leading to virtue as well as instruction distinct from the great mass, and they have to mark and observe all excellent things leading to wisdom. Before anything else they need divine assistance for the perception of the greatest goods, which though belonging specially to the gods, yet are shared with men. The obedience to the body, as well, has to be adequate to the energies (viribus) of the soul in order to bear the toil of the exercise (ad tolerandum exercitii laborem). Good teachers ought also to be available and the following precept that each of us shares in the divinity...<sup>130</sup> For the same reason things in human power if they are done inconsiderately, even if it is unprofitable that they are done, may cause harm . . .*

Throughout all this chapter there is some echo of Cleanthes' views occurring either in his poetry (1.28-30; 33; 4 of the Hymn to Zeus, frgs. *SVF* 1, 559; 560; 561) or in other fragments (*SVF* 1, 558; 563; 566; 567; 582; etc.). These allusions to Cleanthes' teaching may account for Calcidius' ascription to him of the view «some fated events are not providential» as caused by external causes, if Fate is taken as an external cause, as Plotinus puts it probably referring to the Stoics: *So other things (not the soul) are responsible for not thinking; and it is perhaps correct to say that the soul acts unthinkingly according to destiny at least for people who think that destiny is an external cause* (III, 1, 10, 5-10)<sup>131</sup>. But the concept of the Stoic, better, the Cleanthean Fate, as Calcidius understands it, has not yet been clarified.

In the sequel Calcidius using Stoic material refutes the third Stoic refutation of the «Platonic» doctrine, i.e., the art of divination (169-171) and finally the fourth one: *sed praeter spem aiunt aliquanda provenire* (172).

128. Ch. 168 ad loc.: *vox 'sapientibus' monstrat stoicam doctrinam hic referre pergere... dubitari nequit quin de artibus plasticis in fonte Stoico hic adhibito... ».*

129. Op. cit. 65-66, he considers it to be Calcidius' reaction to the contents of 165-167, having a Platonic rather than a Stoic background.

130. Boeft. 65: *and that design of life, which each of us has obtained as a divine protector*. Yet it is not thoroughly improbable that Calcidius might have had in mind Plato, *Timaeus* 90 a. Nor is the concept of daemon alien to the Stoics.

131. Transl. Armstrong. See Long, *Freedom and Determinism* 181; Verbeke, *Aristotélisme et Stoïcisme* 91; Alex. Aphrod., *De fato* 172, 1 ff Bruns.



From this chapter down to 175 the problem of evil is put in a very acute manner and we believe this section may offer a clue to the determination of Calcidius' opinion of the Stoic, specifically the Cleanthean, doctrine of Fate. We very briefly summarize it as follows:

By the Stoic assertion that quite a number of things occur against all expectation, i.e. instances of natural and moral evil, Calcidius seems to understand that the Stoics he has in mind used to attribute all these occurrences to Fate, as he asks: *is the cause of these things also in the power of Fate?*<sup>132</sup> He criticizes them as conferring different and conflicting powers (virtue and vice) on Fate *when they say that offences of this kind are proper to fate* and he asks: *constituant denique, quid esse fatum velint. Divine virtue cannot be since it is the cause of evil. Nor can it be evil (world) soul either since they say that by fate also good things happen.* Perhaps it is a *mixed substance (malitia simul at bonitate... praeditum)*, which is self-contradictory if the same thing brings about *conflicting powers (virtues and vices)* (172). He again wonders *what is the Stoic opinion about Fate. Whether is it omnipotent but not benevolent, benevolent but powerless, or does it lack both power and wish?*<sup>133</sup> This is disgraceful of Fate. If, lastly, the Stoic Fate has both powers and will, it is the cause of all good things and the responsibility for evils will have nothing to do with Fate (173).

Given that in ch. 144 Fate was defined in Chrysippean terms as *a train of causes* stemming from God's will, the alternatives of Fate occurring in the above chapters must refer to another, perhaps «Cleanthean» concept of Fate, inasmuch as Chrysippus' divine Fate is entirely providential, i.e. cause of good only (evil being actually non-existent) having both the power and will to perform it. Calcidius thus must have in mind a Stoic position different from Chrysippus' by asking in the sequel: *Unde ergo mala?* (174), and immediately answering: *They consider the movement of the stars as the cause.* This seems to him equally absurd, for the stars on this assumption (as cause of everything, i.e. good and evil) cannot account for evil only, unless they are insane and wicked, which is contrary to their nature. If, on the other hand, the stars are divine —an orthodox Stoic creed— they can do only good: If, lastly, they cause evil against their will, they are subject to an evil soul.

132 Cf. SVF 2, 1000: *peccata... necessitati... ex fato... si homines ad maleficia non sponte veniunt, sed fato trahuntur* (Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* VII 2).

133. Similarly the omnipotence and benevolence of God has been questioned by the Epicureans (Lactantius, *De Ira* 13, 20-21, frg. 374 Usener).



Fate is here confronted as a divine law and not as Necessity. Necessity as a second cause (συναίτιον) is discussed by Calcidius at length in the sequel (ch. 268 ff) on account of *Timaeus* 47e ff, which refers to the works of Ἀνάγκη in contrast to those of intelligence; that is, in the excursus «on matter». The problem of the origin of evil is, however, put in both places in similar terms. In ch. 298 the stars are again accused of evil. On the question *unde ergo mala?* they blame a certain perversity: *Qua ratione intellegi datur Stoicos frustra causari nescio quam perversitatem, cum quae proveniunt ex motu stellarum provenire dicant* (ch. 298). Not only is the wording similar but the latin translation of νοῦς in this section, is both «providence» and «intelligence», as usually, so that the relationship between intelligence (νοῦς) and necessity in the latter section corresponds to that between providence and fate in the former (*et parente providis auctoritatibus necessitate*, 270). The only difference lies on the justification of Calcidius' refusal to accept the position that the stars account for evil, for in ch. 174 the stars are exempted from evil because of their divinity, whereas in ch. 298 because they consist of morally indifferent matter. Hence it is not necessary that Numenius is the exclusive source of both sections as Waszink believes<sup>134</sup>.

What concerns us here is the presentation of the doctrine that the motion of the stars is responsible for whatever happens both good and evil as a Stoic one. This view involves astrological connotations of Fate not ascribed to the early Stoics by reliable authorities<sup>135</sup>. Yet, astrological determinism and Stoic theory of causation were later confused<sup>136</sup>, and Boeft<sup>137</sup>, Van Winden<sup>138</sup>, A.H.Armstrong<sup>139</sup> (a propos of Plotinus) and Pohlenz<sup>140</sup> not on-

134. He suggests that Numenius' *Περὶ τὰ γὰ θεῶν* is the source of both excursus «on Fate» and «on matter». Boeft questions this certainty on good reasons (Boeft op. cit. 75ff).

135. The eastern, Babylonian origin of the doctrine of Fate, *whose agents are the planetary demons, the keepers of the seven gates which cut off the world from god*, is shown by E. R. Dodds, *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety*, Cambridge 1968, 13 ff, as implying a cult of the planetary gods. Cf. St. Paul, *Ephes.* 6, 12; Origen, in Euseb., *Praep. Ev.* 6. 11. 1; August. *Civ. Dei.* 5, 1 etc.

136. See Th. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Q. 115, A. 3; 4; 6: *Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their actions.*

137. Op. cit. 77: *Astrology plays an important part in Stoic doctrine. Of the main Stoics only Panetius was opposed to it.*

138. Op. cit. 115: *The doctrine ascribed here by Numenius (or Calcidius) to the Stoa is remarkable. There are, indeed, a few other data which show a certain similarity to it, but I know of no real parallel texts.* In comparison with ch. 169 ff, where was the case of evil in human act, in 298 is question of the evil in general. Waszink op. cit. 202 remarks: *Fata secundum Stoicos pendere a motu stellarum non ab ipsis stellis*, and, inserting Plotinus II, 3, 1 and III 1, 5 adds: *haec argumenta, antiquiora sine dubio, nusquam alibi inveni.* Cf. Plot. II, 3, 9-12.

139. Plotinus, v. 3 (Loeb), p. 18 n. 1. Yet E. Bréhier (*Plotin, Ennéades* 3, Paris 1956, p. 11 n. 1) an authority on Stoicism, distinguished between astrologers and the two Stoic theories of Fate attacked by Plotinus *c'est la thèse astrologique qui n'est pas liée nécessairement à la doctrine stoïcienne.* See also Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 5, 29.

140. *Die Stoa* 1, 107. He ascribes astrological views of Fate even to Chrysippus.





ly find nothing unstoic in this doctrine, but consider it a normal Stoic creed, not to mention Bidez<sup>141</sup> who treats the Stoic universe as the city of the Sun. Bouché-Leclercq<sup>142</sup> also sees the Stoic allegorical interpretations as connected with Astrology.

Theiler, discussing Fate in the 2nd century A.D., more specifically Tacitus' account of Fate, argues contrary to Pohlenz that Chrysippus is free from the influence of Astrology and considers Diogenes of Babylonia to be the first to introduce Astrology to the Stoa<sup>143</sup>. Astrological determinism is also seen as alien to Zeno and Chrysippus by Gundel but there are reservations about the date of its connection with Stoicism<sup>144</sup>. Tacitus' passage however, suggests that astrological determinism might be taken as prior to Chrysippus. After presenting the Epicurean views, Tacitus says: *contra alii fatum quidem congruere rebus putant, sed non e vagis stellis, verum apud principia et nexus naturalium causarum*<sup>145</sup> and, if the last sentence represents Chrysippus rather than Philopator, the view of Fate «*e vagis stellis*» might be prior to Chrysippus' view. Similar is Augustine's quotation: *non astrorum consitutionem... sed ...seriem que causarum* (SVF 2, 932). According to the fragments SVF 2, 950; 954 from Cicero (*De fato* 8; 12) Chrysippus seems to have admitted a limited significance of the stars in contrast to the strict astrological determinism of the Chaldeans.

141. *La cité du monde et la cité du soleil chez les Stoiciens*, «Bull. des Lettres de l'Académie Belge» 18 (1932) 244, 253, 274 ff.

142. *Histoire de l'Astrologie*, 29-34. He ascribes the Stoic astrological speculation to their belief in divination.

143. *Phyllobolia* 42-45. On Diogenes of Babylon see SVF 3, Diog. 33. Graeser op. cit. 48 regarding the astrological view of Fate says: *Two Stoic opinions neither of which occurs elsewhere; but Plotinus may have come across these accounts referred to as different versions by authors of 1st century*. Porphyry in his *Letter to Anebo* showed his anxiety that of Chaeremon's friends οἱ πλείους καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀστέρων ἀνῆψαν κινήσεως (cited by Boeft op. cit. 132). Theiler also considers astrological Fate later to the early Stoics: *üblicherweise denkt man in später Zeit bei Schicksal an Sternenzwang* (42), and Seneca is an adherent of this doctrine. Posidonius was also considered a great astrologus (F 111; 112; 104). A contamination of the Chrysippean Fate with astrological views is the piece of information preserved by Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.* 6, 6, 309, 26-28: τὴν εἰμαρμένην εἰρμόν τινα αἰτιῶν εἶναι φασιν ἀπ' αἰῶνος ἀπαραβάτως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἐκ τῆς τῶν οὐρανίων ἀστρῶν φορᾶς καθήκοντα. Cf. Nemesius, *De nat. hom.* 35; Proclus, *De malorum subsistentia*. 73, 46: *et sentientes operationem astrorum... omnium dominam esse fatum*; Pseudo-Arist., *De mundo* 397 a 8, 401 b 8, Plotinus II 3, 1. Ch. De Vogel op. cit. Frg. 937 b on Stoic sympathy.

144. *Heimarmene*, RE 7, col. 2631: *wer von ihnen zuerst den Sternenglauben mit den Lehren der Heimarmene gebracht hat... vor Panaitios*, Cf. Riess *Astrologie*, RE 2,2 col. 1813: *von grösster Bedeutung für die Astrologie war die Philosophie der Stoiker*.

145. VI 22.



Plotinus, moreover, does not seem to distinguish between Stoics and astrological determinists (III 1)<sup>146</sup>, in his attack on some views of Fate from Aristotle down to the Stoics, taken as opponents of the «Platonic» position, in terms similar to those of Calcidius. Armstrong does not see any difference between those who attribute everything to the world-soul or to the heavenly circuit, and to the chain of causation, remarking that *there is nothing necessarily unstoic and thus all the opponents envisaged throughout* (III 1, 4-7) *may be the Stoics*, Chrysippus' position being the last one. Cleanthes, moreover was the first Stoic to consider the soul of the world as God<sup>147</sup> and the Sun as the ruling principle of the world, the leader of the chorus of the stars.

Similarly the last alternative of Fate presented as Stoic by Calcidius, to return to him, seems to refer to Chrysippus rather than to Cleanthes: *Or is there a certain 'Reason' as they say by which all things happen, which are done at present and by which all future events will take place?* (175) But reason is also rejected as a source of evil since evil things take place «without reason». Boeft remarks that this stands for the Stoic Λόγος<sup>148</sup> (SVF 2, 913; 937). But in this way, Calcidius continues, Providence is abolished and moral life, too. And he exposes the «Platonic» doctrine of Fate in Aristotelian and Neoplatonic terms now<sup>149</sup>, and under considerable Stoic influence: *Nos vero...* (176-189). That Providence is prior to Fate is the motive throughout this section, emphasized again in the epilogue in terms contrary to Cleanthes' alleged view. The Stoic position is there explained as adducing to the whole that which is valid for part of the universe only<sup>150</sup>.

## 9. Conclusions.

Given the metaphysical opposition between Platonism and Stoicism (as for the latter what exists is corporeal, God and soul also being corporeal),

146. See n. 139. Plotinus is another example of an author later to early Stoics who uses Stoic arguments as weapons against them. Cf. his doctrine of λόγος (III 2) and his theodicy III 2 5-6), recalling Epictetus and Cleanthes.

147. SVF 1, 532 though Zeno by calling the world a living being implied a world-soul within it.

148. Op. cit. 80.

149. *Quae de fato Plato veritatis ipsius instinctu locutus est: principio a summo deo, qui est summum bonum ultra omnem substantiam... intellectu melior, quem cuncta expetunt... nullius societatis indignus; deinde a providentia... quem n o y n Graeci vocant... sequitur hanc providentiam fatum... huic obsequitur anima mundi tripertita...* (176-7).

150. Ch. 190 *qui ad unam aliquam partem mundanae administrationis respicientes tamquam de solida atque universa dispensatione pronuntient*).



and that no exemplar was needed to the Stoic Λόγος for the construction of the universe —Calcidius himself, drawing on Numenius, presents the Stoics as critics of Plato in this respect—, it was reasonable that the Stoic view coincided with Plato's, concerning worldly things only. Actually, Plato «considers» Fate to dominate worldly things —the only real entities for Stoicism, ideas being excluded— coinciding with or even obeyed by the second Providence which also deals with this realm of Being. More closely dependent upon Numenius than the other Middle and Neo-Platonists who discussed in similar terms the Middle-Platonic relationship of Providence to Fate, Calcidius attempted both to present the Stoics as the most irreconciled adversaries of Plato and to justify Numenius' information that there was a great variance among the leaders of early Stoicism<sup>151</sup>. Numenius had also presented the Stoics as opposing Plato<sup>152</sup>, though accepting some of his doctrines to formulate their own, and he is said by Calcidius<sup>153</sup> to have been based upon Plato and Pythagoras in order to refute the Stoic doctrine of the first principles.

Chrysippus' view, nearly consistent with the Stoic pantheistic Monism and Panprovidentialism, little served Calcidius' intentions to show the Stoics radically opposing the «Platonic» doctrines of freedom of will, the hypothetical character of Fate, and matter as cause of evil. In Cleanthes, whom he considered as one member of a certain group, perhaps one of the astrological determinists, he found the Stoic whom he could present as the exact reverse of his Plato<sup>154</sup>. Based upon some fragments of his work, perhaps upon his poetry, in which either himself (as he is believed to have made certain modifications in his source-book) or the authority he follows, alludes, he attributed to Cleanthes a certain limitation of the divine Providence; and, as the latter had not formulated a technical doctrine of Fate leaving also

151. Frg. 24 Des Places = Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.* 14, 4, 16-59: τὰ δὲ τῶν Στωικῶν ἔστασίασται ἀρξάμενα ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων καὶ μηδέπω τελευτῶντα τὰ νῦν. . .

152. Ch. 294 *reprehendunt* (sc. Stoici Platonem) *quod... mundum sensilem iuxta immortale exemplum a deo factum esse dicat Plato*.

153. *Numenius ex Pythagorae magisterio Stoicorum hoc de initiis dogma refellens* (Ch. 295). See Van Winden 103.

154. Yet Cleanthes had more than any other Stoic moved within the Platoni line esp. of the 10th book of *Laws*. Both Plato and Cleanthes shared the same position towards moral evil. Yet the metaphysical presuppositions of Platonism and Stoicism are radically opposed, though the eclectic tendencies of some Middle-Platonists did not so much see the particular differences. The transcendence of God and the ascending spirituality, however, implied the subordination of Fate to Providence and the hierarchical concept of the universe, which was so alien to Stoic Monism.





room in his etymologies, symbols and his solar Theology, for certain astrological connotations, he did not hesitate to present him as holding Fate to be an all-embracing, morally indifferent cosmic force, perhaps dependent upon the motions of the heavenly bodies.

In saying that Cleanthes' Fate, as understood in Calcidius' statement, might be taken in an astrological sense we do not mean that such actually was the case. There is no parallel evidence pertinent to Cleanthes to allow such an assumption. We only suggest that, if we accept Calcidius' testimony as having any bearing on Cleanthes, we are bound to admit that Calcidius at least did not make any distinction between astrological determinists and the circle of Stoic philosophers he considered Cleanthes belonged to. Since Chrysippus could not attribute evil to Fate, as his Fate was identical with Providence, those who did so could take Fate as a mixed, morally indifferent substance, accounting for both good and evil, and arising from the motion of the stars. Even if we accept that the astrological Fate is posterior to early Stoicism—which is likely but not certain—by no means is it implied that Calcidius himself was of the same opinion. In his time, early Stoic doctrine could have been gravely contaminated by later accretions and, Chrysippus' personal doctrine being sanctioned by orthodoxy, he did not hesitate to impose on Cleanthes the opinion which would turn him into a radical opponent of his own Plato. In any case the Fate sketched by him as an all-embracing force containing good and evil and arising from the heavenly circuit suits the view he fathers on Cleanthes—irrespective of whether Cleanthes would have subscribed to it or not—and only as such it could do both, account for evil and include Providence.

In view of the fact that recently Stoicism has been wholly placed within the line of the Greek philosophical tradition, eastern influences being thoroughly rejected, it is anachronistic to argue for connotations of Cleanthes' Fate similar to those of the Fate of the Chaldeans, inasmuch as, in our view, Cleanthes did not formulate a certain doctrine of Fate. We by no means argue in favour of such a view. We only maintain that Calcidius or his source intentionally misrepresenting Cleanthes' position ascribed an unorthodox view to him, which, however, can have some relative justification as being in conformity with a Stoic view of Fate sketched by Calcidius himself which is not that of Chrysippus. What seems certain is the fact that the Platonic commentator wished to make of Cleanthes a Stoic philosopher who held the exact opposite opinion to that of his Plato, even if he thus either exercised a certain bias on his evidence or, on his own initiative, applied his Prae-Neoplatonic scheme to Cleanthes on insufficient grounds.



If, despite what has been argued in this paper, we attempted to interpret *SVF* 2, 933 isolated from its context, we could propose the following hypothetical interpretations none of which seems to us sound enough to advocate Calcidius' full trustworthiness.

If we take Fate as equivalent to nature (not as the deontological, normative principle of the formula: *ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν*, where Nature is identical with upright Reason, i.e. Providence and God, but as is found in the formula *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν* which are morally indifferent) we can obtain the following relationship: What is according to Providence is in conformity with nature, but what is natural is not always providential. This is a reasonable view, but neither is it corroborated by the evidence (Fate as nature seeming Aristotelian or suiting Proclus' Neoplatonism), nor does it fit the rationalised Fate of the other Stoics, as by no means being a divine decree. Fate as *λόγος* (harmony of opposites) on the other hand, embracing both good and evil alike, cannot easily enter the relationship of Calcidius; *λόγος*, moreover, in this sense would resemble the natural law of the transmutation of the elements rather than the divine one. Paying attention to the wording of Calcidius' statement, finally, on the basis of what is said in ch. 179 on the difference between «*fatum*» and «*fataliter*» we could take the adverb «*fataliter*» occurring in our passage (instead of «*juxta fatum*») as denoting «according to the law of Fate», i.e. as having the Platonic hypothetical character, but in this case Cleanthes' view would coincide with Plato's, which was not among Calcidius' intentions.

We conclude, therefore, that here is not the case of an authentic fragment, claimed as decisive for Cleanthes' theodicy because it is in no way justified by the remaining evidence, unless, by virtue of Calcidius' context exclusively, we consider Cleanthes one of the astrological determinists.

Had Plato's *Timaeus* been lost to us, and had we tried to catch its meaning from its different commentaries, a distorted Plato would have emerged, while the authentic Plato could hardly have subscribed in full to the doctrine of Fate Middle Platonists ascribed to him. Nor would Aristotle readily accept the doctrine of Fate engrafted upon him by Alexander of Aphrodisias. As the Stoics themselves interpreted into Heraclitus (for all claims to the contrary) a doctrine of Fate even Astrology in such a way that the philosopher of the authentic fragments hardly coincides with that of the testimonies, similarly Calcidius viewed both Plato and the Stoics against his Middle-Platonic background as more radical rivals than actually were.

When secondary polemical literature offers evidence, no parallel to which is found among reliable authorities, one must be extremely careful and try to understand the spirit, the intentions and the philosophical position of the authors attesting it, even dispense with it. A selection of the actual quotations and authentic fragments is primarily needed as a basis for the evaluation of the secondary evidence on its merits.



## ΠΡΟΝΟΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΕΙΜΑΡΜΕΝΗ ΣΤΗ ΣΤΟΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΝ ΠΡΟ-ΝΕΟΠΛΑΤΩΝΙΣΜΟ

Ο ΧΑΛΚΙΔΙΟΣ ΩΣ ΠΗΓΗ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΘΕΟΔΙΚΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΚΛΕΑΝΘΗ (ΑΠ. 2, 933)

### Περίληψη.

Οί έννοιες *πρόνοια* καί *είμαρμένη* απέκτησαν μέ τούς Στωικούς συγκεκριμένο θεολογικό περιεχόμενο καί καθιερώθηκαν φιλοσοφικά. Ὡς κυριώτερες απόψεις τοῦ θεοῦ ἀποτελοῦσαν μαζί μέ τούς ὅρους *φύσις* καί *λόγος* τίς κυριώτερες ἐναλλακτικές περιγραφές τῆς θεότητας, καί ὡς λογικές ἀφαιρέσεις ταυτίζονταν μέ αὐτήν. Ἀνάλογα μέ τίς δυνάμεις, τὰ ἀποτελέσματα καί τίς περιοχές τῆς «ἐνεργητικῆς» τοῦ δραστηριότητας ὁ Ζεὺς, μοναδικός κοσμικός θεός τοῦ στωικοῦ συστήματος (ὡς παραδοσιακή ἔκφραση τοῦ πρωταρχικοῦ πνεύματος) μπορούσε νά ὀνομάζεται *πῦρ τεχνικόν*, *ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου*, *κόσμος*, *νόμος*, *αἰθήρ*, καί βέβαια *φύσις*, *λόγος*, *είμαρμένη*, *πρόνοια*, ἀκόμα καί *ἀνάγκη*, χωρίς νά χάνη τήν ταυτότητα καί ἐνότητά του καί νά πολυμερίζεται. Ἡ σύμπτωση ἐξ ἄλλου θεοῦ καί κόσμου, ἀποτελοῦσε θεμελιώδες αἶτημα τοῦ στωικοῦ Πανθεϊσμοῦ, πολὺ περισσότερο ἀφοῦ πρόκειται γιά βιταλιστικό Μονισμό, παρά τήν ἐναλλαγή θεϊστικῆς καί πανενθεϊστικῆς γλώσσας.

Πρόνοια, εἰδικώτερα, ἦταν ἡ θέληση τοῦ θεοῦ, ἡ *ψυχὴ* του, ἔκφραση τῆς οὐσίας του, τῆς ἀπεριόριστης δηλαδή ἀγαθότητάς του· ἦταν ἀκόμα ἡ *ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου* καί ἡ *φύση* στή δημιουργική της δραστηριότητα. Εἵμαρμένη, πού ὀριζόταν ὡς *λόγος τοῦ κόσμου*, *λόγος καὶ νοῦς τοῦ Διός*, *εἶρμος αἰτιῶν*, πού ἀναγόταν στοῦ θεοῦ ὡς πρώτη αἰτία, θεϊκός *νόμος* ὑπαγορευμένος ἀπὸ τὴν ὑψιστὴ ἀγαθότητα, ἦταν ἡ ἐν χρόνῳ πραγμάτωση τῆς θεϊκῆς αὐτῆς θέλησης (τῆς Πρόνοιας), ἡ ὑλοποίησή της στήν ἀπαράβατη τάξη τοῦ φυσικοῦ σύμπαντος. Ἡ ὕλη, *ἀκίνητος*, χωρίς ποιότητα καθαυτή, *τρεπτὴ καὶ ἀλλοιωτὴ δι' ὄλων*, δὲν προβάλλει καμμιά ἀντίσταση στήν ἐξατομικευτική ἐπενέργεια τῆς δραστηρικῆς ἀρχῆς, τοῦ θεοῦ ὡς *σπερματικοῦ λόγου*. Ἐτσι στοῦ στωικοῦ σύμπαν, πού τὸ θεϊκὸ πνεῦμα διαπερνᾷ ἀκώλυτο ἀπ' ἄκρη σ' ἄκρη, ἡ αἰτιότητα συνέπιπτε μέ τὴν τελεολογία —τουλάχιστον θεωρητικά—, ἡ Εἵμαρμένη ταυτιζόταν μέ τὴν Πρόνοια, καί τὸ κακὸ —θεωρητικά καί πάλι— δὲν εἶχε ὄντολογικὴ βάση καί συνεπῶς καμμιά θέση στὸν αἰσιόδοξο στωικὸ κόσμον· ὅσο κι ἂν οἱ Στωικοί, ἀναγκασμένοι ἀπὸ τὴν πραγματικότητα καί τὴ φιλοσοφικὴ κριτικὴ, προσπάθησαν νά τὸ δικαιολογήσουν μέ λογικά καί ἀνθρωπολογικά ἐπιχειρήματα, καί, μειώνοντάς το στοῦ ἑπακρο, νά τὸ ἐντάξουν στήν τελειότητα τοῦ συνόλου.

Τόσο ὅμως ἡ πίστη στήν ἄπειρη καί παντοδύναμη θεϊκὴ Πρόνοια,



ὅσο καὶ ἡ βεβαιότητα γιὰ τὴν ἀδήριτη κυριαρχία τῆς Εἰμαρμένης, θεωρήθηκαν ἀντινομικές, ἡ πρώτη μὲ τὸ φυσικὸ καὶ ἠθικὸ κακὸ καὶ τὴν κακοδαιμονία τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἡ δεύτερη μὲ τὴν αὐτονομία τῆς ἀνθρώπινης βούλησης στὴν ἠθικὴ σφαῖρα, μὲ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενο καὶ τὸ δυνατό, στὴν κοσμική. Τὶς ἀντινομίες αὐτὲς πᾶσχισαν οἱ Στωικοὶ μὲ βαθειὰ διείσδυση στὴν ἐμπειρικὴ πραγματικότητα καὶ πολὺ μόχθο διαλεκτικὸ, νὰ συμφιλιώσουν. Ἰδιαίτερα οἱ συναρτήσεις Πρόνοια - κακία, Εἰμαρμένη - ἐλεύθερη θέληση (ἐφ' ἡμῖν) λογίστηκαν ἀντιφάσεις, ποὺ ὑστερώτερες πολεμικὲς πηγὲς ἀρνήθηκαν ὅτι κατῴρθωσαν ποτὲ οἱ Στωικοὶ νὰ συμβιβάσουν ἱκανοποιητικὰ, ὅσο κι ἂν κάποια αὐθεντικὰ στωικὰ ἀποσπάσματα πείθουν κατὰ κάποιο τρόπο γιὰ τὸ ἀντίθετο.

Ἡ Εἰμαρμένη ὅμως καὶ ἡ Πρόνοια καθαυτὲς, ὡς ἀνεξάρτητες ὑποστάσεις καὶ ὄχι θεϊκὲς ιδιότητες καὶ κατηγορήματα, οὐδέποτε ἀποτέλεσαν γιὰ τοὺς παλαιοὺς τουλάχιστον Στωικοὺς, μέλη ὁποιασδήποτε συνάρτησης, ταύτισης ἢ ἱεραρχίας —ὅπως στὸν Προ- καὶ Νεοπλατωνισμό—, ὅσο κι ἂν (στὴν ταύτισή τους μὲ τὸ θεό) λογικὰ ταυτίζονταν καὶ μεταξύ τους. Στὰ θεολογικά τους ἔργα μποροῦσαν θαυμάσια οἱ Στωικοὶ νὰ ὑποστηρίζουν, ὅτι «ὅλα διευθύνονται ἀπὸ τὶς ἐπιταγὲς τῆς θείας Πρόνοιας», ὅπως καὶ νὰ ἰσχυρίζονται στὰ φυσικά τους ὅτι «ὅλα συμβαίνουν σύμφωνα μὲ τὴν Εἰμαρμένη», χωρὶς νὰ μιλοῦν ἀντιφατικὰ οὔτε νὰ ἐννοοῦν διαφορετικὲς κοσμικὲς αἰτίες, ἀλλὰ διάφορες ἀπλῶς ἀπόψεις, στίς ὁποῖες ἐνέτασσαν κάθε φορὰ τὴν πραγματικότητα.

Μία «στωικὴ» συνάρτηση τῶν ἐννοιῶν αὐτῶν σὲ σχέση ἀμοιβαιότητος καὶ ἱεραρχίας συναντᾶμε πρώτη φορὰ ἀπερίφραστα τὸν 4ο ἢ 5ο αἰῶνα μ.Χ. σὲ μιὰ μαρτυρία τοῦ Χαλκιδίου· τὴν πρώτη τὴν ἀποδίδει στὸ Χρύσιππο καὶ τὴ δεύτερη στὸν Κλεάνθη. Οἱ «στωικὲς» αὐτὲς ἀπόψεις βρίσκονται εἰδικώτερα στὰ σχόλια τοῦ Χαλκιδίου στὸν *Τίμαιο* (41 e 2-3) σὲ ἀντιδιαστολὴ στὴν «πλατωνικὴ» διαφοροποίηση Εἰμαρμένης - Πρόνοιας καὶ στὴν ἀντίστροφη ἱεράρχησή τους. Σὲ σχετικῶς περιληπτικὴ ἀπόδοση ἢ πληροφορία αὐτὴ ἔχει ὡς ἐξῆς: «Μερικοὶ (ἀντίθετα ἀπὸ τὸν Πλάτωνα ποὺ διέκρινε τὴν Πρόνοια ἀπὸ τὴν Εἰμαρμένη καὶ ὑπέτασσε τὴ δεύτερη στὴν πρώτη) ἀρνοῦνται τὴ διαφοροποίησή τους, γιὰτὶ οἱ δύο αὐτὲς ἐννοίες συμπίπτουν στὴν πραγματικότητα. Πρόνοια εἶναι ἡ θέληση τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ συγχρόνως σειρὰ αἰτιῶν καὶ σ' αὐτὴ τὴ δεύτερη ἄποψη ὀνομάζεται Εἰμαρμένη. Συνεπῶς ὅτιδήποτε συμβαίνει σύμφωνα μὲ τὴν Εἰμαρμένη προέρχεται ἐπίσης ἀπὸ τὴν Πρόνοια καί, κατὰ τὸν ἴδιο τρόπο, ὅσα εἶναι σύμφωνα μὲ τὴν Πρόνοια συμβαίνουν καθ' εἰμαρμένην. Ἔτσι νομίζει ὁ Χρύσιππος. Ἄλλοι ὅμως, ὅπως π.χ. ὁ Κλεάνθης, πιστεύουν ὅτι ὅσα βεβαίως ἀπορρέουν ἀπὸ τὴν «αὐθεντία», τῆς Πρόνοιας συμβαίνουν «μοιραίως» (εἶναι σύμφωνα μὲ τὴν Εἰμαρμένη),



ὄχι ὅμως καὶ τὸ ἀντίστροφο· δηλ. ὅσα συμβαίνουν «μοιραίως» δὲν προέρχονται κατ' ἀνάγκην ἀπὸ τὴν Πρόνοιαν» (ἀπ. 2, 933).

Ἡ ἄποψη ποὺ ἀποδίδει ὁ Χαλκίδιος στὸ Χρύσιππο, δὲν δημιουργεῖ ἰδιαίτερα προβλήματα γιατί, ἂν καὶ δὲν συμπίπτει μὲ κανένα αὐθεντικό του ἀπόσπασμα, ἀνταποκρίνεται τουλάχιστον στὴν πλειονότητα ἀξιοπίστων μαρτυριῶν γιὰ τὴ Θεοδικία του—χωρὶς καὶ νὰ καλύπτει ὅλη τὴν κλίμακα τοῦ δόγματός του, ποὺ δὲν ἦταν τελείως ἄμοιρο ἀντιφατικῶν θέσεων. Ἡ Εἵμαρμένη γι' αὐτόν, ὡς *λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοία διοικουμένων*, ἦταν πρῶτιστα θεϊκὸς νόμος.

Ἡ θέση τοῦ Κλεάνθη ὅμως, ὅπως τεκμηριώνεται ἀπὸ τὴ μαρτυρία τοῦ Χαλκιδίου, χωρὶς νὰ διασταυρώνεται μὲ καμμιά παράλληλη πληροφορία, στάθηκε ἀποφασιστική γιὰ τὸν καθορισμὸ τῆ προσωπικῆς του διδασκαλίας, ὅσο κι ἂν δὲν ἀνιχνεύεται στὴ σύγχρονη βιβλιογραφία καμμία, ἀπολύτως ἱκανοποιητική, ἐρμηνεία της. Μὲ βάση τὸ χωρίο τοῦ Χαλκιδίου ἀποδόθηκαν στὸν Κλεάνθη ἀντιφατικὰ ἐπὶ μέρους δόγματα. Ἐλάχιστες ὅμως προσπάθειες ἔγιναν νὰ ἀντιμετωπισθῇ ἡ μαρτυρία αὐτὴ σὲ ἀντιπαραβολὴ μὲ ἄλλες πιὸ ἀξιόπιστες καὶ τὰ αὐθεντικὰ ἀποσπάσματά του, καὶ νὰ διακριβωθῇ τὸ περιεχόμενο τῆς ἔννοιας τῆς Εἵμαρμένης, ποὺ συνεπάγεται ἡ πληροφορία τοῦ Χαλκιδίου. Γιατί, ἂν πράγματι, ὅπως πιστεύεται, πρόκειται ἐδῶ γιὰ διχογνωμία μεταξὺ Κλεάνθη καὶ Χρυσίππου, αὐτὴ δὲν περιορίζεται μόνο στὴν ἔκταση τῆς δικαιοδοσίας τῆς θείας Πρόνοιας, ἀλλὰ προϋποθέτει διαφορετικὲς ἀπόψεις καὶ γιὰ τὴν Εἵμαρμένη. Ἄν ἡ Εἵμαρμένη δὲν συμπίπτει μὲ τὴν Πρόνοια —ὅπως φαίνεται νὰ συνεπάγεται ἡ θέση ποὺ ἀποδίδεται στὸν Κλεάνθη— δὲν πρόκειται γιὰ θεϊκὸ πρόσταγμα, γιὰ *νοῦν Διός*, γιὰ *λόγον τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοία διοικουμένων*. Δικαιώνεται ἡ μαρτυρία αὐτὴ στὴν ὁλότητά της μὲ τοὺς στίχους τοῦ Ὑμνου στὸν Δία, ποὺ ἀπλῶς ἀπαλλάσσουν τὸ θεὸ ἀπὸ τὸ ἠθικὸ κακὸ, ὅπως φαίνεται νὰ πιστεύουν πολλοὶ εἰδικοί;

Ἀπὸ μιὰ σύντομη ἀνάλυση τῶν λοιπῶν μαρτυριῶν καὶ τῶν σχετικῶν ποιημάτων τοῦ Κλεάνθη δὲν προκύπτει ὅτι ὁ Κλεάνθης ἀκολούθησε ρητὰ τὸν Ζήνωνα στὸ δόγμα τῆς Εἵμαρμένης, οὔτε ὅμως φαίνεται νὰ εἶχε διαμορφώσει μιὰ δική του ἀνάλογη διδασκαλία μὲ τεχνικὴ ἔννοια. Ὁ ὅρος «Εἵμαρμένη» ἐξ ἄλλου, ὡς τεχνικὸς ὅρος, λείπει τελείως ἀπὸ τὰ κατάλοιπά του. Ἡ *πεπρωμένη* τῆς προσευχῆς του, ὡς «*παραδιόρθωσις*» στίχων τοῦ Εὐριπίδη, δὲν προσφέρεται γιὰ φιλοσοφικὴ διερεύνηση, ὅσο κι ἂν ἀπὸ κάποιες ἀπόψεις τὸ ποίημα αὐτὸ ἀπηχεῖται —μερικὰ καὶ πάλι— στὴ μαρτυρία τοῦ Χαλκιδίου. Μερικὰ ἐξ ἄλλου δικαιώνεται ἡ πληροφορία τοῦ Χαλκιδίου καὶ ἀπὸ τὸν Ὑμνο στὸν Δία· δηλ. μόνο κατὰ τὸ δεύτερο σκέλος της: «ὅλα ὅσα συμβαίνουν *καθ' εἵμαρμένην*, δὲν ὑπαγορεύονται κατ' ἀνάγκην ἀπὸ τὴν Πρόνοια. Οὔτε ἐκεῖ ὅμως ρητὰ ἀποδίδεται τὸ ἠθικὸ κακὸ στὴν Εἵμαρμένη —ὅσο κι ἂν ἀπὸ φιλοσοφικὴ ἄποψη αὐτὸ θὰ ἦταν δυνατόν—, ἀλλὰ



στήν ανθρώπινη μωρία και ἄγνοια, και ὁ θεὸς —ἐπιμηθεϊκὰ πλέον— ἐναρμονίζει, ὡς λόγος, τὸ κακὸ μὲ τὸ καλὸ, ἔτσι ποὺ τελικὰ τὸ πρῶτο ἀπορροφᾶται καὶ ἐξουδετερώνεται ἀπὸ τὸ δεύτερο, καὶ ἀπὸ τὴ σκοπιὰ τοῦ θεοῦ ὅλα εἶναι καλά· ἡ θεία Πρόνοια φαίνεται νὰ περιορίζεται ἀπὸ τὴν ανθρώπινη σκοπιὰ καὶ μόνο.

Ἡ Εἰμαρμένη τοῦ Κλεάνθη, ὅπως παρουσιάζεται στὸ πρῶτο σκέλος τῆς μαρτυρίας τοῦ Χαλκιδίου, χωρὶς νὰ ἔχη ἀπαραιτήτως ὄντολογικὴ προτεραιότητα ἀπέναντι στὴν Πρόνοια, φαίνεται πάντως, ὡς εὐρύτερη λογικὰ ἔννοια, νὰ τὴν περικλείη. Ἄν, ὅπως πιστεύεται, ἡ Εἰμαρμένη αὐτὴ εἶναι ὑπεύθυνη γιὰ τὸ κακὸ, δὲν φαίνεται ὅμως νὰ εἶναι ξένη καὶ στὸ καλὸ, ἀφοῦ μιὰ περιοχὴ τῆς τουλάχιστον συμπίπτει μὲ τὴν περιοχὴ τῆς Πρόνοιας. Περιέχοντας ἔτσι καὶ τὸ κακὸ (τὸ ἔξω ἀπὸ τὴ δικαιοδοσία τῆς Πρόνοιας) καὶ τὸ καλὸ (ὅσα προέρχονται ἀπὸ τῆς Πρόνοιας τὴν αὐθεντία), πρέπει νὰ εἶναι μιὰ μικτὴ ὑπόσταση-πηγὴ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἰσχυρότερη ἀπὸ τὴν Πρόνοια, μὲ τὴν ἔννοια ὅτι εἶναι ἀνεξάρτητη ἀπ' αὐτὴ, καὶ ἠθικὰ ἀδιάφορη. Δὲν νοεῖται δηλ. ὡς ἰσοδύναμη μὲ τὴ Φύση (ὡς τὴν δεοντολογικὴ καὶ ἀξιολογικὴ ἀρχὴ τοῦ «τέλους»: *ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν*), ἀλλὰ μάλλον μὲ τὸν ὅρο «φύσις», ὅπως νοεῖται στὴν διατύπωση *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν*, ἠθικά, δηλ. ἀδιάφορος φυσικὸς νόμος. Μιὰ τέτοια ἄποψη ὅμως δὲν συμβιβάζεται μὲ τὸ περιεχόμενο τῶν καταλοίπων τοῦ φιλοσόφου μας.

Ἐμπρὸς στὸ ἀδιέξοδο εἶτε νὰ ἀπορρίψωμε τὴ μαρτυρία τοῦ Χαλκιδίου ὡς ἀσυμβίβαστη μὲ τὰ ἄλλα ἀποσπάσματα —δὲν εἶναι ἐξ ἄλλου ἀπὸ τὶς ἄριστες καὶ πιὸ ἀμερόληπτες πηγὲς τοῦ Στωικισμοῦ σὲ ὅλες τὶς ἀναφορές του— εἶτε νὰ καταλογίσωμε τὴν ἀδυναμία μας νὰ τὴν ἐρμηνεύσωμε ἱκανοποιητικὰ στὸ σύνολό της στὴν ἀπελπιστικὴ πενιχρότητα τῶν καταλοίπων τοῦ Κλεάνθη, ἐπιχειροῦμε μιὰ προσπέλαση ποῦ, ἀπ' ὅσο ξέρομε, δὲν δοκιμάστηκε ἀπὸ τὴν ἐρευνα, γιὰ κάποια ὑποθετικὴ ἐρμηνεία. Προσπαθοῦμε δηλαδή «νὰ ἐρμηνεύσωμε τὸ Χαλκίδιο διὰ τοῦ Χαλκιδίου» σὲ πολὺ μεγαλύτερη κλίμακα ἀπὸ ὅσο ἐπιβάλλουν τὰ —ἀδικαιολόγητα λίγα— χωρία, ποὺ περιλαμβάνονται στὴ συλλογὴ τῶν στωικῶν ἀποσπασμάτων, καὶ σὲ ἀντιδιαστολὴ μὲ τὸ «περὶ εἰμαρμένης δόγμα», ποὺ ὁ σχολιαστὴς ἀποδίδει στὸν Πλάτωνα, ἀπὸ τὸ μεσοπλατωνικὸ —καλύτερα προ-νεοπλατωνικὸ, ἀφοῦ ἀπηχεῖ καὶ νεο-πυθαγορικὰ στοιχεῖα — πρῖσμα. Στὸ στάδιο αὐτὸ τῆς ἐρευνάς μας, δὲν μᾶς ἐνδιαφέρει τόσο τί πίστευε ὁ ἴδιος ὁ Κλεάνθης γιὰ τὴ σχέσι Εἰμαρμένης-Πρόνοιας (ποὺ ἐξ ἄλλου δὲν ἀποτελοῦσε φιλοσοφικὸ πρόβλημα τῆς ἐποχῆς του, ἀλλὰ ἀντιμετωπίζεται θεολογικὰ μετὰ τὸν 1ο π.Χ. αἰῶνα καὶ κυρίως, μὲ μεγαλύτερη ὀξύτητα, ἀπὸ τὸ 2ο μ.Χ. καὶ ἐξῆς—καὶ μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοὺς Νεοπλατωνικοὺς χωρὶς ὅμως καὶ νὰ ἔχη τεθῇ ὡς πρόβλημα ἀπ' αὐτούς), ἀλλὰ ποιά ἦταν ἡ γνώμη τοῦ Χαλκιδίου γιὰ τὶς προσωπικότητες τοῦ Στωικισμοῦ καὶ τὴν στωικὴ Εἰμαρμένη ἐπὶ αἰῶνες ἀργότερα. Ὑπάρχουν



δύο ἐνδεχόμενα: εἴτε ὁ Χαλκίδιος (ἢ ἡ πηγή του, πιθανώτατα ὁ Νουμήνιος μέσῳ τοῦ Πορφυρίου) εἶχε ὑπ' ὄψει του ἔργα χαμένα γιὰ μᾶς, πού δικαίωναν τίς εἰδήσεις του, εἴτε ὁ σχολιαστής μας ἀπέδωσε τὴν πιὸ πάνω ἄποψη στὸν Κλεάνθη γιὰ λόγους πού ἐξυπηρετοῦσαν τὴ δική του θέση —τὴν «πλατωνική» δηλ. θεωρία—, δίνοντας ὅμως στὰ συμφραζόμενα ὠρισμένα στοιχεῖα διαφωτιστικά γιὰ τὸ πῶς αὐτὸς ἐννοοῦσε τὰ λεγόμενά του.

Πράγματι ἀπὸ μιὰ σχηματική ἐπισκόπηση τῆς «πραγματείας» γιὰ τὴν Εἰμαρμένη, πού ἀποτελεῖ μιὰ ἀπὸ τίς σπουδαιότερες παρεκβάσεις τῶν Σχολίων του στὸν *Τίμαιο* (κεφ. 143-190), συνάγεται ὅτι ὁ Χαλκίδιος διαμορφώνει τὴν «πλατωνική» ἄποψη σὲ συνεχῆ ἀντιδιαστολὴ πρὸς τὴ «στωική», παρὰ τὸ γεγονὸς ὅτι τὸ μεσοπλατωνικὸ δόγμα γιὰ τὴν Εἰμαρμένη πού ἀποδίδει στὸν Πλάτωνα εἶναι σὲ βάθος διαποτισμένο ἀπὸ στωικά στοιχεῖα. Γιὰ νὰ μὴ θεωρηθῇ ἡ στάση του ἀκραιφνῶς πολεμική ἐναντι τῶν Στωϊκῶν, παρουσιάζει τίς στωϊκὲς θέσεις ὡς «ἀναιρέσεις» τῶν «πλατωνικῶν» θέσεων, ἐνῶ οὔτε ὁ Πλάτων εἶχε διαμορφώσει συστηματικὲς ἀπόψεις γιὰ τὴν Εἰμαρμένη —κατὰ τὰ μεσο-πλατωνικά δεδομένα— οὔτε πολὺ περισσότερο οἱ Στωικοὶ εἶχαν τὴ συναίσθηση ὅτι ἀναιροῦν σχετικὰ «πλατωνικά» δόγματα. Εἶχαν μόνο τὴ συνείδηση, ὅτι πρῶτοι ἔθεταν ἓνα φιλοσοφικὸ πρόβλημα Εἰμαρμένης, σὲ ἀντιδιαστολὴ πρὸς ὠρισμένες ἀριστοτελικὲς ἀπόψεις ἴσως, καὶ ὅπωςδήποτε ἀντίθετα πρὸς τὸν Ἑπίκουρο.

Κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα πάντως, σύμφωνα μὲ τὸν Χαλκίδιο, ἡ Πρόνοια προηγεῖται τῆς Εἰμαρμένης. Ἔτσι «ἡ Εἰμαρμένη ἐξαρτᾶται ἀπὸ τὴν Πρόνοια ἀλλὰ ὅχι καὶ ἡ Πρόνοια ἀπὸ τὴν Εἰμαρμένη» (κεφ. 143, 147). Ἡ ὀρθόδοξη στωικὴ ἀντίστοιχη θέση, ὅπως ἀντιπροσωπεύεται ἀπὸ τὸν Χρυσίππο —παρὰ τὴν ἰσοδυναμία Πρόνοιας - Εἰμαρμένης— συμπίπτει κατὰ τὸ ἓνα σκέλος τῆς μὲ τὴν «πλατωνικὴν θέσιν»: «ὅσα συμβαίνουν καθ' εἰμαρμένην συμβαίνουν καὶ κατὰ πρόνοιαν». Ἡ θέση δηλ. τοῦ Χρυσίππου ἱκανοποιοῦσε μόνο μερικὰ τὸ ἀντιστωϊκὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ Χαλκιδίου. Αὐτὸ πού χρειαζόταν γιὰ νὰ ἀντιτάξῃ πληρέστερα τοὺς Στωικοὺς στὸν Πλάτωνα ἦταν μιὰ ἄποψη πού νὰ βρίσκεται σὲ ριζικώτερη ἀντίθεση μὲ τὴν «πλατωνική». Καὶ εἶναι χαρακτηριστικὸ ὅτι αὐτὴ δὲν τὴν ἀπέδωσε ἀποκλειστικά στὸν Κλεάνθη, ἀλλὰ προφανῶς σὲ κάποιον κύκλο (ἄλλοι), πού πίστευε ὅτι μποροῦσε νὰ ἐκπροσωπεῖται καὶ ἀπὸ τὸν Κλεάνθη. Καὶ τοῦτο, εἴτε γιὰ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Κλεάνθη δὲν ἐμφανιζόταν μαζὶ μὲ αὐτὰ τοῦ Ζήνωνος καὶ τοῦ Χρυσίππου ἀναφορικὰ μὲ τὸ δόγμα τῆς Εἰμαρμένης, οὔτε εἶχε ὁ ἴδιος, ὅσο ξέρομε, ἀνάλογη προσωπικὴ δογματικὴ θεωρία, εἴτε γιὰ τὸ Χαλκίδιος (ἢ ἡ πηγή του) πίστευε ὅτι οἱ ἀπόψεις του συνέπιπταν μὲ τίς —ὅπως γενικὰ πιστεύεται, νεώτερες— ἀστρονομικὲς ἀπόψεις γιὰ τὴν Εἰμαρμένη. Τίς ἀπόψεις αὐτὲς πάντως ὁ Χαλκίδιος δὲν φαίνεται νὰ τίς διαχωρίζῃ ἀπὸ τίς στωικὲς. Ἀποφασιστικὸ ἴσως γιὰ τὴν ἀπόδοση στὸν Κλεάνθη τῆς πιὸ πάνω γνώμης ὑπῆρξε τὸ γεγονὸς ὅτι γι'





αὐτὸν ὁ θεὸς ἦταν ἀνεύθυνος γιὰ τὸ κακὸ, πρᾶγμα ὅμως ποὺ εἶναι καὶ αὐθεντικὴ πλατωνικὴ ἄποψη, παρὰ τὴν προτεραιότητα τῆς Πρόνοιας ἀπέναντι στὴν Εἰμαρμένη, ποὺ ὁ Χαλκίδιος ἀποδίδει στὸν Πλάτωνα.

Ἀναζητώντας μιὰ συνεπῆ στωικὴ θέση γιὰ τὴν προέλευση τοῦ κακοῦ, ὁ Χαλκίδιος προσπαθεῖ νὰ κατανοήσῃ μιὰ στωικὴ ἄποψη γιὰ τὴν Εἰμαρμένη, ὑπόλογη καὶ γιὰ τὸ κακὸ (κεφ. 174-175). Αὐτὴ ὅμως τελικὰ ἀνάγεται σὲ μιὰ *μικτὴ οὐσία*, ποὺ εἶναι καὶ πηγὴ τοῦ καλοῦ, καὶ ἐξαρτᾶται ἀπὸ τὴ *φορὰ τῶν ἀστρῶν*. Πρόκειται γιὰ τὴν ἀστρολογικὴ ἄποψη τῆς Εἰμαρμένης, ποὺ ἀναφέρεται ἀπὸ πολλὲς πολεμικὲς πηγὲς τῆς ὕστερης ἀρχαιότητος καὶ προϋποθέτει ἄκαμπτη αἰτιοκρατία. Ὅπως ὅμως παρουσιάζεται νὰ περιλαμβάνῃ καὶ τὸ κακὸ (ὅσα συμβαίνουν πέρα ἀπὸ τὸ θεϊκὸ σχέδιο) καὶ τὸ καλὸ (ὅσα ὑπαγορεύονται ἀπὸ τὶς ἐπιταγὲς τῆς Πρόνοιας), εἶναι ἡ μόνη συνεπὴς πρὸς τὴ θέση ποὺ ὁ Χαλκίδιος ἀποδίδει στὸν Κλεάνθη, ἄσχετα ἂν ἀντιπροσωπεύῃ ἢ ὄχι τὶς πραγματικὲς ἀπόψεις τοῦ φιλοσόφου στὸ θέμα αὐτό.

Παρὰ τὸ γεγονὸς ὅτι ἡ ἔρευνα δὲν ἔχει καταλήξει σὲ ὀριστικὰ συμπεράσματα ὡς πρὸς τὴν ἀπαρχὴ τῆς συνάφειας τῆς στωικῆς εἰμαρμένης μὲ τὴν κατὰ τὰ χαλδαϊκὰ πρότυπα ἀστρολογικὴ, καὶ παρὰ τὶς «ἀστρολογικὲς ἀλληγορίες» τοῦ Κλεάνθη καὶ τὴ σημασία τοῦ ἡλίου στὴν Θεολογία του, μὲ τὴν ὑποθετικὴ αὐτὴ ἐρμηνεία μας δὲν ὑποστηρίζομε ὅτι μπορεῖ νὰ ἐνταχθῇ ὁ Κλεάνθης στοὺς ἀστρολόγους αἰτιοκράτες· πολὺ περισσότερο ὅτι περιορίζε τὴν παντοδυναμία τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ θεωροῦσε τὴ μοῖρα ἀνώτερή του. Σὲ μιὰ τέτοια περίπτωση ἡ διαφωνία του μὲ τὸν Ζήνωνα καὶ τὸν Χρύσιππο θὰ ἦταν πολὺ καίρια γιὰ νὰ περάσῃ ἀπαρατήρητη ἀπὸ τοὺς ἐκπροσώπους τοῦ Μέσου καὶ Νέου Στωικισμοῦ. Ὑποστηρίζομε ἀπλῶς —ὡς μιὰ ὑπόθεση πιθανώτερη ἀπὸ ἄλλες ποὺ ἀναφέρομε— ὅτι ἑπτὰ αἰῶνες ἀργότερα ὁ Κλεάνθης δὲν διακρινόταν ἀπὸ αὐτοὺς ποὺ σημασιοδοτοῦσαν τὴν Εἰμαρμένη ἀστρολογικά. Ὑπεύθυνος γιὰ τὴν ὑπερβολικὴ αὐτὴ ἄποψη εἶναι ἴσως ὁ Νουμήνιος, ποὺ ὑπερτόνισε τὶς διχογνωμίες τῶν σχολαρχῶν τοῦ Ἀρχαίου Στωικισμοῦ. Ἄν δὲν ἀπορρίψωμε τὴ μαρτυρία τοῦ Χαλκιδίου, ἡ προσπάθειά μας προσφέρει μιὰ πιθανὴ ὑποθετικὴ ἐρμηνεία. Τόσο ὁ Πλάτων ὅσο καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ κρίνονται ἐδῶ ἀπὸ τὸ πρῖσμα καὶ τὴν προβληματικὴ τοῦ Προ- καὶ Νεοπλατωνισμοῦ. Αὐτὸ ποὺ ἀπαιτεῖται, εἰδικὰ γιὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς μὲ τὰ πενιχρὰ ἀποσπάσματα, εἶναι ἐξονυχιστικὴ ἀνάλυση τῶν πηγῶν τῆς δευτερεύουσας γραμματείας γιὰ τὴν ἀξιοποίησή της. Μιὰ ἐπιλογὴ τῶν πιὸ αὐθεντικῶν ἀποσπασμάτων θὰ ἀποτελοῦσε ἓνα καλὸ ἀξιολογικὸ κριτήριον.

Ἀθῆναι

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