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## THE STOIC THEORY OF PERCEIVING AND KNOWING

### Αἴσθησις.

A great deal of ambiguity surrounds the meaning of αἴσθησις as used by the Stoics. The testimony of Diogenes Laertius<sup>1</sup> is explicit of this confusion. In his statement αἴσθησις means:

- (a) the current (πνεῦμα) passing from the principal part of the soul (ἡγεμονικόν) to the senses;
- (b) apprehension (κατάληψις) by means of *the senses*;
- (c) the apparatus of the sense-organs (αἰσθητήρια);
- (d) the activity (ἐνέργεια) of the sense-organs.

Statement *a* introduces two points worth examining: first, the point of departure of the perceptual activity is the ἡγεμονικόν, the ruling part of the soul rather than the source of external stimuli or the functioning of the sense organs. The perceptual activity in this sense can be identified with the πνεῦμα, the kinetic current departing from the ἡγεμονικόν, arriving at the sense-organs and, then, returning in a spiral mode back to the ἡγεμονικόν. The analogy of the spider-web is indicative of this doctrine<sup>2</sup>. It is rather an unusual thesis, for in discussing perception most descriptions follow the reverse path, or, more precisely: from the sense organ, and via the neurons, to the mind. At this point, note also that a hidden assumption seems to be involved having to do with will, i.e. the ἡγεμονικόν is a sort of agent commanding the pneumatic current how and where to move. Although the text does not state, it might not be too risky to say that the Stoics assumed a physiological perception, the use of neurons as channels of the pneumatic current. What is only stated is that pneumatic currents reach each sense, and then return to their source, the ἡγεμονικόν. The πνεῦμα is corporeal in its constitu-

1. *Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Zeno*. Transl. by R. D. Hicks. The Loeb Classical Library 1965, 7, 50.

2. *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, ed. by H. von Arnim (Hereafter: SVF) 2, 802; 841; 879. J. B. Gould, *The Philosophy of Chrysippus*, Albany, State University of New York Press 1970, 52-59.





tion and this view is quite consistent with the Stoics' fundamental assumption of corporeality. Chrysippus, for example, held an extreme monistic position subscribing to an unreserved corporealism. The only exception, in Stoic philosophy which was the source of much controversy, was the λεκτόν<sup>3</sup>.

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3. The concept of *lekton* cannot be examined because it is out of the scope of this work. Scholarly work has not yet well assured us as to what the Stoics really meant. Sextus (*Against the Logicians* 8,11-12) reports that Stoics held that *three things are connected together: the signified, the signifying and the object... the two of them are corporeal, i.e. speech and object, the third is incorporeal, i.e. the signified, the lekton, which is true or false*. And further (8,70), *lekton* is *what subsists in conformity with a rational presentation*; he also reports (8,257-264) that Marcus Aurelius' teacher, Basileides, contrary to the orthodox Stoic position, did not accept the existence of *lekta*; Diogenes Laertius (7,51, 63): *what subsists according to a rational presentation*. Simplicius (*In Cat.* 10) interprets *lekta* to be identical with *thoughts* and *things said*. I. M. Bochenski (*Ancient Formal Logic*, Amsterdam, North-Holland Publ. Co. 1963, 84) renders the definition of the *lekton* as *what consists in conforming with a rational presentation* (φαντασία λογική), *i.e. an object as conceived*. W. Kneale and M. Kneale (*The Development of Logic*, Oxford, The Clarendon Press 1964, 139-158) find the concept of *lekton* the most original part of their Stoics' theory... *an important novelty in the philosophy of logic*. Due to the lack of sufficient textual evidence, plus, the diversity of accounts from the available sources the Kneales realize the difficulty of rendering the intended meaning of *lekton*; for them (a) *it is likely that the Stoics were convinced... that lekta must be distinguished from the sentences which expressed them. It is not the case, however, that any type of lekton can be identified simply with the proposition* (153); (b) *what is meant is probably the most literal translation of lekton*; (c) *a lekton is the result of abstraction from particular forms of linguistic expression... what remains constant in translation from one language to another* (158, underlining mine). Wisniewski (*The Problem of Cognition of the External World in Stoic Philosophy*, «Classica et Mediaevalia» 19 [1958] 114) agrees with K. Prantl (*Gesch. d. Logik* 1, Leipzig 1855, 421) that Sextus Empiricus' evidence admits a double exegesis: (a) *lekton* is *something between the external world and our mind... it is to enable us to cognize reality... They could have a real existence, if any sentence expressing a certain judgment referred to the concrete properties of an object and in this way expressed truth and falseness because a real existence of some premise from the rhetorical and syllogistical point of view was regarded as something really existing*. (b) *If the lekta expressed a pure notion, ennoema, then a real existence would not be attributed to them. In the first case we have to deal with materialistic empiricism in the second with nominalism* (underlining mine). Watson (*Stoic Theory of Knowledge* 41-48) subscribes to the view that *lekton* means *that which can be expressed*. Further: (a) *lekta* are frames, «*mental constructs, not physical words*»; (b) the *lekton* is *neither the word nor, of course, the object nor the ennoema, but the connection established by us in the external universe and between it and ourselves, because of logos through which we tend to articulate reality for ourselves*; and (c) the Stoic theory of *lekton* might be compared with both Frege's and Carnap's



The πνεῦμα, however, cannot be an exception ; it is a mixture of air and fire<sup>4</sup>. And its function is more general rather than limited in the cognitive activity of an organism ; it is used as a metaphysical concept to explain the individuation of the unqualified substance ; it is like a moulding process from within, giving shape and character to particular things ; by its activity the amorphous substance is differentiated and qualified<sup>5</sup>. The πνεῦμα related with cognition is considered by the Stoics as a necessary part of αἰσθησις and conceptual perception ; it seems that only by virtue of the πνεῦμα, arriving at the sense organ through the neurons, αἰσθησις is identified as ἐνέργεια, activity of the sense-organs. Following this interpretation some of the confusion which can be created by *a*, *b*, *c*, and *d* might be dispelled.

Statement *b* suggests the doctrine of faculties employed by Aristotle, which presuppose the Aristotelian concept of δυνάμει. If so, they (senses) should be seen as abilities or dispositions that function under the proper circumstances. Further, αἰσθήσεις, the senses as faculties should be understood both as separate from the sense organs and inseparable : they are separate because they are dispositions (δυνάμεις), and inseparable in the sense that the absence of the sense organs necessitates the absence of the former (but not vice versa).

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theories of referring (19-26). (transliterations and underlin. mine). A. A. Long (*Language and Thought in Stoicism*, in *Problems in Stoicism*, University of London, Athlone Press 1971) : *it is clearly proper to translate, lekton by what is said «where» what is said covers statement «or» state of affairs signified by a word or set of words . . . lekton has logical and grammatical functions (77) ; lekton is defined as the objective content of acts of thinking (νοήσεις 82) ; our sources do not imply that lekta are independent entities (90 ; also 96, 98).*

4. SVF 2,826.

5. SFV 2,413, 449 ; Gould 59 : *the combination of qualities that an individual thing manifests are the effects of pneuma*; the blending of qualities and relations which the object manifests are due to the *pneuma*. Gerard Watson (*The Stoic Theory of Knowledge*, Belfast, The Queen's University Press 1966, 15 : *The pneuma as responsible for the highest form of unity of inorganic matter was called by them hexis*. In SVF 2,45 the account refers to *tonike kinesis in substances which moves simultaneously (a) inwards and (b) outwards* ; the *a* responsible for quantitative and qualitative characteristics whereas the *b* for unity and substance. These accounts do not give a clear account of the Stoics' doctrine. Perhaps, the Stoics themselves had not defined *pneuma* in a satisfactory way. Hence, Alexander's puzzlement (SVF 2,442) is justified. Translators have rendered the term variously : Hicks (Note 1) : *current* ; D. W. Hamlyn (*Sensation and Perception*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul 1966, 35-39), has only transliterated it as *pneuma* ; J. L. Saunders (*Greek and Roman Philosophy after Aristotle*, N. Y., The Free Press 1966), *spirit*. Spirit by its spiritualistic connotation might be misleading.



The term κατάληψις appearing in *b* is not semantically clear. Is κατάληψις the outcome of the senses' functioning in general, or does it have to do with qualifying impressions, and thusly dividing them into categories? It seems that in the context of this paragraph κατάληψις refers to the outcome of the functioning of the senses in general; i.e. it is a sort of general, unqualified sensory impression. But if this is so, it is contrary to the meaning of the term, especially when it is used to predicate impressions as cataleptic on which the criterion of truth is based. We will return to this problem later.

Statement *c* is explicit. It says that the term αἴσθησις is used by Stoics to denote αἰσθητήρια, sense organs.

Statement *d* however admits two interpretations: the one links the term ἐνέργεια (activity) specifically with the sense organs; the second refers to the entire activity beginning with the ἡγεμονικὸν<sup>6</sup> continuing through the senses to the functioning of the sense organs, and ending up at the κατάληψις (if the latter is taken to be the result<sup>7</sup> of the perceptual process). If the former, the connotation of ἐνέργεια is limited; if the latter, though it includes the former it has a wider meaning. In the text the sentence is: the activity of the sense-organs is itself also called sensation (αἴσθησις)<sup>8</sup>. This syntactical structure does not necessarily denote only the ἐνέργεια of the sense organs; if it did, the sentence should be attached to the previous sentence: the apparatus of the sense-organs. But in fact it is not attached. I am inclined to support the wider interpretation that Stoics at times used αἴσθησις as a term or a substitution for the entire perceptual activity. Hick's translation<sup>9</sup> is inaccurate and misleading; Saunders' translation<sup>10</sup> is literal, but due to Laertius' lack of specification one is still left without a complete explanation; Hamlyn does not mention this sentence at all.

#### Ο ἰ κ ε ἰ ὠ σ ι ς.

Of much interest are Hierocles's views<sup>11</sup> of συναίσθησις as consisting a necessary condition of perception. Hierocles maintained that in order to

6. The Stoics locate the *hegemonicon* in the heart, except Cleanthes who assumed it to be seated in the brain (SVF 2,880, 885, 894, 910).

7. Hamlyn (Note 5) seems to do this p. 37.

8. Diogenes Laertius 7,52,6.

9. Ibid.

10. Saunders 67: *Furthermore, the activity itself is called sensation.*

11. M. van Straaten, *Panetius, sa vie, ses écrits et sa doctrine*, Amsterdam 1946, Fragn. 96.



perceive a physical thing it is necessary that the perceiver has first an awareness of himself as being a sort of storehouse of the incoming sense impressions. It is also interesting to note that Hierocles refers to the *τονική κίνησις*, the tensional inner-perceptual field created from the *ἀντερειστικόν*, the resistance of the body towards the *psyche*, resulting up to the passing reports to the *ἡγεμονικόν*. This inner-kinetic conflict eventually results up to what is called *συναίσθησις*, self-consciousness, which, in turn, is a necessary factor for perception. This new aspect of the Stoic theory of perception has been discussed, not sufficiently, but just to the extent to serve the main discussion on the subject of *οἰκείωσις*. *Οἰκείωσις* is referred to as a kind of organic power which is rather difficult to characterize either as inborn or acquired immediately after the birth of man. The power of *οἰκείωσις* has its opposite (*ἀλλοτρίωσις*); both can be regarded as the starting points of sensing (*αἰσθάνεσθαι*). Basically these powers are related with the organisms' survival, or, in Aristotelian terms *σώζεσθαι*, self-preservation. *Οἰκείωσις* is an act of assimilation of what is conducive to the survival of the organism<sup>12</sup> whereas *ἀλλοτρίωσις* an act of rejection of what might be detrimental to it; the former is beset by a feeling of pleasure, the latter by pain. This kind of «transaction» between the organism and environment is the *ἀρχὴ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι*<sup>13</sup>. We can note, then, that *αἴσθησις* can be traced genetically back to a biological basis. *Συναίσθησις*, self-consciousness is necessary for the development and the correct exercise of *οἰκείωσις* and *ἀλλοτρίωσις*, and, hence, of sensory perception. The reader can compare this theory with both Aristotle's functionalism and the modern theory of perception (Assimilation-Adaptation-Equilibrium) by the Swiss psychologist Piaget.

### Λ ό γ ο ς.

Despite their empiricist theory, the Stoics following the old philosophical tradition seem to transcend the experiential cognition. *Logos* is introduced as a complementary factor of man's total cognitive process. The distinction is clearly shown by this passage:

*According to them it is by sense that we apprehend black and white, rough and smooth, whereas it is by reason (λόγος) that we apprehend the conclusion of demonstration*<sup>14</sup>.

The effectiveness of sensation, *αἴσθησις*, then is limited. By means of sensation we only can know the sensory data of primary qualities. The sensory data (primary impressions) are, according to Aetius' testimony,

12. Diog. Laert. 7,85.

13. SVF 1,197.

14. Diog. Laert. 7,52,6-9.



accurate, an assertion reminding one of Aristotle's concept of the unmis-takability of perceiving particular sensibles, ἴδια. But, this is contrary to Cicero's testimony, who says :

*That which was grasped by sense he [Zeno] called a sensation, and if it was grasped so that it could not be «destroyed» by reason, he called it knowledge<sup>15</sup>.*

The final part of the statement suggests that sensations *could be* destroyed by reason. And, if *destroyed* refers to the discovery of something as false, this implies both that Stoics make no universal statement concerning the accuracy of the sensations and that reason is recognized by them as a major factor in the acquisition of knowledge. While Cicero refers specifically to Zeno, this does not necessarily extend his view to the entire group of Stoic philosophers. Anyway, *here* sensations might not denote exclusively primary qualities, i.e. raw sensory data, unrelated and un-signified ; «sensations» might refer to additional elements of more advanced cognitive stages.

What might be very enlightening at this junction is Chalcidius's testimony<sup>16</sup> which refers to Chrysippus's position :

*The whole soul extends its senses, which are functions of it, like branches, from that ruling part, as from a tree; and these senses are to be reporters of those things which they perceive, while the ruling part itself, like a king, passes judgment upon those things which the senses will have reported. Moreover these things which are sensed, namely bodies, are composites, and thus each sense perceives some one ingredient in the composition; this one, colour; another, sound; and while that one discerns the flavor of fluids, this one discerns the aromas of substances, and that one by touch distinguished roughness and smoothness. And all this is concerned with what is present; however, no sense remembers what is past or apprehends what is future. Rather it is the peculiar function of inner deliberation and reflection to observe the affection of each sense and to infer what this object is from those data which the senses report, and to apprehend what is present, and moreover to remember what is no longer present, and to foresee what will happen.*

It seems that *inner deliberation and reflection* should be identified with λόγος, «reason» of the preceding two passages (14,15) ; the function of both of them is to enable the perceiver to transcend the raw information from sense-data, draw inferences and apprehend the object perceived. Further, this testimony alludes to the factor of past experience and the power of recalling, plus, to an identification of λόγος with the ἡγεμονικόν, the ruling part.

As for the way the coming stimuli from the object are transmitted to the sense organs the information is limited. We are only said that in visual

15. SVF 1,60 ; Saunders 66.

16. SVF 2,879.





perception the air is a sort of transmitter where the sense data from the object are conveyed by means of an air mass whose shape is like a cone; the base of the cone is on the object while the peak of the cone contacts the visual organ. The acoustic sense-data are transmitted too by air, but the air shows a wavelike movement which begins from the object and ends in the receiving part of the ear<sup>17</sup>.

#### Φαντασία.

In the Stoic theory αἴσθησις is confusingly related to a family of cognitive concepts. It is first related with φαντασία, presentation; although Stoics at times differentiate one from the other<sup>18</sup>, in this they are not always consistent. If by φαντασία they refer to the outcome of processes<sup>19</sup>, and αἴσθησις is taken as a process, then they are referring to two different things. But sentence b<sup>20</sup> in which κατάληψις is taken to mean the end product of process and since κατάληψις is said to be identified with αἴσθησις<sup>21</sup>, we say that Stoics talk about one thing. Despite this last statement, I interpret them as meaning two different things, having clearly conceived the difference between psychological processes and static epistemological units. Confusion is created by their use of inadequate terms relating to the perception family. It can be suggested that at this point both Diogenes and Sextus might have misrepresented the Stoic theories.

The relation of αἴσθησις with φαντασία, then, is that of process to product of the process. Stoics placed much emphasis on the latter since they regarded it as the primary epistemological unit upon which all cognitive concepts and operations are based. It is generically indispensable for both cognition in general, and the criterion of truth in particular<sup>22</sup>. But what is φαντασία? The general answer is that it is a τύπωσις, an inscription of traces on the soul. It reproduces in a microscopic scale some of the most basic properties and characteristics of the external object; it functions as a kind of medium, a means through which the ἡγεμονικόν, with its activities of comparison and co-ordination can perceive the physical object. We should

17. Diog. Laert. 7,157-58. Also, in S. Sambursky, *The Physics of the Stoics*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul 1959, where he relates aesthesis with physics.

18. Diog. Laert. 7,49,1.

19. Sextus, *Against the Logicians* 1,242-45. The differentiation of *phantasiae* (probable, improbable, true, false, etc.) assumes them to be static.

20. Diog. Laert 7,50.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid. 7,49-50: *The criterion of truth cannot be without phantasia.*





recall that for Stoics soul is both corporeal and at birth blank as a sheet<sup>23</sup>. But τυπώσεις as understood by Cleanthes i.e. κατὰ εἰσοχήν τε καὶ ἐξοχήν<sup>24</sup>, carved and emincenced, considered as a crude doctrine, was improved by Chrysippus who explained that what takes place in the mind is a mere ἑτεροίωσις, an alteration. Chrysippus argues against the views of Cleanthes. If the τύπωσις theory is valid, Chrysippus asks, how could the same part of the soul have two forms, schemata, at the same time? This would result in a contradiction. If numerous opposing presentations could occur ἅμα, simultaneously, a mental confusion would be the outcome. Could each new form overrule those already present? That would be absurd. This is reminiscent of the similar case, usually known as the memory problem, of the psychologists who advocated a strict localization of experience. For such an operation (τύπωσις) to take place would require the abolition of memory. After several revisions the following definitions were formed:

- (a) *Presentation is an impression, τύπωσις, in the soul in so far as it is «soul»<sup>25</sup>.*
- (b) *Presentation is an alteration, ἑτεροίωσις, of the regent part<sup>26</sup>.*
- (c) *Presentation is an alteration, ἑτεροίωσις, of the regent part by way of passivity, κατὰ πείσιν<sup>27</sup>.*

In the first place, what is really interesting about the successive revisions is the introduction of ἑτεροίωσις, alteration, which meets the problems of both impenetrability and exhaustibility. The former, impenetrability, questions the feasibility of storing in the form of τυπώσεις, traces in the same region, whether it is upon the heart or upon the brain; the latter, exhaustibility refers to whether the corporeal ἡγεμονικόν would exhaust its possibility of being «typosized», stamped upon, at some time after the innumerable incoming sense-experiences. The replacement of the static τύπωσις by the changeable ἑτεροίωσις can make intelligible how the same part of the soul can at the same moment perform more than one alteration<sup>28</sup>, i.e. to multifunction. This could be considered novel, given the long-standing theory of «wax-like impressions» of the soul. In the second place the Stoics attach a new meaning to the concept of soul. We should remember how crucial an assumption the concept of ψυχή was in the philosophy of Pre-socratics, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. And, also, we should be aware how ill-defined it was. Now, in their discussion, the Stoics point out that ψυχή has both a broad and a narrow sense. Broadly, it denotes eight parts: the five senses, speech, reproduction, and the ἡγεμονικόν, while in a narrow sense it refers

23. SVF 2,83 (Aetius, *Placita*).

24. Sextus, *Against the Logicians* 1,228.

25. Ibid. 1,233,4-5.

26. Ibid. 1,236,4.

27. Ibid. 236,8-10.

28. Ibid. 1,230.



to that which ties together and co-ordinates all parts of the soul (τό τε συνέχον τὴν ὅλην σύγκρισιν), the ἡγεμονικόν, the regent part<sup>29</sup>. In defending Zeno the latter Stoics interpret his use of ψυχὴ as referring to the regent part; this thesis is of course contrary to the Aristotelian tradition in which ψυχὴ referred to all psychological functions. Lastly, the argument between Stoics and Skeptics concerning the definition of phantasia, presentation, raises the question of perceptual passivity. Skeptics argue that if presentation is «an alteration of the regent part» the definition is too broad. For when other functions such as ὁρμή, impulse, συγκατάθεσις, assent and κατάληψις, apprehension take place corresponding alterations too occur in the regent part; then, the problem is what is that which differentiates these alterations from those caused by phantasia's presentation alone? The differentiating characteristic, Stoics claim, is that alterations corresponding to presentations occur «by way of passivity». In other words, they see the regent part as active only when impulses assent and συγκατάθεσις take place, but passive when presentations occur, which is absurd. This is not enough to quiet the objection raised by the Skeptics. Could passivity be the differentiating mark of presentation, the Skeptics ask; they claim this is also too broad. Since the regent part as corporeal itself is nourished (τρέφεται), increased (αὐξεται), and altered (ἐτεροιοῦται) by passivity (κατὰ πείσιν)<sup>30</sup>, then these events as characterized by passivity should be regarded as presentations too; but this is absurd. The main objection one can raise is that Chrysippus, along with the group of Stoics who speak of passivity interprets Zeno's τύπωσις as ἐτεροίωσις. The only Stoic who rather interprets Zeno faithfully is Cleanthes<sup>31</sup>; for him, φαντασία is τύπωσις, i.e. a trace similar to the one a sigment ring can leave on wax. There is no doubt that Chrysippus position marks an improvement in the theory of perception; the air-analogy, replacing the wax-analogy, shows both Chrysippus' awareness of the problems of impenetrability and exhaustibility and his eagerness to present the Stoic epistemology more sophisticated. The choice of air, reminiscent of Diogenes of Apollonia doctrine, offers a twofold service: it allows the multifunction of the ἡγεμονικόν, thus making the ἐτεροίωσις possible, and at the same time secures the materialistic character of cognition, thus meeting the basic

29. Ibid. 1,234,3. Watson (p. 21) interprets Stoics as identifying *psyche* with the five senses, the *hegemonicon*, plus the faculties of speech and reproduction, that is eight parts. Indeed, this can be concluded from SVF 1,143. But, in Sextus 1,234,3 the Stoics seem to identify *psyche* with only the *hegemonicon*.

30. Ibid. 1,240-41.

31. A. C. Pearson, *The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes*, London, Clay and Sons 1891, 61-62.



Stoic requirement of corporeality. However, Chrysippus' theory of ἑτεροίωσις does not seem to be compatible with passivity which the Stoics assume in their theory of perception<sup>32</sup>. Despite its limitations, Zeno's theory of τύπωσις is at least consistent with the concepts of stability and passivity. Ἑτεροίωσις indicates a change and change is activity. It is surprising how even the Sceptics quarrel over a matter based on a faulty assumption.

As for the contention<sup>33</sup> that Stoics (mainly Chrysippus) intended to mean that φαντασία is both an impression and an interpretation of that impression it does not seem to be supported sufficiently by the sources. The preceding references, and especially Sextus 1,233, 236, and 239, show that mainly φαντασία is just an unelaborated, uninterpreted, raw cognitive unit. That φαντασία is subsequently interpreted and classified as probable, improbable, false, true and so forth should not entail an identity between φαντασία and the interpretative action. Undoubtedly, there is evidence<sup>34</sup> that the Stoics go beyond their orthodox position, i.e. their empiricism, by applying the term φαντασία to products of the mind, a type of mental structures originating in that mind. But, this evidence should be ruled out on the grounds that the date of this view is not known. Sandbach rightly points out that although it might be Chrysippean, it will be *an anachronism* to attribute it to Zeno<sup>35</sup>.

### Π ρ ο λ ή ψ ε ι ς.

The term πρόληψις in almost the same way as in Epicurus<sup>36</sup> admits two interpretations. First, it might be identified with innate ideas or concepts; second, it might be identified with general abstractions of a Berkeleyan type which in Stoic terminology are referred to as ἔννοιαι, common notions.

The first interpretation seems to take support by Chrysippus's thesis that the concepts of good and evil much depend upon the ἔμφυτοι πρόληψεις<sup>37</sup>. Well, the word ἐμφύτων would strongly support this interpretation

32. Sextus, *Against the Logicians* 1,239,8-10; 240-41.

33. F. H. Sandbach, *Phantasia Kataleptike* in A. A. Long (ed.), *Problems in Stoicism*, London, The Athlone Press 1971, 13.

34. SVF 2,85. Sandbach (20) points out that *the date of this doctrine is unknown*. It might be rather *an anachronism* to attribute it to Zeno; it might be Chrysippus's view.

35. Sandbach 20.

36. Sandbach, *Ἐννοια and πρόληψις in the Stoic Theory of Knowledge*, CQ 24 (1930) 49: *had there been a difference in the meaning of the word as used by Stoics and Epicureans, some ancient would surely have mentioned it*.

37. SVF 3,69.



only if it meant «inborn», but it cannot be safely secured that this was really what the Stoics intended. But ἔμφυτοι can be rendered as «implanted» and «ingrained», which in this case rules out the doctrine of the innate concepts. My way to question this alleged evidence is similar to the one I used against De Witt's exegesis of the Epicurean theory of perception.

Another way of supporting the first interpretation is found in A. Bonhöfer's views<sup>38</sup> where he attempts to force the doctrine of Epictetus into old Stoicism<sup>39</sup>. His argument can be presented as follows:

1. Προλήψεις are inborn («spermatically»).
2. Ἐννοιαὶ are προλήψεις.
3. Ἐννοιαὶ are inborn.

Of crucial importance is premise 2. The relation between ἔννοιαι and προλήψεις is presented as one of identity. And this identity draws evidence from Seneca<sup>40</sup> and Plutarch<sup>41</sup>. But although from this evidence can be concluded that only some προλήψεις are universal, it cannot be that all of them are, and thus they are κοινὰ ἔννοιαι. Further, in order to secure this identity it should be shown that also κοινὰ ἔννοιαι are universal. The word κοινὰ does not necessarily mean universal ; it can be taken to mean general abstractions derived from sense experience. Even the evidence from Epictetus<sup>42</sup> as Sandbach shows cannot be taken as reliable because Epictetus refers only to moral and aesthetic concepts and uses the term πρόληψις equivocally. Further, even if he really intended to mean that the identity needed for the argument could be grounded upon universality, this cannot be considered as the position of the old Stoa. As an interpreter of Chrysippus's thought he is not reliable either<sup>43</sup>. Then, the evidence used to establish the premises of the argument is not sufficient<sup>44</sup>. The Fragment, SVF 2,105, where Diogenes Laertius comments that Chrysippus is inconsistent in stating both (a) the phantasia is the standard of truth, and (b) αἴσθησις and πρόληψις is the standard of truth cannot lend support to this interpretation for the

38. *Epiktet und die Stoa* 187-232.

39. Sandbach, *Ἐννοια* 44: *it constructs a system from the use of the words by Epictetus and then attempts to attach this system to the old Stoa in the face of the evidence of the doxographers, which is emended or violently interpreted to suit Epictetus.*

40. *Epist.* 117,6.

41. *De communibus notitiis* 1060 a.

42. *Diss.* 1,10-12.

43. H. von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* xvii ; *Epictetus, Musonius, Seneca ad Chrysippum restituendum nullum fere usum praebent* (Quoted from Sandbach, *Ἐννοια* 44).

44. Sandbach, *Ἐννοια* 45.



simple reason that *προλήψεις* and *κοινὰ ἔννοια* can be regarded as mental abstractions of an empiricist type.

In Fragment SVF 2,841, although Chrysippus is said to put together *πρόληψις* and *ἔννοια*, he does not in fact clearly state what *ἔννοια* denotes. Chrysippus may have used *πρόληψις* as a synonym for *ἔννοια*, but again this would not bear at all upon the problem until the «innateness» interpretation of *ἔννοια* is established.

The second interpretation can be well grounded upon both the empiricist premise of the Stoics that the mind is *tabula rasa* at man's birth and the ways the incoming experiences are structured. I have already discussed how the Stoics use certain «laws» for relating and phenomenologically patternizing the perceptual material. The text is explicit at this point :

*General notions (νοούμενα), indeed, are gained in the following ways: some by direct contact, some by resemblance, some by analogy, some by transposition, some by composition, and some by contrariety<sup>45</sup>.*

It will suffice to reinforce this thesis by presenting another two fragments:

*(a) The Stoics say: When a man is born, the ruling part of the soul is like a sheet of paper suitable for writing. On this he writes off each single thought... That which comes through the senses is the first thing written down. For those who perceive something, like white, have a memory which comes from it. And when many similar memories have arisen, then we say people have experience, for experience is the manifold of similar presentations. But of thoughts some arise naturally (φυσικῶς) in the ways already mentioned, without technical skill, while others come by our teaching and conscious effort. These latter are called thoughts (ἔννοια) only but the others are also termed preconceptions (προλήψεις). Now reason, because of which we are called rational, is said to have received all its preconceptions by the time a child is seven days [or years?] old. And a notion is an image of the mind of a rational living being<sup>46</sup>.*

*(b) [Chrysippus] attempts to credibly explain the varieties of mixture by using the common conceptions (διὰ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν): we acquire (λαμβάνομεν) them from nature...<sup>47</sup>.*

Again, the evidence overwhelmingly weights for the second interpretation. Other supporting references can be made as, for example, to Diogenes Laertius 7,54 where Diocles Magnes is reported to identify *πρόληψις* with the conception of the general traits of an object in a natural way<sup>48</sup>.

45. SVF 2,87 (Diog. Laert. 7,52).

46. SVF 2,83 (Aetius, *Placita* 4,2).


47. SVF 2,473 (Alexander, *De mixtione* 217 Bruns).

48. Revising his old position (CQ 24 [1930] 44-51) Sandbach has raised doubts about the authentic authorship of Diogenes Laertius's 7,50-82 by Diocles Magnes (Long, 33). But this does not seem to imply that this part of Diogenes Laertius does not reflect the Stoic positions.



Φαντασία, συγκατάθεσις and the κριτήριο of Truth.

Φαντασία δυσαπόδοτός ἐστι, is difficult to define<sup>49</sup>. However, it would be best to present a diagram indicating certain distinctions<sup>50</sup> that could show how φαντασία became the basis for the Stoic κριτήριο of truth.



The first major difference between presentations is their breakdown into four groups: PP, PPI, and  $\bar{P}\bar{P}\bar{I}$ , and PI. PP presentations are those that cause disturbing movements (κινήσεις) in the soul ; these presentations make the perceiver not to offer his assent (συγκατάθεσις). An example illustrating PP is this conditional proposition : *If it is dark, then it is day*. PPI presentations refer to the relational relativism of certain things ; here the same presentations could stand for one category of things at one time and a different category at another time. This is determined merely by the relation to other presentations and the position they occupy. Stoics see

49. Sextus, *Against the Logicians* 1,241.

50. Ibid. 1,242-48.





this as well exemplified by problematic statements (ἀπόρων λόγων). PPI presentations are those standing for statements in which no existential import is possible to verify. Example: *The stars are odd, the stars are even in number*. PP are characterized by their causing a smooth κίνησις in the soul. They are also statements standing for περιφανείς, obvious events, things or relations between things that immediately win our assent. *I am discoursing* or *it is day* could be representing a PP type presentations. Then, PP presentations are divided into four sub-types:

PPF presentations which stand for false propositions, i.e. the false affirmation that a straight stick submerged in water is crooked or that the space between columns parallel in a row gets narrower further down the line. In explaining the second sub-type, PPTF presentations Stoics offer some examples from mythology. Orestes experienced Electra's image during his madness. This is explained by means of projection. The existing presentation created from past memories of the real Electra is projected on the imaginary products of his παράνοια, the Fury. The images thus seem to derive from the Fury, which does not exist. Similar to this are dreams about real persons. The PPTF type, known as generic presentations, stand for generic concepts. According to the Greeks, one is either a Greek or a barbarian. Though a clearcut presentation is made, in which only two possibilities exist (one can be only a Greek or a barbarian), in their entirety the presentations can belong to none of the aforementioned categories; they stand for their genus, man.

Stoics refer to the fourth sub-type, PPT presentations, as those in which one might make a true affirmation (ἀληθῆ κατηγορίαν). The illustration cited is similar to that used for PP presentations, *it is day; it is light*. That PPT presentations are sub-divided into the categories of the apprehensive (PPTA) and the non-apprehensive (PPT $\bar{A}$ ). The former, cataleptic or apprehensive, is unique in that it is: (a) caused by an existing object: (b) imaged, transferred to and stamped on the subject in accordance with the existing object, a kind not derivable from an object that does not exist; (c) eminently perceptive of real objects; (d) has reproduced with artistic precision all the characteristics of the perceived object, and (e) possesses each one of these [characteristics] as an attribute<sup>51</sup>. The non-apprehensive φαντασῖαι are characterized by two attributes (ιδιώματα) contrary to the ones expressed in the PPTA type: (a') derived from a non-existing object (Fury); (b') stamped on the subject, but not resembling the object. Because of the criticism of the Academics, who claim that an identical (ἀπαράλλακτον) yet false, appre-

51. Ibid. 1,248-49.



hensive presentation can be produced<sup>52</sup>, Stoics added the phrase «without obstacle», PPTA $\bar{O}$  meaning that although an apprehensive presentation might be found, still it might be «incredible» because of the external conditions (ἐξωθεν περιστάσεων). It would be credible only if the external circumstances allow the perceiver to offer his assent (συγκατάθεσις) without hesitation; the συγκατάθεσις is given only if the presentation is self-evident, clear and striking (ἐναργής, τρανή and πληκτική).

The preceding classification system enables us to better understand the Stoic criterion of truth. The principal question which the Stoics had to answer was : How can we say that a given proposition is true or false? Although at first the answer appears obvious, simply by looking at the diagram, there are in fact difficulties (mainly due to the differences between the various sources) that must be taken into account. To start with, the PPTA $\bar{O}$  presentation constitutes the firm ground of the criterion. Sextus concludes that

*the apprehensive presentation is not the criterion of truth unconditionally but only when it has no obstacle*<sup>53</sup>,

Reinforcing this thesis is Diogenes' statement that although Chrysippus, in his book *On Doctrine*, claims sensation and pre-conception (πρόληψις) to be the only criteria, in his *Physics* he also<sup>54</sup> accepts the apprehensive φαντασία alone as a criterion. This partially resembles with PPTA $\bar{O}$  presentations, which seem to be sufficient for the criterion of truth, i.e. not requiring further factors such as συγκατάθεσις, assent or anything else. Pohlenz who sees Zeno as holding *the criterion of truth is a combination of presentation and assent* offers a wrong interpretation<sup>55</sup>. His thesis implies that assent is a definitional element of the criterion. I contend that assent is a psychological result of a different εἶδος, an element of will distinct from the cognitive action, *per se*. Assent is a result of the latter and a concomitant action that follows the purely cognitive action; it (assent) could not exist without the occurrence of the first. If Stoics have described assent as a psychic state accompanying cognition, yet belonging to the will, does not bound them to this position; in interpreting

52. Ibid. 1,252-53 : *the Academics assert that a false one exactly similar to the apprehensive presentation can be found.*

53. Ibid. 1,257 : *Hence the apprehensive presentation is not the criterion of truth unconditionally, but only when it has no obstacle.*

54. SVF 2,105.

55. Zenon and Chrysipp, «Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen» 12/9 (1938) 181. J. M. Rist (*Stoic Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press 1969, 138) disagrees with Pohlenz.



them we need not include this as a necessary element of the definition. I disagree on the grounds of the textual evidence provided by Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius. The passage «being plainly evident and striking, lays hold of us, almost by the very hair, as they say, and drags us off to assent (εἰς συγκατάθεσιν)»<sup>56</sup> refers to the kind of psychic reaction that one has after experiencing an ἐναργής, clear and striking (πληκτική) apprehensive presentation. A presentation belonging to the category of PPTAŌ must be clear and striking; these two properties, though necessary, are in themselves insufficient for the establishment of the criterion. The passage, however, in no way implies συγκατάθεσις as a necessary part of the criterion. The word because, indicates that assent is a result of, not a part of, the cognitive act; assent follows because the experiencing of this εἶδος of presentation. The word κατασπῶσα (forcing us to assent), points to the same exegesis.

Diogenes cannot be seen as supporting Pohlenz either. The crucial passage in Diogenes' testimonia is :

(A) *the standard by which the truth of things is stated is generically a presentation.*

(B) *the theory of assent and that of apprehension and thought, which precedes all the rest, cannot be stated apart from presentation. For presentation comes first; then thought*<sup>57</sup>.

a complete set of necessary factors. It is simply an assertion that presentation is a necessary element. B repeats that it does not make sense to speak of assent, apprehension or thought without presentations. One fails to see that in this context the criterion includes assent as a definitional factor. The word συγκαταθέσεως is not intended to be taken as an element necessary to the definition of the criterion. Stoics, when referring to the criterion, discuss the assent, as they do in this passage. The syntactical pattern hardly implies the inclusion of assent in the criterion's definition. It might be interpreted that other factors are needed in order to define the criterion, but these are not subsequently enumerated. The words νοήσεως λόγος (thought) are used to emphasize the Stoic's strong empiricist learnings; that is, they believe that without presentation, thought cannot exist.

Νοήσεως λόγος, thought, in this context refers to the thing to which the criterion of truth is applied so that one can predicate this thing (thought) as true or false. Thoughts can be either true or false, and this is precisely where, by means of the criterion, ἔλεγχος can be carried out. The term κατά-

56. Sextus, *Against the Logicians* 1,257,4-6.

57. Diog. Laert. 7,49-50: For the sake of convenience the passage is divided into two parts (underlining mine).



ληψις also might mistakenly be taken to be a necessary factor of the criterion. Although κατάληψις (apprehension) is related to cognition, it is a n a b i l i t y which (although exercised in grasping the distinct, clear, and striking presentations, that is, distinguishing them from other kinds of presentation) is in itself not a cataleptic, apprehensive presentation. Presentations are cataleptic because they are clear and striking, not because of our ability to perceiving (καταλαμβάνειν) them. Note that the criterion includes apprehension not as an action, but as apprehensive presentations. The emphasis on properties of the object is obvious. Stoics see apprehensive presentations as what we call sense-data and contend that a p p r e h e n s i v e p r e s e n t a t i o n s are caused by sensible objects and represent the exact properties of the objects in an isomorphic manner of representation. It is, then, difficult to see how apprehension can be counted as a definitional element.

Sextus and Diogenes refer to Stoics in general ; the two cited passages do not refer exclusively to Chrysippus. Pohlenz could still pass off the view (combination of apprehensive presentation and assent) as that of Zeno. According to Rist Pohlenz argues that a significant change occurred in that Chrysippus replaced the apprehensive presentation-assent view by an emphasis on the criterion *as present in the object of knowledge, and much less in the mind of the knower*<sup>58</sup>. While generally agreeing to this, I object to the point stating that any change occurred. Since Zeno is misinterpreted and the emphasis on the object characterizes the entire Stoic theory of knowledge, there cannot be any talk about any *significant change* at all. Let us hear what Cicero had to say. He refers to assent in the much discussed *gesture symbolism*<sup>59</sup>. Zeno is presented to use the kinetic symbolism of his hands indicating four factors that should be considered in regard to how the wise man knows : perception, assent, comprehension and knowledge. Assent is again related to the processes of perception and comprehension; it is also related to the result of these processes that Cicero terms knowledge. Assent *p e r s e* follows these processes. At the same time it becomes a condition, a positive condition that, from the beginning, accompanies the process of perception, and functions as a reward in each step of the structuring of presentations until the final step, knowledge. It is not stated in, and it does not follow from the gesture symbolism that assent should be taken as an intrinsic part of the cognitive structure, that is, as a qualifying feature of truth. Rather, it conductively accompanies such processes. Assent should be seen like emotions of satisfaction and dissatisfaction which beset from mental processes.

58. *Stoic Philosophy* 138.

59. SVF 1,66.





Undoubtedly, assent is important in obtaining real knowledge. In the case of ignorance as Stobaeus reports<sup>60</sup> assent is weak though present. How could it be countered a necessary factor for the criterion of truth if assent is present in ignorance, even weak? In the Cicero passage perception and apprehension as processes cannot be regarded as elements of the definition of the criterion. Only the results of those processes can be used for the construction of the definition of the criterion.

A second quote from Cicero has often been used in supporting the κατάληψις-assent interpretation.

*... many things are comprehended and perceived by the senses, and this could not occur without assent. Without assent there can be neither memory, concepts, nor arts. And most important of all, though some things may be in our power, nothing is in the power of the man who never assents to anything*<sup>61</sup>.

What is, then, the logical connection of assent with the definition of the criterion? In this passage nothing indicates that assent is a part of the definition. The explanation in regard to the status and role of assent has been previously given several times: though conducive to all cognitive functions (perception, apprehension, judgment) it is a psychic state of another kind (εἶδος).

The only source including assent in the necessary elements for the criterion of truth is Porphyry's<sup>62</sup>, who sees the Stoics' epistemological units as a progression :

sensible representation	——	sensation	——	representation
(primary sensory data)		(αἴσθησις)		(φαντασία)

The role of assent is intended to be a necessary condition. It is categorically stated that without assent, sensible representation (second sentence of the fragment) could not be called αἴσθησις. The *i s* functions as an identity connective. The essence of αἴσθησις is determined by assent; without assent αἴσθησις could not be transformed into φαντασία. Although this is contrary to my interpretation, it is indeed difficult to refute. But it seems to me that this type of hierarchical structure of the epistemological units contradicts

60. SVF 1,68 b: *Ignorance is a changeable and weak assent. I take the i s not to function as an identity connective; it rather means «is characterized by».*

61. SVF 2,115.

62. G. Clark, *Selections From Hellenistic Philosophy*, New York, Crofts 1940, 76, Fr. 74: *The Stoics do not place sensation in representation alone but its e s s e n c e depends on assent; for sensation is assent to a sensible representation, the assent being conforming to desire* (underlining mine).



the testimony of other sources, casting doubt on Porphyry's accuracy in rendering the Stoic theory. Note that the last part of the second sentence referring to *d e s i r e* shows that assent, although present either as a condition or as a result of the cognitive action (or as a parallel, conducive activity of the will), is not in itself a cognitive element.

In refutation, it might be said that most evidence either ignores assent altogether or shows that the cognitive units do not coincide with those mentioned in Porphyry's fragment. Origen, for example, attributes to the Stoics a bold empiricism.

*(Stoics) destroy intelligible realities when they assert that whatever is grasped is grasped by the senses, and all comprehension is attached to sensation*<sup>63</sup>.

I believe that the textual evidence bears out my interpretation and shows the intended meaning of the Stoic criterion of truth.

#### Ἔννοιαι and the «laws» of Association.

The concept of ἔννοιαι, notions, is also important in the Stoic theory of sensory and conceptual perception. Negatively ἔννοιαι have been defined as being neither concrete things nor qualities. Affirmatively they are fictitious, mental images or concepts. Diogenes refers<sup>64</sup> to them as *images of reason* which, though not qualities or concrete things, they are like qualities and things in a similar manner of a person who recalls vividly the image of a horse which at that moment is absent. This should be taken as the particular concept of a particular object, that is a cognitive unit in the second perceptual level. Stobaeus identifies ἔννοιαι, notions, with what the ancients called ideas. In a Platonic fashion we share in them; however, *we only chance upon their modifications which they call common nouns*<sup>65</sup>. Likewise Aetius calls<sup>66</sup> them images of the mind of beings which are living and rational. The last phrase implies that notions are acquired only by men, a point again reminiscent of Aristotle's way of talking about memories and experience, being the distinguishing mark between men and animals.

Commenting upon this testimonia, one could point out that Stoics have been trying to build up an associationistic theory of perception. By describing primary qualities, notions, phantasiai and also referring to more general concepts, one can discern in their [Stoics'] effort the intention to structurize phenomenologically a map of the realm of cognition. To serve this purpose

63. SVF 2,108.

66. Ibid. 2,83.

64. Ibid. 1,65 c.

67. Diog. Laert. 7,52-54.

65. Ibid. 1,65 a.





they have introduced several «laws»<sup>67</sup> that explain how these materials are received and/or related after their reception. The first of these is the law of direct contact (κατὰ περίπτωσιν). In κατὰ περίπτωσιν we understand by direct confrontation with αἰσθητά, concrete things. Given that there is no specification in the text, this might suggest a gestalt-like perception, a holistic perception of sensible things; or, a perceptual act which does resume from the parts to the whole, an analytic perceptual procedure. The second, viz. the analytic procedure can be supported by the fact of the general structuralistic map which the Stoics have been trying to construct. The second law of resemblance (καθ' ὁμοιότητα) can historically be traced in both Aristotle and the British Empiricists. By way of illustration the Stoics state that we acquire our general concept of Socrates by gazing at a representation of him, a bust. The third law is the one they called κατ' ἀναλογίαν in which analogy is used either through exaggeration or diminution. Basically the characteristics are the same in both objects analogically contrasted but differ in their dimensions. Cyclops and Pygmies, respectively, are used to illustrate this; both have the same basic traits but their dimensions (traits's) are different. Another paradigm case is the concept of the earth's center arrived at by means of small spheres. The synthesis (κατὰ σύνθεσιν) law functions when a notion of a Centaur, for example, is acquired through the composition of known, diverse parts. Stoics, also, speak of the transposition (κατὰ μετάθεσιν) law in which notions, such as those of creatures with an eye in their chest, are accomplished. For them the law of contrariety (κατ' ἐναντίωσιν) enables us to fabricate concepts of, for example, death by means of its opposite, life. The law of transition (κατὰ μετάβασιν) leads us to such notions as τόπος, κενόν and λεκτά, the meanings of terms; the latent metaphysical assumption of this law is the possibility of passing from the ontological category of perceptibles to that of imperceptibles. The privation (κατὰ στέρησιν) law functions for the formation of concepts such as that of man without hands. A further view, which the Stoics hold refers to the abstract concepts of justice (δίκαιον) and goodness (ἀγαθόν) whose formation occurs by nature (κατὰ φύσιν). Though historically valuable, Diogenes' information is elliptic. There is not much elaboration which could phenomenologically describe the functions of these «laws». What is, for example, the specific connection of these laws to the various faculties of the mind? Which are the mechanisms involved in the referential activity of the mind, i.e. the method of comparing a new experience with old experiences? Some of these laws remind one of Aristotle's laws of association during the activity of recollection. We might further point out that both Aristotle and the Stoics introduce such laws as explicatory cannons applying only within



the sphere of the mind, that is, within the limits of experience. The only exception could be the Stoic's first «law of contact» which is immediately related with object perceived.

## ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΝΟΗΣΙΣ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟΥΣ ΣΤΩΙΚΟΥΣ

Π ε ρ ί λ η ψ η.

Κατὰ τὶς τελευταῖες δεκαετίες παρατηρεῖται ζωηρὸ ἐνδιαφέρον γιὰ τὶς φιλοσοφικὰς θεωρίαις τῆς Ἑλληνιστικῆς περιόδου. Δὲν θὰ ἦταν ὑπερβολὴ νὰ λεχθῇ ὅτι ἡ Στωικὴ Φιλοσοφία καὶ ἰδιαίτερα ἡ Στωικὴ Ἐπιστημολογία εὐρίσκονται στὸ ἐπίκεντρο πολλῶν ἐρευνῶν στὸ χῶρο τῆς φιλοσοφικῆς αὐτῆς περιόδου. Ἐπιφανεῖς ἐρευνητὲς φθάνουν στὸ σημεῖο νὰ συγκρίνουν π.χ. τὴν ἔννοια τοῦ λεκτοῦ μὲ τὶς θεωρίαις τῶν προτάσεων τῶν Russell καὶ Frege. Παρ' ὅλον ὅμως ὅτι ἐργασίες ὅπως αὐτὲς τῶν Hicks, Bréhier, Pohlenz, Philipson, Sandbach, Sambursky, Reesor, Mates, Watson, Virieux-Reymond, Pembroke, Rist, Gould καὶ ἄλλων ἔχουν αὐξήσει σημαντικὰ τὶς γνώσεις μας σχετικὰ μὲ τὴν θεωρίαν τῆς γνώσεως τῶν Στωικῶν, ὥστόσο ἐρμηνευτικὰ προβλήματα ποὺ σχετίζονται μὲ τὴν σημασία βασικῶν ὁρῶν παραμένουν ἀνοικτά.

Τὸ παρὸν δοκίμιο περιορίζεται κυρίως στὸ πρόβλημα τῆς ἀντιλήψεως, καὶ θὰ πρέπει νὰ θεωρηθῇ ὡς μία ἀπόπειρα νὰ ἐπανερμηνεύσῃ στὸ φῶς τῶν προσφάτων συμπερασμάτων τῆς φιλολογικῆς ἐρευνας τοὺς βασικοὺς ὁροὺς τῆς Στοῆς αἰσθησις, πνεῦμα, τύψεις, ἐτεροίωσις, οἰκείωσις, λόγος, φαντασία, κατάληψις, καὶ νὰ ἐξετάσῃ τὶς μεταξὺ των λογικὰς σχέσεις. Οἱ θέσεις τὶς ὁποῖες λαμβάνει ὁ συγγραφεὺς —καὶ οἱ ὁποῖες δὲν συμπίπτουν πάντοτε μὲ τὶς θέσεις προηγουμένων ἐρευνητῶν— εἶναι οἱ ἀκόλουθοι :

1. Ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ ὁρου αἰσθησις στοὺς Στωικοὺς εἶναι εὐρεῖα. Μπορεῖ νὰ ἐννοηθῇ ὡς συνδυασμὸς δύο κινήσεων : Κίνηση στὰ αἰσθητήρια ὄργανα — κίνηση, ποὺ ἀφετηρία ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. Τὰ ἀποτελέσματα τῶν δύο κινήσεων εἶναι ἀντίστοιχα : ἄ-λογες «φαντασίες», δηλ. ἀκατέργαστα ψυχολογικὰ στοιχεῖα — ἑλλογες «φαντασίες», δηλ. ἐπεξεργασμένα γνωσιολογικὰ στοιχεῖα, σημασιοδοτημένα ἤδη ἀπὸ τὸν τρόπο καὶ τὸν locus τῆς ἐντάξεώς των μέσα στὸ ἐννοιολογικὸ ὑλικό, ποὺ ἀποκτήθηκε στὸ παρελθόν. Ἡ σύνδεση καὶ σημασιοδότηση τοῦ εἰσερχομένου ὑλικοῦ γίνεται σύμφωνα μὲ ὠρισμένους «νόμους» (περίπτωσις, ὁμοιότης, ἀναλογία, ἐναντίωσις, σύνθεσις, μετάθεσις, μετάβασις, στέρησις), ἀπὸ τοὺς ὁποίους τουλάχιστον μερικοὶ ἔχουν χρησιμοποιηθῇ ἀπὸ τοὺς Βρεταννοὺς Ἐμπει-



ρικούς και ὡς ἓνα σημεῖο ἀπὸ τοὺς θεμελιωτὲς τῆς νεώτερης Δομικῆς Ψυχολογίας.

2. Οἱ ἔννοιες *πνεῦμα* καὶ *λόγος* ὑποδηλώνουν ὅτι οἱ Στωικοὶ ὑπεστήριξαν τὴν ἐνέργεια καὶ τὴν ἐπέμβαση στὴ γνωσιολογικὴ ἐπεξεργασία τοῦ ἐμπειρικοῦ ὕλικου, παραγόντων ποὺ ναὶ μὲν ἔχουν ὕλικὴ βάση (ὅπως τὸ καθετὶ γι' αὐτοὺς, ἐκτὸς ἀπὸ τὸ *λεκτόν*, ἔχει ὕλικὴ βάση), δροῦν ὅμως ὥσ-τόσο ὡς ἐὰν ἐπρόκειτο γιὰ αὐτόνομες ὑποστάσεις, πρᾶγμα ποὺ εὐθὺς ἀμέσως εἰσήγαγε ἓνα δυσασμό, δὲν συμβιβάζεται ὅμως κατὰ τὴν παροῦσα ἐρμηνεία μὲ βασικὲς φιλοσοφικὲς θέσεις τῶν Στωικῶν. Προτιμότερο θὰ ἦταν, ἐπειδὴ εἶναι συνεπὲς πρὸς τὴ Στωικὴ Φιλοσοφία, νὰ ἐκληφθοῦν ὡς δυνάμεις τοῦ ὀργανισμοῦ, ποὺ ἀποκτήθηκαν βαθμιαῖα ἀπὸ αὐτόν.

3. Ἡ ταύτιση τῶν *προλήψεων* μὲ τίς ἔμφυτες ιδέες, ὅπως ἔχει ἐπιχειρηθῇ στὸ παρελθόν, ἀποτελεῖ ἐπίσης παρερμηνεία. Κατὰ τὴν παροῦσα ἐρμηνεία πρόκειται μόνον γιὰ ἀποκρυσταλλωμένες ἐμπειρίες τοῦ παρελθόντος, ποὺ παίζουν ἀποφασιστικὸ ρόλο στὴ σημασιοδότηση τῶν νεο-εἰσερχομένων ἐμπειριῶν.

4. Ὅτι καλοῦν οἱ Στωικοὶ *συγκατάθεσιν* εἶναι μόνον παρακόλουθο τῆς γνωστικῆς λειτουργίας καὶ δὲν λαμβάνεται ἀπὸ αὐτοὺς ὡς ἀναγκαῖο στοιχεῖο γιὰ τὸν ὅρισμό τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς ἀλήθειας. Τοῦτο μπορεῖ ν' ἀποτελέσει μιὰ ὑπόθεση γιὰ περαιτέρω ἔρευνα. Ἡ πεποίθηση τοῦ συγγραφέως εἶναι ὅτι, ἂν οἱ μαρτυρίες ἰδωθοῦν μὲ διαφορετικὴ προοπτικὴ, ἡ ὑπόθεση αὐτὴ θὰ ἐπαληθευθῇ. Ἀπὸ τὴν ἐξέταση τῶν κειμένων δὲν προκύπτει ὅτι οἱ Στωικοὶ περιέλαβαν πραγματικὰ τὴ συγκατάθεση ὡς μέρος τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς ἀλήθειας.

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