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## POSIDONIUS' «HIERARCHY» BETWEEN GOD, FATE AND NATURE AND CICERO'S *DE DIVINATIONE*

One of the most important points of Posidonius' theology<sup>1</sup>, and at the same time an acute metaphysical question on which much scholarly debate is still to be found, is the «hierarchy» of God, Nature and Fate, which is ascribed

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1. After such good recent literature on Posidonius, it is perhaps anachronistic to speak of Posidonius' theology in a sense which particularizes him from the other Stoics. Posidonius has not been dealt with by M. Laffranque as a theologian except for some pages on theological matters devoted to him in his activity as a physicist (*Posidonios d'Apamée*, Paris 1964, 320-327, 329-367). Impressive is the omission of Posidonius' theological speculation by A. A. Long (*Hellenistic Philosophy*, London 1974, 216-222). But, as a matter of fact, very little, if anything at all, remains marking Posidonius' originality in this realm, and this little concerns details. During the last century, however, and at the beginnings of the current, a huge bibliography accumulated on Posidonius' theology, eschatology and solar mysticism so that it is usually spoken of an old and a new Posidonius. This fact constituted the «Posidonius' problem» (see R. Hoven, *Stoicisme et Stoiciens face au problème de l'au-delà*, Paris 1971, 95-102, for a detailed bibliography of the subject), subsequent to the «Posidonius' myth», which was demolished by J. F. Dobson among others [CQ 12 (1918) 179-195]. Corssen's book (*De Posidonio Rhodio M. Tulli Ciceronis in libro I Tusc. disp. et in Somnio Scipionis auctore*, Dissert. Bonn 1878) was most responsible for this myth, and in the same line move the works of Gronau, *Posidonios und die judisch-christliche Genesisexegese*, Leipzig/Berlin 1914; P. Schubert, *Die Eschatologie des Posidonios*, Leipzig 1927; I. Heinemann, *Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften*, Breslau v. I-II 1921 - 1928; A. Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa in ihrem geschichtlichen Zusammenhange dargestellt*, Berlin 1892; those of Heinze, Badstümer, Norden, Appelt, Cappelle, Cumont, Festugière and others, and especially the two major works of K. Reinhardt (*Kosmos und Sympathie. Neue Untersuchungen über Poseidonios*, München 1926, and *Poseidonios von Apameia, der Rhodier genannt*, RE 22,1 (1953) col. 558-826) who, however, had given a sober account of Posidonius (*Poseidonios*, München 1921). Using only attested fragments and testimonies which refer to Posidonius by name and aiming to determine Posidonius' originality on sound and objective principles scholars have presented exact accounts from which the new Posidonius with the universal scientific interests, a less rigid ethical theory and a more realistic psychology emerges. We only mention the following works which touch upon theological subjects: R. M. Jones, *Posidonius and Solar Eschatology*, CPh 27 (1932) 113-135; *Posidonius and the Flight of the Mind in the Universe*, CPh 21 (1922) 97-113;





to him. This hierarchy is generally taken as proving Posidonius to have renounced Stoic pantheistic monism and be a precursor of Neoplatonism<sup>2</sup>.

This is not the proper place to discuss the relation among those three aspects of the primordial *πῦρ τεχνικόν* as established by the early Stoics. Suffice it to say that, though the early Stoics never expressly said that God, Nature and Fate were — as distinct hypostases — identical, yet they considered Nature and Fate to be alternative descriptions of Zeus, different aspects of the same reality<sup>3</sup>. In any case God, Nature and Fate were never regarded as members of any hierarchy, since Stoic pantheism admitted of a single principle which was differentiated according to its manifestations and the matter upon which it was acting. It was quite legitimate to present Nature and Fate as identical with God, since God was also Nature (as the principle of growth and cohesion) and Fate (as the causal principle accounting for the temporal evolution of the world). These terms had the same reference, though they were not synonymous, because of the Stoic distinction between sense and reference<sup>4</sup>.

It is true that a certain hierarchical relationship between Fate and Providence was ascribed by Calcidius to Cleanthes<sup>5</sup> in reference to the question of evil and in the light of a metaphysical hierarchy of Being sanctioned by Pre-Neoplatonism and Neoplatonism. This hierarchy hardly represents Cleanthes' views and is by no means justified by dependable evidence. As we have shown elsewhere<sup>6</sup>, either Calcidius treated his evidence with a certain bias in

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P. Boyancè, *Étude sur le songe de Scipion*, Paris 1936. For a full bibliography see Hoven, op. cit. 95-102, Laffranque op. cit. 1-44. Much of the controversy on this subject was due to the inadequacy of the old collection of Posidonius' fragments made by J. Bake in 1810, which, though based on named fragments, was not systematic. The recent collection by L. Edelstein - I. G. Kidd (*Posidonius v. I The Fragments*, Cambridge 1972) provides an excellent basis for research. In this paper we use the numbers and signs of that collection. We have dealt with some probable arguments of Posidonius for the existence of God in our Ph. D. Thesis, considering as such Sextus Empiricus *Adversus Mathematicos* IX 23; 28; 71-74. We have also analysed his conception of God as found in F 100; 101. Throughout this account we have mostly used the translation of the *De divinatione* by W. A. Falconer (Loeb Class. Library).

2. See W. Jaeger, *Nemesios von Emessa, Quellenforschung zum Neuplatonismus und seine Anfängen bei Posidonios*, Berlin 1914, 97-133.

3. See *SVF* 1, 102; 2, 913. Cf. W. Greene, *Moirai: Fate, Good and Evil in Greek Thought*, Gloucester, Mass. 1968<sup>3</sup>, 352; Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy* 148.

4. Cf. Long, *Language and Thought in Stoicism* in Long (Ed.), *Problems in Stoicism*, London 1971, 79; 108 n. 19.

5. In *Timaeum* c. 144 = *SVF* 1, 551. Cf. 2, 933.

6. See our article *Providence and Fate in Stoicism and Prae-neoplatonism*, «Φιλοσοφία» 3 (1973) 262-306, esp. 297.



his endeavour to present Cleanthes as a rival of Plato or he applied his Pre-Neoplatonic scheme to Cleanthes on insufficient grounds, considering perhaps that he was one of the astrological determinists. In any case, Cleanthes' presumed differentiation between Fate and Providence is the only exception to the assumption of a common reference among God, Fate and Nature and to the reciprocal relation between Providence and Fate admitted by Chrysippus and the early Stoics in general.

More explicit, and at first sight better documented than Cleanthes' alleged hierarchical relation between Providence and Fate, is the «hierarchy» of God, Nature and Fate ascribed by Cicero and Aëtius to Posidonius in two slightly differing versions:

1) Ποσειδώνιος τρίτην ἀπὸ Διὸς [sc. τὴν εἰμαρμένην]· πρῶτον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν Δία, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν φύσιν, τρίτον δὲ τὴν εἰμαρμένην (Aëtius, *Placita* I 28.5 = F 103).

2) *Quocirca primum mihi videtur, ut Posidonius facit, a deo, de quo satis dictum est, deinde a fato, deinde a natura vis omnis divinandi ratioque repetenda* (Cicero, *De divinatione* I 125=F 107).

From the recent literature which deals with this question we shall confine ourselves to a brief discussion of the views of L. Edelstein<sup>7</sup>, J.M. Rist<sup>8</sup>, G. Verbeke<sup>9</sup>, E. Bréhier<sup>10</sup>, Andreas Graeser<sup>11</sup>, and Marie Laffranque<sup>12</sup>.

Edelstein<sup>13</sup>, opposing the early Stoics' identification of God with Nature and Fate to Posidonius' differentiation and assuming that Posidonius' hierarchy implies a certain difference in the matter of which these three entities are composed, supposes that Posidonius treats God, Fate and Nature as three distinct substances<sup>14</sup>, i.e., in an absolute sense. Through a penetrating investigation of Posidonius' «physical» fragments, Edelstein shows him to have identified Reason with God, Soul with Nature, and Fate with Matter. Thus he arrives at the following hierarchy: Reason, Soul, and Matter, as the

7. *The Philosophical System of Posidonius*, *AJPh* 57 (1936) 286-325.

8. *Stoic Philosophy*, Cambridge 1969, 201-211.

9. *L'évolution de la doctrine du pneuma du stoicisme à S. Augustin*, Louvain-Paris 1945, 130-131.

10. *The Hellenistic and Roman Age* (Translated from the French by W. Baskin), Chicago and London 1971<sup>3</sup>, 137.

11. *Plotinus and the Stoics*, Leiden 1972, 110.

12. *Op. cit.* 358 ff.

13. *Art. cit.* 292 n. 27. His view that *Cleanthes subordinated fate at least* is obviously wrong.

14. *Ib.* 293. Similar is Greene's interpretation of this hierarchy (*op. cit.* 352). By Nature he seems to understand the animate world (soul), by Fate the inorganic bodies (matter) and by God the principle of activity. Cf. Edelstein 300.



three constituents of the world. This substitution, though in conformity to some extent with Posidonius' psychology, is unstoic and leaves the question about the first entity (Reason) open. If God is Reason, but not seminal Reason nor Reason as Fate (since Fate = matter), what sort of Reason is he? This dualistic interpretation brings Posidonius close to Plato, completely detaching him from Stoic monism.

Edelstein's interpretation has been criticised by J. M. Rist<sup>15</sup>, who, however, on account of F 107 also thinks that the hierarchy may refer to different realities *in some physical and corporeal way*<sup>16</sup>. But, in rejecting Edelstein's conjectures on the basis of F 141a, he seems to understand by the active element the *pneuma*, as *a physical body ringing the outside of the world and giving it a spherical form*<sup>17</sup>, that is, the οὐρανός. He attaches particular importance to the distinction between God and Nature, which he regards as an innovation of Posidonius. He identifies Posidonius' God with the world-soul, which coincides with the heavens as a limit of the κόσμος<sup>18</sup>. He regards Posidonius' Nature either as «a basic element» or as «the passive principle», i.e., matter unqualified, «prime matter» — which is unreservedly unstoic — or even as the world itself or as the «body of the world», which are disparate things. He finally inclines to taking Nature as the world's body, asserting that *Nature is the world's body and Zeus its soul*<sup>19</sup>.

Though this last interpretation seems more sensible than the first, Rist's many alternatives for Nature show that he did not himself arrive at definite conclusions on the matter, but we do not share his view that «this has no bearing on the basic problem»<sup>20</sup>. Although he criticises Edelstein for misunderstanding Posidonius in maintaining that Posidonius completely separated the active from the passive element, Rist himself says: *in each case Posidonius' tendency to separate the active principle, Zeus, from everything else is obvious*<sup>21</sup>. Yet in considering Posidonius' God as the world-soul, which

15. Op. cit. 203 ff.

16. Ib. 202: *So that he can derive divination from each of them differently*. Rist considers Posidonius' hierarchy a very puzzling doctrine which Posidonius undoubtedly professed ... as indication of a most unorthodox view of the physical world, which we do not admit.

17. Ib. 205. Cf. 207: *The identification of the active material principle with the ouranos is much more important for Posidonius than it was for Chrysippus*.

18. Ib. 205-209. He takes the world-soul as the «idea» of the world, on the basis of Proclus *In Eucl.* 141, 8-11 and Posidonius' «exegesis» of *Timaeus* 35a. Cf. F 290.

19. Ib. 211.

20. Ib. 211.

21. Ibid. But see 203: *There is no reason to believe that Pos. wished to separate the active and the passive in such a radical fashion*.





binds the world's body and holds it together like glue from both inside and outside, he does not actually claim such a separation.

His interpretation of the third term of the hierarchy, Fate, seems the most unfortunate: *As for fate, Posidonius' third source of divination, that would correspond to the Platonic errant cause or necessity [ἀνάγκη, πλανωμένη αἰτία]<sup>22</sup>. But how could divination derive from such an errant cause? And how could Posidonius have maintained that *everything happens according to Fate* (F 104) if his Fate were equivalent to such an irrational cause? Where is providence in this scheme? But Posidonius had maintained that *the world is governed through reason and providence* (F 21) and that *if providence exists, there is divination* (D.L. VII 149). He is also reported by Cicero to have denied that Epicurus had actually held any belief in gods since he deprived them of their providential activity (N.D. I 123). If God had been distinguished — though not in a corporeal way — from Nature and Fate, this would have been, we believe, in order that his providential aspect might be emphasised. And yet — as will be shown — we do not think that this is a case of any distinction independent of divination, that is, of an absolute hierarchy such as that which arose later.*

Bréhier, though relating the above hierarchy to divination, nonetheless speaks of a «triad» or «trinity» and believes that Zeus is *force in its unity, destiny the same force viewed from its multiple aspects, and nature a power emanating from Zeus and binding together the multiple forces of fate*<sup>23</sup>. This is mere speculation and it hardly differentiates Posidonius from the early Stoics; nor is it expressly warranted by the evidence. Bréhier feels that Posidonius' tendency to make distinctions where the old Stoa «sought to identify» is in conformity with his psychology<sup>24</sup>; so does Verbeke, who remarks that *Posidonius étend les principes de sa psychologie au cosmos tout entier*, thus arriving at different results from his predecessors' and bringing about *un nouveau relâchement du panthéisme*<sup>25</sup>.

Marie Laffranque, however, sees in Posidonius' God, as distinct from Nature and Fate, the providential aspect of the divinity<sup>26</sup>, taking its other

22. Ibidem.

23. Op. cit. 137.

24. In opposition to the unitary concept of the soul held by Chrysippus, who explained even emotions in terms of reason, that is, in an intellectualistic way, Posidonius distinguished between rational and irrational parts of the soul. Cf. F 141a-169. Accordingly the end for man was redefined (F 186).

25. *L'évolution 110-131: Les conséquences de ce dualisme psychologique ... ont été considérables dans le domaine de la métaphysique.*

26. Op. cit. 323 ff., cf. 340.



two aspects in the traditional sense<sup>27</sup>. Of course, if it were a case either of three distinct entities or of three aspects irrespective of divination, this would be the most reasonable and least sophisticated interpretation. Laffranque is also right in considering Cicero's testimony of greater importance than that of Aëtius, since she closely relates the whole matter with the sorts of divination described in the *De divinatione*. Yet she treats Aëtius' item of information as equally dependable<sup>28</sup>, that is, as accurately rendering Posidonius' views, and attempts to identify the three terms of the hierarchy as if it could also be a case of separate entities, independent of divination<sup>29</sup>, although she speaks of three points of view of the same reality rather than of three distinct realities or better, of the three great hypotheses of the question of divination<sup>30</sup>. Seeing in Posidonius' God the providential activity of the deity, the primordial law of nature, and the artificer of the order of things both in the static and dynamic sense<sup>31</sup>, she understands by Nature *l'ensemble des êtres considérés sous l'angle de la génération, et de leur évolution, le jeu entier autonome et sans premier moteur* and by Fate *l'ordre et la suite des causes ou bien leur liaison*<sup>32</sup>. She says finally: *Principe actif et principe passif sont deux notions plus particulièrement apparentées à celle de Providence; effet et cause à celle du destin; génération et destruction à celle de Nature*<sup>33</sup>. This interpretation is chiefly reached by her through speculation on the account of divination given in the first book of the *De divinatione* and this hierarchy is related to divination by art, to natural divination, and to divination from immediate contact with the divinity. God, Nature and Fate, then, as occur-

27. Op. cit. 330 ff.

28. Op. cit. 342 ff. Laffranque's view that Cicero's order is in compliance with Diogenes Laertius VII 138 is very interesting and can afford another sort of interpretation of this hierarchy, which, however, seems to us more unlikely than the one we advocate in the sequel. That *la hiérarchie dont Stobée se fait l'écho répond à des considérations différentes* is true, but not for the reasons inserted (ib. 343).

29. See ib. 344: *Par un paradoxe chargé de sens, on ne retrouve la pleine valeur de cette hiérarchie dans la Physique et la Cosmologie de Posidonios qu'en se référant, une fois de plus, à l'esprit de ses conceptions mathématiques. La Nature est comparable à la construction de la figure; le Destin, au σχῆμα, à la figure une fois construite. La Providence joue par rapport aux deux le rôle de la formule ou raison qui définit conjointement l'opération et son résultat.*

30. Ib. 329: *trois sortes d'exigences*. Cf. 350: *La conception de la divination chez Posidonios est soumise aux trois grandes hypothèses physiques solidaires, du Destin, de la Nature et de la Providence.*

31. Ib. 338-340. But: *Dans l'école la notion de divinité serait première, et plus importante et même plus répandue que celle de Providence (337-338).*

32. Ib. 330. Cf. 332.

33. Ib. 340. Cf. 351.



ring in Cicero's testimony, are regarded by Laffranque as the respective sources of the different kinds of divination<sup>34</sup>.

It is indeed tempting to regard this hierarchy in terms of the sorts of divination described by Quintus, which in all probability ultimately derive from Posidonius. But there are two problems: though the relationship of Fate with divination by art must be granted, natural divination is related to both God and Nature, so that it would be difficult to ascertain which of them is principally to be regarded as its source. It is also repeatedly said that it is difficult to explain the principles and causes of every kind of divination (*Div.* I 35; 85; 109) and Posidonius himself expressly did not distinguish among them (*Div.* I 126=F 110).

But before stating our personal view, we shall complete this short bibliographical survey by briefly mentioning Andreas Graeser's interpretation, since his views mostly coincide with our own, except concerning the relation of this hierarchy with the sorts of divination. Graeser does not see three separate powers in Posidonius' God, Fate and Nature. He says: *Yet all this certainly does not permit the inference that this is a hierarchy of powers. What can be assumed is that Posidonius, when trying to establish Mantics and Divination as reasonable sciences, found such a three-fold classification relevant to his methodological purposes*<sup>35</sup>. What he states, however, in the sequel, namely, that *Zeus must be viewed with reference to theology, and Nature as expressing references to the realm of prognostication, whereas Fate represented a discipline of its own kind...* seems rather conventional and close to Bréhier's and Marie Laffranque's views on the relevance of these divine aspects to the sorts of divination.

Though it appears reasonable to correlate this hierarchy with the sorts of divination expounded in what precedes and what follows Posidonius' reference in the *De divinatione*, and though we see this hierarchy to be tightly bound up with divination and of no particular significance independently of it, we still believe that Posidonius was not interested so much in the different sources of the kinds of divination as in the theoretical reasons and philosophical principles accounting for and justifying its «existence». Some resemblances between the *De divinatione* and the *De natura deorum* even and the *De fato* as well as a brief survey of the structure of the first book of the former dialogue with some references to the second book may show that this hierarchy is actually associated with the question of divination but otherwise than is generally held.

34. *Ib.* 344-364, esp. 344-351 on artistic (scientific) and natural divination.

35. *Op. cit.* 110.



The first book primarily purports to show not so much the sorts of divination and their respective causes as that «there is divination», that is, that divination is a real discipline. To put it in another way, the reality of divination relies on certain hypotheses and postulates certain principles and theories without which neither its existence nor its particular nature and function can be shown.

Divination is defined in the *De divinatione* as *the foreseeing and foretelling of events considered as happening by chance* (*Div.* I 9) and should not be taken as it was misleadingly presented by Marcus in the second book (*Div.* II 13), i.e., as the foreknowledge and foretelling of things which happen by chance. Here the verb *putantur* has been intentionally replaced by the verb *essent* but the emphasis must be laid on the original verb because, though chance for the Stoics was also a cause, it was incomprehensible to human reason (*SVF* II 965) and as such deprived of essential reality (*SVF* II 967; 970). A better definition of divination and one which clarifies the principles on which it is based is the following: *a science which observes and interprets the signs given by the gods to men* (*SVF* II 1017). This definition implies that there are gods (who give the signs) and that they are providential; that nature is the realm in which these signs are to be found; and that these signs are true because they reveal future events, according to the law of fate, which is defined as *an immortal truth having its source in all eternity* (*Div.* I 125).

The first book of the *De divinatione* is generally held to derive chiefly from either the *Περὶ θεῶν* or the *Περὶ μαντικῆς* of Posidonius<sup>36</sup>, who does not appear to have deviated from the orthodox Stoic teaching in this realm except in order to prove himself a most fervent devotee of all kinds of divination, even of astrology<sup>37</sup>. Though particular definitions of Nature and Fate are not found among Posidonius' attested fragments, we believe that the views occurring in this dialogue on those subjects, even the definitions of those terms, chiefly represent him.

In the first part, after Cicero's introductory chapter, Quintus sets out to give reasons for the belief in divination, that is, to prove its existence. It might be of help for our enquiry to see how the Stoic spokesman attempted to demonstrate the divine providential activity in the *De natura deorum*, since both the methods and the purposes aimed at in these two Ciceronian accounts appear similar. Balbus, the Stoic spokesman in *N.D.*, says of the

36. See A. S. Pease (Ed.), *De divinatione*, Illinois 1923, Introduction 21 ff., and W. A. Falconer, *De divinatione* (Loeb Class. Libr.) 218.

37. See F 106-113b, esp. 111. Cf. T 68: *Posidonius magnus astrologus idemque philosophus*, and F 7.



belief in providence: *A thesis* [sc. that there is providence] *which our school usually divides into three sections. The first is based on the argument proving that the gods exist* [*ducitur ab ea ratione quae docet esse deos*]; *if this be granted, it must be admitted that the world is governed by their wisdom. The second proves that all things are under the sway of sentient nature... and this proved, it follows that the universe was generated from living first causes. The third topic is the argument from wonder... In the first place therefore one must either deny the existence of the gods...* (N.D. II 75-76)<sup>37a</sup>. Thus the reality of the gods, the rationality of Nature, and wonder at the marvels of the universe account for and demonstrate the administration of the world by divine providence.

How far does this three-fold justification of providence differ from Posidonius' hierarchy, with regard this time to divination, except that for wonder at the spectacle of the world one should substitute Fate?

Even if we leave aside the *De divinatione*, the contents of which are quite traditional<sup>38</sup>, and turn to the evidently early Stoic teaching, we find it assumed that the reality and the providence of the gods prove that divination exists, a motif which often occurs in the *De divinatione*. The reciprocal relationship between divination and providence is attested by Diogenes Laertius (VII 149=*SVF* II 1191), by Cicero (*De legibus* II 32) and by Quintilianus (*Inst. orat.* V 7, 35). The same interdependence, better reciprocity, occurs in the *De divinatione* (I 82; 83; 84; II 41; 49 etc., and particularly I 9; 110; 117).

The reciprocal relationship between divination and fate is expressly defended by the early Stoics (*SVF* II 939; 941; 954; 955), according to whom divination is justified by the universal rule of Fate, and Fate in turn by the validity of divination. Characteristic even for the wording is Cicero's *De fato* 11: *Quae tolluntur omnia si vis et natura fati ex divinationis ratione firmabitur*. The same reciprocity occurs in the *De divinatione* I 125-128 and II 19-21.

The interdependence of divination and Nature, or rather the justification of divination by the Stoic doctrine of Nature, is more difficult to explain. One possible explanation is that the interconnection of things, which is postulated by divination, may be fully accounted for by the divinity and rationality of Nature unfolding the divine element throughout the world and binding up its parts into an organic whole<sup>38a</sup>. Nature, as the principle of cohesion working

37a. Translation by Rackham (Loeb Class. Libr.).

38. See Pease op. cit. 120. Cf. K. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios von Apameia* col. 792 ff. Most early Stoic fragments have been drawn from this dialogue.

38a. See W. C. Greene, op. cit. 426 app. 63.





out the cosmic sympathy (*SVF* II 534; 546; 549; 1209), may be regarded as a reason sufficient to explain both the reality and the efficacy of divination. The divinity of Nature preached by the early Stoics is also emphasised by Cicero, echoing Posidonius, and by Posidonius himself (F 85; 87). Because of Nature's spatial and temporal interconnection, unity, and harmony, signs of future events are to be found in her realm (F 106), due to the contact between the different parts of the world. As Nature, moreover, contains the immortal souls «clearly stamped with the marks of truth», which they transmit to men during sleep or in states of frenzy (F 110), *naturae vis* (*Div.* II 143) may thus lead to the belief in divination as a real discipline.

To come back to Posidonius specifically: in view of the fact that he is the main source of the first book of the *De divinatione*<sup>39</sup>, we shall briefly survey the first part of it, which we believe shows what Posidonius may have meant by saying that the vital principle of divination — or better its power and reason — should be traced to God; since, moreover, the tracing of divination to God is said in our fragment to have already been done in the previous chapters<sup>40</sup>.

As a matter of fact, up to I 125, in which Posidonius' «hierarchy» occurs, it has sufficiently been proved that — despite certain errors in the practice of artificial divination — this is not a superstition but a real discipline; in other words, that divination really exists. In what immediately precedes our fragment, Quintus repeatedly insists upon this: *Esse certe divinationem idque esse omnibus confitendum* (*Div.* I 125). Up to this point most of the arguments for its existence have been drawn from the existence, nature, and providence of the gods, from whom all sorts of divination derive.

As was the case in the *De natura deorum*, divination is first proved to exist by universal consent (*Div.* I 1 ff.). It is also confirmed by the authority of the philosophers, most of whom put forward many well-grounded arguments in its favour (I 5 ff.). It is clear then that the whole question here is the existence of divination; arguments for it occur in the first book and those against in the second. Cicero, the Academic spokesman, says: *Faciendum videtur ut diligenter etiam atque etiam argumenta cum argumentis comparemus, ut fecimus in eis tribus libris quos de natura deorum scripsimus* (I 7). What is here questioned is not so much the kinds of divination — those being sanctioned by custom and practice — as whether or not divination is a real science and from where it draws its validity: *Quam habeat divinatio vim et quale sit* (I 9).

39. See Pease, op. cit. 21: *Cratippus and Posidonius need be considered as possible sources on any large scale*. Cf. the views of Heeringa, Corssen and others cited by Pease.

40. *De quo satis dictum est*, draws back to many previous passages.





Considering the enquiry into the nature and efficacy of divination to be the natural sequel of the question of the nature and providence of the gods — which would follow the discussion *On fate* — Quintus, acting here as the Stoic spokesman, relates this question to that of the nature of the gods and says: *My own opinion is that, if the kinds of divination which we have inherited from our forefathers and now practice are trustworthy, then there are gods and, conversely, if there are gods, then there are men who have the power of divination* (I 9). Cicero, calling this reciprocity between divination and the gods the citadel of Stoic philosophy, tries to shake it by maintaining that it is possible for gods to exist without support from divination, as it is also possible that Nature gives signs of future events without the intervention of any god (I 10). Quintus, however, convinced that the existence of some kinds of divination is a sufficient proof of the divine existence and providence and conversely, sets out to prove by arguments this central reciprocity.

There are no severe limits between natural and «artifistic» divination except that the former does not require special teaching and training but is exercised naturally by people endowed with special sensitivity, in dreams and states of frenzy (I 12; 34; 70). The relation of these two sorts recalls that between natural concepts (προλήψεις) and articulated notions (ἐννοιαί)<sup>41</sup>.

The actual instances of divination show that the gods have a concern for human affairs (I 33). It is characteristic of the Stoic views that both kinds of natural divination (from dreams and frenzy) depend upon the same reason (*rationem*): namely that the human soul is derived from outside, that is, from the divine soul (I 70)<sup>42</sup>. That this view represents Cratippus<sup>43</sup> by no means entails that it is not also Stoic. The divinity of Nature means nothing other than the diffusion of divine mind within the world, the function of the world-soul. All cases of both natural divination and divination by art are justified by the hypotheses of the divine existence, nature and providence. Apart from establishing divination as a real discipline, these hypotheses also serve as arguments for the reality of the gods: *What do we expect? Do we wait for the immortal gods to converse with us in the Forum, in the street, and in our home? While they do not, of course, present themselves in person, they do diffuse their power far and wide* (I 79). The hypothesis of the gods is also

41. See *SVF* II 83.

42. *Animos hominum quadam ex parte extrinsecus esse tractos et haustos ex quo intellegitur esse extra divinum animum, humanus unde ducatur*. Cf. *SVF* I 495; II 633; 774; 776.

43. See *Div.* I 70 : *Cratippus noster*. Cf. I 71.



analogically served by the argument proving that there is a divine power within the human soul (I 80).

That the whole discussion hinges upon the effort to prove the existence of divination philosophically is obvious from the following passage, in which the characteristic word of our fragment *ratio* again occurs: *Quam quidem esse re vera hac Stoicorum ratione concluditur: «Si sunt di... at neque non diligunt nos [sunt enim benefici generique hominum amici] ... non igitur sunt di nec significant futura; sunt autem di, significant ergo;... si dant vias... est divinatio; est igitur divinatio»* (I 82-83).

The fact that man cannot know the causes of each particular kind of divination (I 85; 109) — which confirms our point that this hierarchy does not refer to the types of it — does not entail its non-existence, since the very instances cited empirically establish it. Such instances are brought forward liberally throughout the dialogue, all of them testifying to the divine origin of divination and to the whole hypothesis of the gods. Even natural divination is directly referable to divine nature, since *the universe is wholly filled with the eternal intelligence and the divine mind*, in virtue of which *human souls are influenced by their contact with divine souls* (I 110).

The question of how prophets and seers can see things which do not at the time actually exist again depends on the same theory, that is, on the nature of the gods: *But that question would be solved quite readily if we were to investigate certain other questions which demand consideration first. For the theory in regard to the nature of the gods, so clearly developed in the second book of our work on that subject [sc. in the *De natura deorum*], includes this whole question. If we maintain that theory, we shall establish the very point which I am trying to make, namely, that there are gods; that they rule the universe by their foresight and that they direct the affairs of men — not merely of men in the mass, but each individual. If we succeed in holding that position — and for my part I think it impregnable — then surely it must follow that the gods give to men signs of coming events* (I 117). *De quo agimus* throughout the dialogue is that divination exists, that is, that the gods grant signs of events to come because of their providence for mankind.

First and foremost then divination can be justified by the theory (*ratio*) of the existence of providential gods. Accordingly, the principal necessary and sufficient condition for the reality of divination is the existence of providential gods, who diffuse signs throughout sentient Nature, which holds and binds things together in universal sympathy. These signs are interpreted by gifted and specially trained men as revealing future events according to the law of Fate by which all things are governed (I 118). The *leitmotiv* of all this account, even occurring in what immediately precedes Posidonius'



view, is that divination exists and is a real science as proved by the existence and providence of the gods: *Esse certe divinationem, idque esse omnibus confitendum* (I 125). The adverb *quocirca*, moreover, introducing Posidonius' view, clearly shows its reference to the preceding chapters, which is corroborated by the phrase *de quo satis dictum est*, while the dependence of divination on both Fate and Nature is stated in the sequel. This is not the only place where Cicero uses the word *ratio* in the sense of «arguments». As for the singular *deo* instead of the plural employed throughout the whole dialogue, we believe that it can be explained from Cicero's reference to Socrates' personal god, who either gives or withholds his signs (I 123; 124), and we think that this reminiscence still persists when Cicero mentions Posidonius' position. What thus precedes the passage under discussion and justifies Posidonius' reference to God is an attempt to establish the reality and power of divination on the basis of the reality of providential gods.

Next comes the philosophical justification of the efficacy of divination through the doctrine of Fate. Fate is here defined in quite traditional terms as *ordo et series causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat* (I 125) and, though there is no definition of it ascribed to Posidonius specifically, we have no reason to doubt that he would have shared this view; otherwise that would have been indicated by our authorities and especially by Cicero. Fate is also defined as *ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas sempiterna* (ibid.) and this definition fully explains how the doctrine of Fate can serve as a principle for divination: since things cannot change from what was always true of them, so if a man comes to the point of understanding the connection of things, he is able to foretell future events from present signs, in particular from continuous observation, but also in frenzy or in sleep (I 126). If things did not happen according to the law of cause and effect but arose without any cause, spontaneously and suddenly, by chance, no man would be able to predict what was going to happen. But since *fato omnia fiunt* (I 127) — a central Stoic doctrine expressly shared by Posidonius (F 25) — *if there were a man whose soul could discern the links that join each cause, then surely he would never be mistaken in any prediction he might make* (ibid.). But this is a prerogative of God and man can only tell the future from signs sent by him. That *a fato* does not necessarily relate to divination by art, as it is usually taken, is indicated by the facts that *the connection between cause and effect is obvious to both classes of diviners: those who are endowed with natural divination and those who know the course of events by the observation of signs* (ibid.) and *in causes are stored the future events whose coming is foreseen by reason or conjecture or is discerned by the soul when inspired by frenzy or when it is set free in sleep* (I 128). Fate thus accounts for the



reality and efficacy of all sorts of divination in a secondary sense, that is, after the proof made by the hypothesis of the existence of providential gods. Nor is God unconnected with the corroboration of divination by Fate, since God is Fate, having decided, once and for all, all that is decreed to happen; but God's primary aspect is to be providential. Finally, it is obvious from the concluding lines that what is said of Fate in I 125-128 aims to provide arguments for the validity of divination: *Haec quidem et quaedam eiusdem modi argumenta, cur sit divinatio ducuntur a fato* (I 128).

When we come to the third term of Posidonius' hierarchy, Nature, matters are more difficult to explain from Cicero's account, though the introductory lines are: *a natura autem alia quaedam ratio est, quae docet...* (I 129). The theory of Nature — taken here as both divine and natural law, the way things should be and actually are — gives support to divination by showing the great power of the soul when released from the body. This we understand as a sort of getting out of oneself and uniting with the divine spirit diffused throughout Nature. It is true that Nature appears here as related to the natural kind of divination, which would have justified the claim that this term occurred in Posidonius as a source of natural divination, but what is said particularly of Posidonius in this context renders this explanation improbable: *And while it is difficult perhaps to apply this principle of nature to explain that kind of divination which we call artificial, yet Posidonius, who digs into the question as deep as one can, thinks that nature gives certain signs of future events* (I 130=F 110). Moreover astrological illustrations are given as instances of divination from signs manifested in Nature which are closely bound up with the doctrine of Fate (F 111; 112). Entrails and sacrifices — also examined in this section — belong to divination practised by observation, i. e. to the «artifistic», and yet they are cited as means of divination deriving their force from Nature (I 131). Nature, therefore, is not here primarily regarded as the source of natural divination — this being ultimately God and divine intimations (F 108) — but as the common realm which embraces all things in universal unity and in which the signs predicting future events occur. Nature is the one and common house of all (I 131), whose cohesive power accounts for the interconnection of things and the association of signs with future events. This aspect of Nature is more clearly stated in the refutation of the Stoic — particularly the Posidonian — arguments in Book II. Cicero, perhaps, partly echoing Posidonius, concedes there that *the works of nature are firmly bound together in a harmonious whole... that the universe is a unit... that there is a certain contact between the different parts of nature... that some natural connection exists between objects apparently unrelated* and he speaks of a natural tie, an harmony, an association, and



sympathy (II 133-134), which seems to extend even between Nature and the condition of the entrails (II 135). But the definition of Nature which is most pertinent of all to the relationship of divination and nature is the one attributed by name to Posidonius in the same context, though shared with Chrysippus and Antipater: *ad hostiam deligendam ducem esse vim quandam sentientem et divinam, quae toto confusa mundo sit* (II 35). This interconnection is also emphasized by all of them in maintaining that *at the moment of sacrifice a change in the entrails takes place; something is added or something taken away; for all things are obedient to the divine will* (ibid). Nature here, as the principle of unity, is claimed to be the agent of the divine will which is both Providence and Fate and can thus account for the efficacy of divination. In similar terms Nature's vitality and divinity are described in II 142. Nature, then, accounts for divination; that is, as a cohesive, sentient, and divine power it furnishes arguments for the latter's existence. That it comes third does not so much indicate any lack of appreciation as it serves Pos.' methodological purposes, though the providential aspect of the deity is of the highest importance. The reciprocity between providence and divination is expressly maintained by Posidonius: *and there is divination... if there is providence* (F 7). He also states that the world is governed by reason and providence (F 21).

That divination must be traced firstly to God, secondly to Fate, and lastly to Nature does not really imply a certain absolute hierarchy of these three aspects of the artistic fire; rather it means that the Stoic discipline of divination is shown to be real and valid and is justified in all its sorts by the Stoic theory of the gods first (that is, that they exist and are providential), by the Stoic theory of Fate secondly (according to which nothing happens without a cause and signs reveal events to come), and from the Stoic view of Nature thirdly (as the divine principle of unity and connecting link of apparently unconnected events).

This relationship of divination with the three central hypotheses of God, Fate and Nature, as preserved by Cicero, seems the only dependable evidence for Posidonius on this question. Aëtius' version with the change of order between Fate and Nature is perhaps biased and adapted to the metaphysical hierarchy of being which actually existed later<sup>44</sup>. Aëtius appears to have

44. See our article referred to in n. 6. Aëtius inserts Pos'. «hierarchy» in the section dealing with Fate. Not everything said there seems reliable. Plato appears read from the Middle-Platonic view and Heraclitus from the Stoic. For a fair assessment of the *Placita*, see Ch. Kahn, *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology*, N. York-London 1964<sup>3</sup>, 16: *This work... is the most systematic and the least satisfactory of all ancient histories of philosophy.*



detached these three hypotheses from their reference to divination, with which they were originally exclusively linked, with the result to present Posidonius as deviating from Stoic monism and approaching the dualism of Middle Platonism, which we know from Plutarch and contemporary unstoic authorities. Aëtius' absolute «hierarchical» order does not seem to us important since it by no means conforms to what is known of Posidonius from dependable sources. Perhaps it could be ascribed to the generalizing and aphoristic tendencies of the doxographer, not meant to be read as it was.

## Η «ΙΕΡΑΡΧΗΣΗ» ΘΕΟΥ, ΕΙΜΑΡΜΕΝΗΣ, ΦΥΣΗΣ ΑΠΟ ΤΟΝ ΠΟΣΕΙΔΩΝΙΟ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ «ΠΕΡΙ ΜΑΝΤΙΚΗΣ» ΤΟΥ ΚΙΚΕΡΩΝΟΣ

Π ε ρ ί λ η ψ η.

Ὁ ὀρίζοντας μιᾶς προσωπικῆς θεολογίας τοῦ Ποσειδωνίου ὀλοένα καὶ στενεύει μὲ τὰ θετικότερα καὶ νηφαλιότερα κριτήρια τῆς σύγχρονης ἔρευνας. Ὁ περιορισμὸς τῶν περισσοτέρων εἰδικῶν στὴ χρῆση αὐθεντικῶν ἀποσπασμάτων καὶ μαρτυριῶν ποὺ τὸν ἀντιπροσωπεύουν ὀνομαστικά — καὶ ποὺ ἡ ἄρτια πρόσφατη ἔκδοσή τους ἀπὸ τοὺς Edelstein-Kidd καθώρισε τὰ περιγράμματά τους μὲ αὐστηρότητα — ἐλάχιστα πιά περιθώρια ἀφήνει γιὰ αὐτοσχεδριασμοὺς καὶ ἐξεζητημένες συσχετίσεις. Μὲ τὴν κατάρρευση τοῦ μύθου ποὺ (μὲ βάση ἀόριστες ἐπιδράσεις στὸν Κικέρωνα, Πλούταρχο, Σέξτο Ἐμπειρικό, Κλεομήδη καὶ ἄλλους) εἶχε πλάσει ἡ φαντασία ἐρευνητῶν τοῦ περασμένου αἰῶνα — ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν τοῦ δικοῦ μας — ἡ στωικὴ ὀρθοδοξία τοῦ Ποσειδωνίου ἐπιβεβαιώνεται συνεχῶς (ἐκτὸς κάπως ἀπὸ τὴν Ἠθικὴ καὶ κάποιες ἄλλες λεπτομέρειες τοῦ συστήματος), καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος προσφέρεται πλέον στὴν ἔρευνα ὡς οἰκουμενικὴ ἐπιστημονικὴ μορφή περισσότερο παρὰ ὡς μυστικὸς ὀραματιστὴς καὶ ἡλιοκεντρικὸς θεολόγος μὲ πρωτότυπες ἐσχατολογικὲς θεωρίες. Ἄν δὲν ἀμφισβητεῖται ὀλότελα ἡ φιλοσοφικὴ πρωτοτυπία του, πρόκειται πάντως γιὰ μιὰ πρωτοτυπία «πρωτότυπη», ἐμφαντικὴ ἴσως γιὰ τὴν ἀναμφισβήτητη σημασία του στὰ ἐλληνιστικὰ χρόνια. Μὲ τὸν παραμερισμὸ ἔτσι πολλῶν παραμέτρων τοῦ «αἵρετικοῦ» Στωικισμοῦ τοῦ Ποσειδωνίου περιορίστηκε καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς τῶν σχετικῶν (θεολογικῶν) του προβλημάτων, ἂν καὶ ὁ ἴδιος ὡς πολυεδρικὴ φιλοσοφικὴ παρουσία εἶναι καὶ θὰ παραμείνῃ ἴσως γιὰ πάντα ἓνα ἄλυτο πρόβλημα.

Ὡστόσο μερικὰ θεολογικὰ προβλήματα ποὺ ἀναφύονται ἀπὸ ὀνομαστικὲς μαρτυρίες συζητοῦνται ἀκόμα μὲ ἐνδιαφέρον καὶ ἐλάχιστη ὁμοφω-



νία γι' αὐτὰ ἐπικρατεῖ στήν ἔρευνα. Ἀνάμεσά τους — ἴσως τὸ σπουδαιότερο — εἶναι ἡ «ἱεράρχηση» μεταξὺ Θεοῦ [ἢ Διός], Εἰμαρμένης καὶ Φύσης (τόσο σχετικὰ μὲ τὴ μαντική ὅσο καὶ ἀνεξάρτητα) ποὺ προσγράφουν ὁ Κικέρων καὶ ὁ Ἀέτιος στὸν Ποσειδώνιο σὲ δυὸ χαρακτηριστικὲς παραλλαγές. Λέει ὁ Κικέρων: *Γιὰ τοῦτο πιστεύω σωστὸ πὼς ὅλο τὸ κῦρος (ἡ δύναμη) καὶ ἡ θεωρία (ὁ λόγος) τῆς μαντικῆς πρέπει νὰ συναχθοῦν κατὰ πρῶτο λόγο ἀπὸ τὸ θεό, γιὰ τὸν ὁποῖο εἶπαμε ἀρκετά, ἔπειτα ἀπὸ τὴν εἰμαρμένη καὶ ἐφεξῆς ἀπὸ τὴ φύση, ὅπως κάνει ὁ Ποσειδώνιος (De divinatione I 125 = F 107). Καὶ ὁ Ἀέτιος: Ποσειδώνιος τρίτην ἀπὸ Διός [sc. τὴν εἰμαρμένην]· πρῶτον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν Δία, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν φύσιν, τρίτον δὲ τὴν εἰμαρμένην (Placita I 28.5 = F 103).*

Ἡ ταύτιση — ἂν ὄχι καὶ συνωνυμία — θεοῦ, εἰμαρμένης καὶ φύσης, καλύπτεται ἢ ἀναφορὰ καὶ τῶν τριῶν αὐτῶν κοσμικῶν ἀπόψεων στὸ πρωταρχικὸ «τεχνικὸν πῦρ» εἶναι συνακόλουθη μὲ τὸ στωικὸ πανθεϊστικὸ μονισμό καὶ βεβαιώνεται ἀπὸ πολλὰ ἀποσπάσματα καὶ ἀξιόπιστες μαρτυρίες. Θεός, φύση καὶ εἰμαρμένη εἶναι ἐναλλακτικὲς περιγραφές τῆς στωικῆς θεότητας ποὺ ἄλλοτε ἐκλαμβάνονταν ὡς ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἄλλοτε ταυτίζονταν μὲ τὸν κόσμον. Καὶ τὶς τρεῖς αὐτὲς ὁψεις τοῦ θείου οἱ Στωικοὶ τὶς ἀντιλαμβάνονταν, ἀκόμα τὶς ὠρίζαν, παρόμοια. Ἡ ὕψιστη κοσμικὴ ἀρχή, ὡς «ἐνεργητικὴ» ἀρχὴ καὶ «σπερματικὸς» λόγος, ἐπονομαζόταν θεός, ὡς συνεκτικὴ καὶ ζωτικὴ ἀρχή, φύση, καὶ ὡς εἶρμός αἰτιῶν, «λόγος τῶν συμβαινόντων» καὶ πρώτη αἰτία, εἰμαρμένη.

Ἐχομε δεῖξει ἄλλοις ὅτι ἡ ἀνορθόδοξη ὑποταγὴ τῆς πρόνοιας στήν εἰμαρμένη ποὺ ἀποδίδει ὁ Χαλκίδιος στὸν Κλεάνθη δὲν ἐκφράζει τὸν ποιητὴ τοῦ Ὑμνου στὸ Δία καὶ δὲν μπορεῖ νὰ θεωρηθῇ ἀπολύτως ἀξιόπιστη. Σὲ παρόμοια συμπεράσματα καταλήγομε στήν ἔρευνα αὐτὴ καὶ σχετικὰ μὲ τὴ μαρτυρία τοῦ Ἀετίου, ποὺ παρουσιάζει τὶς τρεῖς ἀπόψεις τῆς κοσμικῆς θεότητας ἱεραρχημένες ἀπὸ τὸν Ποσ. κατὰ τρόπο ἀπόλυτο, σὰν νὰ ἐπρόκειτο δηλ. γιὰ τρεῖς διαφοροποιημένες καὶ ἀνεξάρτητες μεταφυσικὲς ὀντότητες. Ἐτσι παρουσιασμένη τὴν ἱεράρχηση τὴν ἀποδίδομε εἴτε στὸ κλίμα τῆς ἐποχῆς, ποὺ ἱεραρχοῦσε μεταφυσικὰ τὸν κόσμον καὶ τὰ ὑπερκόσμια, καὶ σὲ προσπάθεια ἑνταξῆς τοῦ Ποσειδωνίου στὰ πλαίσια τοῦ Μέσου Πλατωνισμοῦ, εἴτε σὲ ἀφοριστικὲς καὶ γενικευτικὲς τάσεις τῆς δοξογραφίας. Ἀξιόπιστη θεωροῦμε ὅμως τὴν ὑπὸ ὅρους ἱεράρχηση τῆς μαρτυρίας τοῦ Κικέρωνος, τὴν ἐξάρτηση δηλ. τῆς ἱεραρχίας αὐτῆς ἀπὸ τὴν μαντική, καὶ προσπαθοῦμε νὰ τὴν ἐρμηνεύσωμε μὲ βάση τὸ πρῶτο βιβλίον τοῦ «Περὶ μαντικῆς» τοῦ Κικέρωνος, ποὺ ἀπηχεῖ στωικὲς ἀπόψεις καὶ ἔχει ὡς βασικὴ πηγὴ [μαζὶ μὲ τὸν Κράτιππον] τὸν Ποσειδώνιον.

Στὴν προσπάθειά μας αὐτὴ συζητοῦμε μόνο τὶς σχετικὲς μὲ τὸ πρόβλημα ἀπόψεις τῶν Edelstein, Rist, Verbeke, Greene, Bréhier, M. Laffranque



καὶ Α. Graeser. Οἱ τέσσαρες πρῶτοι, ἀντιμετωπίζοντας τὴν ἱεραρχία καὶ ἀνεξάρτητα ἀπὸ τὴν μαντική, ἐπιχειροῦν ἐρμηνεῖα τῶν μελῶν τῆς τελείως ξένη πρὸς τὸ στωικὸ μονισμό καὶ τὰ ὀρίζουν ὡς ἀνεξάρτητες ὀντότητες κατὰ τρόπο ἀνορθόδοξο καὶ ἐλάχιστα σύμφωνο μὲ τὶς σχετικὲς μαρτυρίες. Οἱ τελευταῖοι ἀντιμετωπίζουν τὴν ἱεράρχηση αὐτὴ κυρίως σὲ σχέση μὲ τὴ μαντική, κι αὐτὸ μᾶς βρίσκει σύμφωνους, σὲ συνάρτηση ὅμως μὲ τὰ εἶδη τῆς μαντικῆς (τεχνική - φυσικὴ μαντική), ὡς πηγές καὶ αἰτίες τους, πρᾶγμα ποὺ δὲν μᾶς πείθει. Βλέπομε ὅμως μαζὶ μὲ τὴν Laffranque στὸ «θεὸ» πρωταρχικὰ τὴν πρόνοια, τὴν προνοητικὴ δηλ. γιὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους θεϊκὴ ἄποψη.

Ἀναφορικὰ λοιπὸν μὲ τὴ φιλολογία τοῦ προβλήματος εἴμαστε σύμφωνοι μὲ τὰ ἐξῆς πορίσματα τῆς ἔρευνας, ποὺ ἔχομε ὑπ' ὄψη μας: Οἱ ὅροι «θεός», «εἰμαρμένη», «φύση», ἂν καὶ ἔχουν τὴν ἴδια ἀναφορά, δὲν ταυτίζονται οὔτε εἶναι ἀπολύτως συνώνυμοι, δὲν ἔχουν δηλ. τὸ ἴδιο νόημα. Περιγράφουν διαφορετικὲς ἀπόψεις ἢ λειτουργίες τοῦ πρωταρχικοῦ «τεχνικοῦ πυρός». Ὡς «θεός» νοεῖται κατὰ πρῶτο καὶ κύριο λόγο καὶ ἀπὸ τὸν Κικέρωνα καὶ τὸν Ποσειδώνιο ἢ θεϊκὴ πρόνοια, ὅπως ἀντιδιαστέλλεται ἀπὸ τὴν εἰμαρμένη καὶ τὴ φύση (ἂν καὶ ἡ στωικὴ «αἰσθητικὴ φύση» στὴν κοσμικὴ τῆς ἔννοια συνέπιπτε μὲ τὴν πρόνοια). Συμφωνοῦμε ἀκόμη ὅτι ἡ ἱεράρχηση συνδέεται μὲ τὴν μαντική. Ὅμως, δὲν ἀντιμετωπίζομε τὶς θεϊκὲς αὐτὲς ἀπόψεις ὡς χωριστὲς καὶ ἀνεξάρτητες ὀντολογικὰ ὑποστάσεις. Ἔτσι δὲν αἰσθανόμαστε τὴν ὑποχρέωση νὰ ἐρμηνεύσωμε τοὺς ὅρους «θεός», «φύση» καὶ «εἰμαρμένη» στὴν περίπτωσι τοῦ Ποσειδωνίου διαφορετικὰ ἀπὸ τὶς ὀρθόδοξες στωικὲς ἀπόψεις. Στὴ σχέση τῆς ἱεραρχίας αὐτῆς μὲ τὴν μαντικὴ εἴμαστε ἀκόμα ριζικότεροι. Δὲν πιστεύομε, δηλαδή, ὅτι ἔχει νόημα ἀνεξάρτητα ἀπὸ τὴν μαντικὴ. Ἔτσι ἀπορρίπτομε τὴν παραλλαγὴ τοῦ Ἀετίου. Ἀκόμη δὲν συνδέομε τὰ μέλη τῆς ἱεραρχίας μὲ τὰ εἶδη τῆς μαντικῆς [τεχνική, φυσικὴ] ὡς αἰτίες καὶ πηγές τους, γιὰ λόγους ποὺ ἀντλοῦμε ἀπὸ τὸ κείμενο, ὅπου βρίσκεται ἡ ἀναφορά.

Τὴν προσωπικὴ ἐρμηνεία μας στηρίζομε σὲ μιὰ συνολικὴ θεώρηση τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ τῆς δομῆς τοῦ πρώτου κυρίως βιβλίου τοῦ *De divinatione* τοῦ Κικέρωνος — ποὺ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἀποτελεῖ μιὰ ἀπὸ τὶς κύριες πηγές του — σὲ συνάρτηση μὲ τὸ *De natura deorum* καὶ τὸ *De fato*, ποὺ ἀποτελοῦν κατὰ κάποιο τὴν τρόπο τριλογία τῆς στωικῆς θεολογίας καί, ἀπὸ τὴν πλευρὰ τοῦ Κικέρωνος, συνδέονται φυσικά, ὡς συνέχειες.

Σκοπὸς τοῦ δευτέρου βιβλίου τοῦ *De natura deorum* ἦταν ἡ ἐκθεση τῆς στωικῆς θεολογίας, ἡ φιλοσοφικὴ δηλαδή ἀπόδειξις τῆς ὑπαρξης, φύσεως καὶ πρόνοιας τῶν θεῶν, μ' ἓνα λόγο ἡ ὑπαρξη προνοητικῶν θεῶν. Βασικὰ ἐπιχειρήματα καὶ δόγματα γιὰ τοῦτο ἦταν ἡ ὑπαρξη τῆς μαντικῆς καὶ ἡ στωικὴ θεωρία τῆς φύσεως. Στὸ ἀντίστοιχο, ἐποικοδομητικὸ, μέρος τοῦ *De fato*, ποὺ γίνεται ἡ ἐκθεση τῶν στωικῶν θέσεων, σκοπὸς ἦταν νὰ ἀπο-



δειχθῇ φιλοσοφικά ἡ «ὑπαρξη τῆς εἰμαρμένης», νὰ δειχθῇ δηλαδή ὅτι «ὅλα συμβαίνουν καθ' εἰμαρμένην» καὶ ὅτι ἡ εἰμαρμένη δὲν εἶναι ἀπλῆ δεισιδαιμονία. Βασικὰ ἐπίσης ἐπιχειρήματα ἦταν καὶ ἐκεῖ ἡ ὑπαρξη καὶ ἡ πρόνοια τῶν θεῶν, καὶ ἡ δυνατότητα, ἀποτελεσματικότητα, ἀλήθεια καὶ πραγματικότητα τῆς μαντικῆς, ἀδιάσειστο τεκμήριο τῆς θεϊκῆς πρόνοιας καὶ τῆς κοσμικῆς αἰτιοκρατίας. Σκοπὸς τοῦ πρώτου βιβλίου τοῦ *De divinatione* — ὅπου καταφάσκειται ἡ μαντικὴ — εἶναι νὰ ἀποδειχθῇ μὲ φιλοσοφικὲς κυρίως ἀποδείξεις ὅτι ἡ μαντικὴ «ὑπάρχει», εἶναι δηλαδή πραγματικὴ καὶ ἀποτελεσματικὴ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ὄχι πρόληψη καὶ δεισιδαιμονία. Τὸ μοτίβο ὅλου τοῦ βιβλίου εἶναι: «Ἄρα ὑπάρχει ἡ μαντικὴ» [*est igitur divinatio*] ἐνῶ δὲν δίνεται καμμία ἔμφαση στὴν ὑπεράσπιση τῶν εἰδῶν τῆς μαντικῆς (ποὺ ἦταν καθιερωμένα ἀπὸ τὴν παράδοση), οἱ δύο κύριες κατηγορίες τῆς ὁποίας [φυσικὴ (μανία, ὄνειρα, θεϊκὴ ἔμπνευση) καὶ τεχνικὴ (ἀστρολογία, οἰωνοσκοπία, σπλαχνοσκοπία, μετεωρολογία κ.λ.π.)] δὲν προξενοῦσαν ἀμφισβήτησεις, ἐφ' ὅσον εἶχε γίνεи ἀποδεκτὴ ἡ «ὄντολογικὴ ὑπόσταση τῆς μαντικῆς», ἡ πραγματικότητα καὶ τὸ κύρος τῆς ὡς ἐπιστήμης. Τονίζεται ἀκόμα ἡ δυσκολία τοῦ προσδιορισμοῦ τῆς εἰδικῆς αἰτίας κάθε εἶδους. Σκοπὸς τοῦ πρώτου βιβλίου λοιπὸν εἶναι ἡ φιλοσοφικὴ ὑπεράσπιση τῆς στωικῆς θεωρίας τῆς μαντικῆς, ἡ θεωρητικὴ τῆς δικαίωσης. Καὶ τοῦτο, πιστεύομε, γίνεται μὲ τὶς τρεῖς μεγάλες σχετικὲς ὑποθέσεις, μὲ τὶς τρεῖς κεντρικὲς στωικὲς θεωρίες ποὺ ἀποτέλεσαν τὸ ἀντικείμενο τῶν ἄλλων βιβλίων τοῦ Κικέρωνος: Τὴν ὑπαρξη προνοητικῶν θεῶν, τὸ στωικὸ δόγμα τῆς φύσης καὶ τὸ φιλοσοφικὸ κύρος τῆς εἰμαρμένης.

Ὅ,τι προηγεῖται ἀπὸ τὴν ἀναφορὰ τοῦ Κικέρωνος στὸν Ποσειδώνιο (*Div.* I 125) περιέχει πρὸ πάντων «διαλεκτικά», ἀνθρωπολογικά καὶ φιλοσοφικά ἐπιχειρήματα γιὰ τὴν «ὑπαρξη» τῆς μαντικῆς, ἀντλημένα κυρίως ἀπὸ τὴν στωικὴ θεολογία. Ἀπὸ τὴν πεποίθηση δηλαδή στὴν ὑπαρξη τῶν θεῶν, στὴ φύση καὶ τὴν προνοητικὴ τους διάθεση καὶ ἐνέργεια γιὰ τὸν κόσμον καὶ εἰδικώτερα γιὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον. Ἡ μαντικὴ εἶναι ἀδιάσειστο τεκμήριο τῆς θείας πρόνοιας καὶ ἡ πρόνοια θεμελιώδης προϋπόθεση τῆς μαντικῆς.

Ἀκολουθεῖ ἡ θεωρητικὴ δικαίωση τῆς μαντικῆς ἀπὸ τὸ στωικὸ δόγμα τῆς εἰμαρμένης (*Div.* I 125-128). Ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ εἰμαρμένη ὀρίζεται ὡς «αἰώνια ἀλήθεια τῶν πραγμάτων», «εἶρμός αἰτιῶν», «λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοία διοικουμένων» καὶ τίποτε τὸ ἐξωτερικὸ δὲν ματαιώνει τὴν πραγμάτωση τοῦ θεϊκοῦ σχεδίου — οὔτε συμβαίνει τίποτε τυχαίως —, τὰ «σημεῖα» εἶναι ἀποκαλυπτικά τῶν μελλουμένων. Ὅποιος μπορεῖ νὰ τὰ διαβάσῃ, κατέχει στὰ χέρια του τὸ μέλλον ποὺ γράφτηκε μιὰ φορὰ καὶ γιὰ πάντα. Ὁ «Νόμος» τῆς εἰμαρμένης λειτουργεῖ τόσο στὴν «ἐπιστημονικὴ» ὅσο καὶ στὴ «φυσικὴ» μαντικὴ καὶ τοῦτο ἀποτελεῖ πεποίθηση τοῦ Ποσειδω-



νίου (F 100). Ἡ θεωρία τῆς εἰμαρμένης δικαιώνει «λογικά» τὴ μαντική, ὅπως μὲ τὴ σειρά τῆς ἢ μαντικὴ στηρίζει ἐμπειρικά τὴν εἰμαρμένη.

Ἡ πραγματικότητα καὶ ἀποτελεσματικότητα τῆς μαντικῆς εἶναι τέλος συνέπεια τῆς στωικῆς θεωρίας τῆς φύσης (*Div.* 129 ἐπ.), ὡς συνεκτικῆς καὶ ἐνθεῆς ζωτικῆς ἀρχῆς, ὡς «ψυχῆς τοῦ κόσμου», σὲ ἀδιάσπαστη συνάφεια μὲ τὶς ἐπὶ μέρους ψυχὲς ζωντανῶν καὶ νεκρῶν (ἀπορροὲς τῆς κοσμικῆς ψυχῆς). Τὸ σύμφυτο μὲ τὴν ἀντίληψη αὐτὴ στωικὸ [καὶ κυρίως ποσειδωνιακὸ] δόγμα τῆς «συμπάθειας» — συνάφειας, ὁμοιοπάθειας καὶ ἀλληλοπάθειας τῶν πρὸ ἀπομακρυσμένων, χρονικὰ καὶ τοπικά, γεγονότων καὶ πραγμάτων, ἐξηγητικῆς ἀρχῆς τῶν πρὸ προβληματικῶν φυσικῶν φαινομένων — στηρίζει μὲ μοναδικὴ «ἐπιστημονικότητα» τὴ θεωρία τῆς μαντικῆς. Ὅπως ὡς «*natura sentiens*» ἡ φύση ἀποκαλύπτει τὴ θεϊκὴ πρόνοια, ἔτσι ὡς ζωτικὸ πνεῦμα ποὺ διατρέχει, ζωοποιεῖ καὶ θεοποιεῖ τὸ σύμπαν, δικαιώνει θεωρητικὰ καὶ τὴ μαντικὴ καὶ ἀπὸ τὴν ἄποψη αὐτὴ ἀποτελεῖ προϋπόθεσή της. Ἡ φύση εἶναι ἀκόμα ὁ χῶρος ὅπου γράφονται καὶ διαβάζονται τὰ ἀποκαλυπτικά θεϊκὰ σημεῖα, ὁ νόμος ποὺ ὅσα συμβαίνουν πρέπει νὰ συμβαίνουν καὶ ἀπὸ τὴν πλευρὰ αὐτὴ ἐξυπηρετεῖ ἐπίσης τὴ δυνατότητα τῆς μαντικῆς.

Ὅταν λοιπὸν ὁ Κικέρων — ρητὰ ἀκολουθώντας τὸν Ποσειδώνιο — ἰσχυρίζεται ὅτι ἡ δύναμη καὶ ὁ λόγος τῆς μαντικῆς (τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸ της κύρος καὶ ἡ θεωρητικὴ της δικαίωση, ὅπως καταλαβαίνομε τοὺς ὅρους: *vis* καὶ *ratio*) πρέπει νὰ ἀναζητηθοῦν (ἢ νὰ συναχθοῦν) κατὰ πρῶτο λόγο ἀπὸ τὸ θεό, ἔπειτα ἀπὸ τὴν εἰμαρμένη καὶ τέλος ἀπὸ τὴ φύση, ἐννοεῖ, κατὰ τὴ γνώμη μας, ὅτι ἡ «πραγματικότητα» τῆς μαντικῆς ἀποδεικνύεται κατὰ πρῶτο λόγο ἀπὸ τὴν ὑπαρξὴ προνοητικῶν θεῶν [τὴ στωικὴ θεολογία], κατὰ δεύτερο ἀπὸ τὸ νόμο τῆς εἰμαρμένης [τὴ στωικὴ αἰτιοκρατία], καὶ τρίτον ἀπὸ τὴ στωικὴ θεωρία τῆς θεϊκότητας, ζωτικότητας καὶ συνοχῆς τῆς φύσης, στὴ δυναμικὴ ἄποψη τοῦ ὅρου [τὴν περιοχὴ τῆς στωικῆς συμπάθειας].

Κατὰ ἓνα τρόπο οἱ τρεῖς αὐτὲς προϋποθέσεις ἀποτελοῦν — ὅπως συνήθως λέγεται — «πηγές» καὶ «αἰτίες» τῆς μαντικῆς, ὅχι ὅμως τῶν εἰδῶν της — ὅπως ὑποστηρίζεται — ἀλλὰ τῆς μαντικῆς καθαυτὴν, τῆς ὄντολογικῆς της δηλαδὴ ὑπόστασης, τῆς οὐσίας της καὶ τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ της κύρους. Ἀποτελοῦν, καλύτερα, ἐξηγητικὲς ἀρχὲς καὶ θεωρητικὲς προϋποθέσεις, αἰτήματα, θὰ λέγαμε, γιὰ τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴ (φιλοσοφικὴ) ἀπόδειξη τῆς ἀλήθειάς της, τέλος λόγους τῆς ὑπαρξῆς της.

Ἀθῆναι

Μ. Δραγώνα-Μονάχου

