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HOC ALIQUID – QUALE QUID AND THE SIGNIFICATION OF APPELLATIVES

Ludwig Wittgenstein starts his *Philosophical Investigations*¹ with an attack on a theory of signification which he finds exemplified in a passus from Augustinus and which makes signification a relation between a word and a thing. Such theories are usually «genetic» in the sense that they explain the genesis of signification and of our use of words from experiences—usually located in one's childhood—where one is confronted with an object and hears the name of the object pronounced. Thus signification becomes established as a relation between words and objects, the significatum is a thing, and words have ostensive definitions.

It is not difficult to find objections to such theories of signification. We may forget about verbs, prepositions and the like, and be content with discussing substantives. The first obvious difficulty is how to deal with appellatives, that is with universals (for *nomen appellativum et universale sunt idem*²) as it is evident that the theory works best with proper names. Next, suppose we manage to invent a suitable theory of signification for appellatives in referential (subject) position, what are we to make of them when they are used in predicative position?

On the other hand the kind of view criticized by Wittgenstein has some equally obvious attractions to it. I have not for the last many years been an adherent of such theories, and when I got a little daughter two years ago I immediately started teaching her speech in a fashion that seemed more consistent with the view that the meaning of words consists in the way they are used, that is I talked to her like I would talk to any adult, I did not say «table», «bib» or «rattle», but «Come, let's sit at the table», «I think you'd better wear your bib» and «Why on earth do you keep throwing that rattle out of the play-pen? Do you think that is fun?». And all went well until the

1. I use the Suhrkamp edition: *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, Frankfurt a.M. (Suhrkamp Taschenbuch 14) 1971.

2. Boethius de Dacia, *Modi Significandi qu.* 39 (=«Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi» IV, 116, Copenhagen 1969). Cf. Bertrand Russell's more elaborate discussion of the point in *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, London 1940, p. 22.



baby began to speak. In the initial babbling stages I was happy: it babbled in a way that resembled long chains of sentences. And the very first words were μπαμπά (baba) — «daddy!» in Greek— and ποῦ εἶναι; (p u i n e ?) «where is it?». B a b a ! was a little disquieting, but anyhow, a vocative qualifies for a sentence. «Where is (it)?» was superb. But then things began to go wrong. The baby apparently began structuring the world and insisted on being given names for those structures it recognized as individuals, i.e. rattle, bib, table plus a few actions like 'eat' and 'sleep'. Soon I found my little darling blackmailing me into giving up my principles («If you do not point and say a name, I do not produce a word!») and I began to say «this is your rattle», «this is a table». When the child was close to being two I had nearly surrendered the last bastions and said «rattle», «book» while pointing. Right now my daughter is just two years old. The situation is ameliorating. She repeats whole phrases and produces sentences. I am not to the same degree forced to use an object-language. But still there are many cases where she most definitely asks for information of the kind «this is a rubber-stamp» and «this is a cigar».

To still my qualms Bertrand Russell in the *Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*³ several times hints at a theory of universals, or of the acquisition of universal words, which assumes that those of them that belong to the object-language, i.e. among others most appellative nouns, come to be used by a process where the first step is using the word as a proper name, e.g. d o g of some particular dog, and the next step is applying it to another object which is similar to the one which is 'dog' by definition, i.e. by strict ostensive definition. You then arrive at transforming the proper name into a predicate and a class-term embracing all objects which are in some sense similar to or indistinguishable from the object that was originally d o g. Asked about the meaning of such a word you can point to a particular object and say «this is an instance of a dog». Thus /dog/ still has a kind of ostensive definition.

This is probably close to being the best that can be made of a view like Augustinus', and for a genetic theory I find it pretty attractive. My daughter would certainly endorse it. But it has not really solved the problem of what a word means.

Aristotle was very well aware both of the every-day conception and of the problems concerning appellatives, i.e. universals. In the *Categories* (3b 10sqq.) he says :

3. Passim. Cf. the preceding footnote.

«Every substance appears to signify 'this something'. In the case of primary substance it is indisputably true that it signifies 'this something' for what is indicated is an individual and numerically one. And in the case of secondary substances it appears to signify similarly 'this something' because of the form of the designation we use when, for instance, we say *m a n* or *a n i m a l*, but nonetheless it is not true: it rather signifies 'some such thing', for the subject is not one like the primary substance, but *m a n* is predicated of several subjects, and so is *a n i m a l*»⁴.

Similar statements appear elsewhere in Aristotle's works (*SE* 169 a 33 sqq., 178 b 37sqq., *Metaph.* 3.6. 1003 a 5sqq., 7.4. 1030 a 3-6, 7.13. 1038 b 35sqq.).

The later views on our problem are naturally to be found in the commentaries on those Aristotelian utterances. Let us take an example: An *Anonymus* from the 13th or possibly the early 14th century, whose work is preserved in *MS Merton 289*⁵, in connection with the statement from the *Categories* which we quoted, says: (11rB)

«For 'man' or 'animal' is not one *suppositum* or individual in the way the primary substance is an individual, but 'man' is said of the several into which it is divided, and so is 'animal' and 'man' cannot be pointed out so that it might be called a 'this something', for 'man' is not such as to indicate Socrates rather than Plato or any other particular man, for it has no existence in itself, nor is it pointed out in itself but I may point at an undivided, Socrates, e.g., and say that it is such a thing as is Socrates, and therefore it signifies 'some such thing' and it does not signify a 'this something' which is pointed at»⁶.

This is not very far from the Russelian suggestion: 'man' has not strict-

4. Πᾶσα δὲ οὐσία δοκεῖ τόδε τι σημαίνειν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀναμφισβήτητον καὶ ἀληθές ἐστιν ἔτι τόδε τι σημαίνει. ἄτομον γὰρ καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ τὸ δηλούμενόν ἐστιν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φαίνεται μὲν ὁμοίως τῷ σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας τόδε τι σημαίνειν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον, οὐ μὴν ἀληθές γε, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιόν τι σημαίνει· οὐ γὰρ ἐν ἐστὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὥσπερ ἡ πρώτη οὐσία, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πολλῶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ζῷον.

5. A 14th century ms., membr., mm. 355 × 255, ff. I chart + II + 186 + I + I chart, binis columnis, unus scriba. Catalogue: Coxe I. 114-115. Contents: 1-31v Anonymus in *Cat.*, 33-100 Robertus Kilwardby in *A. Pr.*, 101-124 Robertus Grosseteste in *A. Po.*, 125-186v Aegidius Romanus in *SE*. Incipit 1rA: *Sicut dicit Aristoteles in 2^o Metaphysicae oportet erudiri quomodo singularia sunt recipienda et absurdum est simul quaerere scientiam et modum scientiae in quo tangit logicam quoad duo, unum est quod ipsa est...*

6. *Homo enim vel animal non est unum suppositum vel individuum quemadmodum prima substantia est unum individuum, sed homo dicitur de pluribus in quae dividitur, et similiter animal, et non (ideo MS) est homo demonstrabilis, ut possit dici hoc aliquid, homo enim non magis indicat Socratem vel Platonem vel alium particularem hominem, nec enim subsistit per se nec demonstratur per se, sed demonstrans individuum velut Socratem dico quod tale quid est quale Socrates, et ideo significat quale quid et non significat hoc aliquid quod est demonstratum.*

ly speaking an ostensive definition, but it has so *mediante* an identificatory demonstration of some particular which is without further discussion assumed to be a man.

The *Anonymus Mertonensis* was a Westerner. But his inspiration was drawn from Simplicius⁷ whose parallel comment runs:

«When we say 'man' we do not name any particular man in a definite way, but leave it an open question to whom it applies. For we do not name Socrates rather than Plato or any other particular man. For not everything that has a description of any kind is straightaway a 'this', unless it be one and definite. But when I say 'man' I cannot point at the species, as it does not exist by itself, but I shall point to an individual, Socrates, e.g., and say 'such a thing is man as Socrates'»⁸.

In Simplicius' work, as in Russell's the concept of similarity plays an important role, and so it does in several of the Greek commentaries which generally in discussing τόδε τι - τοιόνδε τι give some account of, or reference to, the theory of abstraction. The Westerners generally do not treat the problem in that way. In the Greek account the significatum of an appellative, at least in predicative position, is a κοινωνία or a ὁμοιότης seen and existing in the particulars, but with no independent existence. Universals are ἀποσυλήματα διανοίας, that is what the intellect has carried off as a booty from the particulars^{8a}.

These abstractions are really abstract: this is clearly shown in the Greek interpretations of the Third Man. The three men are thought to be a) the singular individual b) the idea and c) the universal⁹. Thus a theory of meaning where the universal term does not at all signify a thing.

7. For one thing we can detect nearly verbatim quotations from Simplicios in Merton 289 's discussion of 3blo and furthermore on f. 17rA we read *secunda quaestio quam movet hic Simplicius...*

8. *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* 8,103: τὸ μὲν πρῶτον κατασκευάζει διὰ τοῦ οὐ γὰρ ἐν σημαίνει τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὅτι δὲ ποιόν, διὰ τοῦ κατὰ πολλῶν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται, καὶ ὅταν αὐτὸν εἴπωμεν, οὐδένα λέγομεν τῶν ἐν μέρει ὠρισμένως, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἀδήλῳ· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον Σωκράτη ἢ Πλάτωνα ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα. οὐ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ περιγραφὴν ὅποιαν οὖν ἔχον ἤδη καὶ τόδε, εἰ μὴ ἐν ἧ καὶ ὠρισμένον, ὅταν δὲ λέγω ἄνθρωπον, δεῖξαι τὸ εἶδος οὐ δύναμαι (οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑφέστηκεν καθ' ἑαυτὸ) ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄτομον δεικνύς, οἷον τὸν Σωκράτη, λέγω ὅτι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὅποιον Σωκράτης. My translation of περιγραφὴ by «description» is not quite satisfactory, but I could not hit at a really suitable word.

8a. See the texts in the appendix and Simplicios in *Cat*, CAG 8,103; Ps. -Alexandros in *Metaph.*, CAG 1, 523-4; Asklepios in *Metaph.*, CAG 6, 2.302 f. and 376, Philoponos in *Cat.*, CAG 13, 1.72. Cf. also Syrianos in *Metaph.*, CAG 6, 1.136 f.

9. Anon. Paraphrasis in *SE*, CAG 23,4.54; Ps. -Alexandros in *SE*, CAG 2,3.158f; the texts in the appendix.

But alongside of this view there is another one represented in the Greek commentaries, namely that appellatives signify the set of individuals from whom the universal was abstracted, i.e. the set of individuals which have the quality in question. Therefore τοιόνδε τι is paraphrased πλῆθος πεποιωμένον, i.e. set (of individuals) with a certain quality¹⁰.

The notion of appellatives—at least in predicative position—signifying classes is well known to modern logic. What seems a little surprising is that apparently the set in question is by some authors thought of as a closed set with the result—not expressly mentioned by the Greek commentators—that such terms as ‘man’ have always reference (namely to the set of individuals from whom the universal concept was abstracted).

But if this is taken at face value an awkward consequence follows, for it will imply that any sentence containing the predicate ‘man’ will be analytically true or false: true if the subject is one of the individuals used when abstraction was performed, false if the named subject was not involved in the abstraction process: *x is a man* is true if, and only if, *x* is one of the persons we have used for forming the concept of man.

It would seem that if we shall save the Greeks from having said nonsense, the «set with a certain quality» theory must be dissociated from the abstraction theory in the way that they are not on a level, but the set which is the raw material for abstraction forms a set included in the larger, complete set, the πλῆθος πεποιωμένον. It is not, in fact, illicit to perform this dissociation. We cannot save the philosophical reputation of a Leon Magentinos—one of the chief sources, alas!—by means of such operations. But there is not much to save, either. In view of the way Byzantine commentators generally work we may confidently conclude that the combination of the πλῆθος πεποιωμένον and the ἀποσυλήματα theories is just another instance of that disgusting practice of juxtaposing uncritically whatever they found in older works and which seemed to be interesting. The only alternative, I should think, is that the combination is original but that the Byzantine commentators misrepresent one of the two theories or both. So, although Leon cannot be saved, I believe his sources can.

There remain, however, problems connected with the set-theory. The «set with a certain quality» is said to be a τοιόνδε τι. And «set» (πλῆθος) normally appears to mean a definite number. The only sense that can be made

10. See the texts in the appendix & cf. Ammonios in *Cat.*, CAG 4,4.49; Philoponos in *Cat.*, CAG 13,1.72; Anon. *Paraphrasis SE*, CAG 23,4.54. Cf. also the Latin 12th century *Glosulae in Priscianum* quoted by the Rijk in *Logica Modernorum* 2.1.522-3: *homo significat plures cum una communi proprietate*.

of the quale quid claim is, I presume, that either the set has an unknown finite number of members, or it has a possibly infinite number of members. Though, as mentioned, the latter interpretation seems to be ruled out by the normal use of πλῆθος (I have checked the occurrences in the CAG corpus). But I cannot help feeling that a hoc aliquid (= τόδε τι) interpretation of πλῆθος πεποιωμένον would yield more sense, as the Greek set-theory seems to imply that common nouns signify extensionally.

Anyhow, the Greek theories lead us straight to two new points A) the general question of what a class is, B) the question of verification.

At any rate the latter point was much elaborated in the Latin (but not in the Greek) texts we are concerned with. The Eastern philosophers content themselves with stating that universals cannot be demonstratively identified. The Westerners introduce the theory of supposition and sometimes also considerations concerning quantification¹¹.

The positivists of our times claimed that the meaning of a proposition consists in its method of verification. Something of the kind underlies the theory of supposition or 'acceptance' of a term. I think de Rijk hit the nail on the head when he said that *the theory of supposition may also be considered an attempt to specify the... truth conditions for the categorical proposition*¹².

«Terminus supponit (pro) x» equals «go to x and see if it is really joined to what is signified by the other main term in the proposition if you want to see if the proposition in which the term is used is true or false».

Most of the 13th century texts, which are those I know best, are not very clear in matters of supposition theory. I should suggest, however, that the following three schemes —each of them or all of them— are normally present to the mind of those authors, other niceties being added on occasion without always playing a role:

11. The following remarks are of a very general character. Their verification is to be sought in unpublished texts, among which the *SE*-commentaries which I call S F and C (after the manuscripts Salamanca B. Univ. 1839, Firenze Laur. St. Crucis plut. 12 sin 3, Cordoba B. Cap. 52 - cf. Ebbesen & Pinborg, *Studies in the Logical Writings Attributed to Boethius de Dacia*, «Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Age de l'Université de Copenhague» 3,1970) and Radulphus Brito in *SE* qu. 35. Clues to where to find more are provided in the lists of *Elenchi-quaestiones* that I have published in «Cahiers» 10, 1973.

12. *Logica Modernorum* 2.1.569.

	Terminus Communis	Extra propositionem	In propositione	
			Not quantified	Quantified
I.	significat	quale quid	quale quid	quale quid
	supponit	ϕ	quale quid	hoc aliquid
II.	significat	significatum	significatum	significatum
	supponit	ϕ	significatum	suppositum
III.	significat	significatum	significatum	significatum
	supponit	ϕ	ϕ	suppositum

If we postulate a priority for system I, we may explain the development as follows: the significatum is seen to be always a quale quid. Consequently quale quid = significatum, and hoc aliquid = suppositum. That yields system II. But normal Latin usage requires that whatever a term ‘supponit’ should be susceptible of the name ‘suppositum’¹³. Hence the disappearance of ‘significatum’ in the second row of system III.

Now, the Latin commentators on the *Sophistici Elenchi* usually combine the supposition theory with the hoc aliquid-quale quid distinction. But that implies that if they want to follow Aristotle, a change of supposition (from quale quid to hoc aliquid) must be regarded as a flaw in an argument. It will cause the fallacy of figure of speech. But that would be disastrous to the rules of conversion basic to syllogistics, where HOMO EST ANIMAL or OMNIS HOMO EST ANIMAL is thought to entail QUODDAM ANIMAL EST HOMO. The theory encounters rough weather.

The supposition theory should, I suppose, furnish the rules for when the verifier of a statement including a terminus communis should be found in this and when in that place.

It follows that a reasonable definition of ‘suppositio x’ has the form

13. This is not to say that the expression «supponit suppositum» is very common. In fact, as Prof. Pinborg has pointed out to me, it is not regularly found. Yet, it does appear in qu. 45 of the SF commentary in *SE* (cf. note 11).

«a term is said to have suppositio x when we interpret it as follows» or «if we accept the term as importing the following, we shall say that it supponit in the x way». And in fact such formulations are found, as can be seen from L.M. de Rijk's treatment of supposition in *Logica Modernorum*, vol. 2.1.

But it becomes nonsense to say that the so and so inference in whose antecedent nothing is stated as to supposition is v o u c h e d f o r by the fact that the term in case has the supposition x, the contents of the consequent being among the defining grounds for its having the supposition x.

What happens is this: '(omnis) homo est animal' is supposed to allow the inference 'aliquis homo est animal' or 'quoddam animal est homo' in some instances, namely when the terms involved are taken in a certain way (acceptio termini), in other words: with a certain supposition, as having a certain existential import. And it is supposed that taken in another way it would render the inference illicit as it would imply a shift in the «taking» of the term, because in the antecedent it might not have existential import whereas in the consequent it has.

But in that case the theory utterly fails to accomplish its task. For knowing that the term is to be taken with existential import is nothing but knowing the consequent which cannot, accordingly, be said to be vouched for by the fact that the antecedent is meant in some way, but only to indicate it ¹⁴.

My criticism of the Medieval verification principle as embodied in the supposition theory is, if I have understood A.J. Ayer the right way, on a line with the arguments which he advances against modern variants of it in *The Central Questions of Philosophy*, London 1973. On p. 30 we read: «The verification principle also survives in the equation . . . of the meaning of an indicative sentence with the truth-conditions of the proposition which it serves to express. The only objection to this view that I can see is that it is not very illuminating. It is not as though we could pick out the truth-conditions of a proposition independently of understanding the sentence which is used to express it».

It follows from my discussion that I should be willing to give some ap-

14. The problems touched at here of course include the question whether universal propositions have existential import or not. Most classic logicians believe they have, mainly because the syllogistic conversion would otherwise break down, but also certainly because everyday use of universal propositions supposes they have. However, Radulphus Brito (qu. 35 of the *SE*-commentary) shows awareness of the idea that they have not. He says that some people would not convert *omnis homo est animal* into *quoddam animal est homo*, but *quoddam animal est homo* or *omne animal est homo* into *homo est animal*.

plause to those people who said that 'Coriscus est alter ab homine' was liable to foster a fallacy because 'homo' could be taken to stand «pro suppositis» in a strict sense, or «pro significato»¹⁵ (in the sense of an abstraction, a quale quid), or as the nominalists might say: the two possible suppositiones, «pro homine qui significatur — pro conceptu» make the term equivocal. Though I might object to the use of the word 'equivocal' like the 13th century philosophers did¹⁶. 'Ambiguous' would be better.

The medieval verification theory failed. But that does not mean that it did no service to philosophy. It drew attention to the necessity, if one must have a signification theory, of distinguishing between intensional and extensional significata. One of the reasons for its failure was that too few were willing to adhere rigidly to that distinction. Some people postulated a verification «pro significato»¹⁷ i.e. for the intensional significatum. Some were less muddled and more daring. Simon of Faversham has an interesting answer to what is the verifier of the sentence 'Caesar est mortuus': it is the matter that was Caesar and no longer has the form of Caesar!¹⁸

It is not without interest to see how similar proposals make their appearance in the latest literature. In a book published in 1973 Richard Montague¹⁹ suggests the possibility of distinguishing between «full - fledged physical

15. A view mentioned in many SE-commentaries, e.g. the C-commentary (see note 11) qu. 34. But the *pro significato/pro supposito* solution of the Coriscus-sophism was generally rejected by the 13th c. commentators on the ground that a term can never not stand for its significatum.

16. E.g. the SF-commentary qu. 48. A part of this text has been printed in: Jan Pinborg, *Some Problems of Semantic Representations in Medieval Logic = History of Linguistic Thought and Contemporary Linguistics*. Edited by H. Parret. Berlin-N.Y., de Gruyter 1976, pp. 271 f. Prof. Pinborg says the author is Petrus de Alvernia, but that is a conjecture, though a most reasonable one.

17. See, e.g., qu. 92 of the SF-commentary, published in «Cahiers» 3 (1970) 29ff. (by a mistake it is printed with the number 94).

18. Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones Novae super librum Elenchorum*, qu. 23 in the index I published in «Cahiers» 10 (1973) 29-31 (qu. 24 in F. del Punta's forthcoming edition from which I quote): *Quomodo ergo verificabitur ista 'Caesar est mortuus'? Dico quod pro tanto quia eadem materia Caesaris numero quae prius erat sub forma vivi modo est sub forma non-vivi, et eadem materia quae prius fuit sub forma Caesaris modo est sub forma non-Caesaris, unde corrupto Caesare non manet forma eius, sed solum materia, et ideo ratione materiae quae manet debet verificari ista 'Caesar est mortuus' quia illud quod prius erat subiectum vivi modo est subiectum non-vivi—dico tunc quod ista est vera 'Caesar est mortuus'.*

19. Hintikka, Moravcsik & Suppes (editors), *Approaches to Natural Language*, Dordrecht/Boston (Synthese Library) 1973. I quote from Montague's *Comments on Moravcsik's Paper*, p. 293.

objects and substance-portions» as follows: «Jones' ring might be identified with a certain function defined just for that interval of time I_1 during which Jones' ring existed, and having as its value for a moment i in I_1 the Homaam $\langle = \text{heap-of-molecules-at-a-moment} \rangle$ which is its temporal slice at i ; Smith's ring \langle supposed to have been made from Jones' ring being melted down \rangle might be identified with a similar function defined for the later interval I_2 during which that ring exists; and the goldportion constituting Jones' ring during I_1 and Smith's ring during I_2 might be identified with a function defined over a much longer interval of time (including both I_1 and I_2), always having Homaams at its values, and coinciding with Jones' ring and Smith's ring throughout I_1 and I_2 respectively».

It is hard to resist the temptation to equate Montague's ring-functions with Simon's form and Montague's gold-function with Simon's matter. But in spite of Montague, I think that few would accept Simon's theory of verification for 'Caesar est mortuus'. His solution rather shows to which lengths one may be driven if the significate of a noun must be a thing.

I earnestly think that it is a view that must be given up. Not that it is not useful in some instances. Though systematically false it is in a sense at least genetically true: people really learn many of their words through demonstrative identification and consequently hold—implicitly at least—a theory of signification where nouns designate things. Ask anyone what the so-and-so noun means, and he will answer «a so-and-so is something which ...» or the like.

A defence of parts of this every-day view has been undertaken by Strawson who on several occasions stresses the role individuals play for our understanding of the world and for the way we make up sentences.

In one of his papers²⁰ he deals with predication; a statement, he says, contains a term in referential position and one in predicative position. The first is what the sentence is about, it has an identificatory function, and in the simplest, most basic form it will refer to a spatiotemporally continuous particular—not unlike the words of Russell's object—language in its simplest edition. The second term, the predicate, must necessarily be of a higher type. I quote:

Two terms coupled in a true sentence stand in referential and predicative position, respectively, if what the first term designates or signifies is a case or instance

20. P. F. Strawson, *Singular Terms and Predication*. Originally published in «The Journal of Philosophy» 58 (1961). I quote from P.F. Strawson, *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, London 1974 (Methuen University Paperback), pp. 69 & 74.

of what the second term signifies. Items thus related (or the terms that designate or signify them) may be said respectively to be of lower and of higher type; and this is why I called the new criterion one of type. Part of the explanation of the kind of grouping which terms of higher type than the lowest can do was that it is a kind of grouping which designations of spatio-temporal particulars cannot do. So implicit in this criterion of relative position is the consequence that a term designating a particular can never occupy predicative position. A term signifying a kind or property, however, may occupy referential or predicative position, depending upon whether it is, or is not, coupled with a term of still higher type.

...But to say of things of other types <sc. than spatiotemporal particulars> that they also answer to this description is simply to say that we have occasion to bring such things under higher principles of grouping, principles which serve to group them in ways analogous to the ways in which expressions signifying properties (or kinds) of particulars serve to group particulars. In so far, then, as things other than spatiotemporal particulars qualify as objects, they do so simply because our thought, our talk, confers upon them the limited and purely logical analogy with spatiotemporal particulars which I have just described. And now, surely, we are in a position to understand the nominalist prejudice, and to discount it —without flattering the fantasies of Platonism. If by accepting as entities, on this logical test, things other than spatiotemporal particulars, we were claiming for them any other, any further, likeness to such particulars than the logical analogy itself contains, we should indeed be running into danger of committing the characteristic category-confusions of Platonist mythology. One who believes that such acceptance inevitably carries such a claim must seem to himself to have every rational motive for the strenuous efforts of paraphrase demanded by a limited and, as nearly as possible, nominalist ontology. But this belief is itself a symptom of confusion.

But this is just, what some of the Medievals put into the terms 'hoc aliquid' and 'quale quid'. Hoc aliquid might, they said, be used of individuals in the strict sense. But more generally we might say that any member of a class has in indentificatory function, is a hoc aliquid, when related to its class (quale quid), which in turn will be a hoc aliquid if related to a still higher class. Thus 'homo' in 'homo est species' is a hoc aliquid in relation to 'species' although it is a quale quid in relation to the particular men²¹.

21. Robertus de Aucumpno in SE, MS Peterhouse 206 : 181vB & Mazarine 3489 : 37rb : *Ad primum potest dici quod est quale quid duplex : uno modo ipsum significatum commune per terminum communem, unde cum dico 'homo est species', 'homo' respectu particularium dicit quale quid, etsi respectu huius praedicati <species> dicat quiddam singulare; alio modo est quale quid significatum quasi* [3489 : 37vA] *contractum ad individua prout dicit individuum vagum, hoc est indeterminatum, et sic cum dico 'homo currit' hic dicit quale quid, sed* [206 : 182rA] *non hic 'omnis homo currit' propter hoc quod pro omnibus stat determinate ita quod ad quodlibet suppositum potest fieri descensus.* (I have conflated the readings of the two mss, but in general they agree).

Albertus Magnus, *Expositio libri Elenchorum* II. II. VII., ed. Jammy (Lugduni

To wind up the discussion we may return to Wittgenstein and his «the meaning of words consists in the way that they are used»²².

As it stands, the statement is on the verge of nonsense. We may, however, accept it as a somewhat distorted, but elegant, way of saying that knowing other instances of the use of the word is a prerequisite for understanding properly this utterance, and perhaps also that its significance is not independent of the phrase in which it is now used.

Or, to go one better, we might say —and that would probably be more in Wittgenstein's spirit— that the whole idea of all words always and necessarily being signs of something is mistaken. That once again a hundred generations have wasted their time on searching for answers to a question that there was no sense in asking, that is the question «what does the so-and-so— class of words signify?»²³.

Now in the Middle Ages, everybody knows that words signify, and they signify by convention. If it is asked WHY a word means what it does, no other answer is available than that it was «imposed» to do so, or —what comes to the same— that the classical authors use it in that way. So far the (Western) Medievals could agree with Wittgenstein's dictum. But only so

1651), p. 939A: *Est etiam attendendum hic quod terminus communis aut consideratur in se, hoc est in natura sua simplici quae est forma multis communicabilis, et sic omnis terminus communis ad aliqua significat quale quid; et potest etiam considerari ad aliquid et determinatus per comparisonem ad illud, et hoc quadrupliciter, scilicet ad superius vel ad inferius vel ad seipsum secundum quod stans sub una suppositione comparatur ad se secundum quod est sub alia suppositione, et significare potest hoc aliquid. Ut est inferius comparatum ad suum superius, respectu illius determinatam habet suppositionem et significat hoc aliquid. Similiter tractum ad inferius determinatam acquirit suppositionem et significat hoc aliquid, ut 'animal' quale quid, 'homo' hoc aliquid significat, et 'homo' quale quid, 'hic homo' hoc aliquid. Ad seipsum autem sub una suppositione ad se sub alia suppositione, ut 'homo' quale quid, 'omnis homo' vel 'albus homo' hoc aliquid, quia confusum et distributum respectu sui ipsius non confusi et distributi est hoc aliquid determinatum; in se autem commune ad diversum modum suppositionis significat quale quid. Unde hic 'homo currit, ergo omnis homo currit' mutatur quale quid in hoc aliquid.*

22. Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Untersuchungen* I. 43: *Man kann für eine grosse Klasse von Fällen der Benützung des Wortes «Bedeutung» — wenn auch für nicht alle Fälle seiner Benützung — dieses Wort so erklären: Die Bedeutung eines Wortes ist sein Gebrauch in der Sprache.*

23. Notice the brilliant result of J. Lyons' semantical analysis of Plato's words connected with knowledge etc. There is astonishingly little conceptual confusion or inconsistency in his *Structural Semantics, an Analysis of part of the Vocabulary of Plato*. «Publications of the Philological Society» XX, Oxford 1972. Lyon needs no 'significata'.

far. For nothing could be more repugnant to Medieval essentialism than admitting that the most essential of a word's properties, its meaning, was not a stable something. The most daring attack against this notion was carried out by means of the supposition theory, but among the reasons for its failure was exactly the fact that the idea of the word having a fixed sense torpedoes any attempt of describing sense as context-determined: the whole is brought to naught when it is insisted that 'voces non cadunt a suis significatis, vox semper suum significatum importat, significatum est essentialia voci saltem post impositionem' etc. The promising functional description of the type 'x may be used in such a way that the following other statements are implied' was never allowed to develop to maturity because of adherence to the conception of signification as an essential property of a term relating it to a significatum which was conceived of as a thing —however much lip-service was paid to theories of abstraction.

APPENDIX I: ἀποσυληθέντα - abstracta.

Several of the Byzantine commentators use the term ἀποσυλᾶν in the sense of «abstract» (usually, but not invariably in a passive form). It is found in Ammonios in *Int.*, CAG 4.3.10 (in a passage which Busse considered spurious), Philoponos in *A.Po.*, CAG 13.3.181, Syrianos in *Metaph.*, CAG 6.1.137, Ps.-Alexandros in *Metaph.*, CAG 1.463, 471, 472, 483, 504, 509, 524, and in the Elenchi-commentaries published in appendix II (Leon Magentinos and Anon. in Vatic. Reg. Gr. 116).

In this connection I should like to advance the suggestion that the Greek term ἀποσυληθέν may have played a role in the formation of the Latin *abstractum*. It is, of course, true that the nearest Greek equivalent is ἀφαιρεθέν. But it is equally true that Aristotle and, it would seem, the Greek commentators fairly consistently use ἀφαιρεῖν in the sense of taking away the particular, so that the common is left. That is it corresponds to 'abstract from'. But another use of 'abstractum' is the one where it is the common that is 'abstractum', i.e. extracted from the individuals. This is the sense it has when the numbers called ἀριθμοὶ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως are called *quantitas abstracta* in Isidorus (*Etym.* 2.24.14) and in Cassiodorus' *Institutio* (2.4. p. 111 Mynors, 2.21, p. 130 Mynors). And it is, of course, the sense we have got used to. Boethius gives an account of abstraction in his Porphyry - commentary (PL 64 : 84-86) which is wholly on line with the Greek explanations, and perhaps not surprisingly, as he heads it with *haec quidem est ad praesens de propositis quaestio quam nos Alexandro consentiente hac ra-*

tiocinatione solvemus. He there speaks of species as being *cogitatio collecta ex individuorum similitudine*, says that *animus . . . aufert a corporibus incorporeorum naturam* and so on and so forth. It might be that his *aufert* and also *abstractum* reflect forms of ἀποσπλᾶν.

APPENDIX II: Extracts from Leon Magentinos' commentaries on Arist. *Cat.* and *SE* and from the Anonymus on Arist. *SE* in Vatic. Reg. Gr. 116.

Leon Magentinos whose commentaries on Aristotle are preserved in several manuscripts all or most of which are descendants of Vat. Gr. 244 is an enigmatic person: Vat. Gr. 244 is from the second half of the 13th century. Leon is often in the manuscripts described as bishop of Mitylene (Lesbos). The archives of the see of Lesbos do not reach back to the Middle Ages. My guess is that his works are from ca. 1250. He was not a philosopher of rank, but sometimes his works preserve valuable extracts from older commentaries. Ms. Vat. Urb. Gr. 35 contains extensive excerpts from Leon's commentary on the *SE*. The anonymous commentary found in the 14th c. manuscript Vatic. Reg. Gr. 116 has much in common with Leon.

Leon Magentinos on the *Categories* 3 b 10 (Vatic. Gr. 244, f. 45v).

- κδ'. Δείξας τὰ ἀποδοθέντα ἴδια τῆς οὐσίας μὴ ὄντα ἴδια μετα-
βαίνει εἰς ἕτερον καὶ φησι· δοκεῖ τισιν ἴδιον πάσης οὐσίας τὸ σημαίνειν
τόδε τι, ἥγουν ἔν τι πρᾶγμα μερικόν, τὸ γὰρ τόδε δεικτικόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ
δεικτικὸν ὑποπίπτει τῇ αἰσθήσει ὥς φαινόμενον καὶ ὁρατόν, ὥς τόδε
5 τὸ βιβλίον αἰσθητὸν λέγεται ὥς τῇ ὁράσει ὑποπίπτον. πᾶν δὲ αἰσθητὸν
καὶ φαινόμενον μερικόν. προστεθὲν δὲ καὶ τὸ τί μᾶλλον ἐδήλωσε μερικόν
εἶναι τὸ σημανόμενον. ἡ οὐσία, οἷον ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ σημαίνει καὶ
σημαίνεται ὥς μὲν φωνὴ σημαίνει, ὥς δὲ πρᾶγμα σημαίνεται. διαβάλλει
δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἴδιον ὥς μόνῃ τῇ μερικῇ ἐφαρμόζον οὐσίᾳ καὶ μὴ πάσῃ
10 οὐσίᾳ. λέγει τὸν Σωκράτη ἄτομον διὰ τὸ τὰς συνιστώσας αὐτὸν ιδιότη-
τας ἀδύνατον θεωρηθῆναι καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλον τινός, ὥς δὲ ὅλον εἰς μέρη
+ τμητός ἐστι ἄτομα λέγεται + διὰ τοῦτο εἰπὼν ἄτομον προσέθετο καὶ τὸ
ἐν τῷ ἀριθμῷ. ἡ γὰρ μερικὴ οὐσία οἷον ὁ Σωκράτης ἄτομον οὐσα ἔν τι
τῷ ἀριθμῷ σημαίνει. ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῷον τῷ μὲν προφορικῷ
15 λόγῳ καὶ ὥς σχήματι καὶ χαρακτηῖρι ἐνικῷ προφερόμενα δοκοῦσι σημαί-
ναι ἔν τι, κατὰ δὲ ἀλήθειαν ποιόν τι σημαίνουσιν, ἥγουν πλῆθος πεποιω-
μένον καὶ εἰδοποιηθὲν ὑπὸ ποιότητων οὐσιωδῶν, τῶν διαφορῶν δηλονότι,

αὐται γὰρ ποιότητες οὐσιώδεις λέγονται, οἷον ἡ λογικότης καὶ ἡ θνητό-
της, ὡς συμπληρωτικά. καὶ ποιότητες μὲν αὐται, τὰ δὲ αὐτῶν μετέχον-
20 τα ποιά. ἔστι καὶ ποιότης κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὡς ἡ λευκότης, ἡ μελανία.
τὰ δὲ μετέχοντα τούτων σώματα ποιά λέγεται. ὁ γὰρ εἰπὼν ἄνθρωπος
ἢ ζῶον πλῆθος ἐσήμηνε καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνικοῦ χαρακτηῖρος δοκῇ σημαί-
νειν ἓν. τὸ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἢ τὸ ζῶον πλῆθος ποιὸν σημαίνει, οὐχ ἀπλῶς,
τουτέστιν οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ποιόν, ὡς τὸ λευκόν. τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν οὐκ
25 ἄλλο τι σημαίνει ἀλλ' ἢ ποιόν, ἥγουν συμβεβηκός μὴ συμπληρωματικὸν
ὄν οὐσίας τινός. ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῶον ἀφορίζουσι καὶ περικλείουσι
τὸ ποιὸν περὶ οὐσίαν, ἥγουν ποιὸν οὐσιῶδες ἢ καὶ πλῆθος πεποιωμένον
καὶ εἰδοποιηθὲν ὑπὸ τινων οὐσιωδῶν ποιότητων, ἥγουν διαφορῶν,
οὐσίαν γὰρ σημαίνουνσι ποιάν, ἥγουν εἰδοποιηθεῖσαν ὑπὸ τῶν διαφορῶν,
30 ὡς εἶπομεν. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ζῶον πολλὰ σημαίνουνσιν, ἀλλὰ
ὁ ἀφορισμός καὶ ἡ περιοχὴ τοῦ ζώου πλεῖόν ἐστι τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
περιοχῆς, πλείονα γὰρ περιέχει τὸ ζῶον ἢ ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

Leon Magentinos on the *Sophistici Elenchi* c. 21, 169 a 33 (Vatic. Gr. 244, f. 603r).

ρμ'. Μάλιστα δὲ ἡ ὁμοιότης τῆς λέξεως ἐπίσταται ἥγουν δύναται
καταπεῖθιν τὸν ἐρωτώμενον συνεπινεύειν καὶ ὁμολογεῖν ὡς ἐπεὶ πᾶν
τὸ κατηγορούμενον δοκεῖ τόδε τι σημαίνειν ἥγουν ἓν τι πρᾶγμα, ὑπο-
λαμβάνομεν καὶ ὑπακούομεν ὡς ἓν καὶ ταυτόν ἐστι τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ.
5 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ καθόλου ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὗτος ὁ μερικός, ἥγουν ὁ Σωκράτης,
ὣν τὸ μὲν κατηγορεῖται, τὸ δὲ ὑπόκειται ἐν ὁμοίῳ σχήματι τῆς λέξεως,
ἥγουν ἐνικῶς ἐκφέρονται, οἴομεθα καὶ ταῦτά εἶναι. καὶ εἰ ταῦτά εἰσι,
σημαίνει δὲ ὁ ὑποκείμενος, ἥγουν ὁ Σωκράτης, τόδε τι, ἥγουν ἓν τι,
λοιπὸν ἄρα καὶ ὁ κατηγορούμενος, ἥγουν ὁ καθόλου ἄνθρωπος, σημαίνει
10 τόδε τι, ἥγουν ἓν τι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ καθόλου ἄνθρωπος οὐχ ἓν τι σημαίνει,
ἀλλὰ πλῆθος πεποιωμένον, ὡς ἐν ταῖς Δέκα Κατηγορίαις εἴρηται τῷ
γὰρ ἐνί, ἥγουν τῇ μερικῇ οὐσίᾳ ἐφαρμόζει¹ τόδε τι καὶ ἓν σημαίνειν², καὶ,
τὸ ὃν εἶναι, ἥγουν κυρίως οὐσίαν. (603v) αὕτη γὰρ ἡ μερικὴ οὐσία,
οἷον ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐν ὑπάρξει ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ καθόλου ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ὃν ἐστι
15 ἥγουν οὐκ ἐν ὑπάρξει ἐστίν, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς Μετὰ τὰ Φυσικὰ τὰ καθόλου
λέγει εἶναι ἢ οὐδέν, καθόσον εἰ ἀναιρεθῶσι τὰ μερικά, ἐν οἷς θεωροῦνται,
συναναιροῦνται καὶ ταῦτα, ἢ ὑστερογενῇ καθόσον τὰ καθόλου ἀποσυλή-
ματα διανοίας εἰσίν, ἀποματτόμενα καὶ συναγόμενα ἀπὸ τῶν μερικῶν.
διὸ καὶ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος τοῦ παραλογισμοῦ, ὁ παρὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς

1. ἐφαρμόζει: τὸ add. cod. corr. supra lin.

2. σημαίνειν: σημαίνει cod.?

20 λέξεως γινόμενος, θετέος, ἡγουν συναριθμητέος καὶ συνακτέος τοῖς παρὰ τὴν λέξιν παραλογισμοῖς.

c. 22, 178 b 38-39 (Vatic. Gr. 244, f. 635v).

τqθ'. Ἡ πρὸς τι πῶς ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων¹, ἡγουν ποσόν. ἐρεῖ γάρ τις τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐ μόνον ποιόν, ὥς εἵπομεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τι εἶδος γάρ ἐστι, τὸ δὲ εἶδος σχέσις τίς ἐστι καὶ κοινωνία ἐν τοῖς μερικοῖς θεωρουμένη. ἢ δὲ σχέσις τῶν πρὸς τι ἐστί. ποσὸν δὲ λέγεται ὁ καθόλου

5 ἄνθρωπος καθὼς πλῆθος σημαίνει. τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ὑπὸ τὸ ποσὸν ἀνάγεται.

c. 22, 178 b 39-179a1 (Vatic. Gr. 244, f. 635v).

υ'. Τὸ δὲ ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Κορίσκου καὶ Κορίσκου μουσικὸς² πρὸς κατασκευὴν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τρίτον ἄνθρωπον εἴρηται³. καί φησιν ὥσπερ ὁ μουσικὸς Κορίσκος ἕτερος ὢν τοῦ Κορίσκου κατὰ λόγον — κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταυτά εἰσι, τοῦτο γὰρ δηλοῖ τὸ πότερον ταυτὸν 5 ἢ ἕτερον⁴ οὐκ ἐστι καθ' αὐτὸν ἡγουν ἀνθυπόστατον, οὐδ' ὑπαρξιν ἔχει ἰδίαν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ ὁ ἄνθρωπος περιπατεῖ ἕτερος (?) ὢν Σωκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος καὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθυπόστατός ἐστι, καὶ ἰδίαν ὑπαρξιν ἔχει. τὸ μὲν γάρ⁵, ἡγουν ὁ Σωκράτης, τόδε τι σημαίνει, ἡγουν οὐσίαν, τὸ δέ, ἡγουν ὁ μουσικὸς Κορίσκος, σημαίνει τοιόνδε, ἡγουν ποιόν.

c. 22, 179 a 2 (Vatic. Gr. 244, f. 636r).

υα'. Ὡστε οὐκ ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ἐκθέσθαι, ἡγουν οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸν Κορίσκον μουσικὸν ἐκθέσθαι ὥς ἕτερον ὄντα τοῦ Κορίσκου κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον.

c. 22, 179 a 3 (Vatic. Gr. 244, f. 636r).

υβ'. Οὐ τὸ ἐκτίθεσθαι δὲ ποιεῖ τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον ἡγουν οὐ τὸ ἀπαριθμεῖσθαι τοὺς μερικοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἕτερον ἐκείνων λέγειν αὐτὸν τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον εἰσάγει, ἀλλὰ τὸ συγχωρεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅπερ τόδε τι, ἡγουν μερικὴν τινα οὐσίαν ἐν τι σημαίνουσαν. ἔθος 5 γὰρ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει τῷ τόδε τι χρᾶσθαι ἐπὶ τῆς ἀτόμου οὐσίας.

1. Arist. SE c. 22, 178 b 38-39.

2. Arist. SE c. 22, 178 b 39-179 a 1

ληπται
3. εἴρηται cod.

4. SE 179 a 1, ib. 179 a 1-2.

5. τὸ ὑποκείμενον cod.

c. 22, 179 a 4 (Vatic. Gr. 244, f. 636r).

υγ'. Ἐτι δὲ κατασκευάζει τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸν καθόλου ἄνθρωπον οὐσίαν τινὰ ἀνθυπόστατον καὶ μερικὴν καὶ ἄτομον διὰ τοῦ ἔσται τόδε τι εἶναι ὅπερ Καλλίας, τουτέστιν οὐ γὰρ εἰ ὁ Καλλίας τόδε τι σημαίνει, ἤγουν μερικὴ τις ἐστὶν οὐσία καὶ ἀνθυπόστατος, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ ἄνθρω-
5 πος ἔσται τόδε τι, ἤγουν μερικὴ οὐσία καὶ ἐν σημαίνων.

c. 22, 179 a 5 (Vatic. Gr. 244, f. 636r).

υδ'. Τὸ οὐδ' εἴ τις τὸ ἐκτιθέμενον μὴ ὅπερ τόδε τι λέγοι οὕτω νοητέον· εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἐκτιθέμενον ἤγουν ὁ καθόλου ἄνθρωπος, ὅπερ τόδε τι, ἤγουν οὐσία τις μερικὴ, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ποιόν, ἤγουν ἀλλὰ ποιόν, διοίσει μὲν καὶ διαφέρει καὶ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῶν καθέκαστ(α), οὐ μέντοι
5 γε καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ἤγουν ἀνθυπόστατόν ἐστι, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς μερικοῖς θεωρεῖται· τὸ γὰρ κοινῶς ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς μερικοῖς θεωρούμενον οὐκ ἐστὶν οὐσία, ἤγουν ἀνθυπόστατόν τι, ἀλλὰ ποιόν. τὸ γὰρ παρὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς — ἤγουν ὁ καθόλου ἄνθρωπος — ἔσται ἐν τι, ἤγουν ἕτερον μὲν τῶν μερικῶν ἀνθρώπων, πλὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑφίσταται καὶ θεωρεῖται.
10 ὥστε οὐ δοτέον τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἐπὶ πάντων εἶναι τόδε τι, ἀλλ' ἢ ποιόν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ πρὸς τι.

169 a 33 (Vatic. Reg. Gr. 116, f. 350v).

Ἐπεὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ Σωκράτους κατηγορεῖται, ἐκφέρονται δὲ καὶ ἄμφω ἐνικῶς, οἰόμεθα ὅτι καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων εἰσὶ. τοῦτο δὲ ἀληθές οὐκ ἐστὶ. πῶς γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ καθόλου τόδε τι σημαίνει εἴγε τῇ αἰσθήσει μὴ ὑποπίπτει¹ ἀσώματος ὢν
5 καὶ πλῆθος μᾶλλον πεποικωμένον δηλοῦν, ὥς ἐν ταῖς Κατηγορίαις εἴρηκεν.

178 b 36 (Vatic. Reg. Gr. 116, f. 381v).

Καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄραγε ὁ ἄνθρωπος περιπατεῖ; ναί. τί δέ, ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ καθόλου καθ' οὗ τὸ περιπατητικὸν κατηγορεῖται οὐκ ἐστὶν ἕτερος τοῦ αὐτοανθρώπου· ναί. ὁ γὰρ αὐτοάνθρωπος, ἦτοι ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἰδέα, ἀκίνητός ἐστι. τί δέ, ὁ ἄνθρωπος καθ' οὗ κατηγορεῖται τὸ περι-
5 πατεῖν, ἦτοι ὁ καθόλου, οὐκ ἐστὶν ἕτερος τῶν μερικῶν ἀνθρώπων; ναί.

1. ὑποπίπτει: -ον cod ?? quod si legere malueris ὢν in ὄν mutandum erit, et est fortasse solutio omnium optima cum δηλοῦν sequatur.

- τίς γάρ ἐστιν τῶν καθέκαστα ἐφ' οὗ λέγεται τὸ περιπατεῖν ἀγνοοῦμεν, τὸν δὲ καθόλου ἄνθρωπον, ἥτοι ὥτινι λέγομεν ὅτι ὑπάρχει τὸ περιπατεῖν γινώσκουμεν. ἔστιν ἄρα τρίτος ἄνθρωπος οὗ τὸ περιπατεῖν κατηγοροῦμεν'. ἐγένετο δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διότι τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν ἐγκατεταγμένον καὶ σχέσιν ἔχοντα τοῖς μερικοῖς καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑφιστάμενον ἔδωκεν 10 ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος ὅτι αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτὸν ὑφίσταται καὶ ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν καὶ ὑπαρξιν ἔχει. ἔστι δὲ καὶ οὗτος ὁ παραλογισμὸς παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως διότι δοκεῖ μὲν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ καθόλου ὅτι τόδε τι καὶ οὐσίαν σημαίνει ὅσον ἀπὸ τοῦ σχήματος τῆς προσηγορίας, ὁ δὲ οὐ σημαίνει 15 οὐσίαν ἀλλὰ ποιόν, καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τρίτος ἄνθρωπος παρ' αὐτὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τοὺς καθέκαστα, τὸ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅπαν τὸ κοινόν, ἥγουν καὶ ἀπλῶς τὸ καθόλου, + πᾶν δὲ + οὐ τόδε τι καὶ οὐσίαν καὶ ὑπαρξιν ἰδίαν καὶ ὑπόστασιν δηλοῖ, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε τι, ἥτοι κοινωνίαν τοιάνδε, ἥτις οὐκ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν θεωρεῖται, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μερικοῖς ὧν καὶ κοινωνία ἐστίν, 20 ἀφ' ὧν καὶ ὁ νοῦς αὐτῆς ἀπεσυλήθη. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ κοινωνία κοινῶν τινῶν ἐστι, ἀνάγκη αὐτῇ καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις θεωρεῖσθαι ὧν κοινωνία λέγεται εἶναι. ἡ σχέσιν τινὰ σημαίνει. ἡ γὰρ κοινωνία σχέσις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ σχέσις τῶν πρὸς τι. τὸ δὲ ὁμοίως ἡ¹ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Κορίσκου καὶ μουσικὸς Κορίσκος· ἐν τῷ Κορίσκῳ ἐμφαίνεται, καὶ ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν καὶ ὑπαρξιν ἔχει. ὁ γὰρ 25 Κορίσκος καὶ ὁ μουσικὸς ταῦτά μὲν εἰσι τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ ἕτερα, οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ καθόλου εἰ καὶ ἕτερός ἐστι τῶν μερικῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑφίσταται. τὸ γὰρ μουσικὸς Κορίσκος οὐσία πεποιωμένη ἐστίν ἐν τῷ ἀπλῶς Κορίσκῳ ὑφισταμένη. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κορίσκος οὐσίαν σημαίνει, ὁ δὲ μουσικὸς Κορίσκος οὐσίαν πεποιωμένην, ὥστε οὐκ 30 ἔστιν αὐτὸ ἐκθέσθαι², δηλονότι τὸ συναχθὲν ἄτοπον ὅτι ἔστι τρίτος ἄνθρωπος, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκθέσθαι καὶ ἐρωτῆσαι ὅτι 'ἄραγε ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἕτερός ἐστι τῶν καθέκαστα;' ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ συγχωρῆσαι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ τῶν καθέκαστα καὶ ὅτι τόδε τι καὶ οὐσίαν σημαίνει καὶ ὑπαρξιν ἔχει ἰδίαν. καὶ οὐ τῷ ἐκτίθεσθαι καὶ ἀπαριθμεῖσθαι τοὺς μερι- 35 κοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἐρωτᾶν εἰ ἕτερός ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν καθέκαστα εἰσάγεται ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ συγχωρεῖν τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον σημαίνει τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅπερ τόδε τι καὶ οὐσίαν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτήν. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τόδε τι εἶναι ὅπερ Καλλίας καὶ ὅπερ ἄνθρωπος ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ὁ Καλλίας σημαίνει οὐσίαν καὶ ὑπαρξιν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτήν, οὕτως καὶ ὁ 40 καθόλου ἄνθρωπος. οὐδ' εἴ τις τὸ ἐκτιθέμενον, ἥτοι κἂν τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, ὅτι 'ἄρα ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἕτερός ἐστι τῶν καθέκαστα' οὐ λέγει ὁ ἀπο (382γ)

1. ἡ : δὲ Arist. 178 b 39

2. ἐκθέσθαι : ἐκθεῖσθαι cod.

κρινόμενος ὅτι τόδε τι σημαίνει, ἀλλὰ ποιόν, δίδωσι δὲ αὐτῷ τῷ ποιῶ
 ἰδίαν ὑπαρξιν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι. ἀλλ' οὖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει,
 κἄντε γὰρ λέγῃ τὸν καθόλου ἄνθρωπον τόδε τι σημαίνειν <καὶ> ἰδίαν
 45 ἔχει ὑπαρξιν, κἄντε λέγῃ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ποιόν σημαίνειν καὶ ἰδίαν ἔχειν
 ὑπόστασιν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος συνάγεται,
 ἔσται γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τοὺς πολλούς. τοῦτό ἐστίν ἡ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα λύσις καὶ
 ἀληθής. ἔσται οὖν ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἀπλῶς πᾶν τὸ καθόλου ἐν τι, ἥτοι
 ἄλλο παρὰ τοὺς πολλούς, δηλονότι τοὺς μερικούς, ἀλλ' ἐν τούτοις ἐμφαί-
 50 νεται καὶ τὴν σχέσιν ἔχει. φανερόν οὖν ὅτι οὐ δεῖ δοῦναι τὸ κοινὸν κατη-
 γορούμενον, ἥγουν τὸ καθόλου, ὅτι σημαίνει τόδε τι καὶ οὐσίαν αὐτὴν
 καθ' αὐτήν, ἀλλ' ἡ ποιότητά τινα καὶ κοινωνίαν ἢ οὐσίαν σχέσιν ἔχουσιν
 ἐν τοῖς μερικοῖς ἢ πλῆθος πεποιωμένον.

APPENDIX III: Radulphus Brito, *Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos*, Qu. 35. Mss: Salamanca, B. Univ. 2350, f. 182vB (saec. XIV in.) and Bruxelles, B.R. 3540-47, f. 518vB (saec. XV med.).

Consequenter quaeritur utrum interpretando quale quid esse hoc aliquid habeat esse fallacia figura dictionis.

Arguitur quod non:

1. *Quia quandocumque aliqua sunt eadem commutando*
 5 *unum in alterum non habet esse fallacia. Modo quale quid et hoc*
aliquid sunt eadem, ergo commutando unum istorum in alterum
non est aliqua fallacia. Maior de se patet, minor apparet, quia
quale quid et hoc aliquid se habent sicut superius et inferius. Ista
sunt eadem, ideo etc. 2. Item sicut se habet quale quid ad hoc
 10 *aliquid, ita se habet hoc aliquid ad quale quid. Modo interpre-*
tando hoc aliquid quale quid non est aliqua fallacia, ut de se patet,
ideo etc. 3. Item, secundum quod vult Philosophus in Praedica-
mentis, sequitur 'si color est in corpore, ergo est in aliquo corpore'
et tamen quale quid interpretatur hoc aliquid, quia esse in corpo-
 15 *re est commune et quale quid, et esse in aliquo corpore est (esse*
BS) speciale et hoc aliquid, et tamen ista consequentia est bona,
quia ex opposito consequentis infertur oppositum antecedentis,
quia detur oppositum consequentis 'color est in nullo corpore' illa
repugnat antecedenti, ergo interpretando quale quid hoc aliquid
 20 *non est fallacia. 4. Item si interpretando quale quid esse hoc*
aliquid esset fallacia, tunc in qualibet conversione universalis
affirmativae et particularis af [B 519 rA] firmativae esset falla-
cia, sed illud est falsum et inconveniens, ideo etc. Probatio maioris

- 25 quia dicendo 'omnis homo est animal' vel 'quidam homo est animal' 'animal' ibi stat ut quale quid, sed in convertente, dicendo 'quoddam animal est homo' staret iam ut hoc aliquid, quare etc. In oppositum est (S 183rA) Philosophus et expositores. Ad istam quaestionem dicendum est praemittendo quod significat
- 30 quale quid et hoc aliquid. Quale quid enim est (et - est: est autem S) commune, est enim quid sub modo qualis (quale S, qualiter B) significatum, id est sub modo communis sed hoc aliquid est aliquid contractum sub illo universali sicut individuum, et ex hoc apparet quod quale quid et hoc aliquid sunt diversa, saltem
- 35 secundum (per S) rationem. Hoc viso dico quod interpretando hoc aliquid quale quid esse, id est ponendo ea esse eadem secundum rem et rationem fit fallacia. Secundo dico quod si hoc fiat propter similem modum appellandi, fit fallacia figurae dictionis. Tertio dico quod si hoc fiat propter partialem indentitatem aliquorum duorum in tertio habet esse fallacia accidentis. Primum
- 40 declaratur sic: quia quando aliqua sunt diversa accipiendo ea ut eadem secundum quod sunt diversa fit fallacia. Modo quale quid et hoc aliquid secundum rationem sunt diversa, ut visum est, ergo interpretando ipsa esse eadem habet esse fallacia. Secundum declaratur: quia ubicumque est deceptio per causam apparentiae fallaciae figure dictionis, ibi est fallacia figure dictionis.
- 45 Modo interpretando quale quid hoc aliquid propter similem modum appellandi est deceptio per causam apparentiae figurae dictionis, ideo etc. Maior patet de se minor apparet, primo quod sit ibi deceptio sive fallacia, illud iam apparet, [B 519rB] quod etiam sit per causam apparentiae fallaciae figurae dictionis si sit propter similem modum appellandi, illud patet sicut dicendo 'homo est species, Socrates est homo, ergo Socrates est species' si enim propter hoc
- 50 quod homo secundum eandem vocem praedicatur de Socrate et de ipso praedicatur species aliquis crederet (credens S) quod Socrates sit species, decipitur propter similitudinem dictionis cum dictione <quae> est causa apparentiae figurae dictionis, ergo etc. Tertium declaratur, quia quando quale quid interpretatur hoc aliquid propter partialem indentitatem aliquorum duorum in tertio, hoc est per causam apparentiae fallaciae accidentis sicut dicendo
- 60 'homo est species, Socrates est homo, ergo Socrates est species'. Si enim aliquis credat quod Socrates sit species propter hoc quod Socrates et species partim conveniunt cum homine sive propter partialem indentitatem istorum in homine, deceptus est per

65 *causam apparentiae fallaciae accidentis et ita tunc ibi est fallacia accidentis. Sed notandum est quod hoc aliquid potest accipi dupliciter, vel hoc aliquid signatum sicut Socrates vel 'hic homo', vel hoc aliquid vagum et indeterminatum. Modo commutando quale quid in hoc aliquid signatum habet esse fallacia respectu cuiuscumque praedicati hoc fiat, ut hic Coriscus est alter ab homi-*
 70 *ne, ergo est alter a se. Sed commutando quale quid in hoc aliquid vagum non fit fallacia, ut quidam dicunt; tamen illud non credo, immo ibi est fallacia figurae dictionis 'homo est species, ergo aliquis homo est species'.*

Propter quod dico quod commutando quale quid in hoc
 75 *aliquid vagum potest esse dupliciter, quia aut hoc est respectu praedicati [S 183rB] non pertinentis ad differentiam inter terminum communem et supposita, aut respectu praedicati pertinentis ad differentiam [B 519vA] inter ea. Modo si hoc fiat primo modo, non fit aliqua fallacia, sicut hic 'homo currit, ergo aliquis*
 80 *homo currit' vel hic 'color est in corpore, ergo est in aliquo corpore': hic est bona consequentia, quia ista praedicata non pertinent ad differentiam inter terminum comunem et sua supposita vel ad diversitatem; si autem sit praedicatum pertinens ad differentiam inter ea, tunc est fallacia figurae dictionis et fallacia acci-*
 85 *dentis, ut dictum est, et causa huius est quia respectu aliorum et aliorum praedicatorum variantur consequentiae, quia consequentia attribuitur alicui obiecto complexo ratione habitudinis terminorum qui sunt in illo complexo, et ita secundum quod diversificantur habitudines terminorum, secundum hoc diversificantur*
 90 *consequentiae. Modo secundum diversitatem praedicatorum diversificantur habitudines terminorum, et ideo secundum diversitatem praedicatorum diversificantur consequentiae, et ita procedendo a termino communi qui dicitur quale quid ad ipsum hoc aliquid respectu unius praedicati erit deceptio et fallacia, et respectu alterius praedicati poterit esse processus bonus. Tunc ad rationes: 1. Ad primam, quando dicitur 'quandocumque aliqua sunt eadem' etc.: verum est si sint eadem secundum rem et rationem, tamen licet sint eadem secundum rem, (et - rem om. B) ponendo ea esse eadem secundum rem et rationem est deceptio. 2. Ad aliam,*
 95 *cum dicitur 'commutando quale quid in hoc aliquid' etc.: potest dici quod non est simile quia in hoc aliquid includitur quale quid, et non econverso, et ideo commutando hoc aliquid in quale quid sive procedendo ab hoc aliquid ad quale quid non est fallacia,*
 100

- tamen commutando quale quid in hoc aliquid est fallacia. Vel*
 105 *potest dici quod etiam commutando hoc aliquid in quale quid*
est fallacia respectu praedicati pertinentis ad differentiam [B
519vB] inter ipsa, sicut dicendo 'Socrates est individuum (hic
verba sicut dicendo habet S), ergo homo est individuum',
 110 *ita bene est hic fallacia sicut dicendo 'homo est species, ergo ali-*
quis homo est species'. 3. Ad aliam, cum dicitur 'sequitur' color
est in corpore, ergo est in aliquo corpore verum est cum dicitur
quod ibi (om. S) quale quid commutatur in hoc aliquid verum
est in hoc aliquid vagum et indeterminatum, et non respectu prae-
dicati pertinentis ad differentiam inter terminum communem et
 115 *supposita nec etiam commutatur in hoc aliquid signatum; ideo*
respectu talis praedicati non pertinentis ad differentiam inter
terminum communem et supposita potest procedi a termino
communi ad hoc aliquid vagum licet non possit procedi respectu
praedicati pertinentis ad differentiam quia secundum diversita-
 120 *tem terminorum diversificantur consequentiae, ut dictum est in*
positione, sicut non sequitur 'pater currit — vel comedit —, ergo
filius currit — vel comedit', (filius - comedit: et filius B) et tamen
bene sequitur 'pater est, ergo filius est', quia alia est habitudo
patris ad filium respectu huius praedicati quod est 'currere' vel
 125 *'comedere' et respectu istius praedicati quod est 'esse'. 4. Ad aliam,*
cum dicitur quod tunc in qualibet conversione universalis affirma-
tivae vel particularis affirmativae (vel - affirmativae: etc. B)
esset fallacia: falsum est. Et cum dicitur quod ibi (om. S) quale
quid commutatur in hoc aliquid, dico quod non commutatur in
 130 *hoc aliquid signatum, nec in hoc aliquid vagum respectu praedi-*
cati pertinentis ad diversitatem inter terminum communem et
supposita sicut est hic 'omnis homo est animal' vel 'quidam homo
est animal, ergo quoddam animal est homo'; verum est quod
aliqui dicunt quod illae debent sic [S 183vA] converti: 'omne
 131 *— vel quoddam — animal est homo, ergo homo est animal' sine*
signo particulari, tamen Philosophus non convertit sic istas. et ideo
solvendum est sicut dictum est.

ΤΟΔΕ ΤΙ – ΤΟΙΟΝΔΕ ΤΙ ΚΑΙ Η ΣΗΜΑΣΙΑ ΤΩΝ ΠΡΟΣΗΓΟΡΙΚΩΝ

Περίληψη.

Ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης στὶς *Κατηγορίες* λέει πὼς τὰ προσηγορικὰ οὐσιαστικά φαίνονται νὰ σημαίνουν *τόδε τι*, στὴν πραγματικότητα ὁμῶς σημαίνουν *τοιόνδε τι*. Τὴν ἄποψη ὅτι σημαίνουν *τόδε τι* τὴ δεχόμαστε συνήθως καὶ λέμε λ.χ. γιὰ ἓνα καθόλου πὼς εἶναι «κάτι πού . . .». Οἱ θεωρίες γιὰ τὴ σημασία τῶν προσηγορικῶν μποροῦν νὰ χωρισθοῦν σὲ δύο ομάδες: μία πού ἔχει «γενετικὸ» χαρακτήρα καὶ μία πού δὲν ἔχει. Οἱ πρῶτες ἐξηγοῦν τὶς σημασίες τῶν λέξεων ξεκινώντας ἀπὸ τὸν τρόπο πού τὶς μαθαίνομε στὰ μικρά μας χρόνια, ἀκούγοντας ἀπὸ τοὺς μεγάλους πὼς «αὐτὸ εἶναι ἓνα τραπέζι» κλπ. Τέτοιες θεωρίες, πού ὑπάρχουν καὶ σὲ παλαιότερους συγγραφεῖς (στὸν Αὐγουστῖνο λ.χ.) καὶ σὲ μεταγενέστερους (τὸν Ράσσελ λ.χ.), πρέπει νὰ συνδέονται μὲ κάποια θεωρία ἀφαιρέσεως. Μία τέτοια, πού βρίσκουμε σὲ μεσαιωνικὰ ἑλληνικὰ κείμενα, περιέχει ὡς κεντρικὴ ἔννοια τὸν ὄρο *πλῆθος πεποιωμένον*.

Στὴ Δύση τὸ πρόβλημα τῆς σημασίας τῶν προσηγορικῶν τὸ ἔβλεπαν ἀπὸ ἄλλη σκοπιὰ στὸ Μεσαίωνα, καὶ συνήθως ἔκαναν χρῆση τῆς θεωρίας γιὰ τὶς «ὑποθέσεις» (*suppositiones*). Ὁ συγγραφέας ἀσκεῖ κριτικὴ ἐναντίον τῆς θεωρίας αὐτῆς, συγκρίνοντάς την μὲ τὴ θετικιστικὴ «ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐπαληθεύσεως». Μνημονεύει τὸν τρόπο πού ὁ Strawson χειρίζεται τὸ θέμα («κάθε κατηγορημα πρέπει νὰ εἶναι ἀνώτερου τύπου ἀπὸ τὸ ὑποκείμενο») καὶ δείχνει πὼς μιὰ παρόμοια θεωρία βρίσκεται σὲ μερικὰ λατινικὰ κείμενα τοῦ δέκατου τρίτου αἰῶνα, ὅπου τὸ «ἀνώτερου τύπου» λέγεται *quale quid* (= *τοιόνδε τι*) καὶ τὸ «κατώτερου τύπου» *hoc aliquid* (= *τόδε τι*). Τελικὰ ἀσκεῖται μιὰ γενικώτερη κριτικὴ ἐναντίον τῆς ἔννοιας τοῦ «σημαινομένου» ὡς πράγματος.

Τὸ Παράρτημα I συζητᾷ τὸν ὄρο *ἀποσυλᾶν*, πού οἱ Ἕλληνες φιλόσοφοι τοῦ Μεσαίωνα τὸν χρησιμοποιοῦν σχεδὸν ἰσοδύναμα μὲ τὸ *ἀφαιρεῖν*. Τὸ Παράρτημα II περιέχει ἔκδοση Σχολίων τοῦ Λέοντος τοῦ Μαγεντινοῦ στοὺς *Σοφιστικοὺς Ἑλέγχους* τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους. Τὸ Παράρτημα III περιέχει ἔκδοση μέρους τοῦ Ὑπομνήματος τοῦ Radulphus Brito (ἀρχὴ τοῦ 14ου αἰῶνα) στοὺς *Σοφιστικοὺς Ἑλέγχους*.

Κοπεγχάγη

Sten Ebbesen