

THE ARISTOTELIAN ΝΟΥΣ IN *DE ANIMA*, Γ 5. TWO KINDS OF ΝΟΥΣ OR ONE?*

I. The Problem with Νοῦς Παθητικός and Ποιητικός¹

In *De Anima*, Book Γ, Chapter 5, Aristotle develops one of the most difficult, puzzling and perplexing theories about νοῦς (mind)² in his entire corpus. At the beginning of this chapter the Stagerite philosopher remarks that: (1) ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει, «in the whole nature», two factors are involved: (a) τὸ μὲν ὅλη ἐκάστῳ γένει, «a matter in each genus», which is potentially all the different members included in the genus, «though actually it is none of them»³, and (b) τὸ αἷτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, «an active cause, which makes them all», and its function is compared with art. (2) Since we find these factors, namely, ὅλη and αἷτιον ποιητικόν, in the whole nature, then, as Aristotle maintains, these factors must be found not only in nature, but also ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, «in the soul»⁴.

Let us see now how we find ὅλη and αἷτιον ποιητικόν within the soul. The philosopher remarks that in the soul:

* The present paper was presented at the Postgraduate Summer School entitled «The Soul: From the Aristotelian *Scientia de Anima* to Early Modern Psychology» (14-21 July 2008), Radboud University Nijmegen – Den Bosch, The Netherlands. I am most grateful to Professor Paul Bakker and Associate Professor Cees Leijenhorst for inviting me and giving me the opportunity to present this paper at the Postgraduate Summer School. Also I would like to thank the participants (esp. Dr Leslie Kavanaugh) for their valuable comments. Finally, I would like to express my deepest and sincere gratitude and appreciation to Professor Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou for her guidance, encouragement and support.

1. Ch. S. PAPACHRISTOU, *The Cognitive Process in the Aristotelian Philosophy: Αἰσθησις (Sense), Αἰσθημα (Sensation), Φαντασία (Phantasia), Φάντασμα (Phantasma), Μνήμη (Memory), Μνημόνευμα (Mnemonic Image), Νοῦς (Mind), Νόημα (Noëma)*, Ph.D. Thesis (in Greek), Thessaloniki, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 2008, pp. 273-286.

2. We keep the Greek word νοῦς, which means «mind» or, «intellect» or, «reason», throughout. However the plural form of νοῦς does not appear in the Aristotelian treatise *De Anima*. In this case we use the English term «minds».

3. ARISTOTLE, *De Anima*, with translation, introduction and notes by R. D. HICKS, New York, Arno Press, 1976 (1907¹), p. 499.

4. ARISTOTLE, *op. cit.*, Γ 5, 430 a 10-14.

ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα. Καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμιγής, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὦν ἐνέργεια. Ἀεὶ γὰρ τιμιώτερον τὸ ποιεῖν τοῦ πάσχοντος καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὕλης. Τὸ δ' αὐτό ἐστὶν ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι· ἢ δὲ κατὰ δύνάμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἐνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐ χρόνῳ· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτε μὲν νοεῖ ὅτε δ' οὐ νοεῖ. Χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίων. Οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός, καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθέν νοεῖ⁵.

In this passage Aristotle distinguishes two forms of νοῦς⁶: (a) ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς, «the passive mind», and (b) ὁ [νοῦς] τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν [νοῦς ποιητικὸς]⁷, «the mind which makes all things [the active mind]». But how does Aristotle describe νοῦς παθητικὸς and ποιητικὸς?

Νοῦς Παθητικὸς Characteristics

- (1) ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι⁸
(2) ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός⁹

The philosopher says that there is a νοῦς, namely, ὁ νοῦς παθητικὸς which τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, «becomes all things». Taking into account lines 429 a 17-18 of the treatise *De Anima*¹⁰ we should say that the word πάντα (430 a 14) refers to the word τὰ νοητά (intelligible objects). Accordingly, ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς, which is called by Simplicius¹¹ and Alexander of

5. *Ibid.*, Γ 5, 430 a 14-25.

6. Indicative readings for Aristotle's theory of νοῦς are the following: K. OEHLER, *Die Lehre vom Noetischen und Dianoetischen Denken bei Platon und Aristoteles: Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der Geschichte des Bewusstseinsproblems in der Antike*, München, Zetemata, Heft 29, C. H. Beck, 1962. F. BRENTANO, *The Psychology of Aristotle, In Particular His Doctrine of the Active Intellect*, with an Appendix Concerning the Activity of Aristotle's God, edited and translated by R. GEORGE, Berkeley - Los Angeles - London, University of California Press, 1977 (1867¹). H. KURFESS, *Zur Geschichte der Erklärung der Aristotelischen Lehre vom sog. NOYΣ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ und ΠΑΘΗΤΙΚΟΣ*, Tübingen, Ph.D. Diss., 1911. M. DE CORTE, *La Doctrine de l' Intelligence chez Aristote*, Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1934. E. HARTMAN, *Substance, Body, and Soul: Aristotelian Investigations*, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1977, pp. 264-269. F. BRENTANO, *Nous Poietikos: Survey of Earlier Interpretations*, in M. C. NUSSBAUM and A. Oksenberg RORTY (eds.), *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 313-341. Sir D. ROSS, *Aristotle*, with a new introduction by J. L. Ackrill, New York, Routledge, 2005 (1923¹), pp. 93-96. T. ANDO, *Aristotle's Theory of Practical Cognition*, Kyoto, published by the author, 1958. M. V. WEDIN, *Tracking Aristotle's Noûs*, in M. DURRANT (ed.), *Aristotle's De Anima in Focus*, London and New York, Routledge, 1993, pp. 128-161. M. J. WHITE, *The Problem of Aristotle's Nous Poietikos*, *The Review of Metaphysics*, 57, 2004, pp. 725-740 etc.

7. The words in brackets [] within quotations are ours.

8. ARISTOTLE, *De Anima*, Γ 5, 430 a 14-15.

9. *Ibid.*, Γ 5, 430 a 24.

10. *Ibid.*, Γ 4, 429 a 17-18: οὕτω τὸν νοῦν πρὸς τὰ νοητά. Ἀνάγκη ἄρα, ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ.

11. SIMPLICIUS, *In Libros Aristotelis de Anima Commentaria*, 11, 242, 17-18: 'Ο τοιοῦτος ὁ ὡς ὕλη· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ ἐσχάτον ἀποδίδεται· καὶ ὅπως ὡς ὕλη, ἐδήλωσεν, ὅτι τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι.

Aphrodisias as ὑλικὸς νοῦς (material mind)¹², is a νοῦς which becomes τὰ νοητά. And since this νοῦς is like ὕλη, and ὕλη as Aristotle says is identical to δύναμις¹³, then this νοῦς is a νοῦς δυνάμει (potential mind)¹⁴. This νοῦς is receptive of the forms (εἶδη) of the objects. It is a kind of substratum that receives the forms of the intelligible objects.

And we shall wonder: Does the νοῦς παθητικός undergo a change, when it receives the forms of the intelligible objects? Lloyd P. Gerson asserts that «the sense in which mind is in potency to all things, does not, therefore, indicate that the intellect undergoes a change, a change which consists in its ‘acquisition’ of form»¹⁵. And this view can be justified by the fact that in Book Γ, Chapter 5 of *De Anima* Aristotle says that οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν τὸ φρονεῖν, ὅταν φρονῇ, ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, «it is not right to say that something which understands undergoes change when it understands»¹⁶.

Aristotle also remarks that the νοῦς παθητικός is φθαρτός (perishable). As we shall discuss later, this clause means that this kind of νοῦς is combined in a mysterious way with the body (it is connected with the processes of imagination and memory), which is perishable.

Νοῦς Ποιητικός Characteristics

- (1) ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς.¹⁷
- (2) Καὶ αὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμειγρὴς, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὧν ἐνέργεια¹⁸
- (3) Χωρισθεὶς δ’ ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίων¹⁹

In lines 430 a 15-17 the philosopher says that ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γὰρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα. Aristotle does not use the phrase νοῦς ποιητικός, but it is justified by the words πάντα ποιεῖν. He says that this νοῦς is like ἔξις (disposition) akin to φῶς (light)²⁰. “Ἐξις is used to ex-

12. ALEXANDER APHRODISIAS, *De Anima*, 81, 24-25: ὑλικὸς νοῦς καλεῖται τε καὶ ἐστὶ (πᾶν γὰρ τὸ δεκτικὸν τινος ὕλη ἐκείνου).

13. ARISTOTLE, *op. cit.*, B 1, 412 a 9: Ἔστι δ’ ἡ μὲν ὕλη δύναμις.

14. In Latin νοῦς δυνάμει is translated as *intellectus*, while νοῦς ποιητικός is translated as *intelligentia*. Cf. T. ANDO, *Aristotle’s Theory of Practical Cognition*, Kyoto, published by the author, 1958, p. 21, n. 6.

15. L. P. GERSON, *The Unity of Intellect in Aristotle’s De Anima, Phronesis*, 49, 2004, p. 363.

16. ARISTOTLE, *op. cit.*, B 5, 417 b 8-9.

17. *Ibid.*, Γ 5, 430 a 15-16: «there is another [mind] which makes all things like a certain kind of disposition/state such as light».

18. *Ibid.*, Γ 5, 430 a 17-18: «And this mind is separable and impassive and unmixed, being in its substance in actuality».

19. *Ibid.*, Γ 5, 430 a 22-23: «And when [mind] is separated, it is just what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal».

20. Several commentators assert that Aristotle borrows the comparison of νοῦς ποιητικός with φῶς from Plato. In *Republic*, ΣΤ, 509 b 1-10 Plato compares knowledge to the sun: Τὸν

plain πάντα ποιεῖν and to describe φῶς which makes τὰ δυνάμει χρώματα (potential colors) into ἐνεργεία χρώματα (actual colors). Φῶς actualizes χρώματα that are present in potency as the νοῦς ποιητικός actualizes the forms that are present in the νοῦς παθητικός.

Hicks's explanation of the expression ὥς ἔξις τις is quite interesting. First he stresses the fact that ἔξις has a similar meaning to εἶδος²¹. Then he asserts that «that which is always actual and never potential can be described as ἔξις by a stretch of the term»²², namely, as ἔξις τις²³.

We believe that the expression ὥς ἔξις τις and consequently the term ἔξις is, as Rist says, «insufficiently precise to achieve an exact description»²⁴ of νοῦς ποιητικός. Hence, the comparison of νοῦς ποιητικός with φῶς is incomplete. But we shall try to justify the Stagerite philosopher for using this comparison. We think that the light metaphor has not been chosen accidentally. Perhaps Aristotle thought that light is the only of the physical phenomena that νοῦς ποιητικός could be compared with, since there is nothing in nature that is exactly like this form of νοῦς.

In lines 430 a 17-18 Aristotle describes the νοῦς ποιητικός as χωριστός (separable), ἀπαθής (impassive) and ἀμιγής (unmixed), being in its substance in actuality (ἐνέργεια). We should remark here that the same epithets were applied to νοῦς in Book Γ, Chapter 4²⁵.

Hicks believes that the νοῦς to which the three epithets «were ascribed in Chapter 4 is the passive intellect, and that *a fortiori* they belong to the active intellect which, as cause and activity, stands higher in the scale of logical priority»²⁶. And we shall wonder here: if Aristotle in *De Anima* Γ 5, is referring to two separate minds²⁷, and not divisions/grades —as

ἥλιον τοῖς ὁραμένοις οὐ μόνον αἶμαι τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι δυνάμει παρέχειν φήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ αὐξὴν καὶ τροφήν, οὐ γένεσιν αὐτὸν ὄντα. Πῶς γάρ; Καὶ τοῖς γινωσκομένοις τοῖνον μὴ μόνον τὸ γινώσκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβεία καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.

21. ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysics*, H 5, 1044 b 32: τοῦ μὲν καθ' ἑξιν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ὕλη.

22. ARISTOTLE, *De Anima*, with translation, introduction and notes by R. D. HICKS, New York, Arno Press, 1976 (1907¹), p. 501.

23. ARISTOTLE, *On Generation and Corruption*, A 7, 324 b 17: τὰ δ' εἶδη καὶ τὰ τέλη ἔξεις τινές, ἡ δὲ ὕλη ἢ ὕλη παθητικόν.

24. J. M. RIST, Notes on Aristotle *De Anima* 3,5, *Classical Philology*, 61, 1, 1966, pp. 11-12: «The truth of the matter is that Aristotle's terminology of 'potentiality', 'actuality', 'disposition', is sometimes insufficiently precise to achieve an exact description of the phenomena with which he is concerned».

25. Cf. *De Anima*, Γ 4, 429 a 15: ἀπαθὲς ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι. *Op. cit.*, Γ 4, 429 a 18-20: ἀνάγκη ἄρα εἶναι πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, ἵνα κρατῇ, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἵνα γωρίζη. *Op. cit.*, Γ 4, 429 b 4-5: τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὁ δὲ χωριστός.

26. ARISTOTLE, *De Anima*, with translation, introduction and notes by R. D. HICKS, New York, Arno Press, 1976 (1907¹), p. 502.

27. Cf. n. 2.

we shall argue later— within the mind, is it possible then that the epithets χωριστός, ἀπαθής and ἀμείγῃς to be applied to the νοῦς παθητικός in Chapter 4 and to the νοῦς ποιητικός in Chapter 5? But we shall return to this question later. Firstly, we shall try to provide a brief analysis of the previous epithets.

Zeller and Hicks²⁸ remark that «χωριστός means here not merely ‘separable’ but ‘actually separate’, i.e. ‘not involved in physical life’»²⁹.

Ross asserts that «the meaning of ‘separable’ here is to be gathered from the occurrence later of the expression ‘when it has been separated’»³⁰. Aristotle remarks there that Χωρισθείς δ’ ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίων («when mind has been separated, it is just what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal») ³¹. But which kind of νοῦς, when separated, is just what it is, and this alone is ἀθάνατος and αἰδίος? Some commentators (e.g. Alexander of Aphrodisias) and contemporary scholars (e.g. Victor Caston) say that the essence of this νοῦς is ἐνέργεια, and Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* applies this description to God. God is that actuality of νοῦς³².

Others support the view that the aorist passive particle χωρισθείς refers to νοῦς that makes all things and is said to be in the soul. Ross, for example, indicates that the clauses χωρισθείς...ὅπερ ἐστὶ probably mean that «after separation from the passive reason [mind], at death, the active reason is just its true self»³³. It exists in its purity, in its pure form.

Rist mentions that the words χωριστός and χωρισθείς refer to the νοῦς ποιητικός. Νοῦς ποιητικός must be χωριστός, and consequently, as we shall add ἀπαθής (impassive) and ἀμείγῃς (unmixed), from what is not totally χωριστός. Νοῦς παθητικός is, according to Rist, akin to matter, while νοῦς ποιητικός is an efficient cause. «Efficient causes are often separate or

28. ARISTOTLE, *De Anima*, op. cit., p. 502.

29. In the *Generation of Animals* Aristotle says that οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ [τοῦ νοῦ] τῇ ἐνέργειᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια («bodily activity has nothing to do with the activity of mind» Γ 3, 736 b 28).

30. Sir D. Ross, *Aristotle*, with a new introduction by J. L. Ackrill, New York, Routledge, 2005 (1923¹), p. 94.

31. ARISTOTLE, *De Anima*, Γ 5, 430 a 22-23.

32. IDEM, *Metaphysics*, Λ 2, 1072 b 26-30: ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζῶν, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ’ αὐτὴν ἐκείνου ζῶν ἀρίστη καὶ αἰδίας. φαιμέν δὴ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῶν αἰδίου ἀρίστον, ὥστε ζῶν καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ αἰδίας ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός.

33. ARISTOTLE, *De Anima*, edited, with introduction and commentary, by Sir D. Ross, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961, pp. 47-48: «The unnamed subject of the present sentence is plainly the active reason (cf. χωρισθείς, 1, 22, with χωριστός, 1, 17). The words χωριστός...ὅπερ ἐστὶ might be taken to mean (1) that after separation from the passive reason, at death, the active reason is just its true self, or (2) that it is *only* after that separation that it is its true self; but the position of μόνον strongly favours the first interpretation».

separable from the matter on which they operate»³⁴. So, when Aristotle says that the [νοῦς ποιητικός] χωρισθείς, implies that there is a time when the νοῦς ποιητικός is not separated, but connected in a way to the νοῦς παθητικός. Separation occurs at death, and this is shown, as Rist says, by the words ἀθάνατον (immortal) and αἰδίων (eternal)³⁵.

Finally, some others, like Zabarella, state that χωρισθείς refers to the νοῦς ποιητικός and means that this νοῦς is separated by abstraction (mental separation) from the relation it has with the νοῦς παθητικός³⁶.

And now we shall try to explain and interpret the last clause of the chapter, namely, καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐδὲν νοεῖ. This clause is rather ambiguous and it has troubled many commentators. It has been much discussed and has received many interpretations. The problem in this sentence is the reference of τούτου. In other words, the problem is whether the word τούτου refers to the νοῦς παθητικός or to the νοῦς ποιητικός. In our paper we shall present, very briefly, some of these interpretations.

Simplicius, for example, interprets these lines as ἄνευ δὲ τοῦ παθητικοῦ... οὐδὲν νοεῖ ὁ ἀπαθής, «and without the passive mind...the impassive mind thinks nothing»³⁷, and Philoponus as ἄνευ φαντασίας ὁ νοῦς οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ, «and without imagination the mind does not think»³⁸.

According to St. Thomas Aquinas, the sentence means that *intellectus* (mind) does not think without the *intellectus possibilis* (passive mind) and, though *intellectus* survives after the death of the body, it no longer thinks in the same way as it does now³⁹.

Zeller provides two explanations/interpretations of the sentence καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐδὲν νοεῖ, as: (a) «and without the passive mind the active mind thinks nothing», and (b) «and without the passive mind the thinker or the soul thinks nothing»⁴⁰.

34. J. M. RIST, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

36. Cf. J. ZABARELLA, *In Tres Libros Aristotelis de Anima Commentarii*, Venezia, 1605.

37. SIMPLICIUS, *op. cit.*, 11, 248, 6-7. The ancient commentator interprets τούτου (this) as the παθητικός νοῦς (passive mind) and makes ὁ ἀπαθής [νοῦς] (impassive [mind] = active mind) the subject of νοεῖ (thinks).

38. JOANNES PHILOPONUS, *In Aristotelis Libros de Anima Commentaria*, 15, 542, 7.

39. Sancti Thomae DE AQUINO, *Corpus Thomisticum. Sentencia Libri De Anima, Liber III*, textum Taurini 1959 editum ac automato translatum a Roberto Busa SJ in taenias magneticas denuo recognovit Enrique Alarcón atque instruxit, in <http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/can3.html>: «Passivus vero intellectus corruptibilis est, idest pars anima, quae non est sine praedictis passionibus, est corruptibilis;...Sine hac autem parte anima corporalis, intellectus nihil intelligit...Et ideo destructo corpore non remanet in anima separata scientia rerum secundum eundem modum, quo modo intelligit».

40. E. ZELLER, *Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics*, Vol. II, translated by B. F. C. Costelloe and J. H. Muirhead, London, New York and Bombay, Longmans, Green & Co, 1897, p. 101, n. 3.

Also, Brentano identifies νοῦς παθητικός with imagination and νοῦς ποιητικός as the moving principle of the receptive. He interprets the last lines of Chapter 5 as follows: «The active intellect without images would be like a bow without an arrow; the images without the active intellect, like an arrow without the propelling force of the bow; it would be impossible for either of them alone to reach the target, for they would be incapable of generating thought»⁴¹.

Furthermore, Ross provides four alternatives as translations for the last phrase of *De Anima* Γ 5: «(1) ‘and without the passive reason the active reason knows nothing.’ (2) ‘and without the active reason the passive reason knows nothing.’ (3) ‘and without the passive reason nothing knows.’ (4) ‘and without the active reason nothing knows’»⁴². Ross selects number (4) as the best translation of καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ.

Düring makes as the subject of νοεῖ the human knowledge and τούτου to refer to the νοῦς ποιητικός⁴³, while Gerson makes as the subject of νοεῖ the individual and τούτου to refer to the νοῦς παθητικός⁴⁴.

Finally, we believe and we shall try to show that in Book Γ, Chapter 5 the Aristotelian distinction in νοῦς παθητικός and ποιητικός, is related to the duality of a *single* νοῦς⁴⁵. In other words we aim to show, that νοῦς has two grades, and therefore whether we make τούτου to refer to (a) νοῦς ποιητικός or (b) to νοῦς παθητικός, the basic meaning in this sentence is that «the individual without νοῦς (with its two grades) knows nothing». Our thinking is possible only through the cooperation of νοῦς παθητικός and ποιητικός.

II. Νοῦς Παθητικός and Ποιητικός: A Brief Review of Earlier and Most Recent Interpretations

We shall provide a short summary, following Brentano⁴⁶, of the earlier and most recent interpretations about νοῦς παθητικός and ποιητικός.

41. F. BRENTANO, *The Psychology of Aristotle, In Particular his Doctrine of the Active Intellect, With an Appendix Concerning the Activity of Aristotle's God*, edited and translated by R. GEORGE, Berkeley - Los Angeles - London, University of California Press, 1977, p. 142.

42. Sir D. ROSS, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

43. I. DÜRING, *Aristotle, Presentation and Interpretation of his Thinking*, translated in Greek by A. Georgiou-Katsivela, Vol. II, Athens, M.I.E.T., 1994, pp. 407-408.

44. L. P. GERSON, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

45. IDEM, p. 12.

46. F. BRENTANO, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-24.

- Theophrastus considers not only νοῦς ποιητικός but also παθητικός as immaterial⁴⁷, and he took both of these minds to be faculties of one subject⁴⁸.
- Alexander of Aphrodisias distinguishes three kinds of νοῦς: (a) the νοῦς ὕλικός (material mind), which is analogous to the νοῦς παθητικός, (b) the ἐν ἔξει νοῦς (mind in disposition) and (c) the νοῦς ποιητικός (active mind). He makes the νοῦς ποιητικός separate from the human body and he interprets it as the activity of the divine mind.
- Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) distinguishes two kinds of *intellectus* (mind): (a) the *intellectus potentialis* or *materialis* (potential or material mind), which is a human faculty and (b) the *intellectus agens* (active mind), which is a separate spiritual substance and it is not mixed with the body.
- Averroës (Ibn Rushd) distinguishes: (a) the *intellectus passibilis* (passive mind), which is located in the central cells of the brain, (b) the *intellectus materialis* (material mind), and (c) the *intellectus agens* (active mind). The *intellectus materialis* and the *intellectus agens* are pure spiritual beings.
- According to Thomas Aquinas, not only the *intellectus agens* (active mind), but also the *intellectus possibilis* (passive mind)⁴⁹ is immaterial. Both of these minds belong to the human soul and they are not purely spiritual beings. They are faculties of the human soul, but they lack a bodily organ.
- According to Trendelenburg⁵⁰, the νοῦς παθητικός organizes all the lower faculties that are required for the thinking of a thing. This νοῦς is called by Trendelenburg as νοῦς παθητικός because it is completed by νοῦς ποιητικός. More noble is the νοῦς ποιητικός which is not divine but it is found in the human soul. It is not the divine νοῦς but it is akin to the deity.

47. THEMISTIVS, *In Aristotelis Libros de Anima Paraphrasis*, 5, 3, 108, 15-18: ἀπαθής γάρ φησιν ὁ νοῦς, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἄλλως παθητικός, καὶ ὅτι τὸ παθητικὸν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ οὐχ ὡς τὸ κινητὸν ληπτέον (ἀτελής γάρ ἡ κίνησις), ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνέργειαν. καὶ προΐων φησι τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις οὐκ ἀνευ σώματος, τὸν δὲ νοῦν χωριστόν.

48. *Ibid.*, 5, 3, 107, 31-108, 1: ὁ δὲ νοῦς πῶς ποτε ἐξωθεν ὦν καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπίθετος ὁμῶς συμφυής, καὶ τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν εἶναι κατ' ἐνέργειαν, δυνάμει δὲ πάντα, καλῶς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ληπτέον ὡς οὐδὲ αὐτὸς (ἐριστικὸν γάρ); ἀλλ' ὡς ὑποκειμένην τινὰ δυνάμιν καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὕλικῶν. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐξωθεν ἄρα οὐχ ὡς ἐπίθετον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γενέσει συμπεριλαμβανόμενον θετέον, and 108, 23-25: καὶ τί πάλιν τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἢ συνηρτημένον τῷ ποιητικῷ; μικτόν γάρ πως ὁ νοῦς ἐκ τε τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ δυνάμει. εἰ μὲν οὖν σύμφυτος ὁ κινῶν, καὶ εὐθύς ἐχρήν καὶ αἰεί. Cf. FRANZ BRENTANO, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

49. St. Thomas Aquinas characterized passive mind as *intellectus possibilis* instead of *intellectus passibilis* (cf. the Arabian commentators).

50. ARISTOTELIS, *De Anima Libri Tres*, ad interpretum Graecorum auctoritatem et codicum fidem recognovit commentariis illustravit Frider. Adolph. Trendelenburgh, Jena, Walz, 1833, Berlin, W. Weber, 1877, Graz, Akademische Druck-und Verlagsanstalt, 1957.

- For Brandis⁵¹ the νοῦς ποιητικός belongs to the particular man. He ascribes mediating thought to the νοῦς παθητικός, while «the νοῦς ποιητικός is the cognition of *per se* principles, which are true and certain»⁵².
- Trendelenburg's and Brandis's interpretations approach the view of Theophrastus, since they attribute the νοῦς ποιητικός to the human being.
- Finally, traces of Alexander's and the Arabian commentators' interpretation can be found in: Fr. Ravaisson-Mollien, E. Zeller, P. Moraux, S. R. L. Clark, W. K. C. Guthrie, J. M. Rist, M. Frede, V. Caston⁵³.

III. Νοῦς Παθητικός and Ποιητικός: Two Grades of a Single Νοῦς

After the foregoing analysis regarding the problem with νοῦς παθητικός and ποιητικός, we shall attempt to rebut several arguments that commentators have advanced in favor of the thesis that in *De Anima*, Γ 5 Aristotle is referring to two distinct minds, which correspond to the human and the divine mind. To be more precise, we shall attempt to give an answer to the following questions that have been raised previously:

(1) Is it possible the epithets χωριστός, ἀπαθής and ἀμιγής to be applied to the νοῦς παθητικός in Chapter 4 and to the νοῦς ποιητικός in Chapter 5?

(2) In *De Anima*, Γ 5 Aristotle is referring to two distinct minds or to two grades of a single νοῦς?

(3) Can we identify the νοῦς ποιητικός with God?

(1) Initially, we shall try to defend the thesis that the νοῦς that is characterized as χωριστός, ἀπαθής and ἀμιγής in chapter 5 is identical with the νοῦς in Chapter 4, which is characterized in the same way. In Chapter 4 of Book Γ Aristotle raises two questions: (a) τίς ἔχει διαφοράν, «what

51. C. A. BRANDIS, *Handbuch der Geschichte der Griechisch-römischen Philosophie*, Vol. II, Berlin, Gr. Reimer, 1835-1866, ii/2, p. 1177.

52. F. BRENTANO, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

53. Cf. F. RAVAISSON-MOLLIEN, *Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote*, 2 vols, Paris, 1837-1846, Hildesheim, G. Olms, 1996. E. ZELLER, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung dargestellt*, Vol. II, Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1963 (1856-68¹), p. 441. P. MORAUX, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise: Exégète de la Noétique d'Aristote*, Liège, Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres, pp. 97-99. S. R. L. CLARK, *Aristotle's Man: Speculations upon Aristotelian Anthropology*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975, pp. 174 et ff. W. K. C. GUTHRIE, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, Vol. Six: Aristotle: An Encounter, New York, Cambridge U. P., 1981, pp. 309-327. J. M. RIST, Notes on Aristotle *De Anima* 3, 5, *Classical Philology*, 61, 1, 1966, pp. 15-17; IDEM, *The Mind of Aristotle: A Study in Philosophical Growth*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1989, pp. 181-182. M. FREDE, La Théorie Aristotélécienne de l'Intellect Agent, in G. ROMEYER-DHERBEY - C. VIANO (eds.), *Corps et âme: Sur le De anima d'Aristote*, Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, pp. 383-390. V. CASTON, Aristotle's Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal, *Phronesis*, 44, 1999, pp. 211-212.

is the distinctive feature [of mind]⁵⁴, and (b) πῶς ποτέ γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν, «how thinking comes about»⁵⁵. We believe, that in Chapter 4 the Stagerite philosopher tries to answer the first question and in Chapter 5 the second⁵⁶. Also, we agree with L. P. Gerson's view «that the beginning of the passage Ἐπεὶ δ'... suggests a continuation of the train of thinking of chapter four and not the introduction of an entirely new subject. In fact, chapter five aims to explain how thinking is possible for an individual»⁵⁷.

Those (e.g. Victor Caston)⁵⁸ who believe that Chapter 5 does not «suggest a continuation of the train of thinking» of Chapter 4 base their views on the following arguments:

(a) Aristotle in many passages of the treatise *De Anima* speaks about the [νοῦς] τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, namely, the νοῦς, which is in the soul and receives the forms of the external objects. See, for example, the following passages:

Ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς (λέγω δὲ νοῦν ὃ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἢ ψυχῇ) οὐθέν ἐστιν ἐνέργεια τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν⁵⁹

Ὅταν δ' [ὁ νοῦς] αὐτως ἑκάστα γένηται⁶⁰

ὅτι δυνάμει πῶς ἐστι τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς, ἀλλ' ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδέν, πρὶν ἂν νοῇ⁶¹

(b) The philosopher only in Chapter 5 of Book Γ speaks for a [νοῦς] τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι that is ἀθάνατος and αἰδώς. So, (a) and (b) suggest that there are two kinds of νοῦς in *De Anima* and not a single νοῦς. But we don't agree with this view for the previous and the following reasons.

(2) Aristotle in *De Anima* Γ 5, 430 a 17-23 claims that when the νοῦς is separated from the soul and consequently from the body it is its true self. And this means that ὁ νοῦς...ὢν ἐνέργεια, «the mind...in actuality», when it is separated from that which is acted upon, namely, the νοῦς παθητικός, it is just what it is, it is pure energy:

54. ARISTOTLE, *De Anima*, Γ 4, 429 a 12-13.

55. *Ibid.*, Γ 4, 429 a 13.

56. Cf. M. V. WEDIN, *Mind and Imagination in Aristotle*, New Haven - London, Yale U.P., 1988, p. 162: «For the question of what features are distinctive of νοῦς is kept separate from the question of how thinking occurs, and thus the possibility arises that *De Anima*, III, 4 is meant to address the first and *De Anima*, III, 5 the second question. It is this suggestion that I want to exploit», and p. 175: «...the distinction between productive and receptive mind is to be connected with the mind described in 429 b 5-9...and with 429 b 22-25's puzzle about how the mind can think at all if thinking is something like being affected».

57. L. P. GERSON, *op. cit.*, p. 11, n. 45.

58. V. CASTON, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-212.

59. ARISTOTLE, *op. cit.*, Γ 4, 429 a 22-24: «then the part of the soul that is called mind (and by mind I mean that whereby the soul thinks and supposes) is in actuality none of the beings before it thinks».

60. *Ibid.*, Γ 4, 429 b 5-6: «And when [the mind] in this way becomes each thing».

61. *Ibid.*, Γ 4, 429 b 30-31: «the mind is in potentiality the intelligible objects but in actuality nothing until it thinks».

Καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμειγρῆς, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὧν ἐνέργεια...
Χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδῖον.

And we shall wonder here: If there is one νοῦς, how can this νοῦς be separated from its true self? Lloyd P. Gerson gives the answer. He notes that «mind is always mind, that is, it is always engaged in self-reflexive activity. This is the case both when mind is 'in the soul' and when mind is separate. But when it is in the soul —when it is accessed by that which operates in nature— that access is always via images»⁶², as Aristotle remarks in lines 431 a 16-17 (Διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἢ ψυχῇ)⁶³ and 432 a 8 (ὅταν τε θεωρῇ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φαντάσματος θεωρεῖν)⁶⁴. Consequently, when νοῦς is in the soul, it operates with φαντάσματα (mental images), the products of the faculty of φαντασία (imagination). And when νοῦς separates from the soul and it is just what it is, it operates without φαντάσματα, because its true self has nothing in it that is external.

Also, according to our view, Aristotle's point in lines 430 a 23-24 (Χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδῖον. Οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθὲς, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός) is that a part of the complex individual body that survives after death, has no power of μνήμη (memory)⁶⁵, hence and no φαντασία, since these powers or faculties function only when the soul is acted upon through the body. And this part of the individual body that survives after death is the νοῦς ποιητικὸς, which is always superior (τιμώτερον = first grade of νοῦς) to that which is acted upon, namely, the νοῦς παθητικὸς (second grade of νοῦς). On the other hand the νοῦς παθητικὸς is a kind of substratum. It receives and actualizes the φαντάσματα. It is this grade of νοῦς that is connected in a mysterious way with the processes of φαντασία and μνήμη. And these processes, according to Aristotle, are located in the heart (*sensus communis*). However, the powers of αἰσθάνεσθαι (sense perception)⁶⁶, φαντασία, μνήμη and νοεῖν cease to exist after the disintegration of the body. So, after death the νοῦς which becomes all things, the νοῦς παθητικὸς (the second grade of νοῦς), perishes (ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός), since it is no longer: (a) combined with the

62. L. P. GERSON, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

63. ARISTOTLE, *De Anima*, Γ 7, 431 a 16-17: «this is why the soul never thinks without a mental image».

64. *Ibid.*, Γ 8, 432 a 8: «and whenever a person contemplates, it is necessary at the same time to contemplate a mental image».

65. Memory belongs *per se* to the primary perceptive part of the soul and *per accidens* to the thinking part of the soul. Cf. ARISTOTLE, *On Memory and Reminiscence*, A, 450 a 11-14: ἡ δὲ μνήμη, καὶ ἡ τῶν νοητῶν, οὐκ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἐστίν· ὥστε τοῦ νοῦ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν εἴη, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ.

66. The αἰσθάνεσθαι is the faculty of perceiving the forms of the external objects without their matter.

body (it perishes because it was combined with the body), (b) affected by memory and imagination and (c) becomes all objects.

Now, as far as it concerns the material (νοῦς παθητικός) and the immaterial (νοῦς ποιητικός) nature of νοῦς we should remark the following. Aristotle in line 430 a 8 of the treatise *De Anima* asserts that the νοῦς is immaterial:

ἄνευ γὰρ ὕλης δύναμις ὁ νοῦς τῶν ταιούτων⁶⁷.

Nevertheless, in lines 403 a 8-10 he expresses his skepticism regarding the immaterial nature of νοῦς by saying that τὸ νοεῖν (thinking or thought) cannot be apart from the body:

Μάλιστα δ' ἔοικεν ἴδιον τὸ νοεῖν· εἰ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἂν οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι⁶⁸.

So what does that mean? We believe that Aristotle expresses this skepticism and does not attempt to admit openly a material substratum to νοῦς, because it seems to have had no distinct idea of a bodily organ of thought⁶⁹. And without doubt he seeks for an ἔσχατον αἰσθητήριον, «ultimate organ of sense»⁷⁰, that it could be able to judge or distinguish the differences of its own sense object (κρίνει τὰς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ διαφοράς)⁷¹.

Finally, we shall agree with Charalambos Ierodiakonou⁷² who suggests that Aristotle's distinction in Chapter 5 between these two forms of νοῦς, the νοῦς παθητικός, which is affected by passions (e.g. love, hatred, joy, sorrow, anger, etc.), and the νοῦς ποιητικός, which is impassive, unmixed and is such as light, could find its parallel in the distinction between the physical brain (the physical and biological matter contained within the skull) and the energetic function of thought. Namely, the νοῦς ποιητικός is analogous to the energetic function of thought, and the νοῦς παθητικός to the physical brain⁷³:

67. ARISTOTLE, *De Anima*, Γ 4, 430 a 8: «for the mind is the potentiality of such things without matter».

68. *Ibid.*, A 1, 403 a 8-10.


69. T. ANDO, *op. cit.*, p. 56: «Aristotle ... only conjectures that it might be sought either in the heart or in the brain, yet does not decide which is more probable. But since prudence as a kind of intellect is assigned to the heart, and the physiological function of the brain is considered to be to cool the blood, and to preserve the whole body, the organ of intellect seems rather to be assigned to the heart. At any rate, it is undeniable that Aristotle has admitted a material and physiological substratum to human thinking».

70. ARISTOTLE, *op. cit.*, Γ 2, 426 b 16.

71. *Ibid.*, Γ 2, 426 b 10.

72. C. S. IERODIAKONOU, *Psychological Issues in the Writings of Aristotle* (in Greek), Thessaloniki, Mastorides, 2004, p. 243.

73. Ch. S. PAPACHRISTOU, The Puzzling Role of the Brain in Aristotle's Theory of Sense Perception, *Antike Naturwissenschaft und ihre Rezeption*, Band XVIII, herausgeber von Jochen ALTHOFF, S. FÖLLINGER, G. WÖHRLE, Trier, Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2008, pp. 18-19.



Many would disagree with this view by saying that the difference between νοῦς παθητικός and ποιητικός and brain and thinking is the following:

- (a) Brain and Thinking = once the heart stops beating, the brain stops functioning. Once the brain stops functioning, thinking stops.
- (b) Νοῦς Παθητικός and Ποιητικός = when νοῦς (νοῦς ποιητικός) is separated, it is just what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal, while νοῦς παθητικός is perishable.

But, we shall wonder here:

- (a) If our brain waves, which are energy waves, are in fact our thinking, then it would seem that our thinking is energy.
- (b) According to the First Law of Thermodynamics energy cannot be created or destroyed.

So, if in fact our thinking is energy and it cannot be destroyed, then what happens to it after we die?

Our opinion is that the distinction between the νοῦς παθητικός and ποιητικός or the material and immaterial νοῦς, has everything to do with Aristotle's analysis of human thinking: How thinking comes about⁷⁴. If νοῦς were a specific material organ, then it would be restricted to receiving only certain kinds of information (e.g. τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶδη)⁷⁵. Its immaterial part (νοῦς ποιητικός) is capable of receiving and reflecting all forms (e.g. τὰ ἀδιαίρετα)⁷⁶.

74. ARISTOTLE, *op. cit.*, Γ 4, 429 a 12-13: πῶς ποτέ γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν.

75. The αἰσθητὰ εἶδη (sensitive forms) of an object without its matter are: color, shape, size, magnitude and so on.

76. How do we get to the ἀδιαίρετα (indivisibles)? With a certain mental function, abstraction, by which the ἀδιαίρετον is comprehended or thought in the particular. In Book Γ, Chapter 6 Aristotle describes: (a) how the νοῦς grasps the ἀδιαίρετα, and (b) how the νοῦς puts together single notions and forms a new unity.

And for this reason in the soul (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ) the νοῦς παθητικός and ποιητικός are analogous to brain and thinking (one mind in contemporary terms). In the soul there is a unified νοῦς.

In addition, as Caston points out, the distinction of the two minds in the soul, no more indicates the distinction among the μέρη (parts) or δυνάμεις (faculties or powers) of the soul indicates multiple souls⁷⁷:

Aristotle's Division of the Μέρη (Parts) or Δυνάμεις (Faculties or Powers) of the Soul	
1. Θρεπτικόν (Nutritive) or Γεννητικόν (Reproductive) 2. Ὅρεκτικόν (ἐπιθυμία, θυμός, βούλησις) [Appetitive (desire, spiritedness, wish)] 3. Αἰσθητικόν (Sensitive) 4. Κινητικόν κατὰ τόπον (Locomotive/Motive according to place) 5. Φανταστικόν (Imaginative) 6. Νοητικόν (Rational) or Διανοητικόν (Discursive) ⁷⁸	One Soul
Grades of Νοῦς	
1. Νοῦς Παθητικός (Passive Mind) 2. Νοῦς Ποιητικός (Active Mind)	One Νοῦς

(3) Furthermore, we shall pose the last question: Is this νοῦς, namely, the νοῦς ποιητικός, which is μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστί, «just what it is», comparable to God, who is νόησις νοήσεως⁷⁹? In *De Anima* Aristotle does not speak about God or the divine νοῦς. Although he calls the νοῦς ποιητικός as eternal and immortal, he does not identify it with God. We believe that when he says that this νοῦς ἐστί μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστί probably he envisages both God and νοῦς ποιητικός, and not God itself⁸⁰, since God is an unmoved

77. V. CASTON, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

78. For a useful analysis of the meanings νοητικόν and διανοητικόν, cf. K. OEHLER, *Die Lehre vom Noetischen und Dianoetischen Denken bei Platon und Aristoteles: Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der Geschichte des Bewusstseinsproblems in der Antike*, München, Zetemata, Heft 29, C. H. Beck, 1962, pp. 131-244.

79. ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysics*, Λ 9, 1074 b 33-34: αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις. For an analysis of the expression νόησις νοήσεως in *Metaphysics* Λ, cf. K. OEHLER, Aristotle on Self Knowledge, *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 118, 1974, pp. 493-506.

80. Cf. J. M. RIST, *op. cit.*, p. 16: «Scarcely anyone nowadays is disposed to take seriously the identification of the Active Intellect with God made by Alexander of Aprosdisias». Cf. also ALEXANDER APHRODISIAS, *De Anima*, 2, 1, 89, 9-15 and 108, 19-28: τοιοῦτον δὲ ὃν εἴη ἂν ὁ ποιητικός νοῦς ... εἴη, εἰ ὁ τοιοῦτος νοῦς τὸ πρῶτον αἷτιον, ὃ αἰτία καὶ ἀρχὴ τοῦ εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις, εἴη ἂν καὶ ταύτῃ ποιητικός, ἢ αὐτὸς αἷτιος τοῦ εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς νοουμένοις, καὶ ἐστὶν ὁ τοιοῦτος νοῦς χωριστός τε καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμείγρως ἄλλω, ἃ πάντα αὐτῷ διὰ τὸ χωρὶς ὕλης εἶναι ὑπάρχει.

mover and not an efficient cause⁸¹. So, we must argue that νοῦς ποιητικός must not be the divine νοῦς, but it is closely related to deity⁸² (ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἴσως θειότερον τι καὶ ἀπαθές ἐστίν⁸³).

IV. Conclusion

We conclude the present paper by arguing that there is in fact only one νοῦς discussed in *De Anima*: a unified νοῦς. Also we have to add that the way of approaching and interpreting νοῦς παθητικός and ποιητικός in Book Γ, Chapter 5 of the treatise *De Anima* contains a new dynamic: «it opens a promising perspective for a re-reading of Aristotle's work through its connection with contemporary science»⁸⁴.

Ch. PAPACHRISTOU
(Thessaloniki)

χωριστός τε γὰρ καὶ αὐτός καθ' αὐτόν ὢν διὰ τοῦτο. τῶν γὰρ ἐνύλων εἰδῶν οὐδὲν χωριστὸν ἢ λόγῳ μόνον τῷ φθορᾷ αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης χωρισμόν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπαθές, ὅτι τὸ πάσχον ἐν πάσῃ ἢ ὕλῃ καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ἀπαθές δὲ ὢν καὶ μὴ μεμιγμένος ὕλῃ τινὶ καὶ ἀφθαρτός ἐστιν, ἐνέργεια ὢν καὶ εἶδος χωρὶς δυνάμεως τε καὶ ὕλης, τοιοῦτον δὲ ὃν δέδειχται ὑπ' Ἀριστοτέλους τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ καὶ κυρίως ἐστὶ νοῦς» and «τοῦτο δὴ τὸ νοητὸν τε τῇ αὐτοῦ φύσει καὶ κατ' ἐνέργειαν νοῦς, αἴτιον γινόμενον τῷ ὑλικῷ νῷ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτο εἶδος ἀναφορὰν χωρίζειν τε καὶ μιμεῖσθαι καὶ νοεῖν καὶ τῶν ἐνύλων εἰδῶν ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν νοητὸν αὐτό, θύραθεν ἐστὶ λεγόμενος νοῦς ὁ ποιητικός, οὐκ ὢν μόριον καὶ δυνάμεις τις τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἐξωθεν γινόμενος ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅταν αὐτὸν νοῶμεν, εἴ γε κατὰ μὲν τὴν τοῦ εἶδους λήψιν τὸ νοεῖν γίνεται, τὸ δὲ ἐστὶν εἶδος αὐλὸν αὐτὸ σὺ μεθ' ὕλης ὃν ποτε οὐδὲ χωριζόμενον αὐτῆς ἐπειδὴν νοῆται. χωριστός δὲ ἐστὶν ἡμῶν τοιοῦτος ὢν εἰκότως, ἐπεὶ μὴ ἐν τῷ νοεῖσθαι αὐτῷ ὑφ' ἡμῶν τὸ εἶναι νῷ γίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν τῇ αὐτοῦ φύσει τοιοῦτος, ἐνέργεια νοῦς τε ὢν καὶ νοητός [the emphasis is ours].

81. Cf. T. ANDO, *op. cit.*, p. 63, n. 5. When we think, we access the divine νοῦς without becoming God.

82. Probably we, as individuals, are part of a higher consciousness, that we are not aware of, just like each neuron cell of our brain, sends its own information, at the moment it fires (it produces different actions), but it is not aware of the consciousness that it helps to produce.

83. ARISTOTLE, *De Anima*, A 4, 408 b 29-30: «but the mind is probably something more divine and is unaffected».

84. D. SFENDONI-MENTZOU, Time and Being in Aristotle and Prigogine (in Greek), *Proceedings of the International Conference "Aristotle Today", Naousa-Mieza, September 20-23, Naousa, Municipality of Naousa, 2002*, p. 358.

Ο ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΙΚΟΣ «ΝΟΥΣ» ΣΤΟ *ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ*, Γ 5.
ΔΥΟ ΕΙΔΗ «ΝΟΥ» Η Ή ΕΝΑ;

Περίληψη

Τὸ Πέμπτο Κεφάλαιο τοῦ Τρίτου Βιβλίου τῆς πραγματείας *Περὶ ψυχῆς* ἀποτελεῖ ἓνα ἀπὸ τὰ πιὸ δύσκολα καὶ αἰνιγματικά σημεῖα τῆς σκέψης τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλη. Στὸ κεφάλαιο αὐτὸ γίνεται ἡ περίφημη διάκριση τοῦ νοῦ σὲ δύο εἶδη: (α) τὸν παθητικὸ νοῦ πού γίνεται ὅλα τὰ νοητά (ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι) καὶ εἶναι φθαρτός, καὶ (β) τὸν ποιητικὸ νοῦ πού τὰ πραγματώνει ὅλα σὰν μία ἔξη, ὅπως τὸ φῶς (ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς), καὶ εἶναι χωριστός, ἀπαθής, ἀμνηστὴς αἰδῖος καὶ ἀθάνατος.

Τὰ ὅσα ἀναφέρει ὁ Σταγειρίτης φιλόσοφος στὸ συγκεκριμένο κεφάλαιο γιὰ τὸν παθητικὸ καὶ ποιητικὸ νοῦ ἀπασχόλησαν ἀπὸ τὴν ἀρχαιότητα ἕως τὴ σύγχρονη ἐποχὴ τοὺς μελετητὲς καὶ ἐρευνητὲς τοῦ φιλοσοφικοῦ τοῦ ἔργου, ὅπου, ὅπως ἐπιχειροῦμε νὰ δείξουμε στὸ παρὸν ἄρθρο, οἱ περισσότεροι ἀπ' αὐτοὺς ὑποστήριξαν ὅτι πρόκειται γιὰ δύο διαφορετικὰ εἶδη νοῦ. Ἐμεῖς, ὅμως, μὲ τὴ σειρά μας ὑποστηρίζουμε ὅτι ἡ διάκριση τοῦ νοῦ στὸ Πέμπτο Κεφάλαιο τοῦ Τρίτου Βιβλίου τῆς πραγματείας *Περὶ ψυχῆς* σὲ παθητικὸ καὶ ποιητικὸ νοῦ ἀφορᾷ τὴ δυαδικότητά του (duality) ἢ τὰ διαφορετικὰ ἐπίπεδα λειτουργίας του καὶ ὅτι δὲν πρόκειται γιὰ δύο διαφορετικὰ εἶδη νοῦ.

Ἐπίσης ἀκολουθώντας τὴν ἄποψη τοῦ Χαράλαμπου Τεροδιακόνου τονίζουμε ὅτι ὁ διαχωρισμὸς ἐδῶ σὲ παθητικὸ καὶ ποιητικὸ νοῦ μᾶς ἐπιτρέπει νὰ παραλληλίσουμε: (α) τὸν παθητικὸ ὡς τὴ βιολογικὴ βάση τῆς σκέψης, πού ἡ σημερινὴ Ἰατρικὴ δέχεται ὅτι εἶναι ὁ ἐγκέφαλος, καὶ (β) τὸν ποιητικὸ ὡς τὴν ἐνεργητικὴ λειτουργία τῆς σκέψης.

Χριστίνα ΠΑΠΑΧΡΗΣΤΟΥ