

ση τῶν συμπερασμάτων, ἀλλά, ἐπὶ πλέον, καθιστοῦν τὶς μελέτες τῆς ἀξιόλογο βοήθημα γιὰ τοὺς ἐρευνητὲς ποὺ θὰ ἐπιθυμοῦσαν νὰ προχωρήσουν σὲ περαιτέρω μελέτη ἐνὸς σπουδαίου κεφαλαίου τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς καὶ Ἑλληνιστικῆς φιλοσοφίας.

Παναγιώτης ΤΖΑΜΑΛΙΚΟΣ

Panayiotis TZAMALIKOS, *The Concept of Time in Origen*, Dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Glasgow, 1987, pp. xv + 834.

This thesis constitutes a remarkable piece of work aiming at providing a clarification of Origen's concept of time. It is the first time in the bibliography world wide that such a project has been carried out. Thus it is the first time that an account of Origen's view of the question has been researched and expounded. Through a brilliant analysis, out of a four-year full-time research, the author shows how the concept of time may contribute to a better understanding of a certain philosophy as a whole. This is the case of a courageous and well-executed attempt to eliminate current (yet well entrenched) misconceptions about Origen's thought, as well as about critical aspects of the relation between Hellenism and Christianity during the first three centuries of the Christian era. Besides, the author takes the opportunity to exonerate Origen from the traditional charge that he compromised his theology by mingling it with much of Platonist philosophy. This claim has so far been an unquestioned tradition, which has resulted in Origen being regarded as one of the chief architects of the Hellenization of Christianity.

In expounding his views, the author offers a vast number of passages of Origen translated from the Greek original into English for the first time. His points are made not so much through dialectics or logical inference. They are substantiated through Origen's own texts, taken from about a hundred (100) works of his preserved in Greek to one extent or another. Latin versions are also taken into account, yet always in close juxtaposition with views of Origen found in the Greek original. Besides, the author offers a convincing account of why the study of the concept of time in Origen is necessary and what is the scientific benefit to be expected out of such a research. Since the concept of time is an abstrusive notion, the difficulties for such an enterprise are quite obvious.

The author discusses a vast number of theories of time which reached





Origen in the third century as a background: Presocratic, Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, Neoplatonic, Epicurean, Eclectic, Syncretic, Gnostic, Sceptic, early Christian views of time —they are all well taken into consideration and are thoroughly discussed.

That this is the case of a remarkable piece of work becomes evident from the impressingly large number of points which are really original and constitute substantial contributions to the field researched. It is really worth while to point out some of them:

1. Against any ancient or modern account of Origen's thought, it is proven that he did not hold the notion of the so-called «eternity of creation». This is a revolutionary assertion indeed, yet it has been substantiated and confirmed through Origen's own words and is thoroughly discussed in one of the most lengthy sections of this work.

2. Origen's doctrine of Creation is meticulously discussed. This is a point where many distortions are still standing. The exposition rebuts not only those supposed to be opponents of Origen (such as Justinian and Jerome), but also sympathizers, such as H. Crouzel, in our day.

3. The *De Principiis* has been taken into account in its Latin rendering: Greek extants, Koetschau's edition, English edition, American edition as well as the recent French edition. All modern editions contain serious mistakes (indeed the French one by H. Crouzel - M. Simonetti some serious ones) which are systematically pointed out and rebutted (although only to the extent that they relate to the subject-matter) usually through Origen's own words. Concerning the German and French editions of other works of Origen (such as the *Commentary on John*) the author calls attention to mistaken points and propounds the correct rendering. It is almost invariably the case that scholars have been content to confine themselves to Origen's *De Principiis*. Dr. Tzamalikos reveals the folly of this, juxtaposing spurious portions of this work with authentic views found in other writings preserved in the Greek original.

4. The significance of «homonyms» in Origen's thought is pointed out through his own remarks. The author adduces the Alexandrian's definitions of the notion and points out the pivotal rôle which they play in his thought. Crucial notions, such as τέλος (end), αἰών (aeon), αἰώνιος (eternal), κόσμος (cosmos), γῆ (earth) γνῶσις (knowledge), σοφία (wisdom), θάνατος (death), ἀνάστασις (resurrection), are homonyms. This means that different realities are denoted under the same name; subsequently, they can be elucidated only once these different realities are pointed up and illustrated properly.

5. Against all current accounts, it is documented that Origen holds a





conception of God *Himself*, as contrasted with conceptions of God as creator, or Judge, or Provident etc. Subsequently, the author evinces, against universal claims, that Origen does hold a conception of God without thinking of him necessarily as Creator (as a Platonist could do).

6. Against P. Plass it is shown that no notion of «sacred time» makes sense in Origen, since he does not hold such a notion at all.

7. The relation of the Logos to God is portrayed against erroneous views, such as those of H. Chadwick and, even worse, of R. A. Norris. The views of Norris constitute one of the worst distortions of Origen's thought and fallacious claims of this author are rebutted on various issues at numerous points of this work, particularly in Chapter 1. At any rate, it is confirmed that the relation of the Logos to God has nothing to do with Neoplatonic conceptions, as claimed by Norris and others.

8. A systematic account of the relation between God, World and Time is given. The notion of the *world* is thoroughly examined before that point, and the limits of Temporality and Timelessness are clearly portrayed.

9. There are numerous references to the English translation of *Contra Celsum* by H. Chadwick. It is demonstrated that crucial points of the text are misrendered to an extent that Origen's views are utterly distorted. At the end of the work (and after numerous rebuttals of Chadwick's rendering) the author takes the view that a new translation of *Contra Celsum* in English is urgently needed.

10. Origen's conception of time is expounded for the first time in an *ad hoc* treatise. The author examines the ontology of time proper. He proves that the fundamental ontological definition of time as *διάστημα* has a Stoic ring, and the relevant terminology which was introduced by Origen for the first time is illustrated and discussed in detail. The author substantiates how Origen's terminology adumbrates both time proper as well as the relation of time to space in an inspired way. His terminology of time was used *verbatim* not only by the Cappadocians, but also by subsequent Christian writers, such as John of Damascus in the Eighth Century. The author points out and canvasses the crucial points on which Origen established radical break with Platonism. This, while the entire Greek tradition (Presocratics, Platonism, Aristotelism, Stoicism from Zeno to Marcus Aurelius, Neoplatonism and others), as well as Gnosticism, are continuously discussed throughout this work in juxtaposition with Origen's views.

It is displayed that a vast number of Christian writers merely echoed Origen's views on the question of time. And, at the points where they were unable to comprehend Origen's views in all their depth, they fell in a



strikingly Platonic way of thinking. This is what happened with Gregory of Nazianzus and John of Damascus, as discussed in detail.

11. It is evidenced that it was Origen who is the source of Augustine's theory of time. The discussion on this point is somewhat extensive yet absolutely illuminating. For indeed this provides answers to long-standing questions, such as those posed by H. I. Marrou (1938, 1949), J. Callahan (1958), R. Sorabji (1983), and remained unanswered hitherto.

12. The question of the relation between comprehensibility and the notion of infinite in Stoicism receives a definitive answer and eliminates current ambiguities. Besides, the relation between the Stoics and Origen on this point is discussed for the first time.

13. It is sustained that before Origen there was no definite view of time established as a *Christian* one. The statements of Athenagoras, Justin and Tatian are taken into account. Some of them have been discussed in the past by others, too. However, it is the first time that the views of Justins on time are taken into consideration and are thoroughly discussed.

14. O. Cullmann's views in *Christ and Time* have been particularly criticized at various points of this work. His contradictions are pointed out. Beyond that though, it is argued that Cullmann's thought and dialectics is essentially a *Platonic* one, namely, this is precisely what it was meant to fight against in the first place. This is a point not made by those who paid some attention to Cullmann's assertions thus far.

15. The characteristics of «teleological» (as contrasted with «anacyclological») time are portrayed and it is sustained and confirmed that Origen's time is a *teleological* one. The pertinent discussion contains the notions of *prophecy* and *kairos* in Origen. It is shown that the notion of *kairos* has a rather different content from that which this is attributed today. It is precisely out of this conception that Origen's time has a character which is not only teleological, but also a *dramatical* one. This is the conclusion of a detailed discussion on the subject.

16. It is proven that Origen's perception of the life of a human being throughout an «aeon» (= a certain cosmic period) has not been grasped hitherto. Certain assertions of H. Crouzel are rebutted.

17. The significance of the Incarnation of Christ for the character of time is pointed out. O. Cullmann (to the extent that he is not wrong or self-contradicting) said nothing new. This had been said by Origen (as his texts demonstrate) long time ago. C. H. Puech's allegations about Gnosticism in Origen turn out, through Origen's own words, to be utterly wrong.

18. The notion of *eternal* is discussed on an entirely new basis. First, the non-scriptural term «eternity» is discarded, since it was never used by



Origen. Besides, this term is misleading since it hinders from grasping the crucial fact that *eternal* is a homonym. As a matter of fact there are three entirely distinct and different existential states to which the notion of eternal could be applied.

19. The term *αἰών* (in contrast to Platonism) has a *spatio-temporal* import. In fact the very term *αἰών* in Origen means *space-time*, perceived as *one* reality. This notion is discussed in relation with these of modern science.

20. An extensive account of the etymology of the term *αἰών* is propounded. Current miscomprehensions of Aristotle's views of the subject are rebutted. Finally, the author propounds another etymology for the term *αἰών*, quite different from that of *αἰών* = *ἀεὶ* (always) + *ὄν* (being) of Plotinus. He asserts that Origen's conception of *αἰών* is actually near the original meaning of the term as found in Homer. Origen's views are compared with those of Plato and Philo. Claims of modern scholars on what they call «eternity» in Origen are thoroughly rebutted, particularly the entirely erroneous assertions of C. Bigg, C. H. Puech, E. de Faye, H. Crouzel, H. Jonas, A. Nygren, A. Harnack, H. Koch, R. Hanson, P. Plass, et al.

21. Against H. Crouzel's claims for the opposite, conclusive evidence is adduced confirming Origen's conviction about the final abolition of evil.

22. It is shown how unfair Augustine's criticism against Origen was on the issue of the final abolition of evil. In fact Augustine was but a mere follower of Origen. For he was proven unable to follow Origen all the way in his inspired perceptions on the question of time. Thus, after a certain point (discussed in this thesis) Augustine falls into employing Neoplatonic conceptions, because he did not grasp how Neoplatonic notions had been radically transformed through Origen's thought.

23. The final destination of movement *in* time and the idea of what time itself is destined to be at the end is discussed. Further, a portrayal of this *end* is offered. In relation to this, the author composes a detailed account of Origen's eschatology, pointing out and canvassing the pertinent crucial notions. On this issue, there is no ancient or modern assertion which is not rebutted out of this exposition. For, in one way or another, scholars think that Origen held a doctrine of the so-called «eternity» of the world; subsequently, they either allege that his eschatology is vague or even that he has no eschatology at all. Against all these, the author demonstrates and authenticates that Origen *does* have eschatological ideas and this is sustained through his own texts. As far as we know, it is the first time that a clear exposition of Origen's eschatology is given. As a matter of fact, it is one of the conclusions of this research that Origen's thought in general is par



excellence a fervently and intensely eschatological one. All these are confirmed through quotations from his own texts, according to the fundamental tactics followed by the author throughout his entire work.

24. On points related to this topic, a vast number of scholars are rebutted. Some of them are: C. Bigg, H. Crouzel, M. Simonetti, H. Chadwick, T. Torrance, A. Nygren, H. Koch, T. Boman, R. Sorabji, E. Molland, G. Butterworth, J. Daniélou, E. de Faye, H. de Lubac, H. C. Puech, R. Hanson, J. Rist, E. Jay, N. Pike, G. Iseminger, E. Stump, N. Kretzmann, A. Prior, N. Wolterstorff, A. H. Armstrong, R. A. Markus, O. Cullmann, G. Florovski, P. Plass, M. Werner, J. Cheek, W. A. Banner, et al.

25. The author points out notions of Origen which are already justified by moderne science. He discusses the fact that the Newtonian world-picture has collapsed after the Theory of Relativity, which for the last eighty five years is constantly vindicated. There are problems arising for pivotal philosophical notions (which are discussed) out of this development. He then explains why Origen's thought is that which will provide solutions to impasses which current «orthodoxy» already has to face out of the new scientific discoveries.

26. The author assesses current simplistic distinctions between «Greek» and «Hebrew» thought expressed in terms of space and time: he discusses the assertions that Greek thought is «spatial», whereas Hebraic thought is «temporal» (C. von Orelli, T. Boman, N. Glatzer, J. Marsh, C. H. Ratschow in part). In view of this analysis, he evinces that Origen's thought is actually beyond and above such distinctions, because this is a thought taking into account the *spatio-temporal* character of the reality. Origen does have an eschatology and this is expounded in detail in the last chapter of this treatise. As a matter of fact, this is the case of an intensely *eschatological* thought and its eschatological orientation is vividly present in the formation of Origen's conception of time, too. His thought is profoundly imbued and determined by notions such as *providence - prophecy - promise - expectation - realization - faith - hope - waiting - fulfilment - end*. A thought earnestly orientated towards a promised, and thus expected, *end*. A thought, however, which clearly visualizes the realization of this end through a *spatio-temporal* view of the world and its perspectives.

27. This work contains two Appendices.

i. Appendix A rebuts assertions made by H. Crouzel and M. Simonetti in the recent French edition of *De Principiis*. They actually take for granted that Origen's thought is a Platonic one and that «eternity of the world» is a doctrine of his theology. This Appendix rebuts these erroneous allegations in



point of their wrong claims about the significance of *κόσμος νοητός* and *κόσμος νοερός* within this thought.

ii. Appendix B deals with an erroneous exposition of the classification of *motion* by Origen made by H. Chadwick and J. Oulton. They did not grasp crucial points of the Alexandrian's tenet on this point. Subsequently, the significant question of the movement of heavenly bodies (implied by Origen in that exposition) eluded them altogether. In providing a correct account of his conception of motion, the author finally reveals that (against current claims for the opposite), after a certain moment of his life onwards, Origen *did not* hold that heavenly bodies are animate objects. How important this is seems from the fact that neither Jerome nor Augustine unequivocally deny that stars have souls, and Thomas Aquinas (ten centuries after Origen) regarded the question as open.

Regarding this distinguished thesis as a whole, it is impressive that the views of a glaringly vast range of authors are boldly discussed. Sometimes the author is perhaps much too combative, even abrasive, in discussing the opinions of secondary authorities.

To deal with such a subject is a difficult task indeed. For it requires a thorough knowledge of at least three fields of philosophy: Firstly, an awareness of the philosophy of Time, the questions related to this, as well as the tremendous bibliography on the issue from antiquity until our day. Secondly, a good command of Greek philosophy, as well as Gnosticism. Thirdly, knowledge of the Patristic tradition: the author deals with Christian fathers until the 8th century, with further references even to Thomas Aquinas.

Dr. P. Tzamalikos was in fact singularly well equipped to undertake such an enterprise. His background on both Science and Philosophy allowed him to treat his topic from a Philosophical, also a Theological, as well a scientific (both Mathematical and Physical) point of view. This is why he has very strongly assessed the relationship between Hellenism and Christianity, buttressing his views with most solid evidence and arguments.

Dealing with an elusive concept such as Time, Dr. P. Tzamalikos shows a unique mastery of the Greek language, while at the same time he is himself remarkably fluent in English. As a matter of fact, he is proven a very articulate philosopher, since he has an impressive ability to communicate complex metaphysical concepts in comprehensible terms. Therefore, both in methodology and argument, this is quite the case of a distinctive and highly original treatise of outstanding merit —a work requiring a very unusual erudition and competence in order to be carried out. Particularly impressive is the depth and scope of the author's knowledge of Classical and Hellenistic





thought, which is in fact the potential that enabled him to assess the controverted relation between Classical Philosophy and Patristic Theology.

It is beyond any doubt that, after this brilliant treatise, nothing will be the same with regard to our knowledge of Origen, as well as the evolution of ideas during the first three centuries of the Christian era and the critical interplay between Hellenism and Christianity during the same period. Crucial aspects concerning the History of Philosophy and Theology of this period will have to be written again, in the light of the discoveries and contributions made by this excellent and remarkable piece of work.

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Ioanna KUÇURADI (ed.): *Philosophy Facing World Problems*. Philosophical Society of Turkey, Ankara, 1986.

Τὸ πρόβλημα τῆς φιλοσοφίας, κατὰ τὶς τελευταῖες δεκαετίες, ἔχει στὴν πραγματικότητα δύο ὄψεις.

Τὸ πρῶτο ἔχει γνωσιολογικὸ χαρακτήρα: Ἦδη ἀπὸ τὸ 1905, ἡ κοσμοεικόνα ποὺ ἴσχυε ἀμετακίνητη ἐπὶ αἰῶνες ἄρχισε νὰ καταρρέει. Ἡ Θεωρία τῆς Σχετικότητος κατὰ τὰ τελευταῖα ὀγδόντα πέντε χρόνια συνεχῶς ἐπιβεβαιώνεται, μὲ συνέπειες οἱ ὁποῖες κατὰ τὸ μέγιστο ποσοστὸ τοὺς δὲν ἔχουν γίνει ἀντιληπτές ἀπὸ τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντες. Ἄν καὶ ἡ περὶ χώρου-χρόνου ἀντίληψη, ποὺ ἴσχυε ἀπὸ τὴν ἐποχὴ τοῦ Παρμενίδη μέχρι σήμερα, κατέρρευσε, οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἐξακολουθοῦν νὰ σκέπτονται ὡς ἐὰν ὁ κόσμος εἶναι ἐκεῖνος ποὺ περιγράφει ἡ Νευτώνεια Φυσικὴ. Γνωρίζουν ὅτι αὐτὸ εἶναι λάθος — καὶ τὸ μαθαίνουν ἀκόμη καλύτερα ἀπὸ τὸ γεγονὸς ὅτι οἱ ἴδιοι ἔχουν ἀπὸ καιρὸ φθάσει σὲ ἀδιέξοδο, ἔτσι ὥστε πολλοὶ νὰ μιλοῦν γιὰ τὸ «τέλος τῆς φιλοσοφίας». Βεβαίως ἡ φιλοσοφία ὄχι μόνον δὲν τελείωσε, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ ὀρισμένες ἀπόψεις εὐρίσκεται μᾶλλον στὶς ἀρχές της. Ἐκεῖνο ποὺ ἔχει τελειώσει εἶναι ἡ φρεναπάτη ὅτι εἶναι δυνατόν νὰ φιλοσοφεῖ κανεὶς μὲ ἄγνοια καὶ ἀγνόηση τῆς φυσικῆς πραγματικότητος, τῆς εἰκόνας τοῦ κόσμου ὅπως τὴν περιγράφουν οἱ τελευταῖες λέξεις τῆς σύγχρονης Φυσικῆς.

Τὸ Μηδεὶς Ἀγεωμέτρητος Εἰσὶτω ἰσχύει γιὰ τὴν Φιλοσοφία σήμερα ὅσο ποτὲ ἄλλοτε. Δὲν πειράζει ποὺ τὰ τεμῆνη της βροῖθουν ἀπὸ ἀγεωμετρήτους. Αὐτοὶ θὰ μιλοῦν ἀπελπισμένοι γιὰ τὸ «τέλος τῆς φιλοσοφίας» καὶ θὰ ἀντιμετωπίζουν τὰ ἀδιέξοδα ποὺ συνεπάγεται μία λανθασμένη ἀντίληψη τῆς πραγματικότητος. Διότι σήμερα λαμβάνει χώραν τὸ ἐπόμενο βῆμα ἀπὸ τὴν ἐποχὴ τῶν Προσωκρατικῶν. Τότε συνετελέσθη ἡ μετάβαση ἀπὸ τὴν μυθολογικὴν στὴν ἔλλογη σύλληψη τῆς «φύσεως». Ἡ εἰκόνα τοῦ κόσμου

