

## THE HISTORICITY OF VALUES

I start from a philosophical-anthropological viewpoint and from the thesis about the changeability and historicity of values, from the happening of values, and finally, from a principled decision on the possibility to create new values in a changed world. The principle of historicity is also valid for the philosophical theory of values, especially for the ethics and the aesthetics, as well as for moral and aesthetic values themselves in the world of life.

Thanks to Hegel, we realize the dialectical character of these two courses of happening, the theoretical and the practical one. In regard to the theoretical thinking, on one hand, the comprehensive theories emerge, such as Marx's or Comte's, and then Taine's and Spencer's, but, at the same time, on the other hand, the theories of specific values emerge, first of all economic, then moral, aesthetic and artistic, athletic etc., in the same way as the axiology emerges as a new philosophic discipline. Traditional values are being called into question, the eternal validity of the christian-classical [Greek] system of moral values is being denied and the way opened for the creation of new values (Marx, Nietzsche). The art becomes conscious of itself and its position in culture begins to change: new artistic values emerge and modern aesthetica is being born (Fiedler, Nietzsche). Art which is becoming conscious of itself changes its position in culture and in the second half of the 19th century, it goes, first of all, through the experience of its autonomy (*l'art pour l'art*), to find itself later on, in our century, in comprehensive theories again, while the institution of culture and the theory of culture is playing the role of a mediator. This holds true not only for the neo-Kantian viewpoint (J. Cohn, G. Simmel, E. Cassirer), but also for the marxist viewpoint, G. Lukacs for instance, who holds to the Hegel's notion of the totality (of epoch and history), but who began his way by establishing the specificity of the aesthetic in the spirit of neo-Kantianism. This also holds for the pragmatic anthropological view of culture by J. Dewey, who views the man in his natural and social environment, and his art in the continuity of the process of culture. In all these theories, in which the authority of culture plays the role of a mediator between different form of cultural activities, the aesthetic values are connected with the moral ones, while the autonomy of either of the two has been denied. J. Cohn speaks of the dialectical development of the position of art



which first had, in the prehistoric life, a *pantonomic* position, and later lived in the *heteronomy*, to confirm its *autonomy* not earlier than in the last century. According to Cohn, the actual position of art in the culture is a *modern pantonomy* which does not forget its autonomous realm of validity and its own specific nature. G. Simmel formulated this in the way that he confirmed the right of *l'art pour l'art*, though not separating it from the right of *l'art pour la vie* and *la vie pour l'art*. For Dewey, the aesthetic experience is always superior to the aesthetic, it represents the manifestation of the life of one culture and can be only viewed in the continuity of a cultural process. In the so-called critical theory, in works of H. Marcuse, T. Adorno et al. for example, the culture also appears as a mediator between its philosophic, scientific form and its political and social practice and devotion, i.e. involvement (engagement). However, aestheticizing the ethos, what Marcuse does, cannot be considered as a true solution of the relation at issue. Wittgenstein's identifying the ethics with the aesthetics (Ethics and Aesthetics are One, *Tractatus*, 6.421) results from an entirely different viewpoint, from the impossibility to found and express these two disciplines, because, in order to solve the philosophic problem of values, we need a viewpoint from without our world: the meaning of values can only be discerned out of the totality of the actual world, which can only be available to us from a viewpoint from without of that world. «The foundation of the morality on purely aesthetic grounds», which Souriau proposes as a new morality, starts from the presumption that all aesthetic facts are creative phenomena. Therefrom, only from the viewpoint of another philosophy of creativity, unwritten as yet, we are able to speak of a new morality as the aesthetic one, but then such a terminology is inadequate and obsolete. For, only with a radical change of the world in which we live, which (i.e. the radical change) Nietzsche denotes as a «breaking off with the tradition» and which means the revolution for Marx, the problem of the relation between the aesthetic and moral value ceases to be a dialectical/axiological problem to become an ontological one, which means the problem of a radical historicity of the world and the man in the world, the problem of the being and the survival of man's in facing the nothingness. Therefrom only a possibility opens for a philosophy of creativeness in an anthropological view, as a task of our time. In relation to the traditional morals and the traditional aesthetics, this is the way beyond the ethics and the aesthetics.

### **On the Temporary Morality and the Open Aesthetics.**

One should write a chronicle and keep protocols on the «happening of



the values» in our time, one should record that which is happening in all spheres of life with all the fundamental values of our moral and aesthetic being, with threatenings impending over these values, but also with a requirement that they, as anthropological constants, are maintained, along with the opposite requirement for new values, as if they could be driven out from our being at will, but also with returning to some primitive authentic values, and again, with a belief in the possibility of creating new values and a new way of life, and of corresponding, specifically new and largely *unknown* values. This *ignorance* (i.e. unknowing) is a matter of principle and relates to the *historicity of values*: marxist historicism speaks of this ignorance. Therefrom the question of the marxist theory of values in general, as a task of our time, is posed. In relation to the aesthetics, which he sees as a science about value, Stefan Morawski speaks about this task (see *Predmet imetoda estetike*, The Object and the Method of Aesthetics, Belgrade, Nolit, 1974). This task relates also to the aesthetics, to practical problems of the existence in our transitional time, to which a «temporary morality» corresponds. This temporariness should be understood by all means in a way different than Descartes defined it in his system as a final offspring on the «tree of sciences», because not an uncompleted system of scientific-philosophical knowledge is at stake here the roots of which lie in the rationalistic metaphysics, but rather the historicity of moral, aesthetic and other values, a new system of moral values, that is standards of taste, a dominant art style et al. are at issue here.

The acuteness of the problem of historicity of values should not be underlined here anymore, though I would cite some live «theoretical» experiences and some examples from the life of the values at this moment. Marx thinks in a historical way and critically asks how are values coming into being at all, where do the systems of values come from, what is this historical logic as an ideo-logic, according to which views of the world appear and disappear. It is possible that Marx's question was preaxiological in principle, and that the axiology appeared in the second half of the past century just because at that time the crisis of fundamental values of the bourgeois way of life broke out. Marx starts from «*one* historical science», the subject of which is the universal historical happening which, as a supporting base, makes possible the emergence of certain systems of values too. The historical way of thinking instructs Marx to speak not of the proletariat, socialism and communism in any other way but in terms of historical categories, which would just mean that they are not necessarily realized as a certain system of values, but that the basic problem is connected with the realization itself, which means with the elimination of the old system of values under certain econo-



mic-social conditions in an open perspective of the democratic release of creative energies of the humankind, though without any historical guarantees and privileges, without any immunization from succumbing to particular interests or from failures in the construction of socialism.

Therefrom: to determine which are these new moral and aesthetic values of our existence remains today an open task of an open aesthetic and a «temporary morality». The postulate of withdrawing to the critical preaxiological position in the spirit of marxist historicism has thus become a condition of the marxist conception of aesthetics and ethics as well. One could speak of the appearance of new moral values, for example, in confrontation with the tolerance, the one-time virtue of religious tolerance which is today becoming a new moral value of the coexistence, with a requirement for a new rational founding of ethics as to planetary consequences of our acts and decisions in all areas of life: in economy, science, politics etc.

One notion forged earlier, in the time of the great German philosophy, ensues from there, but which has acquired today another meaning and its full sense. This is the notion of «creative conscience» which equally relates to both scientific thinking and artistic shaping, to scientific-technical-industrial development with all its consequences, to economic judgment and political decision-making in our time. The «creative conscience» follows from the «responsibility for the whole» (Verantwortung für das Ganze), and not only for the whole of an art product, scientific invention, technical undertaking, economic or political solution, while remaining in these particular spheres of life, but rather for the wholeness of human survival at this moment.

It could be said that art in today's world has also acquired a planetary meaning according to the epochal con-consciousness of artist, according to the work as one moment of a substantially social communication, in an «aesthetic process» which is more comprehensive and important than an individual creation, which points to a new meaning of the collective creation. Accordingly, it can be seen that the restoration of romanticist or individualistic self-consciousness of artist in an aestheticism which finally emerged with the appearance of «absolute poetry», pure music, «pure visibility», absolute director's creation et al. is now not being at issue here. What is at issue, however, is a new creator, a new notion of the work, new artistic and aesthetic values are at issue, but also new moral and intellectual values. New categories and new criteria that the aesthetics is yet to forge are at issue. The way of a new foundation of the aesthetics as a solution to the actual crisis of aesthetic and artistic values opens here from a general poetical view or the general theory





of creation. We will try below to clarify an aesthetic-ethic category which acquires a new epochal content.

### On the Creative Conscience.

The word «conscience» in the meaning of the «moral conscience» represents its narrower and later meaning, which is usually taken as the only one, so that its original and wider meaning is thus being lost. We speak here of the «creative conscience» just in the wider meaning of the term and notion «conscience». In the oldest known use of the word «conscience» in our tradition, in Democritus' frg. 297 D, the ancient Greek *syneidesis* does not have a special ethical meaning, which appears only in the Hellenistic era, to be maintained then in the Christian epoch, all the way to the new age. Despite the polysemy of the entire fragmentary works of pre-Socratics, from the mentioned Democritus word, however, a wider meaning of the «conscience» could be discerned, to which its etymology points in a substantial accordance with the Latin *conscientia*, but also with modern national terms, with the German *Gewissen*, with our [i.e. Serbo-Croatian] *savest*). Here, from the beginning and everywhere, the same prefix syn-, con-, cum-, sa- is found, while the basic word in the beginning and later on was *knowledge* [i.e. *znanje* in Serbo-Croatian], and thus «conscience» is the same as con-science (i.e. with-knowledge or con-knowledge) [i.e. *sa-znanje* in Serbo-Croatian], knowledge-of-oneself [*znanje-o-samon-sebi*], with-consciousness or con-consciousness [*sa-svest*], self-consciousness [*samo-svest*].

A wider non-aesthetic and non-theological meaning of the word «conscience» was clearly exposed by Wilhelm Perpeet in his book *The Being of Art and the Method of the Philosophy of Art* (*Das Sein der Kunst und die kunstphilosophische Methode*), Alber, Freiburg-Munich, 1970, especially p. 206 ff). We can find an interesting and important information there about how in the early 18th century the word «conscience» had the same meaning as the «taste». Perpeet points to the German classical philosophy, where in the works of Fichte, Hegel, and Schopenhauer as well, we first encounter the term the «creative conscience» (*schopferisches Gewissen*). Eventually, Perpeet points to today's philosophical use of the word «conscience», especially in the early works of Heidegger. In accordance with views of Erich Rothacker, and, especially, with his anthropological philosophy of culture, Perpeet understands the conscience as a «fundamental cultural notion» as a «motive which is beyond all cultural works». This is why it would be justifiable to speak not only of a moral, but also of an artistic, political or scientific conscience. Perpeet, also, refers to Windelband, according to whom «for a nature cultural





man there isn't only a moral conscience, but the logical and aesthetical one as well».

What is then the «creative conscience?» What does the term and the notion «conscience» mean from the viewpoint of the philosophy of art? The basic definitions of «creative conscience», that Perpeet determines by on the basis of his analysis, are obtained through the consideration of art in general, of art written with capital A, from art which is ontologically-anthropologically understood, by starting from the human being who, in his essence, remains that which he is in all his historical modifications and in all changes of art. In Perpeet's work, nothing is changed in his basic philosophical position nor in his definition of the «creative conscience» by the subreptitious narrowing of the meaning of art to the visual art. Perpeet deems that the «source of art» should be found in a well understood «creative conscience» as a «momentaneous self-certainty» of the artist while shaping his/her work. In contrast «temporality, uncertainty, nonindependence and fragmentariness of our life», artist makes a decision in the «creative moment» about the work which bears the qualities of «absolutness, uncoditionality, self-certainty, inner necessity, centeredness in oneself», all this meaning: as Perpeet assumes it: the qualities of the «style».

However, in those definitions of «creative conscience» Perpeet does not take up the development of art in our century, the crisis of contemporary art, the avant-garde art, the unique phenomena of modern art and the new aesthetic experience, which, at this moment, has raised the question of fundamental categories of the traditional aesthetics. So, today we doubt not only the absoluteness of an art work, with which, according to Perpeet, the «creative conscience» of artist is connected, but also the work itself as such, that is the traditional understanding of this work which «blessedly rests in peace in its very self». If an absolute work is called into question, that, consequently, the «being of art» in the traditional understanding is also called into question, and ultimately, the «creative conscience» of artist.

This is why the question of «creative conscience» of artist cannot be considered in principle solely as if there were an always the same being of art and a same situation of artist, as Perpeet assumes it, but also as a *historious question*, which, today, means: having in view the situation of today's art in a changed world, having in view the experience of the art [which is] contemporary to us, which as the art of a transitional time should be differentiated from the phenomenon of some organic epoch in the history of art. What is at issue here is not a historism or a relativism in the understanding of art, but the essence of art itself in relation to its notion and being that have been in use so far.



As to its source, the «being of art» could be understood from a «fortunate self-certainty» of artist, according to Perpeet's definition of the «creative conscience», but under the presumption of nonexistence of a doubt in the «being of art itself», or, according to Nietzsche, under the presumption of a «great confidence» (grosses Vertrauen) in the traditional art, as the eternal one. However, if right this being of art were uncertain in our time, than the phenomenon of «fortunate self-certainty», that is «creative conscience» of artist cannot be the same here as in other organic epochs of the evolution of art. And this is in what the historicity of the artistic conscience does lie. In taking into account the art experience of our time and in recognizing the historicity of «creative conscience» not only that the existence of this phenomenon in the art [which is] contemporary to us that is not called into question, but, on the contrary, it has now become expressed with an even greater strength and acquired a bigger importance. It could be said that in our transitional time everything is in a critical situation and everything is called into question, everything except the very notion of or the word art, so that the «creative conscience» of artist should be also active in regard to the basic decision of artist on what is the art, what is the work [of art], who is artist, what is the role of the viewer (audience) etc. Thus, out of the feeling of his/her being endangered and his/her uncertain position in the world in which s/he lives, today's artist develops an epochal con-consciousness, reflecting his/her own position, as well as the meaning of his/her devotion in his/her art, and all this in such a humankind which itself calls itself into question. This is how s/he practices his/her «creative conscience».

Therefrom the art today is not reduced to an absolute work as to an autonomous reality, not even to the work itself, which is taken as one moment of the «aesthetic process», in the art as an essentially social communication (S. J. Schmidt), or else, it «dis-acts» (Ph. Minguet). By an artistic act, that is a decision of artist on the being of art, a decision is made at the same time on the being of man, out of the «responsibility for the whole» and, in an artistic way, on the survival of the humankind, which is for the first time directly exposed to the possibility of self-destruction. The way to this has lead from a creative subject, from the artist who does not feel nor recognize any binding norm, except the one imposed on him/herself by him/herself, and which s/he asks to be the recognized by the contemporary world. That which binds the con-temporary artist today, which leads him/herself from his/her creative Me towards the planetary We is just his/her epochal con-consciousness, which is expressed in his/her «creative conscience», as the decision on how the solution to the puzzle of art in today's world is contained in the idea





and the ideal of art which s/he produces. Today's artist who was in his/her work freed first from everything which was nonartistic, since the «art cannot be found on any other way but on the way of art itself» (C. Fiedler), and who was, then, in the world of art itself, freed from the dominant style and taste, from existing schools, tendencies and practices, and who knew of nothing else but of the self-determination out of the freedom, is now realizing that s/he cannot survive with his/her big Me like a romanticist artist could, and feels an obligation and co-responsibility for the destiny of art and the destiny of humankind, and, with every part of him/herself, makes a decision on *how* and *why* the art could exist today.

The artistic conscience is thus expressed as the artist's decision on the being of art, which also means the decision on the being of man and the being in general. «The survival (Dasein) is the existing which appears not only among the other existing ones, but it is also ontically conspicuously existing by the fact that in its own self it cares about the being itself (Sein)» (Heidegger, *Sein u. Zeit*, S. 12). Since the humankind in our time does not find any Archimedean point in its thinking, that is, in regard to philosophy, it rejects any metaphysical foundation, and since such a point can only be found in a «creative conscience» i.e. in the decision by a creative subject on the being of art and the being in general, thus a way opens towards the «responsibility for the whole», towards the co-responsibility and con-consciousness, towards sym-path<sup>y</sup> [co-feeling] with other existing ones and with the planetary We. From the artistic con-science towards the self-consciousness, while the self-consciousness cannot be interpreted as according to some theory, there is a way leading towards the recognition of another consciousness and the other, in order critically to attain the social We in the reflective character of art, which takes its own self as the subject or the theme of the artistic thinking and attitude, by calling its own self into question and making the decision on the being of art in general.

An inherent *criticalness* of contemporary art follows from the artistic conscience as self-knowledge of artist, which is in an uncertain position between the traditional notion of art, from which it takes a distance, and the openness towards that which the art could be, which it could only be as authentic today, and according to the *belief* of that artist who lives at the level of his/her time. The *belief* of artist in art which only s/he her/himself according to his/her creative conscience can approve of, which does not exist yet, but which is the only one which can be as to the strength of his/her belief, is substantially connected with his/her openness towards the future in the mentioned sense of the word. This belief is strongly expressed at the end





of a period of the history of art and the world history, when a new epoch is about to begin, when the artist does not believe in an art which would be realistically possible, though only it would not be a real one, but s/he rather believes in art which does not exist as yet, not even as a possibility.

Here we support the view on an indispensable creative conscience in transitional times in the history of art, when one way of artistic production is being exhausted and a new beginning is about to come. At that time, from an artist's viewpoint, one cannot speak about a «fortunate self-certainty» anymore, but rather about a split in the artistic consciousness, about an increased self-consciousness and creative conscience on a historical boundary when *new values are being created*. Therefrom, the creation of new values would not be possible without an artistic conscience as creative consciousness, of which both Marx and Nietzsche testify.

The «creative conscience» of individual artist should be recognized in the life of contemporary art with the tension and strength which are hard to be found in some other time. The time in which the theory of the creativeness acquires a crucial importance, in which artists themselves are tackling the theory of their art, and their theoretical comment could be understood as one dimension of their work (A. Gehlen), the time in which the word and notion «engagement» appears in art reveals a state of crisis, in which a real basis for the creative devotion in art is missing. Such an actual state of things points to a general crisis of the foundations for the survival of humankind, to a state of *hovering*, as some artists and thinkers of today would speak, in an unusual accordance with each other. Therefrom a need for a new notion of reality and for a *dialectics* without casting any metaphysical anchor, because «the reality is neither an objective world given beforehand nor it is grounded on the establishment of the subject. The reality is the connectedness of happenings, in which the subject and the object are mutually intertwined in the way of their mutual conditionality... Such a happening is the process whose basic trait is *dialectics*. (Walter Schulz, *Philosophie in der veränderten Welt*, Neske Verl., Pfullingen, 1972, S. 841).

The modern notion of dialectics originates from Hegel. However, the Hegel's theory of conscience, for our exposition, has also an actual and important meaning. Namely, Hegel knew that the conscience is able of cheating (the conscience in an ethical sense), because, according to him, the «conscientious action» should include all the accidental circumstances of one reality, which it can never achieve. Therefrom, for Hegel, Kant's moral self-definition cannot be an absolute basis for the decision-making which would guarantee that the conscience cannot be cheated. In contrast to the action, which is not



possible unless is conjunction with its opposition and which always relates to something absolutely different as the negative of the consciousness, in Hegel's view the only knowledge which relates to its own self makes the «conscientious action» possible as a con-science [i.e. with-knowledge, con-knowledge, or sa-znanje in Serbo-Croatian], and con-consciousness. Therefrom, art, finally, is possible only as a con-conscious action, which means as modern art.

### The Meaning of the Aesthetic Morality.

Etienne Souriau dedicated his last work, unexpectedly as it seems, to the old question of the relation between the ethics and the aesthetics and exposed the «morality on purely aesthetical grounds» as a new morality which corresponds to our times. However, no matter how we should apprehend this *aesthetic* morality, it is the *morality* in which, after all, Souriau is interested in his late turning to this seemingly obsolete subject matter. Nevertheless, behind the traditional terminology which Souriau uses when speaking about the Beautiful, which should take the place of the exhausted Good now, about the Sublime et al., there are new values which Souriau perceives correctly in the life of the humankind of our epoch, together with new tasks before our century and the next one. Therefore, one should understand well the standpoint from which Souriau gets into his exposition of the «morality on purely aesthetic grounds», since, basically, this is not a moralistic standpoint but rather the standpoint of a philosophy of creativity or «general poetics» (la poétique générale), according to the term which was forged by René Passeron, pursuing the path of Valéry. Within the framework of this philosophy one could imagine a systematic task of deducing the morality which is yet to be instituted, the moral values which are yet to be created, a task which differs obviously from the exposition of any existing (positive) morality or any known system of moral values, similarly to the difference that exists between some science about art which is always historical, because for it the art already exists as the world of art works, as a historically given art, and some special form of poetics as the science on that art which is yet to be constituted, on an art work which is yet to be established or founded. The general theoretical basis of the new aesthetic morality which is exposed by Souriau (in his work *La couronne d'herbes*, Esquisse d'une morale sur des bases purement esthétiques, 10/18, Nr 930, Union générale d'éditions, Paris 1975) could be formulated, in brief, in the following manner. Souriau assumes that all aesthetic facts are creative, that they are related to the spiritual foundation or constitution (instauration), and since likewise the morality, which is yet to be constituted, can also be found on the way of finding out and creating, the result



therefrom is that this new morality should not be but an aesthetic morality.

Therefore, the morality which already exists is not issue here —although Souriau knows that aesthetic motivations are found in the works of «moralists and practitioners in all times» and that «each ethics has some aesthetic appearance (facies) (p. 8)— but rather a morality which is yet to be constituted. This argument, in the words of Souriau himself, goes as follows: «Each creative (founding, instaurating) step is related to the art; an aesthetic fact represents the inner wisdom of this creative (instaurating) step. The morality which is to be constituted demonstrates the creative (instaurative) procedure, therefore an aesthetic procedure» (p. 16). Therefrom the new morality which is yet to be formally, that is essentially, created is an aesthetic morality. Souriau, of course, knows of the criticism and difficulties with which the aesthetic morality is faced in the traditional understanding, and he is preoccupied with these difficulties particularly in order to demonstrate the eliminativeness of all counter-authorities for his «morality on purely aesthetic grounds». He briefly discusses and invalidates all these counter-reasons, and exposes his «morality on purely aesthetic grounds», starting from his fundamental apprehension that not only that moral values in our epoch have changed, but that new values have also appeared of which the traditional morality does not know. Therefrom a thesis results on the principled possibility of the emergence of new moral values in the happening of values from the viewpoint of the *historicity of values*, the viewpoint which Souriau advocates in such a substantial accordance with Nietzsche and Marx, although without a direct relation towards these thinkers, crucially significant for our epoch. This accordance is important, for it speaks of a good con-temporaneity of the Souriau's examination of the new morality which he calls, even though in the old fashion, the aesthetic morality. In this way Souriau first examines the aesthetic morality in an individual, then in interpersonal relationships, and finally in collectives and social groups, to come thus to the question of the «society of free people which is to be created», of the future humankind and future man as a «creature more beautiful, more noble and more sublime than the man of the times past and present». If one would say of this idea to be a dream, Souriau would accept this word, adding that there is a firm decision for this dream to be realised, «that the man of the future can be of more value than the man of today, such a larva» (pp. 417-418). This is why Souriau calls: «Poets, on board (à vos bords)!».

Although Souriau holds to some determined line of the history of philosophy, or some known models of philosophical thinking, he is still moving through this history with a reliable knowledge, and what's more, with a lucid



insight he achieved results which are in accordance with some big systematic concepts. However, even in exposing his standpoint, Souriau does not hold to a strictly logical line and enclosed systematics; he speaks the language of a researcher who is facing new phenomena in the moral life, with newly generated ethic principles. As to the relatedness of his understandings on the new morality as an aesthetic morality to some great ethical concepts (in a new philosophical attire), we already pointed to Marx and Nietzsche, although this relatedness has more to do with a common epochal foundation and the historical way of thinking, and not so much with that concrete philosophical attitude and endeavor, or a philosophical position. The very name «aesthetic morality», which Souriau gave its new morality, could not be as adequate for Marx nor for Nietzsche, though, of course, the name is not the only problem at issue here. In fact, the morality of which Souriau speaks is not an aesthetic morality as to any acceptable meaning of the term and the notion «aesthetic», but it is rather a morality of the creative human existence, the morality of human being as a creative person, the morality which is at work in the heuristic situation of a scientist or in the creative position of an artist, the morality which is laid in the foundation of any creative advancement of human life, everywhere where the «logic of fantasy» is at work. Therefrom, this morality cannot be systematically expressed in any other way than in an «open system», in the outline of future morality, the morality of human being who will outgrow the human being of past times, and in the society of free people who are yet to be created.

This is how Souriau, as to the historicity of his thinking on morality, is formally in accordance with Marx and Nietzsche. He starts from the philosophical notion of human being as a creative being, though he does not deduce this notion systematically, but takes it rather as it was already assured, and then he asks his investigative question what would be the morality which would correspond to human being as creative being. This question contains in itself the hypothesis which looks beforehand to be fertile, since one can expect, and with good reasons, that the moral position of human being as creative person differs from the position of human being who only maintains his own life, of human being as (in a wider sense of the word) conservative being, for whom some eternal morality, or some suprahistorical logic of moral values is valid. Souriau does not speak uniquely of the historicity of moral values, but he perceives well the actual changes of these values, when old systems of values are losing in their strength or are completely disappearing. He does not speak of our time and of the new age, nor he formally interprets the events of this time in the spirit of a historical way of thinking;





but for that reason though he deeply sympathizes with our time, and therefore his conclusions are in accordance with the historical way of thinking. Thus, Souriau does not speak of the metaphysics of subjectivity of the new age, when man, for the first time as a creative person (producer) in his substantial subjectivity, is faced with nothingness without having any grounds whatsoever in some absolute, so that his creative being can only now be, so to say, understood (in previous epochs the human survival could have not been even imagined without a metaphysical foundation in an absolute), but this is the reason why he consequently and sharp-wittedly exposes the moral aspect of this entire situation as a «morality on purely aesthetic grounds».

The necessity for an ontological foundation of this «aesthetic morality» is therefore understandable, since in this way only such a standpoint could be protected from both the aesthetization of morality and of the moralizing in the sphere of aesthetics. If Souriau does not deduce but only assumes the notion of human being as creative being, he systematically deduces instead the notion of the work [of art] as something which should be created and which characterizes human being in a substantial manner. In spite of the crisis of the traditional notion of the «work» in today's aesthetics, Souriau therefore starts from the necessity of the work, because without it one cannot think of the creative man's attitude and thus of his «aesthetic morality».

The «morality on purely aesthetic grounds» is nothing else than the morality of the man's creative being.

Milan DOMRYEURIC

## Ο ΙΣΤΟΡΙΚΙΣΜΟΣ ΤΩΝ ΑΞΙΩΝ

### Περίληψη

Ἡ μελέτη αὐτὴ ἔχει ὡς ἀφετηρία φιλοσοφικὴ καὶ ἀνθρωπολογικὴ διάσταση. Ἀντικείμενό της εἶναι ὁ ἱστορικισμὸς τῶν ἀξιῶν καὶ στόχος της ἡ διερεύνηση τῆς δυνατότητας δημιουργίας νέων ἀξιῶν. Εἰδικότερα, ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ ἱστορικισμοῦ τῶν ἀξιῶν ἰσχύει τόσο ὅσο ἀφορᾷ τὴ θεωρητικὴ-φιλοσοφικὴ ἀντιμετώπιση τῶν ἀξιῶν ὅσο καὶ στὴν πρακτικὴ. Κατὰ συνέπεια ἐρευνᾶται γενικῶς ἡ ἀμφισβήτηση καὶ ἡ κρίση τῶν ἀποκαλουμένων παραδοσιακῶν ἀξιῶν, ἡ ὁποία σημειώθηκε κυρίως κατὰ τὸ δεύτερο ἡμισυ τοῦ 19ου αἰῶνος, ὁπότε καὶ προέκυψε ὡς ἀνεξάρτητος θεωρητικὸς κλάδος ἡ Ἀξιολογία. Παράλληλα ἐρευνᾶται ὁ ρόλος τῆς Τέχνης στὴ συνειδητοποίηση τῆς ἀλλαγῆς τῶν ἀξιῶν καθὼς καὶ ὁ ρόλος τῆς συνειδήσεως, ὑπὸ τὴν εὐρύτερη ἔννοιά της, αὐτὴν τῆς δημιουργικῆς συνειδήσεως, ὅπως κυρίως





όριοθετείται υπό τὸ πρίσμα τῆς Φιλοσοφίας, τῆς Τέχνης καὶ συγχρόνως καταδεικνύεται ἡ συνάφεια μεταξὺ τῆς συνειδήσεως αὐτῆς καὶ τῆς δημιουργίας νέων ἀξιῶν. Τέλος, ἐπιχειρεῖται ἡ περιγραφή τοῦ νοήματος τῆς « Αἰσθητικῆς Ἠθικῆς » ὡς μιᾶς σύγχρονης Ἠθικῆς, θεμελιωμένης ἐπάνω σὲ καθαρὰ αἰσθητικὴ βάση, ὅπως γιὰ παράδειγμα ἀναλύεται ἀπὸ τὸν E. Souriau.

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Ἑλλ. μετάφραση: Ἄννα Ἀραβαντινοῦ-Μπουρλογιάννη

