THE "NEW WAY OF IDEAS": PLATO, LOCKE, AND THEIR ROMANTIC READERS

"They will take the city and the characters of men, as they might a tablet, and first wipe it clean — no easy task. But at any rate you know that this would be their first point of difference from ordinary reformers, that they would refuse to take in hand either individual or state or to legislate before they either received a clean slate or themselves made it clean".

PLATO, *Republic*

"Again the word idea seems to be commonly taken in a very loose sense, even by Mr Locke himself, as standing for any of our Perceptions, our sensations & Passions, as well as Thoughts... By *Ideas* Plato, notwithstanding his fantastic expressions respecting them, meant what Mr Locke calls the original Faculties & Tendencies of the mind, the internal Organs, as it were, and *Laws* of human Thinking: and the word should be translated *Moulds* and not *Forms*".

S.T. COLERIDGE, *Collected Letters*

A fundamental issue in our understanding of the Enlightenment's conceptual presuppositions, not only for themselves but as they filtered into the mind of the Romantics, is the "new way of ideas" introduced into the intellectual climate of the age. The word *ἰδέα*, I think, together with *νοῦς, λόγος, ἔρως, ψυχή,* and *φύσις*, may be taken to constitute a term whose investigation marks the origin and history of consciousness (and consciousness of histortу) in our culture. Although certainly not invented by Plato[1], it was endorsed by him and was accorded the highest ontological status as the pattern

1. J.L. MACKIE, pointing out that the "Greek language before Plato made little use of abstract nouns", emphasizes that such "universals" were coined by Plato "for his own philosophical purposes", and that even in the early dialogues "the Forms were often introduced by odd circumlocutions"; his conclusion being that "philosophical theory on the whole precedes the linguistic phenomenon from which it is sometimes believed to have arisen" (*Problems from Locke*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976, 126).

of Being, or "structure of the real", which is copied or "mirrored" in the sensible world. Coleridge's tracing of the genealogy of the word is indicative both of the central position the term holds in the unfolding of Western philosophy (and literature), as well as the interest of the Romantics in its signification: "The word *ἰδέα*, in its original sense as used by Pindar, Aristophanes, and in the *Gospel* of St. Matthew, represented the visual abstraction of a distant object, when we see the whole without distinguishing its parts. Plato adopted it as a technical term, and as the antithesis to *εἴδωλα*, or sensuous images; the transient and perishable emblems, or mental words, of ideas, "whereas the "ideas themselves he considered as mysterious powers, living, seminal, formative, and exempt from time"; subsequently, Coleridge continues his exposition, "the word became the property of the Platonic school". Restricting the term to its regional usage, he then remarks, that: "Our English writers to the end of Charles 2nd's reign, or somewhat later, employed it either in the original sense, or platonically, or in a sense nearly correspondent to our present use of the substantive, Ideal, always however opposing it, more or less, to image, whether of present or absent objects"[2].

Plato's *ἰδέα/εἶδος* as the archetypal pattern of things, having a separate ontological existence and "presence", in its descent down the ages was transformed first by Aristotle into the form of the object in the mind, since "it is not the stone which is present in the soul but its form"[3]. For the Christian theologians, as for example St. Thomas following very much in the tradition of Aristotle, the "intellect knows bodies through immaterial and intelligible species which are derived from things, not from separate forms"[4]. Descartes, "as is well know, intentionally took an old philosophical term, idea, and put it to a new use";[5] what Descartes actually does, is to make the "idea" not the object of *νόησις* in a metempirical mental state, but the content of mind in its discursive and perceptual functions. In his own phrasing, "*Idea* is a word by which I understand the form of any thought, that form by the immediate awareness of which I am conscious of the said thought"[6]. The Cartesian "ob-

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2. *Biographia Literaria*, ed. J. Shawcross, 2 vols (1907; 1954, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 1, 69, N.

3. "On the Soul", III, 7, 431 b/30, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941).

4. John W. YOLTON, "Ideas and Knowledge in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy", *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 13 (1975) 148.

5. Robert MCRAE, "Idea as a Philosophical Term in the Seventeenth Century", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 26 (1965) 175.

6. Quoted in MCRAE, "Idea as a Philosophical Term in the Seventeenth Century", 182.

jective reality" of the "idea" is obviously not Plato's transcendent *χωριστὸς τόπος*, but refers to the independent existence of the "thing" represented in thought. The content of the term "idea" as an object of the understanding might be described as a common denominator underlying the otherwise polymorphic cultural phase of the Age of Reason. Yet this specific meaning, though predominant in England, is only one of the three main interpretations of "idea" which "can be found among Descartes' successors, and all of which find expression in the writtings of Descartes himeself"; the three versions being that of idea as *object* (Locke, Berkeley), idea as *act* (Spinoza), and idea as *disposition* (Leibniz)[7].

This brief survey of rival notions of the term "idea", in both a diachronic and synchronic dimension, can only marginally indicate how Locke's adoption of a word already loaded with a variety of controversial significations, must have been at once inevitable and problematic. Inevitable, because, working within a long tradition which had "wrestled" with Plato's "idea", Locke apparently felt that he had to build his own premises of a psychological approach to the questions of philosophy by first "deconstructing" the false assumptions of a generation, and past generations, that upheld the doctrine of the "idea" as an ontological entity, whether outside God or within the divine Mind. Locke himself recognized the need to justify his usage of the term over which so much contention had been waged; besides, the challenge to de-ontologize and psychologize what appears to be the cherished notion of philosophical "realists", was apparently too strong for him to resist: "I must here in the Entrance beg pardon of my Reader, for the frequent use of the Word *Idea*, which he will find in the following Treatise. It being that Term, which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by *Phantasm*, *Notion*, *Species*, or whatever it is, which the Mind can be employ'd about in thinking"[8].

Locke's new way of treating *idea* as a "proxy" for *thing* is a significant deviation from Plato's contention that mind comes to know the "idea" only and to the extent that it turns its attention away from "thing". And on the basis of the premise that, "ideas are themselves" Locke holds, signs of things, or of the reality with which the mind in its thinking is concerned[9]. Locke's

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7. *Ibid.*, 175.

8. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (1975; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) I, i, 8.

9. James GIBSON, *Locke's Theory of Knowledge and its Historical Relations* (1917; Cambridge, University Press, 1931), 12.

conception of *idea* as a *sign* of *thing*[10] is a thorough inversion of Plato's model of *thing* being a *sign* or rather *copy* (denoting a closer representational correspondence) of *Idea*. In translating Platonic ontology into psychology, Locke not only followed the trend of his time, which, critical of the meaphysical certainties of tradition, focused its interest on mental events, but exemplified a tendency which, while alienating him from the Platonic dogma, indicated an affinity to Plato's sceptical method; although subverting Plato's a priori principles, Locke, I believe, used some of the Platonic tactics in his polemic against "given" authority. The difference between the two, however, remains that whereas Plato in his dialogic "dramas" began with doubt to reach (an admittebly often ambivalent) truth, empirical scepticism remained engulfed in doubt, unable or unwilling to secure any degree of epistemological (and consequently metaphysical) assurance for the human mind.

One might contend that Plato is only a nominal object of attack in Locke's argumentation against innate ideas[11], since the Platonic advocation of *a priori knowledge*, the soul's acquaintance with the Ideas before birth (which entirely relies on a theory of pre-existence), is fairly distant from the notion of *innate ideas*, i.e. ideas (or Reason) implanted, as it were, by God in man's soul upon his birth, independent from the senses; this notion is a basic tenet of what has come to be known as Platonic theology, resulting from the "mixing" of Platonism and Cristianity. Consequently, the doctrine of *innate ideas*, which in its turn may be considered a translation into psychological terms of the theological creed of ideas existing in the mind or God, is only a "kind" of Platonism —and not a very orthodox one— since it does not rely on "intimations of immortality"[12] from recollection, which forms the cornerstone of Plato's theory of Ideas. Locke's criticism centres upon the Platonic

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10. Discussing the effect on poetics brought about by Locke's revolutionary epistemology, Ernest L. TUVESON emphasizes its contribution to the production of "many characteristic features of the romantic" (*The Imagination as a Means of Grace: Locke and the Aesthetics of Romanticism*, 1960; New York: Gordian Press, 1974, 72-73).

11. Stating that the problem which "has puzzled (and still puzzles) students of Locke, is the precise identity of his opponents", Isaiah BERLIN locates the three most likely "enemies" in Descartes, the Cambridge Platonists, and particulary those "surviving followers of Scholasticism" (some of which attributed the theory of innate knowledge to Plato); Locke's intention, he notes, was not epistemological only, but mainly theological and political, proclaiming the "primacy of individual judgment against authority and dogma" (*The Age of Enligtenment: The Eighteenth Century Philosophers*, 1956; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979, 39).

12. The allusion is to Wordsworth's "Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood", *Poetical Works*, ed. Thomas Hutchinson, rev. edn. Ernest de Selincourt (1904; 1936; Oxford: Oxford University Pres, 1973).

theologians' view of ideas as "stamped" on the soul of man by God upon its coming into the world[13]. It is interesting to note that Locke's preclusion of the existence of "innate principles", or *innate ideas* as he calls them elsewhere, does not cover the whole range of psychic content, which is somehow allowed to operate according to what he calls "inherent faculties", namely the *Will* and *Understanding*. Yet these faculties being not "distinct Beings" but "powers" exercized and controlled by mind[14], they fail to gain access to the metempirical *substratum*, or support, of those *Ideas* we do know", of which we only have "an uncertain supposition of we know not what"; Locke declares, "I confess, there is another *Idea*, which would be of general use for Mankind to have, as it is of general talk as if they had it; and that is the *Idea of Substance*, which we neither have, nor can have, by *Sensation* or Reflection"[15]. A.D. Nuttall contends that, there are "signs that Locke had more of the Platonist in his temperament than is usually recognized", exemplifying that this "appears most strongly in his strange distinction between real and nominal essences"[16].

The "unknowability" of the reality of which "ideas" or "inner images" are signs, is one of the basic, and most deeply unsettling, premises of Locke's empiricism, sustaining that, "the simple *Ideas* we receive from Sensation and Reflection, are the Boundaries of our Thoughts; beyond which, the Mind, whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor can it make any discoveries, when it would prie into the Nature and hidden Causes of those *Ideas*"[17]. Here Plato, I believe, would partly agree with the theory that, we cannot penetrate below the sensible surfaces of things to "the simple *Idea* of naked matter", and particulary with Locke's thesis that the "underlying substance" is beyond the reach of human understanding. Plato would definitely support the proposition that "naked matter" cannot be known, but he would probably add, as he has done, that knowledge of the material, "errant cause" is not knowledge in the first place; besides, it is not worth seeking it for itself but only for the sake of the "divine cause" or for phenomenal things. The undesirability or futility of focusing a cognitive pursuit on the "second" principle of creation appears in a number of dialogues, and most prominently in the *Timaeus* (68 e - 69 a);[18] nevertheless, although recognizing his material cause as basically beyond cognition, Plato makes a tentative

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13. *Essay*, I, ii, 2.

14. *Ibid.*, II, xxi, 17-18.

15. *Ibid.*, I, iv, 18.

16. *A Common Sky: Philosophy and the Literary Imagination* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1974), 17.

17. *Essay*, II, xxiii, 29.

18. All references to the Platonic text are to *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

movement towards difining it, even in negative terms (51 a - 52 b). In the light of the above discussion, Nuttall's comment that, "for Locke, no less than Plato, ultimate reality is elusive, transcendent, unperceivable", takes on an ambiguity somehow captured in the critic's comment that, "there is a delicious irony here, for Locke has found his way to this deeply counter-intuitive doctrine by the most innocent of paths — that of the plain, scientific Englishman"[19]. If Plato guarantees knowledge of reality (at least the *one* of his *two* first principles), this cannot obviously be said of Locke's *one and only* cause of phenomena matter. This point is made clear by Nuttall, who, in modifying somewhat his earlier proposition that Locke is a "covert Platonist", admits that "in a way Locke out-Plato's Plato; for although Plato's forms inhabit their proper heaven they are less completely inaccessible than Locke's reality"[20]. The relation of the Lockean to the Platonic "idea" might be seen as one of reduction and internalization; whereas Plato refers to a non-sensible, self-existent *pattern*, prior to its "imprinting" on matter, apprehended by intuitive reason, Locke attributes ideality to the "impression" on the mind made by an external physical object, apprehended by sense. As Armstrong tells us, in "Locke's doctrine, *ideas* mediate between the two supposed worlds of mind and matter since they are caused by external matter, and are themselves the content of mind"; he points out the actually dual nature of Lockean "ideas" which "derive their *reality* or validity from their external cause, matter, while their actual character or nature is that of mind"[21].

What is worth noticing, I believe, is that the central "happening" in the act of awareness (I do not say "knowledge" because "cognition" for Plato differs from mere consciousness of externality), present in both the Platonic and Lockean epistemological language, is that of "reflection", or "imprinting", or "stamping", or "mirroring", with the difference of inverted poles of action, thus revealing Locke as working still within the convention of Platonic metaphysics and rhetoric, using the Platonic code to subvert the Platonic binary opposition, while he simply reverses it. So it is fairly obvious, I think, that, if "the Platonic Dogma was defunct, the language of the Dogma survived"[22], determining and conditioning subsequent utterances, by providing the root metaphors around which "played" the inquiring minds of later eras. And it would probably not be an exaggeration to consider Locke's posi-

19. *A Common Sky*, 16.

20. *Ibid.*, 19.

21. Robert L. ARMSTRONG, "Cambridge Platonists and Locke on Innate Ideas", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 30 (1969) 193. See also Robert L. ARMSTRONG, *Metaphysics and British Empiricism* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), 103.

22. Thomas E. WEBB, *The Intellectualism of Locke* (1857; New York: Burt Franklin, 1973), 51.

tion in British philosophy as, "the analogue to Plato, in the epoch of his life, in personal endowments, in width of experience, and in dispassionate statement of conflicting intuitions"[23].

By adopting a "destructive" stance in his polemic against the given interpretations of the "real", Locke's attitude not only functions as an equivalent to Plato's *ἀπορία* and dialectical *ἔλεγχος*, but also, at times, uncovers certain subsequent fallacies and misrepresentations of the original thought of the Greek philosopher, in the tradition that stems from him and calls itself "Platonic". For Locke's attack upon "innate" universal principles endowed to man by God or spirit as the most significant factors in the production of knowledge, and particularly his criticism of "non-contradiction" as one of the speculative summits ammong these principles, shows Lockean epistemology very much in line with the Platonic[24] though appearing to sustain it. One of Locke's most memorable pronouncements, exemplifying his criticism of established principles of logic is, I think, his questioning of the unshakable premise of "to be or not to be", thus revolutionizing traditional metaphysics and ethics: "*Tis impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*, which of all others I think have the most allow'd Title to innate. These have so settled a Reputation of Maxims universally received that 'twill, no doubt, be thought strange, if any one should seem to question it. But yet I take liberty to say, that these Propositions are so far from having an universal Assent, that there are a Great Part of Mankind, to whom they are not so much as known"[25]. Strange as it may sound, Locke might have enlisted Plato himself among that "great Part of Mankind" to whom this supposedly innate principle is unknown, or better unacceptable, as becomes clear in the following proposition from the *Theaetetus*, where both "relatedness" and "relativity" are emphasized: "Each one of us is a measure of what is and what is not, but there is all the difference in the world between one man and another just in the very fact that what is and appears to one is different from what is and appears to the other" (166 d).

So to endorse the view, that Locke might be seen as yet another "transmitter" or better "transformer" in the history of "ideas" that began with

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23. Alfred N. WHITEHEAD, *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology* (1929), ed. David R. Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: The Free Press/Macmillan, 1978), 60.

24. Despite the declaration made in the *Republic* that, "the same thing will never do or suffer opposites" (IV, 436 b), PLATO not only acknowledges perceptual contradiction as the spur for philosophical investigation, but employs a rigorous method of verbal contradiction in his dialectial practice that fosters the mind to cognition of Ideas.

25. *Essay*, I, ii, 4.

Plato, is not so preposterous after all. If Locke misrepresents Platonism, by taking the Platonic ideas to mean subjective, consciously held particles of knowledge rather than objective relationships apprehended by *νοῦς*, the fault, I would definitely urge, is not his, but is embedded in the tradition of over twenty centuries that preceded him, and which systematically used, misused, and abused Plato's originary philosophical notions. Paul Shorey's contention, that Locke had probably read the *Theaetetus*, *Philebus*, and the *Symposium*[26], makes the similarity between the two quotations a point of departure for an interesting, though admittedly wild, speculation which would read Locke's statement as a "Platonic" answer/attack to a Platonic (theological Neoplatonic) defence of innate ideas. Shorey does not say as much, but he certainly points the way to a reconsideration of the whole relationship between Locke and Plato, when he maintains that the "analogies between Platonic dialectic and psychology and the thought of Locke and Hume would repay study, whether they are the coincidences of great minds grappling with the same problems, or indicate more acquaintance with Plato's writings than is generally attributed to these philosophers". Shorey, I believe, recognizes that both Plato and Locke are concerned with what might be described as "myths of total explanation" of the relation of the human mind to reality, and therefore their lines of thinking and the interpretative metaphors they use, move in the same channel. As Shorey puts it, on a "superficial view Locke is a link in the Bacon-Mill empiric philosophy which is the antithesis of Platonism"; but being "one of the half-dozen philosophers who, like Plato, thinks over the whole ground", his thought "will parallel or translate back into Platonism more readily than that of the pseudo Platonists"[27].

So Locke, by putting "ideas" into the human mind performs an act of translation —baptizing the Platonic *εἴδωλον* into *ἰδέα*[28]— while his continued belief in the ulterior existence of "real essences" foregrounds the Platonic strain in his philosophy. Locke's revolutionary model of the human mind is Plato's model of the "mind-in-perception" given an ultimate epistemological status. In fact, one might even go beyond that. If the relationship between the object and its "idea in the mind is viewed by Locke in a questioning light, if, as Jonathan Bennet expresses it, "Locke puts the objective world, the world of 'real things', beyond our reach on the other side of the veil of percep-

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26. *Platonism: Ancient and Modern* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1938), 206.

27. *Ibid.*, 205.

28. A latent relation between the two words may be traced to their etymological kinship to *εἴδω* (to see).

tion"[29], then the "veil" metaphor operates as yet one more connecting link between the Lockean and Platonic theories. Sensation seen in terms of "mirroring" and "veiling", half reflecting and revealing while at the same time distorting and concealing reality is, I believe, a common *locus* with both philosophers. So the "passion for reality" characteristic of British empiricism, may be said to be embedded within the tradition that started with Plato who, far from sacrificing —I would strongly urge— the empirical world for an otherwordly mode of being, tried, on the contrary, very much a child of the Greek sensuous aesthetic approach to life, to "save" the phenomenal flux from both Heraclitean "elusiveness" and Parmenidean "illusiveness", by making it a "copy" of reality — none the less, a "real" copy of a "knowable" transcendent "being". No greater certainty can be given, I think, to the human mind of its position in the world and its relationship to "otherness", than this, offered by Plato in particular and the Greek culture in general, that sense perception is true (or partly true) and mental "conception" (in both senses of the word) is imaginatively creative — which integrates mental faculties into a unified whole, a "circle of perfection" that constitutes the ground of that "happy consciousness"; or, to put it in Keats' words, when "Beauty is truth, truth is beauty, that is all / Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know"[30].

Locke's closed and self-centred epistemology ultimately results from his basic philosophical tenet that the human understanding must be studied introspecively. The Cartesian dualism of mind-matter that Locke endorsed, dictated to some extent the rules of the philosophical game that Locke walked into; but Locke drew out of the inferences of Descartes' system the latent sceptical elements, by transforming the proposition that man can have a definite knowledge of his understanding by observing the activities of his own mind, to a model whereby man can know directly *only* the content of his mind. The problem rising out of such premises is self-evident, and has brought Locke "face to face with the question which gives birth to idealism" — "if we are aware of nothing but internal sensations, how can we claim to have knowledge of an external world"[31]? The same attitude that refers to an unknown and virtually unknowable matter, may also be applied to an un-

29. *Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes* (1971; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 69.

30. "Ode on a Grecian Urn", *Poetical Works*, ed. H.W. Garrod (1956; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973).

31. Hoxie N. FAIRCHILD, *The Romantic Quest* (1931; New York: Russel & Russell, 1965), 380.

known and unknowable spirit; because, if Locke "tried to answer the question in terms of cause and effect: we may infer an external world from the sensations which it produces in our minds"[32], he seems to think that a similar methodological procedure is applicable, though possibly with as little certitude, to the mind's dealings with a spiritual cause, "it being as rational to affirm, there is no Body, because we have no clear and distinct *Idea* of the *Substance* of Matter; as to say, there is no Spirit, because we have no clear and distinct *Idea* of the *Substance* of a Spirit"[33].

The above argument makes it clear that Locke accepts a spiritual (though unknowable) cause as a substratum of mental operations by analogy to a material (and equally unknowable) principle as a ground for perceptual apprehension. His model does not differ basically from Plato's, except in the crucial distinction that Plato's introspective method —his "know thyself"— unlike Locke's which remains self-referential and hopelessly solipsistic, becomes a door of perception of the *Ideas*. Locke's "mind", on the other hand, pending between two realities, outer and inner, each an obscure "terra incognita" beyond comprehension, clings desperately to his "known" epistemological security, the *ideas*, lest it slips into, or out-to, the gaping abyss. This, I believe, is the radical distinction between platonic and modern thought, applying not only to the empiricist but also to the transcendentalist model of reality, which is considered a revival of Plato's system. Platonic Ideas, though in-tellectually perceived by in-tuitive reason, are a "leading-out", openings of freedom to an en-lightened realm (the outer space of "divine banqueting") where knowledge of Being-itself is attained (*Phaedrus*, 247 a-b). With Locke, "knowledge of the outer reality is made forever impossible by the iron ring of ideas, within which each of us is shut up a helpless prisoner"[34].

The gradual evolution of consciousness into knowledge, which is the cornerstone of empiricism after its rejection of innate ideas, is in many ways different from Plato's presentation of the retrogressive involution of the soul, in two fundamental distinctions; the empiricist passiveness of the mind characterizes a "quantitative" growth, "impresion by impression" so to speak, that substitutes Plato's active (and self-contending) mind whose introspective operations end with a "qualitative" transformation of awareness; and the final target which for empiricism is *perfectibility*, a continuous, interminable

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32. *Ibid.*, 380.

33. *Essay* II, xxiii, 5.

34. James B. PRATT, "Critical Realism and the possibility of Knowledge", in *Essays in Critical Realism*, ed. Durant Drake et al. (London: Machmillan, 1920), 87.

improvement that reaches towards an unattainable goal, takes the place of the Platonic quest for "the Good", the *perfection* that has no "better", and which, without being "innate", lies within the sphere of human possibilities and potentialities. In terms of conceptual structures, the empiricist *line* replaces the Platonic *circle*; and in terms of moral imperatives, I would suggest, that the pragmatic motto "make thyself" replaces not so much the cognitive "know thyself", but the theological concept of a self a priori "given". As Basil Willey puts it, the "whole force of Locke's polemic against 'innate' ideas and principles springs from his presupposition that we must each one of us build up our own being from ourselves out of our own dealings with the universe", rejecting "common notions which are said to be from God, but are really the received opinions of country or of party, or the sacrosanct dogmas of tradition". Yet the Lockean emphasis on mental freedom, suggested by Willey, in that, "God has not 'stamped' any 'truth' upon the mind; but he has furnished us with faculties which sufficiently serve for the discovery of all we need to know", that God indeed "gives us powers of sensation and reflection, not information ready-made"[35], creates, I think, a "sandwich" model of the human mind, where mental activity is conditioned by a spiritual reality which grants the faculties and a material reality which uses them.

Locke's rejection of "innate ideas" is essentially, a subversion of authority; and his image of a mind passively subjected to the "shows of things", follows upon the experience of a mind actively questioning and negating not as much "in-nate" notions as "in-doctrinate" doctrines imposed upon the understanding of men, and demanding an uncritical conformity to received opinion, "which was to take them off from the use of their own Reason and Judgment, and put them upon believing and taking them upon trust, without farther examination: In which posture of blind Credulity, they might be more easily governed by... and to make a Man *swallow that for an innate Principle*, which may serve to his purpose, who teacheth them"[36]. Locke employs the Platonic dialectical method of severely criticizing accepted concepts and dogmas, to literate the human mind from the authoritarian pseudo-Platonic doctrine of innate ideas, in order to ultimately subject it to an un-Platonic passivity before the material objects of sensation. Locke's radical transference of meaning in the term "idea" with his "new way" which, undercutting traditional, authority, attributed authorship to the action of "thing upon mind",

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35. *The Seventeenth-Century Background: Studies in the Thought of the Age in Relation to Poetry and Religion* (1934; London: Chatto and Windus, 1962), 274.

36. *Essay*, I, iv, 24. Emphasis mine.

ultimately led to the rejection of universals and allowed "thought to spring from the immediate facts of consciousness"[37]. His conception of what we might call Thing-as-Author of experience upon the Mind's Tabula Rasa, tends to read the relation of mind to its environment in terms of a "scriptural" act, displacing authority from "tradition" to "sensation". By using the method of analogy which, as in Plato's theory of "approximation", Locke maintains that, "in things which sense cannot discover, analogy is the great rule of probability"[38] he attempts to interpret the correspondence of "idea" to "thing" in terms of the relation between "idea" and "word", thus endorsing a semiotics of "difference". In stressing the priority of "experience" over "language" (the texts of tradition), Locke attempted to liberate the human mind from the authority of inherited knowledge or the tyranny of "logos"; yet, in introducing a version of representational semantics, he made the science "called *σημειωτική*, or *the Doctrine* of *Signs*" the referential ground of knowledge, able to "afford us another Logick and Critick, than what we have been hitherto acquainted with"[39]. The word-as-sign-of-idea-as-sign-of-thing stands in a position of "third remove" from reality, which is precisely the place Plato assigns to the (poetic) word-as-copy-of-thing-as-copy-of-idea, with a difference. As Ernst Cassirer puts it, referring to the tradition of British empiricism as a whole, "The more sharply they defined language not as an expression of things but as an expression of *concepts*, the more imperiously the question was bound to rise as to whether the new spiritual medium here recognized did not falsify rather than designate the ultimate, 'real' elements of being"; especially in Locke's case, "even though cognition was founded in the particular data of sensory perception and the perception of self, it embodied a tendency towards universality", and so the "abstract word becomes the expression of the 'abstract universal idea', which, beside the particular sensations, is here still recognized as a psychological reality"[40].

It was this "universalized" and abstracted reality (and language) that disturbed the Romantics and elicited from them an ambiguous attitude to-

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37. Ian WATT, "Realism and the Novel", in *English Literature and British Philosophy: A Collection of Essays*, ed. S.P. Rosenbaum (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), 72.

38. Joseph W. BEACH, *The Concept of Nature in Nineteenth-Century English Poetry* (1936; New York: Russel & Russell, 1966), 173.

39. *Essay*, IV, xxi, 4.

40. *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Vol I: Language*, trans. Ralph Manheim (1955; New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), 36.

wards the philosophy of empiricism. They embraced a "life of sensations"[41], but rejected the "Lockes, Priestleys, Humes, Condilliacs and the dehumanizing race of fashionable Metaphysicians"[42], intending to save sensation from Plato's "discredit" (allegory of the cave) and Locke's "distrust", and to "treat man as man — a subject of eye, ear, touch, and taste, in contact with external nature, and informing the senses from the mind, and not compounding a mind out of the senses"[43]. In this statement, Coleridge's account of Wordsworth's poetic project poses, I think, the problematics of the Romantic situation, precariously balanced between the (traditonally given) Platonic model of "mind-as-subject" turning its back to the sense, and the Lockean "mind-as-object" subjected to the senses, attempting to find a third alternative that would retain both the supremacy of intellection (in a form of intellectual intuition) and the validity of sensation; the reconciliation is undertaken (not always successfully, of course) in the model "subject of eye", which is antithetical to the Lockean image of mind as a passive recipient in perception.

Wordsworth, Willey contends, "was the kind of poet who could only have appeared at the end of the eighteenth century, when mythologies were exploded", and this, I believe, is largely true of the other major Romantics; so his debt to tradition, Willey continues, "unlike Dante's, was a negative one; he owed to it his *deprivation* of mythology, his aloneness with the universe"[44]. It was precisely this rejection by Locke of the common "ideas" of orthodoxy that provided Wordsworth with the cultural conditions whereby he was forced to use his own "unaided intellect" (or "powerful feelings"), and become creative partly through a (negative) dialectic with his precursors, but mostly through his own dealings with Otherness, turning experience into consciousness and passion into poetry. From a different perspective, Wordsworth in *The Prelude* may be said to have beaten the empiricists on their own ground, playing their own game, in so far as, the "ultimate basis of their theories has always been the same —observation by introspection"[45]— as of

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41. The reference is to John KEATS celebrated proclamation, "O for a Life of Sensations rather that of Thoughts!" (*The Letters of John Keats, 1814-1821*, ed. Hyder E. ROLLINS, 2 vols, 1958; Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1976, I, 185).

42. *The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, ed. Kathleen Coburn, 3 vols (Vol. I, New York: Pantheon Books, 1957; Vol. II, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962; Vol. III, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), III, entry 3281.

43. S.T. COLERIDGE, *Speciments of the Table Talk*, 4th edn (London: John Murray), 185.

44. *The Seventeenth-Century Background*, 298.

45. Hugh S. DAVIES, "Wordsworth and the Empirical Philosophers", in *The English Mind*, ed. Hugh S. Davies and George Watson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 162.

course was Plato's. Locke's maxim, "Men must think and know for themselves"[46], coupled with Plato's "know thyself", may be taken to provide a common ground inciting Romantic individualism in its revolutionary attitude towards authority, and possibly effect a fragile "marriage" of empiricist and transcendentalist theories.

Arthur Beatty detects a close resemblance between Wordsworth's and Locke's attitude to the relation of mind-object in sensation, arguing that, "the endeavor of Locke was the endeavor of Wordsworth"; for both of them, he stresses, "the validity of all knowledge depends on the reality of our sensations: for it is only through the sensations that we can be sure that we touch objective reality"[47]. He quotes from the poem *Expostulaton and Reply* in support of his thesis that passivity in the mind's attitude before the natural object in both Wordsworth and Locke: "Nor less I deem that there are Powers / Which of themselves our minds impress; / That we can feed this mind of ours / In a wise passiveness". However, this passive receptivity in both Wordsworth and Locke entails an active element in it, as becomes manifest in Locke's statement on the nature of Power[48]. Locke follows traditional patterns when attributing active power to the Divine principle, leaving intact the accepted notion of God as "author" or initiator of creativity, and allowing man a position of "intermediate" and questionable nature, "capable of both *active* and *passive* Power", between a God-as-Subject, "author" of Matter, and a Matter-as-Subject, "author" of human sense-data ("ideas"). As for Wordsworth's "wise passiveness", Melvin Rader argues that the poet "uses Locke's famous metaphor of the *tabula rasa*, or mental tablet, on which sensation writes impression; but in the later poetry", he continues, "this metaphor, implying the passivity of the human mind, no longer fits the strong and active role of our mental faculties as Wordsworth conceives them"[49]. This brings Wordsworth's model closer to the Platonic notion of the mind's leading position ("actor" rather than "patient") in its transactions with reality.

Coleridge's study of Locke provided him with a target for his polemic against empiricism and materialism; unlike his love/hate relationship with other empiricists —for instance Berkeley and Hartley— to whom he admitted allegiance at certain periods of his life, his attitude towards Locke seems to be

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46. *Essay*, I, iv, 23.

47. *William Wordsworth: His Doctrine and Art in their Historical Relations* (1922; Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1960), 124-25.

48. *Essay*, II, xxi, 2.

49. *Wordsworth: A Philosophical Approach* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1967), 48.

uniformly inimical, and to formulate a centre of gravity that gave coherence to his early reading and thinking. Locke, more than any other philosopher, is singled out by Coleridge as standing at the antipodes of Plato, and held responsible for the "anti-metaphysical" climate of the age. As he makes it clear in the *Biographia Literaria*, "But in my own instance, I had the additional misfortune of having been gossiped about, as devoted to metaphysics, and worse than all, to a system incomparably nearer to the visionary flights of Plato, and even to the jargon of the Mystics, than to the established tenets of Locke"[50]. One of the main criticisms that Coleridge levelled against Locke, as might be expected from a person who had studied Plato in the original, is Locke's misuse or abuse of the Platonic term "idea"[51]. In a letter written to Josiah Wedgewood early in 1801[52], which reflects the results of his "meditations on the relations of the word "innate" which, he thinks, is not at all justified in Plato's employment of the term. Locke, Coleridge asserts, refrains from naming specifically those of the preceding philosophers in whose work the term "innate" makes its appearance: "More especially, he should have given his Readers the Definition of the Obscure Word 'innate' in the very Language of the most accurate of such Writers as had used the Word. Pythagoras, it is said, and Plato, it is known, held the pre-existence of human Souls"[53].

On the other hand, he finds a "complete coincidence" between the Lockean metaphor of the mind as an "unwritten sheet of paper" and Aristotle's proposition that the mind in its first state is an unwritten tablet; further, to support his critique of the "utter meaninglessness" of Locke's use of the term "innate", he quotes a paragraph from Hume's own critical commentary on Locke's usage of the terms "innate" and "idea", describing the former as "artificial" and the latter as "loose". Besides, Coleridge seems convinced that Locke borrows his conception of the "idea" not from Plato but from Descartes[54]. Besides the severe criticism of Locke's superficial treatment, not to

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50. II, 212.

51. As Kathleen Coburn informs us in her edition of COLERIDGE'S *Philosophical Lectures* (1949; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950), "Coleridge says in a note on Petvin's *Letters Concerning Mind*, that Locke's ideas and Plato's, were no more alike than'a Syllogism and an Apple-Dumpling" (462).

52. For a detailed analysis of Coleridge's letters to Wedgwood see R. Florence BRINKLEY, "Coleridge on Locke", *Studies in Philology* 46 (1949): 521-43.

53. *Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, ed. Earl Leslie Griggs, 6 vols (1956-59; corr. edn., Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1966-71), II, 680.

54. *Ibid.*, II, 682-83.

say violation, of such a semantically charged term as "idea", Coleridge recognizes a misuse of notions connected with the activities and content of the mind: "In Mr Locke there is a complete Whirl-dance of Confusion with the words *we, Soul, Mind, Consciousness*, and *Ideas*"; consequently, the point that Coleridge wishes to make is that whereas Locke defines "soul" and "mind" as "consciousness", he contradicts himself by referring to acts of consciousness of which *Consciousness is unconscious*. The unorthodox and conflicting Lockean conceptions about "ideas" and "mind", Coleridge portrays by using the ware-house metaphor, where, "Sometimes again the Ideas are considered as objects of the mind in thinking, sometimes they stand for the mind itself, and sometimes we are the thinkers and the mind is only the Thought-Box. — In short, the Mind in Mr Locke's Essay had three senses — the Ware-house, the Wares, and the Ware-house-man"[55].

Coleridge is well aware of the fact, as he says, that Locke "would willingly change the Term 'Idea' for a Better, if any one could help him to it. But he finds none that stands so well *for every immediate object of the mind in thinking, as Idea does*[56]. Coleridge's criticism of the Lockean "idea" refers back not only to the British philosopher's missuse of the Platonic term, but also of the Cartesian. J.A. Appleyard sums up this line of argumentation in Coleridge's third letter to Wedgewood on the subjct of Locke's epistemology, by pointing out the inversion that Locke effects in his misinterpretation of the French thinker, whom he incorporates with those accepting *κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι*, whereas "the innate ideas of Descartes are exactly equal to Locke's ideas of reflection, while innate ideas in the sense in which Locke understands them were explicitly denied by Descartes"[57]. It is fairly obvious, I believe, that Coleridge's main charge against Locke's philosophical system is that it is based upon a series of misreadings both of the older philosophers and his near contemporaries, a missaprehension and misrepresentation of key terms and root metaphors, which renders Locke's polemics against both "innate" and "ideas" ineffectual as well as pointless, based as it is on false presuppositions.

Shelley's reading of Locke does not share in Coleridge's disputation of incorrect use of terms; by taking Locke's statements at their face value, Shelley enlists him in the forces of radicalism which combat intellectual despot-

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55. *Ibid.*, II, 696.

56. *Ibid.*, II, 683.

57. *Coleridge's Philosophy of Literature: The Development of a Concept of Poetry, 1791-1819* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965), 79.

ism. His question, "Am I to expect an enemy or an ally in Locke?"[58], indicates the different nature of his problematic, and the "political" rather than epistemological motivation of his interest All the same, it has been affirmed of Shelley that "the very basis of his metaphysical speculations seems to be derived from Locke rather than from any one else"[59].

It might sound peculiar that Locke should be invoked as a contestant in a discussion on God, in a letter exchange between Shelley and Elizabeth Hitchener in June 1811; she provides the initiative for an inquiry into Locke's relation to the Christian religion: "Thanks to your kind attention I have received Locke and am highly delighted with what I have hitherto read... I am satisfied I never had neither *innate ideas* nor *innate principles* thó of the former you convinc'd me and of the latter Locke", exclaiming, "I am so truly happy to find Locke saying we *possess faculties* to *discover God, I hope therefore in time* to be able to give a *reason* rather than a *feeling* for my *belief*". To which Shelley answers, "Locke *proves* that there are no innate ideas, that in consequence there can be no innate speculative or practical principles, thus overturning all appeals of *feeling* in favor of Deity... since all ideas are derived from the senses this *feeling* must have originated from some sensual excitation"[60]. Hitchener and Shelley in fact formulate as clearly as possible the inner contradiction of the Lockean system; she stresses the "spiritual" aspect of his philosophy by mentioning the inherent faculties he admits of as a means of approaching God —a principle which (despite empiricism) is never ostracized from Locke's metaphysics—, whereas Shelley employs Locke's rejection of innate ideas in order to undermine a supposedly "innate" human need for God.

In applying Lockean rationalistic premises to the emotionalist field of religion, Shelley gives us, I believe, a very good sample of the Romantic determination to banish the compartmentalization of human experience into isolated mental boxes, each one with its own separate determinants, and to collapse all inner partitions, in pursuit of a totaly unity of awareness; the result was a metaphysical and psychological "chaos", where the notions of the real underwent infinite transformations, where the ontological categories of Self/Other and the grammatical categories of Subject/Object combined in

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58. *The Letters of Percy Bysshe Shelley*, ed. Frederick L. Jones, 2 vols (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1964), I, 99.

59. Amiyakumar SEN, *Studies in Shelley* (1936; New York: The Folcroft Press, 1969), 18.

60. *Letters*, I, 98-100.

all possible schemes and patterns. "Chaos" is to some extent the characteristic condition of Romanticism; but it is a confusion resulting from the conscious decision of the Romantic poets to destroy a give model of ordering human consiousness, which did not recognize the "metaphorical" interaction of "faculties", but did its best to raise impenetrable walls between them. Locke's contribution to this shift is both negative and positive; he helped build the walls, but also gave signs of how they could be demolished. As Joseph Barrell puts it, "Locke did more than afford a healthful check to the extravagances of rationalistic thinking" or "call attention to experience as an essential factor in human knowledge. By investigating the human mind itself, and by provocatively declaring the basis of knowledge to be sensation, Locke turned the tride of human thought from the outer world to the inner"[61].

So had Plato done at a different age, if with different intentions. And although Shelley himself does not seem to find a common denominator between the two philosophers that would allow for comparison or even contrast (the way Coleridge does), there may be an element of truth in James A. Notopoulos' contention that Locke proved instrumental in enkindling Shelley's Platonism: "John Locke, whom Shelley read and thought about throughout his life, is an anti-Platonist, if his attack on innate ideas is used as a criterion. But though Locke is not a Platonist on the surface, he has many points of contact with Plato"; Notopoulos continues by indicating certain Platonic elements in Locke, such as his "running fight against equivocation, his divisions and dichotomies, ... the observation that the mind like the eye sees not itself; the comparison of intellectual inquiry to hunting", to finally conclude that this "kind of Platonism, however, is not the kind that Shelley used as material for poetry; it would mostly appear in Shelley's dialectical discussion with friends like Hogg". The critic in fact distinguishes between Shelley's "written" and "oral" Platonism in statements like the following: "Locke therefore cannot be excluded from Shelley's oral Platonism, which could play an important part in our account of Shelley's Platonism if we had more than the few echoes of it in the testimony of his friends"[62].

The great challenge, as I see it, that Locke offered to his readers (poets and philosophers) with the ambivalence of a doctrine that abolished "innate" ideas as the crutches of human thought, while stressing "intro-spec-

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61. *Shelley and the Thought of his Time: A Study in the History of Ideas* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), 27.

62. *The Platonism of Shelley: A Study of Platonism and the Poetic Mind* (1949; New York, 1950), 119.

tion" as the only way to knowledge, was the problematizing of personal identity, amenable to an "identity of consciousness" (what I would describe as "unity") and not identity of "spiritual substance" (what I would define as "likeness" leading to "union"), i.e. an immortal soul preternaturally sealed upon with ideas, the "marks" and "traces" of Divine Authority. In Locke's wake, however, Berkeley's Neoplatonic answer to Locke's nearly Platonic model of a mind "free" from subscription to orthodox "truths", was to re-establish the validity —and dependence— of human "ideas", by making them "ectypes" of the archetypal ideas in God's mind. That Berkeley endorses an attitude which amalgamates empiricism and Platonic theology is also supported by Peter S. Wenz who points out that, "George Berkeley was an empiricist, but unlike such other famous empiricists as John Locke and David Hume, there is good reason to believe that Berkeley was also a Christian neo-Platonist, one who holds the view that abstract ideas exist in the mind of God and that the world was created by God using these ideas as models or archetypes"[63]. Berkeley, as an empiricist, considers it impossible for human beings to have "abstract" ideas (the equivalent to innate ideas); as a Christian (un-Platonic) Platonist he accepts that abstract ideas exist in the mind of God, as patterns to be imprinted on the mind of man. Thus, Berkeley's "newer" new way of ideas actually signals a return to the "old" or rather "middle" version — the transformation of the Platonic-Greek model into the Christian one, which produced the monistic Neoplatonic ontology that by reducing all reality to "spirit" bypasses the crucial question of "who is who" or "who does what". Berkeley's empirical immaterialism (or, should we say, "imperialism") is a similar type of response to the problematics raised by Locke who, I am more and more convinced, deserves the title, if only by functional than theoretical similarity, of the "British Plato"[64].

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63. "Berkeley's Christian Neo-Platonism", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 37 (1976) 537.

64. The British philosophers of the period under examination that, to my knowledge, have been granted this title are Bacon, Cudworth, and Shaftesbury.

Ο «ΝΕΟΣ ΤΡΟΠΟΣ ΤΩΝ ΙΔΕΩΝ»: ΠΛΑΤΩΝ, LOCKE, ΚΑΙ ΟΙ ΡΟΜΑΝΤΙΚΟΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΝΑΓΝΩΣΤΕΣ

Περίληψη

Ἡ Πλατωνικὴ θεωρία τῶν ἰδεῶν ἔχει ἀφήσει τέτοια ἀνεξίτηλα σημάδια πάνω στὴν εὐρωπαϊκὴ φιλοσοφία (καὶ λογοτεχνία) ποὺ ἦταν σχεδὸν ἀναπόφευκτο γιὰ τὸν Locke, πρωτεργάτη τοῦ βρεταννικοῦ ἐμπειρισμοῦ, νὰ υἱοθετήσει τὸν ὅρο «ἰδέα» στὴν προσπάθειά του νὰ ἀποδώσει τὸ περιεχόμενο τοῦ νοῦ, ἔχοντας πλήρη ἐπίγνωση τοῦ νέου τρόπου (ἢ δρόμου) ἀντίληψης καὶ χρήσης μιᾶς λέξης ποὺ ἀποτέλεσε σημεῖο ἀναφορᾶς γιὰ τὴ γένεση καὶ ἐξέλιξη τῆς φιλοσοφικῆς σκέψης. Μεταφράζοντας τὴν πλατωνικὴ ὀντολογία σὲ ἐπιστημολογία, ὁ Locke χρησιμοποιεῖ τὴν «ἰδέα» στὴν ψυχολογική της διάσταση, ἐνῶ παράλληλα ξεκινᾶ μιὰ πολεμικὴ ἐνάντια στὴ θεωρία τῶν «ἔμφυτων ἐννοιῶν» (innate ideas) ποὺ κατὰ τὴ γνώμη του ἀποσκοπεῖ στὴν πνευματική (πολιτικὴ καὶ θρησκευτική) καταδυνάστευση τοῦ ὑποκειμένου. Ἡ προσέγγιση στὸ θέμα τῆς σχέσης τοῦ Locke μὲ τὸν Πλάτωνα, ὅπως παρουσιάζεται σ᾽ αὐτὴ τὴν ἐργασία, εἶναι διττή: ἀπὸ τὴ μιὰ προσδιορίζονται οἱ βασικὲς διαφορὲς ἀνάμεσα στοὺς δύο στοχαστὲς ποὺ ἐπικεντρώνονται γύρω ἀπὸ τὸν ὅρο «ἰδέα» — ἀντικειμενικὴ (ἀληθινή) ὀντότητα γιὰ τὸν Ἕλληνα «ἰδεαλιστὴ» καὶ ὑποκειμενικὴ (ἀπατηλή) ἀναπαράσταση γιὰ τὸν ἄγγλο ἐμπειριστή. Πέρα ὅμως ἀπὸ τὶς προφανεῖς «δογματικὲς» διαφορές, ἐπισημαίνεται μιὰ ταυτότητα καὶ συγγένεια «μεθόδου», στὸ ὅτι ὁ Locke, χρησιμοποιώντας μιὰ στρατηγικὴ ἀπελευθέρωσης τοῦ ἀτόμου ἀπὸ δεδομένες «ὑποθέσεις», παραδίδει τὸ νοῦ ὡς «καθαρὴ πλάκα» (tabula rasa) στὴν ἐμπειρία (καὶ ἀπορία) τῶν πραγμάτων. Τὸ ἐνδιαφέρον τῶν ἄγγλων Ρομαντικῶν γιὰ τὴ φιλοσοφία τόσο τοῦ Πλάτωνα ὅσο καὶ τοῦ Locke πηγάζει ἀπὸ τὸν ἔντονο προβληματισμό τους πάνω σὲ καίρια ἐρωτήματα γνωσιολογίας, αἰσθητικῆς καὶ μεταφυσικῆς — κυρίως τὴ σχέση τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μὲ τὴ φύση, τὴ δυνατότητα ἐπικοινωνίας τοῦ «ἑαυτοῦ» μὲ τὸ «ἄλλο», καὶ τὴν ἐνεργητική (δημιουργική) ἢ παθητικὴ συμμετοχὴ τοῦ νοῦ στὴν «κατασκευὴ» τῆς πραγματικότητας. Τόσο στὰ ποιητικὰ ὅσο καὶ στὰ θεωρητικὰ κείμενα τῶν Wordsworth, Coleridge καὶ Shelley, τὰ ὀνόματα τοῦ Πλάτωνα καὶ τοῦ Locke (ὅπως φυσικὰ καὶ ἄλλων φιλοσόφων) πλέκονται μὲ ἕνα τρόπο ποὺ ὑποδηλώνει τὴν ἀναζήτηση ἀπαντήσεων σὲ διαφορετικὰ (συχνὰ ἀνταγωνιστικά) συστήματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν οὐσιαστικὴ ρομαντικὴ θέση νὰ καταλύσουν τὰ παραδοσιακὰ στεγανά, ποὺ ἀπομομώνουν τὶς κατηγορίες τῆς ὕπαρξης (καὶ τῆς γλώσσας) καὶ νὰ ἐκτεθοῦν στὴ «μεταφορική» (δηλαδὴ ποιητική) κατοίκηση τοῦ κόσμου.

Κ. ΔΟΥΚΑ-ΚΑΜΠΙΤΟΓΛΟΥ