

SOME ASPECTS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN DOCTRINE OF COGNITIVE *PHANTASIA*

Introduction. It has been doubted whether Aristotle's concept of cognitive «phantasia» should be associated with Plato's doctrine on imagination about mental states¹. Aristotle's clear connection of cognitive *phantasia* with the verb 'phainesthai' (appear) occurs in *De Anima* 3,3 and elsewhere. In fact Aristotle's pioneering treatment of the 'phantasia' is based primarily on the concept of reason, but it seems to me a bit artificial to divide the Aristotelian doctrine on the *phantasia* between mental imagery and the entire recognition of sensory presentations. Although Aristotle has not clarified the complexities of his theory concerning the logical peculiarities of the *phantasia*, it remains seminal for those willing to seek a further investigation. The conceptual mapping of *phantasia* is a difficult task, so the Stagirite urges us to find new ways of connecting the particular phenomena with their intellectual source. In this sense, if nous has a place in concept acquisition, it is very likely, mainly through its role in acquiring genuine, as opposed to merely inferential linguistic understanding.

In this sense *phantasia* is an experience produced by actual perception. It is a state contemporaneous with or following immediately on sensation, but it is used of a state which occurs when the object has ceased to be perceived. Aristotle considers that we can remember not only what can be imagined, but also what is bound up with that which can be imagined. Thus he tends to exclude any understanding of *phantasia* in neither sense-perception, nor scientific knowledge, nor intuitive reason, nor opinion, nor a synthesis of both sense-perception and opinion.

My chief point remains this: investigation of Aristotle's *De Anima* 3.3, as well as other aristotelian works in relation to and comparison with Plato's theories and the Alexandrian Commentators' interpretations on particular issues such as 'phantasia' and 'phainesthai', 'phantasia' and 'phantasma'. Aristotle considers *phantasia* as a typical form of thinking because what really appears to us is patently not under our complete control. He constantly reminds us of the variety of the phenomena we need to consider and urges us to proceed to a further investigation.

1. Cf. PLATO, *Theaetetus* 152 a-c; *Sophist* 264 a-b.



II. Definitions of *phantasia*. The doctrine of *phantasia* in Aristotle's works² came under fire in the writings of L. Wittgenstein and especially in G. Ryle's *The Concept of Mind*³. But M. Schofield states that Aristotle is primarily concerned with the verb φαίνεσθαι. He maintains that Aristotle refers to «non paradeigmatic sensory experiences»⁴, i. e. mental imaginaries of φαίνεται, which in fact are not Aristotle's main concern. It was M. Nussbaum who drew our attention to the view that «mental images are central to either Aristotelian φαντασία or our notion of imagination is reception of sense-impressions»⁵. An opposite view appeared in a work of D. Modrak, who stated that the Aristotelian *phantasia* exclusively makes mental images very important. In this context *phantasia* becomes the cause of the «awareness of a sensory content under conditions that are not conducive to vertical perceptions»⁶.

My concern here is to read carefully the Aristotelian interpretations of the issue, taking into account these rival modern views expressed by the above-mentioned authors. Certainly I shall require the assistance of some Neoplatonist Commentators on the *De Anima*, because they have thrown much light to the problem involved⁷. Those Commentators often reproduced traditional interpretations of Aristotle's theories and insist on the fact that he meant a faculty which has mental images⁷. But it was Aristotle who drew the necessary distinctions between the φρονεῖν (practical thinking) and νοεῖν (theoretical thinking), which in no way can be identified with sensation. Relevant to these, but not the same, is the concept of *phantasia*, which does not appear in any of the fragments of the Pre-Socratics, but only in

2. Cf. M. SCHOFIELD, Aristotle on the Imagination, G. E. R. LLOYD-G.E.L. OWEN, (ed.) *Aristotle on Mind and the Senses*, Cambridge 1978, reimpr. J. BARNES-R. SORABJI (ed.), *Articles on Aristotle*, IV, London, 1979, 103-32. M. C. NUSSBAUM, *Aristotle's De Motu Animalium*, Princeton 1978, Essay 5, pp. 221-69. D. MODRAK, Φαντασία reconsidered, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 68, 1986, 47-69. IDEM, *Aristotle: the power of perception*, Chicago-London 1987, passim. G. WATSON, Φαντασία in Aristotle, *De Anima* 3,3, *Classical Quarterly*, NS 39, 1982, 100-13. IDEM, *Phantasia*, *Classical Thought*, Caiway, 1988, 14-33. M. WEDIN, *Mind and Imagination in Aristotle*, New Haven-London, Yale University Press, 1988, passim.

3. Cf. L. WITTGENSTEIN, *Philosophical Investigations*, tr. G. E. M. Ascombe, Oxford 1958, II. XI, G. RYLE, *The Concept of Mind*, London 1948, ch. 8. M. WARNOCK, *Imagination*, London 1976, pt. iv.

4. Cf. A. SHEPPARD, Phantasma and mental images: Neoplatonist interpretations of *De Anima* 3,3, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, Supplementary Vol. 1991, 166.

5. Cf. D. MODRAK, Φαντασία reconsidered, *op. cit.* p. 48.

6. H. J. BLUMENTHAL, Neoplatonic Elements in the *De Anima* Commentaries, *Phronesis* 21, 1976, 64-87. IDEM, Neoplatonic Interpretations of Aristotle on Phantasia, *Review of Metaphysics* 31, 1977-78, 242-257. IDEM, Some Platonist Readings of Aristotle, *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, NS 27, 1981, 1-16. IDEM, *Plotinus' Psychology. His Doctrines of the Embodied Soul*, The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1971, esp. ch. 7: Memory and imagination, pp. 80-99.

7. Cf. A. SHEPPARD, Phantasma and mental images..., *op. cit.*, pp. 168-169.

Plato's *Republic*⁸ and elsewhere, where he argues that *phantasia* involves chiefly an activity of sensation⁹. In this sense it is that combination of perception and judgement which, according to *Theaetetus*, occurs when I see an instinct figure and in any case, positively or negatively, judge it to be somebody whom I know by accident¹⁰. In the *Philebus* (39 b) Plato considers imagination as the exclusive work of a kind of painter in the mind who makes pictures of likenesses of certain things. These pictures and likenesses are named as "pictured semblances" (φαντάσματα ἐξωγραφημένα), but still the *phantasia* is not yet used. In *De Anima* (3.9, 428 a25) Aristotle refers to Plato's σύμμιξις αἰσθήσεως δόξης and compares it with his συμπλοκή δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως φαντασία ἂν εἴη, i.e. imagination is neither opinion joined with sensation, nor opinion through sensation, nor yet a complex of opinion and sensation¹¹.

Aristotle seems to give *phantasia* a rather new sense, which is not to be confused with Plato's special use of the term here. In other words, the connection between *phantasia* as the simple blend of perception and judgement on one hand and the art of creating semblances or appearances on the other¹². The sculptor, for example, produces φαντάσματα, such as are rife in painting and fine art. He really imposes on us false judgements by means of our senses¹³. It is obvious here that Plato uses *phantasia* not exactly as an opposition to reality, but as some sort of unreality in the object. According to this judgement, all this that has been expressed about *phantasia* throws no much light on what may be called the problem of the εἰδωλον, i. e. the problem, that this appearing or seeming without really being and saying something which yet is not true. But the question still remains: how can there be something which seems real without being real?¹⁴ In fact the image making, like all other arts, includes a part of being and a part of not-being¹⁵. Truly speaking, the image is not the reality, and the reality is not the image. How, «the not real is not

8. PLATO, *Republic*, B 382c: κομιδῇ ἄρα ὁ θεὸς ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθὲς ἂν τε ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατᾷ, οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας οὔτε κατὰ λόγους... Cf. *Theaetetus*, 152 c, *Sophist*, 260 e, 263 d, 264 a.

9. J. ANNAS, *An Introduction to Plato's Republic*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981, pp. 80-82, 244-245, 247-256. F. M. CORNFORD, *Plato's Theory of knowledge. The Theaetetus and the Sophist of Plato*, London 1973, p. 319: «Appearing... is not 'imagination', the faculty which pictures an absent of imagery object not perceived at the moment».

10. PLATO, *Theaetetus* 194 b, 195 d: σύναψις αἰσθήσεως πρὸς διάνοιαν. Cf. also *Philebus* 38a.

11. Cf. R. D. HICKS, *Aristotle De Anima, with translation, introduction and notes*, Amsterdam, Hakkert, 1965, pp. 126-127.

12. PLATO, *Sophist* 235 e. Cf. F. M. CORNFORD, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge... op. cit.*, pp. 197-199.

13. *Ibid.*, 236 e: In this case here it is the object that appears but is not real.

14. *Ibid.*, 257 c.

15. *Ibid.*, 258 a.

unreal, but just the image, which is quite as much as that of which it is the image»¹⁶.

In order to understand Aristotle's conception of *phantasia*, we must avoid the basis of its scientific or poetical aspect¹⁷. He argues that *phantasia* is neither sense-perception nor scientific knowledge, yet nor intuitive reason¹⁸. In this sense *phantasia* is not an opinion¹⁹, not even a mere combination of sense-perception and opinion²⁰, but sense-perception is a mere result of it²¹, which in any case is either true or false²². This let Aristotle to distinguish three kinds of object of sense-perception: a) the main objects of the five senses, about which is very hard to make an error²³, b) things about which error is possible²⁴ and c) common properties of the things, i. e. movement and size²⁵. It is evident that imagination is an experience produced by actual perception²⁶, but "it is a bit artificial to divide the work Aristotle assigns to *phantasia* between mental imagery and the reception of sensory or quasi-sensory presentations. If we are to attribute to him a concept of imagination, then without endowing it with a Kantian scope we can permit it to range beyond the confines of mental imagery²⁷.

In his *De Anima* 3.3, Aristotle gives the most systematic account of the entire essence of the term 'phantasia'. He emphasises the distinction between thought and perception²⁸, as well as the difference of imagination from other activities and functioning of the soul²⁹. In fact imagination is used by Aristotle of a state that occurs when the actual object has ceased to be perceived. In other words. it is a function of

16. Cf. F. M. CORNFORD, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge... op. cit.*, p. 322.

17. ARISTOTLE, *Analytica Posteriora* 89 b 18. *Poetics* 1455a 32.

18. IDEM, *De Anima* 3, 6, 428a 5-16.

19. *Ibid.*, 428a 18-2.

20. *Ibid.*, 428a 24-b 9.

21. *Ibid.*, 428b 10-17.

22. *Ibid.*, 428b 18.

23. *Ibid.*, 428b 19-20.

24. *Ibid.*, 428b 20-22.

25. Cf. D. ROSS, *Aristotle De Anima*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967, pp. 38-39.

26. ARISTOTLE, *De Anima*, 3.3, 428b 30-429 a 2: *εἰ οὖν μηθὲν ἄλλο ἔχει τὰ εἰρημένα ἢ φαντασία (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ λεχθὲν) ἢ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένη.*

27. Cf. M. SCHOFIELD, Aristotle on the Imagination, M. NUSSBAUM-A. OKSENBERG-RORTY (eds), *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 250-251. Also see P. STRAWSON, Imagination and Perception, L. FOSTER-J. W. SWANSON (eds.), *Experience and Theory*, London, Methuen, 1974, pp. 91-120. R. SCRUTON, *Art and Imagination*, London, Methuen, 1974, pp. 91-120. See also G. RYLE, *The Concept of Mind*, London, Penguin, 1963, ch. 8.

28. ARISTOTLE, *De Anima*, 3.3, 427a 17-b 16: *φαντασία γὰρ ἕτερον καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας αὕτη τε οὐ γίγνεται ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης οὐκ ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις.*

the primary faculty of perception, not of the five separate senses. Here Aristotle includes memory as the sense that what we are contemplating is really something in the past. It is evident that Aristotle does not limit the objects of memory to things that can be objects of imagination.

There is a tendency among certain scholars to downgrade or even restrict the role of imagination in Aristotle's psychology. Indeed M. Schofield, for example, holds only a conceptual deviant status of imagination and M. Nussbaum argues that Aristotle's basic use of imagination as the seeing aspect of perception³⁰. It is interesting the fact that M. Nussbaum suggests that Aristotle put stress on imagination on the view that it has a material basis which renders it an appropriate component in a rather physiological account of movement. In this sense «the affections suitably prepare the organic parts, desire the affections and imagination the desire; and imagination comes about either through thought or through sense-perception»³¹. In this sense, imagination is the animal's awareness of a sort of object or state of affairs³².

It is true that not every imagination of a rational creature is a rational *phantasia*. In fact creatures with reason look to the future and to past experience, while animals can act only according to the awareness of the moment³³. So Plato more often employs *phantasia* or *phantasma* to talk of unreal appearances more generally³⁴. The Protagorean concept of *phantasia* in Plato's *Cratylus* is apparent in Aristotle's text, where his choice of the linguistic criterion is the guide-line for the interpretation of *phantasia*³⁵. Here Aristotle does not make the necessary distinction between imagination and perception in physical or physiological terms, nor, on the other hand, does Aristotle adopt the procedure associated with David Hume of reflecting on the presence of sensory features in imagining.

III. *Phantasia-Perception*. Aristotle had once defined *phantasia* as a sort of weak perception in the early *Rhetoric*³⁶, but that view has been totally abandoned in *De*

30. Cf. M. SCHOFIELD, Aristotle on the Imagination, M. NUSSBAUM-A. OKSENBERG-RORTY (eds), *Essays ... op. cit.*, pp. 249 ff. M. NUSSBAUM, Changing Aristotle's Mind, *Ibid.*, pp. 39-45.

31. ARISTOTLE, *De motu animalium*, 8, 702 a 17-19: Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀργανικά μέρη παρασκευάζει ἐπιτηδείως τὰ πάθη. ἡ δ' ὁρεξις τὰ πάθη τὴν δ' ὁρεξιν ἡ φαντασία. Cf. VI. NUSSBAUM, *Aristotle's De Motu Animalium. Text with Translation, Commentary and Interpretive Essays*, Princeton, U. P., 1978, pp. 261 ff.

32. ARISTOTLE, *Nicomachean Ethics*, VII, 1150b 28. VII, 1147b 4-6. *Metaphysics*, A, 980 b 25-27: Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ταῖς φαντασίαις ἕξεται καὶ ταῖς μνήμαις, ἐμπειρίας δὲ μετέχει μικρόν.

33. IDEM, *De motu animalium* 433b 29-30, 434a 6.

34. PLATO, *Republic*, VI 510 a, VII 582 c, I 598 b, X 599 a; *Sophist*, 234 e, 236 c.

35. IDEM, *Cratylus*, 387 c.

36. IDEM, *Rhetoric* IV 1370a 28-29: ἔπει δ' ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδεσθαι, εὖ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι τινος πάθους, ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν αἰσθησίς τις ἀσθενής, αἰεὶ ἐν τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐλπίζοντι ἀκολουθοῖ ἂν

*Anima*³⁷, where he opts firmly for behavioral criteria. More precisely he asks: is believing a voluntary activity like imagining? Are the consequences of imagining the same as those of belief³⁸?

Aristotle is at pains to prove that *phantasia* is not the same as perception, for the latter is only one kind of imagination equivalent to dreaming, while the φαινόμενα experienced in other sorts of *phantasia* need not be. In this sense Aristotle's objection to Protagora refers to imagination as not the genus of which perception is a species, but a species co-ordinate with perception. We are reminded here that Protagoras' concept of αἰσθήσις in Plato's *Theaetetus* is much wider than Aristotle's perception of proper objects³⁹. The problem we discuss here requires a further examination on the question of how close each other are *phantasia* and φάντασμα as to be identical? A careful reading of Aristotle's *De Anima* 3.3, 428a 5-16, shows that the verb φαίνεσθαι (appears), which in itself is appropriate and only in special perceptual circumstances. Further, he claims that all animals have perception, but apparently not all of them have *phantasia*.

Another point of this issue refers to Aristotle's attack on Plato's view that *phantasia* is a blend of perception and belief. The Stagirite first expounds Plato's doctrine that φαίνεσθαι (appears) will be «believing exactly what one perceives»⁴¹. He, then, argues that where one experiences a false «appearance» about what is before, one which conflicts with the true belief one holds about it⁴². Elsewhere in the *Sophist*, Plato argues that any belief which is formed as a result of perception is a case of *phantasia* and can properly be expressed by a form of words which includes the verb φαίνεται⁴³. Evidently Plato's view here is that *phantasia* is not exactly a faculty which pictures an absent of imagining object not perceived at the moment. He seems to accept that it is this specific combination of perception and judgement which, as in his *Theaetetus* indicates, occurs «when one sees an indistinct figure and, rightly or wrongly, judge it to be someone he knows»⁴⁴.

37. IDEM, *De Anima*, 3.3, 427b 15-25.

38. IDEM, *Metaphysics*, Γ, 1010b 3.

39. PLATO, *Theaetetus*, 151e-152c. Cf. D. BOSTON, *Plato's Theaetetus*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988, pp. 41-44.

40. ARISTOTLE, *De Anima*, 3.3, 428a 12-15: εἴτα αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς αἰεὶ, αἱ δὲ φαντασίαι γίνονται αἱ πλείους ψευδεῖς.

41. *Ibid.*, 3.3, 428a 12-15: Τὸ οὖν φαίνεσθαι ἔσται τὸ δοξάζειν ὅπερ αἰθάνεται, μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Φαίνεται δὲ γε καὶ ψευδῇ, περὶ ὧν ἅμα ὑπόληψιν ἀληθοῦς ἔχει.

42. *Ibid.*, 3.3, 428b 2-4.

43. PLATO, *Sophist*, 264a-b.

44. IDEM, *Theaetetus*, 193b, especially 195d: σύναψις αἰσθήσεων πρὸς διάνοιαν.



IV. *Phantasia* and Thinking. Aristotle shows himself aware of the close relation between *phantasia* and perception on the one hand and thinking on the other. He suggests that thinking is a *sine qua non* condition of *phantasia*, for there is not ὑπόληψις (thinking of) without *phantasia*⁴⁵. Aristotle insists in both *De Anima* 3.9 and *De Motu Animalium* 6-7, that thinking by itself is rather weak to lead to certain action. Another aspect of Aristotle's doctrine refers to *phantasia* as a form of thinking, but one might argue that in different parts of *De Anima* 3.3, he endows *phantasia* with such a different features just because he has different kinds of experience of the *phantasia* we are talking about. In this sense *phantasia* is regarded as a necessary condition of thought, as well as a mere after image of the sense-perception, often false one⁴⁶. But what kind of νόησις (thought) and κρίσις (judgement) can we expect *phantasia* to perform it which is utterly dependent on perception a more-after image of a rather dark appearance? In fact there could be both thought and judgement in Aristotle's psychology: its substantial role in the collocation and retention of sense-perceptions, and its role in applying thinking to several objects of specific sense-perception⁴⁷. The most difficult part of Aristotle's discussion of *phantasia* and νόησις (thinking) refers to his claims that *phantasia* is active every time we have any thought at all, because, for him, perception is essential for practical wisdom⁴⁸. Yet all our thinking, theoretical as well as practical, is necessarily escorted by some activity of *phantasia*⁴⁹. In fact there is no thinking that is abstract, for every thought there is some kind of envisaging that provides a certain vehicle for the thought⁵⁰.

The important role of *phantasia* as synthesiser is conceived by Aristotle as the mutual interaction between the object of perception and the actualized capacity. In this sense it is not the mere passive reception of immaterial imprints⁵¹. This leads to the interpretation that *phantasia* is much more like perception than thought⁵². Elsewhere he often argues that perception, which makes us aware of certain distin-

45. Cf. D. FREDE, *The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle, Essays on Aristotle's De Anima*, op. cit., pp. 279-289.

46. ARISTOTLE, *De Sensu*, I 432a 2. *Metaphysics* A₁, 980a 1-2.

47. IDEM, *De Anima*, 3.3, 432a 6-10: οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μὴθὲν ἂν μάθοι οὔθ' ἂν μάθοι οὐδὲ ξυνείη, ὅταν τε θεωρῇ ἀνάγκη ἅμα φάντασμα τι θεωρεῖν· τὰ γὰρ φαντάσματα ὥσπερ αἰσθημάτων ἐστὶ πλὴν ἄνευ ὕλης. Ἔστι δ' ἡ φαντασία ἑτέρα φάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως.

48. ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysics*, Λ₁, 1072 b-c.

49. IDEM, *De Anima*, 3, 3 427b 16. Cf. PLATO, *Theaetetus* 152 c, 161 e.

50. Cf. M. NUSSBAUM, *De Motu Animalium...* op. cit., p. 226.

51. ARISTOTLE, *De Anima*, B₁₂, 424a 17-18: ἡ μὲν αἰσθησις ἐστὶν τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης.

52. IDEM, *De Insomniis*, 458b 31-33. Aristotle argues that sense-perception is a *sine qua non* of *phantasia*.

ctions, is essential for practical wisdom, and to a certain extent, for induction and demonstration⁵³. Finally he concludes that the ability to perceive is a necessary condition for thinking in general⁵⁴.

Another problem is that of Aristotle's denial that mere thinking is physical, which commits him to what we might think of "messy overcomplexity"⁵⁵. Still Aristotle's doctrine on *phantasia* has drawn the attention of scholars who have focused their interest on the "inner sense", or the "first sense". To our understanding it seems to have functions ascribed to consciousness, because it receives all the sensory information. But the dominant role of the common sense is only indicated in *De Anima* and further elaborated in the *Parva Naturalia*⁵⁶. Aristotle ascribes to the inner sense the ability to receive and discern different sensations and perceptions simultaneously. In fact this inner sense is primarily responsible for the κοινὰ αἰσθητά (common sensibles), the notion we feel and see. Thus, *phantasia* can be separated from their origin, while perceptions cannot and in this sense they can give us a coherent picture of a situation that transcend the immediate perception⁵⁷. But how far is *phantasia* itself from pure thinking? This is evident when *phantasia* once it is separated from its origin, then it can be either false or misleading. Due to the absence of a factor that keeps the faculties of the soul in order, *phantasia* can become mere appearance that drift *in* and *out* of our consciousness and reappear in dreams⁵⁸. In this sense it is clear that Aristotle does not treat the φανταστική as a distinct faculty of the soul, instead it is considered as a phenomenon that supervenes on sense-perception.

Aristotle puts emphasis on the actual meaning of dreaming as a interesting sort of *phantasia*. Surely dreaming is not subject to the will, except in a freudian way which Aristotle shows no sign of anticipating, nor is one always as completely detached with emotion from the frequent horrors of a dreaming as a horrific picture of the matter⁵⁹. Thus, dreaming presents a challenge to the view that there is a unity to Aristotle's treatment of *phantasia*, in all its entire functioning within the mind, which is compatible with identifying *phantasia* with imagination. If it is so, then one might suppose that dreams involve mental imagery, as it appears in Aristotle's reference to φαντασία, with respect to dreams at *De Insomniis*,

53. IDEM, *Analytica Posteriora*, I₁₈, 81a 38.

54. IDEM, *De Anima*, 3.3, 432a 6-7.

55. Cf. M. NUSSBAUM, *De Motu Animalium*, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

56. ARISTOTLE, *De Anima*, 3.3, 426b 17-29. Cf. D. ROSS, Aristotle, *De Anima*, *op. cit.*, pp. 280-281. R. D. HICKS, Aristotle, *De Anima*, *op. cit.*, pp. 446-447.

57. Cf. M. SCHOFIELD, Aristotle on the Imagination, *op. cit.*, pp. 271 ff.

58. *Ibid.*, pp. 272-273.

59. Cf. M. NUSSBAUM, *De Motu Animalium*, *op. cit.*, pp. 221, 244, 297, 249.

although elsewhere at *De Anima* the Stagirite forges a different link between them⁶⁰.

V. *Phantasia* and Motion. What exactly is the relation between *phantasia* and motion? At *De Anima* 3.3, Aristotle argues that *phantasia* is identified with movement and its activities derive from perception⁶¹. It is clear that *phantasia* is a movement co-extensive with a motion which results from perception⁶². Dr. R. D. Hicks states that “in virtue of this motion it is possible for its possessor to do and experience many things”, but in his relevant commentary on the lines κατ’ αὐτήν (with respect to it) is taken to mean, κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν (with reference to imagination), rather than κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν (with respect to movement). It is evident that Professor Hicks proceeds to the view that here *phantasia* is opposed to mere presentation of his doctrine⁶³.

It is important to emphasise here that Dr. Hicks asserts that *phantasia* with its links to motion reveals its character that it can be either true or false. The question is not how *phantasia* can be true and false, but rather how the motion which derives from perception can indeed be true and false. In this case the motion which derives from the activity of perception will certainly differ primarily on which of the forms of perception it results from the first perception of proper objects of sense, is true so long as perception is present, the others, perception of objects incidentally (κατὰ συμβεβηκός), a perception of common objects (τῶν κοινῶν), may be false, whether perception is present or absent. Thus the truth or falsity of *phantasia* depends on the character of the corresponding sense-perception. The imagination that follows the perception of the special object of the sense is true, while the perception lasts, but it can become false once the perception is over⁶⁴.

The cognitive role of *phantasia* both in theoretical and practical thinking according to Aristotle is based on the exclusive relation between the sensible and the intelligible through motion. In this sense one might ascribe Aristotle’s psychology a sort of a conception of the unity of consciousness that comprises both the senses and the Nous, but this hypothesis is still under detailed examination and further investigation⁶⁵.

60. ARISTOTLE, *De Anima*, 3.3, 427b 16-24.

61. *Ibid.*, 3.3, 428b 30-429a 1: ... ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ’ ἐνέργειαν γυγνομένη. Cf. R. D. HICKS, *Aristotle, De Anima*, *op. cit.*, pp. 473-474. In addition see, PHILOPONUS, *In de Anima*, 514, 31. THEMISTIUS, *In de Anima*, 93, 21.

62. ARISTOTLE, *De Anima*, 3.3, 428b 10-17: ἡ δὲ φαντασία κίνησις τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως γίνεσθαι.

63. Cf. R. D. HICKS, *Aristotle De Anima*, *op. cit.*, pp. 417 ff.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 469.

65. Cf. M. SCHOFIELD, *Aristotle on the Imagination*, *op. cit.*, pp. 276-277.

The relationship between *phantasia* and *Nous* has been linked to that between matter and form through motion. The *phantasia*, even though it often functions as incentive for thought in the physical world, remains phenomenon in its own right. Thus *phantasia* is basically a unified concept in Aristotle, but it that fully justified, i. e., is there not only a more or less coherent family of psychic phenomena, a loose-knit family concept? In fact the causal account for all imagination is more or less the same: all *φαντασίαι* are motions in the soul caused by sense-perception. There are sensory images or imprints which can exist independently from their original source. Most of all the character and value of *phantasia* may be clear or confused, true or false⁶⁶.

Conclusion. The activity of *phantasia*, as Aristotle taught, is dependent on its past as well as its present tendencies. It is obvious that the philosopher must begin with and return to the *φαινόμενα*. The interest of appearing (*φαίνεσθαι*) as a matter of fact underlies Aristotle's development of a theory of *phantasia*, dreaming, delusion and motivation. He includes *αἴσθησις* as the necessary condition of imagining⁶⁷. From this point of view *phantasia* is treated as unified concept, especially in Aristotle's work. But if one excludes the metaphoric meaning of *φαντάζειν*, then at least the causal account for all imagination is the same: all *φαντασίαι* are motions in the soul caused by sense-perceptions. All these are sensory images which can exist independently from their original source.

The most substantial virtue of Aristotle's account on the soul is its recognition of the range of psychological phenomena, which deserve to be associated in this familiar concept. Indeed Aristotle reminds us of the phenomena we need to consider and compels us to find ways of connecting them. Despite the existing inconsistencies in his account, he succeeds to tackle problems that derive from the entire functioning of the faculty of *phantasia* within the whole activities of the soul.

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66. Cf. D. FREDE, *The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle*, *op. cit.*, pp. 281 ff.

67. Cf. D. MODRAK, *Phantasia reconsidered*, *op. cit.*, 47-69. IDEM, *Aristotle, The power of Perception*, Chicago, U.P., pp. 123-124, p. 215 and note 29.



ΑΠΟΨΕΙΣ ΤΙΝΕΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΙΚΗΣ ΔΙΔΑΣΚΑΛΙΑΣ
«Η ΓΝΩΣΤΙΚΗ ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ»

Π ε ρ ί λ η ψ η

1. Ὑπάρχει εἰσέτι μεταξύ τῶν μελετητῶν τῆς ἀριστοτελικῆς φιλοσοφίας ἡ διαφορὰ ἀπόψεων περὶ τὴν ἐρμηνείαν τοῦ προβλήματος τῆς γνωστικῆς φαντασίας, ἐν σχέσει πρὸς τὴν πλατωνικὴν θεωρίαν περὶ τῆς νοητικῆς δομῶν τῆς φαντασίας. Ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης εἶναι κατηγορηματικὸς ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὅτι ἡ φαντασία εἶναι μιὰ νοητικὴ λειτουργία συμπεριλαμβάνουσα καὶ αἰσθητὰ στοιχεῖα, πλὴν τῶν νοητῶν. Εἶναι δὲ προφανές ὅτι ὑπὸ τὴν θεώρησιν αὐτὴν ἡ φαντασία εἶναι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα τῆς διὰ τῆς ἀντιλήψεως ἀποκτωμένης ἐμπειρείας ἐν συνδυασμῷ πάντοτε πρὸς τὰ δεδομένα φανταστικοῦ ἢ τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου φανταστικοῦ.

2. Κατὰ τὴν ἐρευνά μας ἐπιχειρεῖται μιὰ νέα ἀπόπειρα προσεγγίσεως καὶ ἐρμηνείας τῆς ἀριστοτελικῆς διδασκαλίας εἰς τὸ *Περὶ ψυχῆς* Γ₃ κυρίως, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς ἄλλα ἔργα τοῦ Σταγίριτου, ἐν συγκριτικῇ ἀντιπαραθέσει καὶ διαλεκτικῇ σχέσει πρὸς συναφεῖς πλατωνικὰς θεωρίας. Ἀσφαλῶς ἡ ἀναφορὰ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀλεξανδρινοὺς σχολιαστὰς καὶ ὑπομνηματιστὰς τῶν ἀριστοτελικῶν ἔργων εἶναι ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιβεβλημένη. Ἡ ἐρευνά μας λαμβάνει σοβαρῶς ὑπ' ὄψιν τὰς λίαν ἀξιολόγους μελέτας τῆς συγχρόνου βιβλιογραφίας, μάλιστα δὲ τινὲς ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποτελοῦν τὸ θεμέλιον τῆς ἐρευνητικῆς προσπάθειάς μας. Ἐννοιοὶ ὡς «φαντασία» καὶ «φαίνεσθαι», καθὼς καὶ «φαντασία» καὶ «φάντασμα» ἀποτελοῦν τὴν ἀφετηρίαν τῆς μελέτης μας, διὰ νὰ συνεχίσωμεν μὲ τὰς ἐννοίας τῆς «φαντασίας-ἀντιλήψεως», «φαντασίας-νοήσεως» καὶ «φαντασίας-κινήσεως» καὶ νὰ καταλήξωμεν εἰς τὴν ἀρχικὴν ἐρεῦνησιν περὶ τῆς «γνωστικῆς φαντασίας» ὡς συντελεστοῦ τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ τοῦ πράττειν.

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