

ΠΑΡΟΥΣΙΑΣΗ ΚΑΙ ΚΡΙΤΙΚΗ ΒΙΒΛΙΟΥ

παρουσιάζει μέσα από το σπουδαίο έργο του Παχυμέρη, ό οποίος συμβάλλει πολύ στη σωστή κατανόησή τους.

Εὐαγγελία ΜΑΡΑΓΓΙΑΝΟΥ

T. M. ROBINSON, *Plato's Psychology*, Second Edition, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1995 (original edition, 1970), 202 σσ.

The present work attempts to give as lucid an account as possible of all that Plato says on the nature of the soul in each of the dialogues. The writer tries to let the texts speak for themselves. He concludes therefore that Plato uses particular «models» of psyche (uniform, bipartite, tripartite) to suit particular contexts. He examines therefore the notion of the soul through the platonic dialogues. After the *Foreword* and an *Introduction to the second edition*, in which T. M. Robinson clarifies the following notions: 1) soul as self-moving 2) the demiurge as soul 3) «φέρεσθαι» and «ἄει» 4) space, time, pre-time, the writer looks into the platonic texts classifying them as follows: Ch. 1. The «Socratic» Dialogues (*Apology, Crito, Charmides, Alcibiades I, Gorgias, Meno*). Ch. 2. The *Phaedo*. Ch. 3. The *Republic*. Ch 4. The *Timaeus*: 27A-47E. Ch. 5. The *Timaeus*: 48A (end). Ch. 6. The *Phaedrus*. Ch. 7. Tripartition, Immortality, and the After-Life. Ch. 8. The *Politicus*. Ch. 9. The *Philebus*. Ch. 10. The *Laws* and the *Epinomis*. The book finishes with the Coda, the Abbreviations, the Bibliography and the Indexes. Through the pages of this book we are informed about the platonic conception of the soul. So we learn for example that several distinguishable senses of soul emerged from the socratic dialogues: it is a cognitive principle, a principle of moral activity, the true self of the counter-person. In the *Phaedo* soul is at the same time a cognitive and a moral principle, the true self and the the conterperson as well as life-principle. Soul is also as the Ideas something static, homogeneous and atomic. As for the body-soul relationship, this is one of extreme dualism. The pleasures and desires of the body are suspect and distinguished in kind from the more reputable desires of the soul. The body is an influence for harm, and the life of good man will be a process of «purification» from it. In the *Republic* most of the senses of soul, seen in the *Phaedo*, re-emerge. Apparently to suit a political analogue, the soul is declared to be tripartite, and this is a notable advance over the *Phaedo*. Desires and pleasures are in the *Republic* seem to have a part to play in the balanced personality, if they are sensibly canalized. Conversely, conflict in a person is conflict within his soul, not conflict within his soul, (as in the *Phaedo*) between soul and body. Virtue is health of soul, and health of soul is balance between its different constituent elements. In the *Timaeus* the world, analogously with the human being and other living things, is itself alive and has a «soul». This soul is purely noetic and everlasting. It possesses everlasting circular motions, called the Same and the Different, which demonstrate its inherent rationality. T. M. Robinson in his interpretation criticized the views of Proclus and Plutarch and defended the more literalist interpretation of Aristotle. This included a defence of the «physical» language used of world-soul as well as of individual soul in the *Phaedo* and in the *Timaeus*. In the *Philebus* the parallelism between world-soul and individual soul is again stressed, but is given a different emphasis by the assertion that world-soul is the source of human soul and world-mind the source of human mind. In the *Laws* soul is again said to be a source of motion and eternally self-moving. Now the stress is upon soul as life-force, or cosmic-stuff ethically and intellectually neutral, the «sine qua non» of all ethical and intellectual activity. This book is in short a very important work, necessary to everyone who is interested in ancient thought and especially in platonic philosophy.

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